Best Laid Plans: Implementing Chicago’s Re-Newal of Three HOPE VI Developments

BY
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THESIS
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Charles Hoch
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To my parents
Whose encouragement, support, and perseverance have made this work possible.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 INTRODUCTION: PLAN IMPLEMENTATION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF HOPE VI</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Background and Purpose of the Research</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Theoretical Framework and Significance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 The Argument</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Method and Case Selection</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Outline of the Dissertation</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 LITERATURE REVIEW: SITUATING PLAN IMPLEMENTATION</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Implementation Theory</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1 Plan Implementation</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2 Plan Evaluation</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Critique of Plan Implementation and Evaluation Literature</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Summary</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 HOPE VI: BACKGROUND AND POLICY CONTEXT</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 U.S. Public Housing History and Evolution</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1 Mixed-income Development Proposals</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2 The Policy Approach</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.3 The New Urbanism</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.4 New Urbanism and Income Mixing</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Critique of New Urbanism</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 How Mixed-Income Development Work in Practice</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Summary</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 CONCEPTUALIZING PLAN IMPLEMENTATION FOR MIXED-INCOME DEVELOPMENTS</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Conceptual Framework</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.1 Defining Commitment</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.2 A Range of Actor Commitment</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.3 Planning Constraints</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.4 Planning and Implementation Process</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Summary</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 METHOD: COMPARING IMPLEMENTATION IN MIXED-INCOME DEVELOPMENTS</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Research Design: Comparative Case Study Approach</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Data Analysis &amp; Collection: Process as Focus</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Case Selection Process: A Unique Typology</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 Summary</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 SHAPING PLAN IMPLEMENTATION: HOW IMPLEMENTATION WORKS IN CHICAGO</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1 Public Housing in Chicago</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.1 The Legacy of Gautreaux and HUD Takeover of the CHA</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.2 HUD Takeover</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.3 The Plan for Transformation</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.4 Challenges to Implementing Mixed-income Developments</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.2 Case Context</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3 Network of Actors and Institutions</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4 Critical Implementation Episodes</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5 Summary</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 ROOSEVELT SQUARE: COMMUNITY ORGANIZING AND NEGOTIATING WITHIN THE SYSTEM</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1 Background</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2 Plan Development: A Community Divided</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3 Participatory Process: Division of Interests</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4 Final Plan Development: Big Plans, Limited Action</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5 Construction: Equitable Plan Implementation</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.6 Marketing &amp; Occupancy: A Change in Plans</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.7 Community Building: Little HOPE, Little Transformation</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.8 Summary</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 WESTHAVEN PARK: POWER AND PUBLIC-PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1 Background</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2 Plan Development: Establishing Plan Parameters</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3 Participatory Process: Planning a Community - Legacy of Influence, Who Wins?</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4 Final Plan Development: Incremental Planning for the Future</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5 Construction: Implementing Grandiose Plans</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.6 Participatory Process: Cyclical Process of Development Pays off</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.7 Construction: Streamlining, Learning from the Past</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.8 Marketing and Occupancy: Different Prevailing Interests, Residents or Neighborhood?</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.9 Community Building: Paradox of Creating Neighborhoods</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.10 Future Development: The Superblock - A Mixed Bag</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.11 Summary</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 JACKSON SQUARE: ON THE OUTSIDE LOOKING IN – CONNECTIONS, BUT NO BUY IN</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1 Background</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2 Plan Development: Failed Plans and Broken Promises</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.3 Participatory Process: Out on a Limb – No Project Support</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.4 Final Plan Development: Good Intentions just not Enough</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.5 Construction: Building the Project - A Balancing Act</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.6 Marketing and Occupancy: An Unexpected Target Market</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.7 Community Building: New residents, What community?</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.8 Summary</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 CONCLUSIONS: COMMITMENT IN MIXED-INCOME DEVELOPMENT IMPLEMENTATION</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.1 Summary of Research Findings</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.2 Theoretical Contribution</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.3 Policy Contribution</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.4 Urban Planning Practice</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.5 Limitations and Future Research</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CITED LITERATURE</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. COMMITMENT CRITERIA</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. DEVELOPMENT PHASES AND PRIMARY INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. PROFILE OF INTERVIEWEES</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. CASE SELECTION TYPOLOGIES</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CASES</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. RooseveLT SQUARE UNIT TOTALS</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. PRIMARY SCHOOL CHARACTERISTICS WITHIN NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOL BOUNDARIES</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACTOR COMMITMENT AND PLANNING CONSTRAINTS</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X. WESTHAVEN PARK UNIT TOTALS</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACTOR COMMITMENT AND PLANNING CONSTRAINTS</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII. JACKSON SQUARE UNIT TOTALS</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACTOR COMMITMENT AND PLANNING CONSTRAINTS</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The directional flow between actor commitment and planning constraints</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Phases of implementation and factors that influence actor decisions</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Chicago Hope VI locations</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Study area map</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Land use map</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Neighborhood amenities map</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Transit map</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Vehicular circulation map</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Housing median income 2000</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Housing median income 2010</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Percent poverty 2000</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Percent poverty 2010</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Racial diversity 2000</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Racial diversity 2010</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Population 2000</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Population 2010</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Institutions and their relationship in the planning process</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Critical Implementation Episodes</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Participants and relationship in the planning process at Roosevelt Square</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Photographs of ABLA</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Aerial of ABLA</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Building figure ground of ABLA</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Block figure ground of ABLA</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Telesis / Calthorpe neighborhood synthesis plan</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Roosevelt Square timeline</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Photographs of the Brooks Home</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Destefano Partners master plan</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Photographs of Roosevelt Square</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Roosevelt Square photographs of vacant for sale lots</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Aerial of Roosevelt Square</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGURE</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Building figure ground of Roosevelt Square</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Block figure ground of Roosevelt Square</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Participants and relationship in the planning process at Westhaven Park</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Photographs of Henry Horner Homes</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Aerial of Henry Horner Homes</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Building figure ground of Henry Horner Homes</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Block figure ground of Henry Horner Homes</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Westhaven Park timeline</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Photographs of Westhaven Park</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Photographs of mid-rise building</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. Westhaven Park master plan</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Photographs of Westhaven Park</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. Aerial of Westhaven Park</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. Building figure ground of Westhaven Park</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. Block figure ground of Westhaven Park</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. Photographs of Superblock</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. Participants and relationship in the planning process at Jackson Square</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. Photographs of Rockwell Garden</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. Jackson Square timeline</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. Photographs of neighborhood infill</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51. Aerial of Rockwell Gardens</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52. Building figure ground of Rockwell Gardens</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53. Block figure ground of Rockwell Gardens</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54. Photographs of building types</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55. Photographs of Phoenix Military Academy</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56. Okrent Associates &amp; Piekarz master plan</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57. Building figure ground of Jackson Square</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58. Block figure ground of Jackson Square</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59. Aerial of Jackson Square</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60. Photographs of Jackson Square single-family</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61. Photographs of Jackson Square phase 1A/B</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62. Photographs of Jackson Square for sale vacant lots</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABLA</td>
<td>Jane Addams Homes, Robert Brooks Homes, Loomis Courts, and Grace Abbot Homes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPI</td>
<td>Business and Professional People for the Public Interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAC</td>
<td>Central Advisory Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4C</td>
<td>Connecting 4 Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Contract Documents</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDOT</td>
<td>Chicago Department of Transportation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Community Development Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHA</td>
<td>Chicago Housing Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLCC</td>
<td>Chicago Land Clearance Commission</td>
</tr>
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<td>CDBG</td>
<td>Community Development Block Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNU</td>
<td>Congress of New Urbanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPD</td>
<td>Chicago Parks Department</td>
</tr>
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<td>CPS</td>
<td>Chicago Public Schools</td>
</tr>
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<td>CRA</td>
<td>Concerned Residents of ABLA</td>
</tr>
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<td>CSS</td>
<td>Community and Social Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPD</td>
<td>Department of Planning and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHLB AHP</td>
<td>Federal Home Loan Bank Affordable Housing Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOA</td>
<td>Home Owners Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOME</td>
<td>HOME Investment Partnerships Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOPE VI</td>
<td>Homeownership Opportunities for People Everywhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUD</td>
<td>Department of Housing and Urban Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Horner Resident Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVP</td>
<td>Home Visitors Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB</td>
<td>International Baccalaureate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>Local Advisory Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIHTC</td>
<td>Low Income Housing Tax Credits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>Master Development Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTO</td>
<td>Moving To Opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWSCDC</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Planned Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHA</td>
<td>Public Housing Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Project Match</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTR</td>
<td>Pathways to Rewards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFP</td>
<td>Request for Proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMC</td>
<td>Resident Management Corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOSCV</td>
<td>SOS Children’s Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEM</td>
<td>Science Technology Engineering and Math Magnet Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIF</td>
<td>Tax Increment Finance District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIC</td>
<td>University of Illinois at Chicago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVA</td>
<td>University Village Association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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SUMMARY

The HOPE VI program is the predominant housing policy to ameliorate the deteriorating conditions of public housing, and the high concentrations of poverty found in inner cities. This effort demolished over 220,000 units of distressed public housing in the United States, and replaced them with low-density, mixed-income housing based on new urbanist design principles. The HOPE VI program married subsidy policies with new urbanist design principles, to guide the development of mixed income and mixed density communities. The alliance of new urbanism and income mixing strategies argues that, well-designed housing in good locations will attract middle and upper class owners to mixed-income developments. The belief is that the participation and presence of this economic demographic will offer social capital for their low-income neighbors. Attention has focused on the most successful cases where goals and outcomes aligned. But evaluations of the level and scope of income and density mix across the United States, finds that many mixed-income developments have not met program expectations.

My research seeks to understand how differences in commitment to social and physical mixing goals by actors, contribute to differences in project plans across development phases. My research goal is to compare and contrast actors’ commitment to HOPE VI ideals across three mixed-income planning efforts in Chicago. My inquiry focuses on how actors work to accomplish the design and income mix across development phases to understand how much, and how well actors integrate HOPE VI ideals into their project plans. I also assess how institutional constraints affect actors’ commitment at ‘critical implementation episodes’ or development stages in the implementation process. Constraints that cause actor commitment to adjust include: consensus among stakeholders, legal parameters, financing, housing market conditions, and political support. I trace changes in actor commitment across ‘critical implementation episodes’ to understand where actors are committed to HOPE VI ideals, and where institutional constraints influence actors’ ability to act on good intentions, or some mixture of the two.

I focus on commitment and the contextual factors that influence actor decisions and judgments, because it remains unclear as to why some mixed income development plan goals and outcomes have aligned, and others have not. There are a range of HOPE VI project outcomes, and there is often a lack of consensus as to how, or why this is the case, as well as how the policy ideas are actually implemented on the ground. To understand this translation, I utilize a comparative case study approach to analyze the implementation process across Roosevelt Square, Westhaven Park, and Jackson Square, which exhibit very different outcomes. I compare how actors’ work to accomplish the design and income mix policy goals across the implementation process for each project to account for how the
current outcomes were produced. I argue the differences found in HOPE VI developments trace back to changes in local actors’ level of commitment to ambitious plans for social, and physical mixing during the implementation process. If actors responsible for implementation do not share this commitment to new urbanism, they will not take the practical steps to assure the integration the project plans hopes to achieve.

Based on in-depth interviews with key actors involved in the implementation process, I argue that projects that are more consonant with plan goals, have a higher level of actor commitment across each stage in the planning process, compared to projects that are not consonant with plan goals, and do not have actors along the way whom are faithful to HOPE VI ideals. My research findings show that the differences in case outcomes are based less on the new urbanist principles described in the initial HOPE VI plans and more from differences in actor commitment to HOPE VI ideals at different phases of implementation. There are four different ways that commitment plays out – there are stages where: commitment matters; commitment is constrained by impeding actors, commitment is constrained by planning constraints, or some combination of both; and commitment simply wanes due to impeding actors or inhibiting planning constraints. Moreover, as commitment plays out differently at each stage of development, there are similar roles actors play based on their institutional affiliation. More specifically, in both Westhaven Park and Roosevelt Square cases, the primary actors are represented by idealists, realists, and those that are indifferent. At Jackson Square, the primary actors are idealists, non-believers, and those that are indifferent. These differences in commitment show how idealists and realist keep plan ideas alive, and those that are indifferent, or non-believers can be detrimental to the implementation process.

The cases also highlight key ‘critical implementation episodes’ such as marketing, occupancy, and community building, where institutional constraints such as consensus among stakeholders, financing, and market conditions, act as barriers to commitment. In this case, commitment does not necessarily change, but actors must make decisions about project plans that may not align with HOPE VI ideals. Additionally, there are also five additional factors my research discovered that also constrain plan implementation: the planned development process, site constraints, developer capacity, buy-in, and accountability.
1. Introduction: Plan Implementation Within the Context of HOPE VI

“New urbanism is a forum, not a formula. It is an ongoing project of reform filled with debates on an evolving body of tools and strategies.”

(Dunham, 2008:70)

1.1. **Background and Purpose of the Research**

The HOPE VI program, which began in 1993, is intended to ameliorate the deteriorating conditions of public housing, and the high concentrations of poverty in inner cities. This effort demolished over 220,000 units of distressed public housing in the United States from 1993-2010, through 262 HOPE VI Revitalization Grants to public housing authorities (PHAs), totaling almost $6.3B (HUD, 2013). This housing policy facilitates tearing down distressed public housing, and replacing high-rise development with low-density, mixed-income housing, based on new urbanist design principles. The HOPE VI program marries income-mixing strategies, with the design goals of new urbanism.

Mixed-income policy expects that the residential spatial proximity of low, moderate and high-income households, will improve the quality of social community among those households. First, wealthier households, obtaining access to a good location, may interact with less prosperous neighbors, sharing access to occupational, or other social networks. Second, as high-income household members form friendships with lower income neighbors, their civility will inspire improved levels of civic accountability. Third, the more prosperous households might more explicitly serve as role models for those low-income neighbors seeking social improvement in social standing. Lastly, the wealthy households will attract, and make public and private investments that produce local improvements. These improvements will generate economic, social, and environmental benefits for their neighbors, regardless of income (Joseph, 2008). Historically, though there are relatively few, diverse urban neighborhoods provide the social precedent for these policy ideas.

The design vision of new urbanism complements the mixed-income strategy, by replacing high-rise public housing projects, with lower-density, mixed-use, pedestrian friendly, residential communities (Bohl 2000). The combination of a good urban location, and the provision of dwellings aligned along street faces on relatively small blocks, allows for the spatial integration of high, moderate and low-value dwellings nearby each other. The wealthy enjoy larger single-family homes, while the moderate-income have access to condominiums.
and townhomes, and the low-income can rent low-rise rental units. The physical features of the early twentieth century urban neighborhood, or small town provide the precedent for the physical layouts and social ideals.

HOPE VI combines the social ideals of income mixing, with the physical design ideals of new urbanism, hoping to create residential communities that would integrate public housing units into the social, and physical fabric of the surrounding city. Instead of segregating the poor into spatially isolated projects, the new developments would restore, and improve the urban fabric of residential communities. The proximity of households with different incomes would reduce stigma, encourage social interaction, and improve the long-term viability of the new community. Low-income households would benefit most, as they would no longer suffer the cumulative location effects of spatial segregation, while obtaining access to new social, and community benefits.

The HOPE VI program uses a mixed-financing approach to redevelop public housing. Private firms build, own, and manage the land and dwellings. Housing authorities help with the financing and social service assistance for residents of the public housing units. These public-private partnerships package public and private funds to develop public, affordable, and market-rate housing units in equal proportion depending on local market conditions.

HOPE VI development efforts convene a host of actors into a working group. These groups govern relations between the developer and housing authority, from the plan through the final construction and lease up phase. The working group includes individuals from five types of institutional and individual agents: housing authorities, municipalities, developers, consultants, and civic stakeholders. Housing authorities provide program implementation, operational funding, and relocation efforts. Municipalities provide infrastructure and support services, financing, as well as, plan review. Development companies secure financing, conduct development, and construct the buildings. Consultants (planners and architects) prepare physical designs, compose plans, and conduct outreach efforts. Civic stakeholders include public housing residents, lawyers, tenant organizers, service providers, and others playing an active role advocating, challenging, facilitating, or abetting project plans and activity.

Actors for each type of agent, prepare plans to redevelop public housing sites into mixed-income communities. These plan efforts extend across multiple phases of development, focusing on the HOPE VI program goals for new urbanism and income mixing. Across the 262 projects that are funded through the HOPE VI program, attention focuses on the most successful cases where goals and outcomes align, such
as Park DuValle in Louisville, KY, New Holly in Seattle, WA, or Centennial Place in Atlanta, GA. However, evaluations of the level and scope of income and density mix across the United States, finds that many mixed-income developments did not meet program expectations (Smith, 2002; Vale, 1996). This dissertation seeks to understand how the commitment to HOPE VI ideals shape the plans for three Chicago projects in which outcomes were met, partially met, and largely unmet.

My research seeks to understand how differences in commitment to social and physical mixing goals, contribute to differences in project plans for HOPE VI developments during the plan implementation process. I study how the degree, and kind of commitment varies among the different types of actors. I construct these accounts for three HOPE VI planning efforts in Chicago, paying close attention to five contextual influences: social consensus, legal parameters, financial feasibility, housing market conditions and political support (Laurian et al, 2004; Talen, 1996). I describe how levels of commitment during each phase of development vary in relation with these influences. Researchers link plan outcomes to each of these influences (Dalton, 1989; Dalton & Burby, 1994; Baglioni & Vicari, 1995; Talen, 1997; Laurian et al., 2004b) as explanations. I work backwards from three different project outcomes (met, partially met, and unmet) to understand the contours of interaction among the actors, as they respond to these influences. I focus on how different actors in each case plan to meet the demanding end goals of the project as they perform their work.

Plan implementation in this account does not appear as an add-on to the planning process, but as an ongoing commitment to the end goal at each major step in a complex development process. People make plans work as practical guides if they adjust to shifting influences keeping their commitment to the goal intact. Studying how different actors make this commitment, or not, can help us understand the relationship between plans, intentions and consequences. I write the case accounts believing that goals matter for the many actors who participate in large redevelopment projects. A less generous, and more cynical view challenges this presumption. Actors under this assumption, pursue their own personal, institutional or occupational goals, paying only lip service to project goals. I suspect the truth of practice lies somewhere in between. My research puts the presumption of ongoing commitment to project goals to the test. I explore with questions to the participants about their own commitment, and its meaning for each phase of a long development process:
1) How much and how well do actor planning commitments pursue HOPE VI ideals across all phases of development?

2) How do actors adjust their commitment to HOPE VI ideals in response to contextual conditions at each phase?

1.2. Theoretical Framework and Significance

This dissertation draws from theories of implementation, plan implementation, and evaluation in the urban planning literature, as well as, the literature on mixed-income developments, to understand how HOPE VI projects are planned and implemented. To understand the implementation process, I use the context of public housing redevelopment to show how actors use purposeful principles about social, and physical mixing to achieve plan goals. I utilize a comparative case study approach to assess how much, and how well actors integrate HOPE VI ideals into project plans as they make decisions.

My conceptual framework has three main components I use to analyze the implementation process in each case. First, I use four specific dimensions of new urbanism, to trace commitment across mixed-income developments. Second, I catalogue a range of actor commitment found across the implementation process to explain why some mixed-income development projects have various outcomes. And lastly, I assess the influence of five institutional constraints on actor commitment. I analyze the interplay between commitment and institutional constraints to understand how, and at what stages in the implementation process, does actor commitment adjust, or project plans change, as a result of implementation barriers.

Focusing on HOPE VI ideals, and commitment to these principles, I assess cases based on four broad dimensions, to determine actors’ commitment as they make decisions that guide the development of mixed-income plans. These design principles include: diversity of use, connectivity, physically well-defined spaces, and equitable distribution of services. Diversity of use is exhibited by offering a range of housing types across public, affordable, and market rate units, as well as, incorporating mixed land uses which include retail, civic, recreational, and commercial. Connectivity is based on the ability to establish connections within the development, through an interconnected network of streets, pedestrian paths, and transit-oriented development. These characteristics are exhibited by creating a neighborhood that is compact, with mixed uses available within walking distance, and also broader transit connections to regional systems in place. Physically well-defined spaces are based on the ability to bring people into close proximity, and enable residents to create a safe, and stable neighborhood, by encouraging interaction and community identity. Physically well-defined spaces exhibit features such as street oriented buildings, defined public and private spaces, and rich architectural detail that reflects local traditions. Lastly, equitable distribution
of services is based on the ability to provide an accessible, and supportive social infrastructure for residents living in mixed-income developments. This characteristic is exhibited by incorporating community-based social services within the development that are accessible to residents.

I use commitment with the purpose of extending the current definition of how actors carry out project plans within their institutional roles. More specifically, I refer to actors as agencies and organizations. I define commitment based on the issue of new urbanism, and I outline a series of commitment criteria for actors involved in the implementation process. Commitment describes how much, and how well actors use HOPE VI ideals to inform decisions and judgments made during each phase of implementation. Actors involved in the development process play different functional roles, and the commitment criteria reflects the differences as to how actors either support, or inhibit the use of new urbanism in project plans. To further define commitment across cases, I describe both the institutions and individual agents, as well as, the way actors for each type of agent express their commitment or not in the implementation process. As previously mentioned, the five primary actors I focus on have different functional roles in the development process, therefore the way these actors exhibit their commitment varies.

Based on in-depth interviews, there is a range of actor commitment to the social and physical mixing goals of HOPE VI, which I categorized into five archetypes or patterns of behavior to describe actors range of commitment to new urbanism: 1) the idealist, 2) the realist, 3) those that are indifferent, 4) the opportunists, and 5) the non-believers or cynics. Idealists believe in the social and physical mixing goals, and either work in the capacity to guide the process so plan norms fit plan purposes, or idealism serves as a hindrance to practical judgments and actions. Realists are part idealist, yet do not trust other institutional players to adhere to the program goals, and work to hold actors accountable in an effort to maintain said commitments. Indifferent actors simply focus only on their specific job without any concern for the consequences in the later development phases. Opportunists appear to be committed to the program goals when it serves their institutional role but are not if it is not to their advantage. And lastly, non-believers or cynics dismiss the program goals of social and physical mixing, but ironically enacts their role in a way that pursues the program goals, or disrupt the planning process.

Each actor displays commitment differently as a function of their institutional role in the planning process. While some actors maintain a similar level of commitment throughout the planning process, others can and do change during it. This range of actor commitment helps to understand the different types of actors, and how much and how well HOPE VI ideals guides their decisions, or not, in their efforts to implement HOPE VI plans.
As I analyze the implementation process, I also consider the influence of institutional constraints that challenge commitment, and cause actors to adjust their commitment, as well as, when institutional constraints, which act as barriers to project plans. These institutional constraints can either reinforce the implementation process or inhibit it. Based on the planning literature, and research on mixed-income developments, there are several institutional constraints that influence the plan implementation process: consensus among stakeholders, legal parameters, the condition of the local housing market, the ability to secure financing, and political support. (Laurian et al., 2004b; Talen, 1996). Consensus among stakeholders is a key factor that affects major reforms, such as public housing redevelopment. Consensus among stakeholders is achieved by engaging the community in the planning process to ensure community-wide support.

Legal parameters also play a significant role in the plan implementation process that affects how decisions are made. Legal statutes in Chicago may apply citywide or be project specific. For instance, in Chicago, the Gautreaux consent decree applies to all new public housing construction. This ensures that developments are not segregated. Likewise, project specific legal parameters exist at Henry Horner and Cabrini Green, which represent redevelopment plans that are marred by litigation due to a lack of resident inclusion, and support of the redevelopment plan. Each development has a consent decree in place that requires the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and developers to reach an agreement with resident representatives on all matters related to the redevelopment process.

Market conditions also constrain plan implementation, and are based on two limitations; the first is the strength of the housing market, and the second is whether the mixed-income strategy can in fact attract market demand. The strength of the housing market is based largely on the development location, access to amenities, and market demand. The ability to attract higher income households is contingent on such issues as the size, design and condition of the development, racial and ethnic composition of the development and surrounding neighborhood, and the state of the regional housing market (Schwartz & Tajbakhsh, 1997).

Additionally, the degree of implementation is significantly constrained by the ability to secure sufficient financing for the project. Mixed-income development projects require significant public and private resources, therefore success is partially dependent upon sufficient funding. To secure financing, a degree of financial flexibility is required, as local actors forge public/private partnerships, and collaborate across a multitude of actors.

Lastly, implementation is constrained by the ability to secure political support for the project. The political support of both elected officials and the community are important factors that shape the PHAs capacity and commitment to the plan. Political support is measured by the strength of the relationship between the PHA, city
agencies, city council, and community based organizations (CBO) in garnering political support for the project. Political support examines the support of elected officials, and the capacity of local government to raise the resources needed for redevelopment through community development block grants (CDBG) funding, developer incentives, tax increment financing (TIF) funds, etc.

Based on these institutional constraints, I describe the extent to which any were drivers in the implementation process, and how then it caused actor commitment to adjust – if it did. I also show that a mix of institutional constraints and variations in commitment account for compromises of new urbanist norms by actors at some phases more than others.

The overall objective of my dissertation is to understand how differences in commitment to plan goals, contribute to differences in project plans for HOPE VI developments during the implementation process. This objective is met by focusing on the actors involved in this process, the ways that decisions are made in shaping redevelopment plans, and how commitment to program goals are affected by external constraints. Addressing the aforementioned research questions makes several contributions to theory, policy and urban planning practice. My research contributes to the plan implementation literature in urban planning and mixed-income developments, which currently does not account for the influence of external factors on commitment, and how this contributes to project plans. Likewise, the bulk of research on mixed-income developments focuses on the programmatic outcomes on the people, and whether projects have been successful in achieving the desired social benefits. My research extends the understanding of what can shape these outcomes between the interplay of commitment, and institutional constraints, showing how commitment works at different phases of implementation, where actors were committed to HOPE VI ideals, and at what times actors either paid lip service, or external factors overwhelmed their ability to act on good intentions – or a combination of the two. My cases illustrate a range of actor commitment, and the types of actors needed to assure HOPE VI project goals are sought.

Second, my research provides insight into the kinds of constraints faced by actors to implement HOPE VI plans. My cases highlight the difficulty to consistently implement new urbanism on the ground, and the necessity for actors involved in plan implementation to be consistent in how these plan goals are used. Without consistent implementation practices, there will be variation in plan outcomes, in which some goals and outcomes will align, and others will not. Understanding both institutional context and commitment, will help assess how policy reform can facilitate better practices on the ground.
Lastly, my research aims to inform practitioners how to work more effectively within the institutional constraints, to implement HOPE VI projects that meet program goals. My research provides insight into other constraints such as, the planned development process site constraints, developer capacity, community buy-in, and accountability that arises during plan implementation. These additional factors also constrain commitment, and act as barriers to project plans. Moreover, I offer recommendations for practitioners to use in an effort to implement both housing and community support systems, which meet HOPE VI program goals. Furthermore, my research aims to inform not only future assessments of mixed-income developments, but also provide insight for other efforts to improve low-income communities, using these principles.

1.3. The Argument

I utilize a comparative case study approach to assess how much, and how well, HOPE VI ideals guide actor decisions and judgments. More specifically, I describe the similarities and differences of the plan implementation process across three mixed-income developments in Chicago that exhibit very different outcomes. I compare how local actors in Chicago work to accomplish the design and income mix, policy goals across the implementation process for each project, to account for how the current outcomes were produced. I argue the differences found in HOPE VI developments trace back to changes in actors’ level of commitment to ambitious plans for social, and physical mixing during the implementation process. Commitment describes how much, and how well actors use new urbanism to inform decisions and judgments made during each phase of implementation. If actors responsible for implementation do not share this commitment to new urbanism, they will not take the practical steps to ensure the integration the plan hopes to achieve.

Therefore, projects that are more consonant with plan goals have a higher level of actor commitment across each stage in the planning process, compared to projects that are not consonant with plan goals, which do not have actors along the way who are faithful to the social, and physical mixing plan goals. More specifically, projects that are more consonant with plan goals have actors that are primarily idealists and realists, that keep the plan ideas alive, and maintain an accountability check. While those projects that are not consonant with plan goals, may have actors primarily represented by non-believers, opportunists, and those that are indifferent. Actors make decisions about plans within institutional constraints that challenge commitment, which can alter plans, and the project trajectory. Constraints that cause commitment to adjust include: consensus among stakeholders, financing, housing market conditions, legal parameters, and political support. I trace changes in actor commitment across ‘critical implementation episodes,’ or
different phases of the development process, to help understand that even the best laid plans encounter challenges. Plans do not work as a blueprint, but as a kind of practical judgment that adjusts to the different institutional challenges that arise during the planning process. This comparative approach illuminates how actors use deliberate, purposeful attention to plan norms and project goals, as a commitment or guide for the way they play their institutional role.

1.4. Method and Case Selection

I employ a qualitative research methodology, utilizing a comparative case study approach, to examine commitment and the institutional constraints that influence plan implementation in mixed-income developments. My comparative case study focuses on process, in an effort to bridge the gap that exists between the policy and theoretical foundation, and how local actors use these ideas on the ground to implement plans. The primary sources of data collection include reviewing original documents and in-depth interviews. Secondary data sources were observations and spatial analysis, to understand the previous, current, and intended patterns of urban form. I conduct 43 in-depth interviews with local actors involved in the plan implementation process, and collect a variety of both public, and private documents and plans.

I examine three planning efforts in Chicago, each representing a different degree of program outcome success. I employed a purposeful case selection process focusing on developing a typology of HOPE VI projects that exhibit different outcomes to identify these cases. First, I reviewed HOPE VI projects across the 20 largest public housing authorities, which include 71 cases based on how well the outcomes met the program goals. I then sorted cases based on their housing mix (income mixing), and land-use mix (design) in their final projects. Within this sample of cases, I identify three types of HOPE VI redevelopment outcomes: low fit, moderate fit, and high fit. I chose to select a case from each type from a single PHA – the Chicago Housing Authority - for two reasons; first, Chicago had a case that fell under each typology, and second, selecting a single city makes it easier to control for the contextual factors. The cases include Jackson Square at West End (low fit), Westhaven Park (moderate fit), and Roosevelt Square (high fit).

I use my comparative framework to explore ‘critical implementation episodes’ across the Project Planning + Design, Construction, and Sale + Management phases. I analyze the specific dimensions of new urbanism to trace commitment across each case to compare and contrast whether actors use plan goals as a guide, or judgment for how decisions are made. I also categorize the range of actor commitment found across the implementation process to explain the differences in project outcomes. Lastly, I describe the institutional constraints that influence actor decisions
during the implementation process. My comparative case study reveals the areas where actors are committed, or not, to new urbanism in the plan implementation process, and the role external factors play in how actors make decisions about mixed-income development project plans.

1.5. Outline of the Dissertation

The next chapter provides a review of the literature, which guides my research inquiry. In this chapter I outline the major perspectives on implementation theory, which draws from the more prevalent body of public administration literature. Next, I discuss the plan implementation and evaluation literature within urban planning, to use as a foundation to identify the assumed factors that influence implementation, commitment, and the typical methods used to evaluate plans. Lastly, I offer a critique of the plan implementation and evaluation literature, in which I present existing gaps in the literature, and how my research contributes to the development of implementation theory.

Chapter three provides a background of the policy context of HOPE VI. I explain the historical evolution of public housing in the U.S., and the federal government’s policy approach to reform public housing with mixed-income developments. I describe both the premise for income mixing strategies, as well as new urbanism, to understand the key dimensions I will use to trace commitment. I also discuss how mixed-income communities are developed, as well as, the challenges faced with implementing HOPE VI projects.

Chapter four outlines my conceptual framework that guides the analysis to understand the implementation process for mixed-income developments. I present my conceptual framework, and discuss how I will analyze the interplay between commitment and institutional constraints. I define commitment, outline commitment criteria, and discuss the functional role of actors involved in the planning process. Next, I identify the specific institutional constraints, which will be used to understand whether commitment is influenced at various stages of development. In addition to my conceptual framework, I will also layout the phases of development, in which I will focus my research.

Chapter five presents the methodological approach I use to examine the implementation process across three planning efforts in Chicago. I outline my use of a comparative case study approach, as well as, my focus on a process analysis, that focuses on the implementation process. By focusing on the process, I examine major episodes within development phases with specific decision points. I compare and contrast major planning episodes of mixed-income developments, which include decision points and actors involved in making decisions along a timeline. I analyze these planning episodes, in which actor commitment is influenced by external factors. I also outline my research questions and rationale, and the data collection strategies used. Additionally, I explain my case selection process and
how I develop a typology of HOPE VI cases that exhibit different outcomes, to understand the process of plan implementation, and how practice can inform how intentions shape plan outcomes.

Chapter six focuses on Chicago and traces the historical, and current contextual conditions to illustrate the unique conditions found around public housing redevelopment. By describing the conditions around public housing redevelopment in Chicago, this helps to situate the city of Chicago and the CHA, and how these institutions implement policies. This overview provides the contextual conditions of how the planning process appears to work, and the network of institutions and actors involved in the implementation process within the broader context of HOPE VI policy. I focus on three phases; Project Planning + Design, Construction, and Sale + Management to illustrate the specific ‘critical implementation episodes’ that are central to my comparative case approach. These ‘critical implementation episodes’ are where I examine actor commitment across Roosevelt Square, Westhaven Park, and Jackson Square.

Chapters seven, eight and nine describe and analyze the ‘critical implementation’ episodes in the plan implementation process for Roosevelt Square, Westhaven Park, and Jackson Square respectively. For each case I provide the contextual background of the former public housing site, and the preceding planning, or legal efforts. Next, I illustrate the primary network of institutions and actors involved in the planning process. Lastly, I summarize the different ways that actor commitment plays out on the ground, across development phases. I use the actor archetypes to categorize the level of commitment to HOPE VI ideals, and how decisions made by actors shape the implementation process. I also discuss other planning constraints that arise, which are discovered through my case research.

Chapter seven describes the implementation process at Roosevelt Square, which is a high profile project guided by a powerhouse development team and consultants, resources, and located in an affluent location with deeply vested community interests. The case reveals how well-designed project plans, with actors committed to the physical and social mixing goals, can fail without a planning development (PD) process that is flexible, and adaptable to less than perfect conditions along the way. This case is shaped heavily by consensus among stakeholders, financing, and housing market conditions. Consequently, even though there was a high level of actor commitment, Roosevelt Square was left with a project that was frozen in place, unable to be implemented with the changing contextual conditions.

Chapter eight illustrates the case of Westhaven Park, which has been touted as a model case for the PFT. Westhaven Park represents a redevelopment process guided by committed, powerful public-private partnerships, and a pragmatic development team that did not entirely buy into the social and physical mixing goals of the HOPE VI program. This combination leads to a plan implementation process that is flexible, where at each stage there are
valuable lessons learned and applied to future stages of development. Although the planning process has to contend with a myriad of different interests and varying levels of actor commitment to the plan goals, when actors fail to maintain their commitments, public-private partners are in place at most stages to ensure the plan goals were upheld.

Chapter nine focuses on the case of Jackson Square, which is considered a low profile case that receives relatively little attention from the CHA, or city of Chicago. This project faces significant barriers to completing the project, due to a lack of support and commitment, as well as, consensus among stakeholders, financing, and market conditions. Jackson Square is comprised of few participants that are committed to the physical and social program goals throughout each stage of the development process. Limited experience in large-scale, mixed income developments, little collective planning, and even less commitment from other local actors responsible for implementation, left this project team without a clear vehicle to implement plan ideas. This case reveals the importance of actor commitment, to move the planning and implementation process forward.

Lastly, chapter ten summarizes my research findings from the comparative analysis of the three mixed-income development planning efforts in Chicago. I offer a brief comparison across each case explaining the range of actor commitment, the institutional constraints that affect commitment, and the stages where this occurs. I also outline how my research findings contribute to the body of literature on plan implementation and mixed-income developments, the policy implications for redeveloping public housing, as well as, lessons for urban planning practitioners working on mixed-income development projects. In closing, I present the limitations of my research findings, and define a future research agenda that will build upon my dissertation research.
2. Literature Review: Situating Plan Implementation

“Learning is the key to both implementation and evaluation. We evaluate to learn, and we learn to implement”
(Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984:xviii)

This chapter outlines a literature review and situates my research within plan implementation and evaluation theories. I use the context of mixed-income developments to explore how actors use social and physical mixing principles to guide project plans. Mixed-income developments represent a turn from top-down, policy driven approaches to bottom-up, collaborative planning efforts in redeveloping public housing. To date, studies on mixed income developments focus on the programmatic outcomes, in terms of the larger affects of the program on the people. This has shown limited success. For example, internal critiques conducted by the federal government, that analyzed HOPE VI, focused on program implementation, HUD oversight, and cost related issues (Hanlon, 2008). Other studies conducted by non-profit research firms such as the Urban Institute, have measured the impacts of HOPE VI against its objectives. Additionally, academic research has also analyzed the economic impact of HOPE VI (Zielenbach, 2002, Bair & Fitzgerald, 2005), the social effects of income mixing (Cunningham, 2001; Clark, 2002; Kliet, 2005; Varadai, Raffel, Sweeney, & Denson, 2005; Chaskin & Joseph, 2009, 2011), and the variables for success (Vale, 1996).

In addition to internal critiques of HOPE VI, academics have offered external critiques that question the premise of the HOPE VI program. For instance, scholars have focused on the HOPE VI program and the relationship to neoliberal, market-based approaches to reshaping inner city neighborhoods. Neoliberal approaches to public housing redevelopment have oftentimes been at the expense of existing low-income residents (Bennett & Reed, 1998; Keating, 2000; Keating & Flores, 2000; Gotham, Shefner & Brumley, 2001). Also, the HOPE VI programs goal of community building through social mixing, has been viewed as a vehicle for further reducing the role of the government in providing public housing for the poor (Bennett & Smith, 1998). Additionally, Wyly and Hammel (1999, 2000) contend that mixed-income developments contribute, and act as catalysts for gentrification and, the subsequent displacement of the indigenous population. Likewise, Vale argues that there are striking parallels to the slum clearance of the 1930s and 40s, and ongoing efforts across the U.S. in Chicago and Atlanta to redevelop public housing (Vale, 2013).

These studies overlook plan implementation and the factors that influence the implementation of HOPE VI plan goals. Transforming the physical form of public housing is central to the HOPE VI program objectives. Because implementation plays a significant role in this physical transformation, there is a need to analyze the factors
that shape plan outcomes. My research aims to fill this void in the policy and urban planning literature, by discussing how mixed-income developments are implemented by tracing actor commitment to new urbanism, and the influence of institutional constraints on actor decisions and judgments. Tracing actor commitment across major development phases helps policy makers and practitioners understand whether HOPE VI plan goals are used as a guide to make decisions, as well as how actors can learn to work more effectively within existing institutional constraints.

The first section outlines the broader works on implementation theory, the main perspectives of plan implementation, and evaluation in urban planning theory. Implementation theory draws from the policy and public administration disciplines and forms the basis for much of the plan implementation research in urban planning practice. The primary theories range from top-down, bottom-up, and contingency theories to explain policy implementation. The departure from top-down to bottom-up approaches are significant in urban planning practice as the implementation process involves various stakeholders, activities, and interests. Within these complex collaborative planning processes, the implementation literature outlines a number of relevant internal and external factors that influence the implementation process. I draw from these bodies of work to understand the relevant factors that influence how plan goals are used to guide project plans.

The second section outlines existing gaps in implementation and evaluation literature. Plan implementation theory, and methods to evaluate the implementation of plans, lack insight regarding the varying degrees to which plans are implemented, particularly the factors that influence plan goals at critical episodes in the implementation process. While there is research around the determinants of plan implementation and whether plans are successful through conformance and performance based approaches, the process, causes, and factors that affect implementation across development phases remain understudied. Despite the insights the single case study and quantitative approaches provide, these methods are unable to account for variations in the actual process of implementing plans, or the roles played by actors. Studies review conventional planning processes around local plans and land use patterns, but there is little that specifically addresses the implementation of mixed-income development plans.

2.1. **Implementation Theory**

There is a robust amount of literature on policy and program implementation across the fields of public administration, policy, and political science. However, much less is known about implementation within the field of urban planning. First, I review the broader work on implementation theory and next, I discuss plan implementation within the context of urban planning. Implementation theory is focused on several areas, which include: the
disconnect between policies and implementation, top-down and bottom-up approaches, and contingency theories. Arguments about policy implementation suggest that implementation fails because policies, and intended outcomes, are disconnected in terms of how adaptable policies are for implementation.

Top-down approaches assume that government officials give direction to bureaucrats that implement policies and plans. The success of top-down approaches hinge upon whether or not directives from the top down are followed (Joseph, Gunton, & Day 2008). Bottom up approaches are driven by how policies are implemented on the ground. This is accomplished through collaborative-based approaches that include many stakeholders and different interests, as well as the modifications that occur in implementing policies and plans. Contingency theories focus on using different approaches to implementation based on the contextual conditions that exist, as opposed to a one-size-fits-all approach to policy implementation.

Pressman and Wildavsky’s (1973) classic book *Implementation*, examines several employment programs in Oakland, CA. Pressman and Wildavsky make the argument that policies, or plans are typically based on sound ideas. However, ideas oftentimes are difficult to implement due to the disconnect between the definition of policies and their ability to be executed given the complexity of actors, activities and interests. Wildavsky and Pressman study the case of Oakland, CA and the Economic Development Administration’s (EDA) program, to understand the connections between policy or plans, implementation and evaluation. The EDA program chose select cities to provide new jobs to minorities through economic development, which includes providing employment opportunities through various public works projects. The project had a significant amount of potential and was fully funded and approvals from city officials were obtained. Nevertheless, years after the initial start of the program the construction was partially completed, business loans failed, and there was little increase in minority employment. Likewise in the case of Oakland, all of the major foundational elements were met in regards to funding, agreements and political support, but the project failed because those agreements, and the initial support of the plan, waned over the course of time. The value of a policy therefore lies in its ability to be implemented. To measure whether a plan is successful, comes down to the difference between intended and actual outcomes.

In addition to the disconnect between the definition of a policy and its execution, Pressman and Wildavsky also suggest that implementation may fail because of the quality, or lack of feasibility of the plan. While the plan should be reviewed in terms of whether it meets its stated objectives, plans also must avoid the blueprint approach and instead ask the question whether the intentions, shape the outcomes in relation to decisions and actions. Another factor may be the hidden constraints that have been in place, only to be discovered once the plan is in the process.
of being implemented. If the conditions of the implementation process continue to change over time, then the old constraints disappear, and new ones emerge. The implementation process must be one that is continually undergoing evaluation and goal setting to ensure that outcomes are still aligned with the intentions. Policy and implementation cannot be divorced from sound planning and local actors must be able to respond to changing circumstances throughout the planning process.

Top down and bottom up approaches also offer other ways to understand policy implementation. Top-down approaches are defined by Sabatier and Mazmanian (1983), in their book, *Can Regulation Work?* The California Coastal Commission efforts are examined to develop coastal zone management plans. Sabatier and Mazamanian focus on the criteria necessary for successful outcomes. There are six criteria identified: clear and consistent objectives, linkages between actions and outcomes, adequate agency capacity and resources, committed and skilled staff, stakeholder support, and a supportive socioeconomic and policy environment (Joseph et al., 2008). Goggin et al (1990) address implementation in, *Implementation Theory and Practice,* which focuses on scientific explanations as to why implementation of policies and plans vary. This research found three interrelated constraints that affected state implementation: federal level decisions from the top, state and local level decisions from the bottom, and state capacity. Researchers conduct bottom-up approaches that argue that those on the ground, actually implementing policies and plans, are the key to successful implementation. Lipsky (1971 & 1980) and Hjern (1982; Hjern & Hull, 1983) conclude that successful implementation is only possible if the primary stakeholders impacted by the plans are included in the implementation process. Researchers that support bottom up approaches argue that understanding the complexity of implementation requires the knowledge of those on the ground. The challenge with bottom-up approaches is that by including stakeholders in the implementation process, this inevitably slows down the process. Moreover, this adds more complexity to the implementation process compared to top-down approaches that are driven by policy makers, with the expectation that directives will simply be followed and implemented.

In addition to top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy and plan implementation, there is research around contingency theories. Contingency theories argue that instead of policies that operate as a one-size-fits-all approach, policies should be adaptable to different conditions, which in turn may require different implementation strategies (DeLeon, 2002). Scholars Matland (1995), Ingram (1990), and Scheberle (1997) further suggest that a single implementation strategy does not exist, and the contextual conditions should be a guide for the most appropriate implementation strategy. This rational approach is generally the guide to policy and plan efforts, but does not consider the number of variables that come into play to implement policies and plans. A more effective model for
implementation is evident in the support towards collaborative planning approaches that acknowledge the importance of strong stakeholder support. The collaborative planning approaches that include stakeholders working together to reach planning agreements, are considered a more effective approach that supports implementation.

Although there has been progress made towards understanding policy implementation, there remains a need for future research. The policy research argues that program evaluation is necessary to understand good implementation (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Brown & Wildavsky, 1984). The purpose of program evaluation is to assess programs that are implemented to develop ways programs can be improved. The challenge with program evaluation lies in the difficulty in assessing a programs success in real time, therefore reliance on evaluation occurs after implementation. In a complex policy environment it is difficult to isolate variables or recommend new policy implementation strategies (DeLeon, 2002). Likewise, implementation is also addressed by looking at the origin of the policy to address subsequent problems.

2.1.1 Plan Implementation

While the aforementioned work in other disciplines is widely developed, plan implementation in urban planning remains an area of limited research. The literature from policy, public administration, and political science can inform plan implementation, but the difference lies in the linkages between policies, plans, and actual land development. Talen focuses her attention on methods to evaluate physical plans and argues that planning needs to develop a new method to evaluate the physical, spatially referenced side of planning that ultimately guides the future development of cities (Talen, 1996). She suggests that planning researchers need to ask the question – to what extent plans have been successfully implemented? Where have they failed, and where have they achieved their goals? Because there are few methods to empirically test whether plans are successful or where they fail. Planning practitioners do not know what factors influences the degree of plan implementation (Laurian et al., 2004).

Based on the limited urban planning research, there are several reasons identified as to why plans are oftentimes not implemented as intended. For instance, implementation can be impacted by broad economic or political circumstances such as lack of funding or limited political support (Laurian, et al., 2004b). However, what is less clear are the causes of either effective or poor plan implementation. Drawing from the planning literature to understand the factors that influence implementation, research identifies internal and external factors that influence the implementation of plans. Internal factors that assume influence on implementation include plan quality, uncertainty, and inherent biases. Plan quality can range from the complexity, weakness, or comprehensives of the plan...
(Laurian et al. 2004b; Talen, 1996). Similarly, Dalton (1989) considers the strength or weakness as well as the quality of the plan that influences implementation (Dalton & Burby, 1994). Talen (1996) also states that other internal factors affect implementation, such as the uncertainty and limitations that planners face, planners biases and roles, flawed planning objectives, and the failure of the plan to recognize the effect of politics on planning decisions.

In addition to internal factors, there are external factors that affect the implementation process. Talen identifies several external factors that influence the implementation process: local political context, the degree of local consensus on the planning issue, knowledge of the issue, and financial and political support for the project (Talen, 1996). Similarly, Laurian further identifies four specific external factors that are assumed to influence implementation: community-wide context, local consensus on the issues, capacity of developers and partners, and relationships between agencies and partners (Laurian et al., 2004b). First, the context the planning agency operates within, impacts the implementation process. Planning agency characteristics are a product of their context, and the capacity of the planning agency depends on its commitment to the plan, which is related to both the financial and political support for the plan. There are several examples from the literature that illustrate the importance of political support, to planning agencies ability to deliver plans. A study of local implementation of state planning found that the support of state goals had a positive impact on the implementation of local development programs (Dalton & Burby, 1994). Additionally, there was no direct effect of resources on agency commitment, which suggests that plan implementation is more so related to the commitment of planning agencies as opposed to its resources.

Second, community wide context is also linked to obtaining local consensus on the issues. For instance, Dalton (1989) found that plans supported only by pro-growth elites without any community support, shaped the attitudes about plans. The implementation was Therefore, the communities’ attitudes about the plan directly affects the implementation. Similarly, Baglioni & Vicari (1995) examines the power relationships between community groups and planning agencies, as well as the negotiation between political and economic interests. In this case, pressure exerted by community groups for or against the plan was found to adversely affect implementation. Daniere (1995) identifies the lack of political leadership as a key component affecting implementation. Additionally, Dalton & Burby (1994) also found that political support from elected officials and the community affects the planning agencies level of commitment to the plan. Both the political support for the plan, and the planning agencies capacity and commitment to the plan are consequently interrelated. This relationship suggests that the effects of community wide support indirectly influences whether the planning agency has the capacity and commitment to deliver the plan.
Third, the scale of land development projects, as well as the capacity of the developer, also impacts the ability or degree to which plans are implemented. The size of a project can affect to what degree the plan can be implemented. The level of complexity, number of actors and relevant policies make it much more difficult to implement a multi-use public-private project, compared to a small-scale developer led residential project. Furthermore, developers are typically power players in the land development process and have a direct effect on the implementation process. The role of the developer in the implementation process is affected by two factors: the commitment of the developer to the plan objectives, and the capacity of the developer to meet the objectives in practice (Laurian et al., 2004b). The commitment of the developer is based on his/her sense of responsibility, and commitment to plan objectives, and the capacity of the developer is based on prior professional experience and available resources to deliver the project. Both of these factors impact the effectiveness of the implementation process, as do the perceptions and professional experience of consultants on the development team.

Lastly, the relationship between the planning agency and the developers and consultants can also impact implementation. There are two types of relationships generally found between planning agencies and developers: coercive or facilitative (Laurian et al., 2004b). A coercive relationship is one where the planning agency enforces strict guidelines and rules. This process is considered a more top-down and authoritative style, compared to the facilitative relationship that fosters a level of flexibility and is more collaborative. The dichotomy of planning styles in the relationship found between planning agencies and developers, may help explain varying degrees of plan implementation (Burby et al., 1998).

2.1.2 Plan Evaluation

In understanding whether plans are successful, or the degree to which plans are implemented, plan evaluation has been the predominant methodology used in the urban planning discipline. Plan evaluation is focused on the systematic assessment of plans, planning processes, and outcomes (Laurian et al, 2010) with the purpose to determine the difference made by using plans and planning. There are two different ways to look at how plans are evaluated, a conformance based approach and a performance based approach. The conformance-based approach focuses on the planning outcomes and the linkages between plans and actual development. A plan is considered implemented if the patterns are consistent with the intended development patterns and adhere to the policies and meet its objectives. The approach assumes a rational planning model and acts as a “blueprint” for future development. There is a direct relationship between the plan objectives and the outcomes of the plan (Wildavsky, 1984). On the other hand, the
performance based approach focuses on the planning process and considers the plan as a guide for future planning decisions, rather than a blueprint (Alexander & Faludi, 1989; Baer, 1997; Faludi, 1987; Hopkins, 2001; Mastrop & Faludi, 1997). The plan is considered as implemented if it is used or consulted in decision making processes, so even if there is a departure from the plan that is considered rational or necessary – it can still be considered implemented even though it departs from the policy in place.

Several studies have used the conformance based approach to evaluate plans, particularly around land use and the environment. More specifically, studies have been conducted comparing intended and actual land uses and densities, as well as plan achievement (Alterman & Hill, 1978; Calkins, 1979). Likewise, Houghton (1997) suggested a focus on planning activities rather than planning processes. Additionally, on one hand, Laurian et al. (2004) argued for a conformance based evaluation (PIE) methodology that assessed whether and to what degree plan policies were implemented in local planning efforts in New Zealand. This research found that the overall implementation of land use plans in New Zealand was low and the implementation varied greatly across different plans. Laurian et al debated that the conformance-based approach is preferable to evaluating plan implementation because it is more relevant for practitioners given the focus on comprehensive plans to shape the physical outcomes of development.

On the other hand, Hoch (2002) argued for an approach that utilized a pragmatic, qualitative framework that analyzed plan implementation against the impact of external factors. In this case, the goal is to understand the similarity between planned and actual outcomes, as opposed to strict correspondence or the blueprint approach. The blueprint approach may be more precise, but lacks context and continuity, where a pragmatic approach integrates context and the diverse viewpoints held by actors (Hoch, 2002).

In addition to conformance-based approaches, there have also been several performance-based approaches to plan evaluation. Alexander Faludi (1989) offered a range of options about whether plans are successful, which include conformity of the actions of plans, rationality of the planning process, quality of the plan prior to implementation and during the planning process, and whether the plan is used in the planning process. There are also other scholars such as Berke & French (1994) and Dalton & Burby (1994) who suggested that plans meet their objectives if it results in more implementation tools being put in place.

Similarly, Mastop & Faludi (1997) contend that a performance based approach, which looks at how plans affect decisions, and how decisions then affect outcomes, offered a casual link between plans and outcomes. Hopkins agreed with the assessment linking plans to outcomes, and suggested that there is a need to understand how plans work to determine whether the plan achieves its goals. Another alternative to determining the success of plans,
identified by Connerly & Muller (1993), explain that the frequency of consultation about the plan by decision makers, is one measure of plan quality. Talen also supported the performance-based approach, and disputed that plans should not be addressed directly in terms of whether the plan is implemented exactly as designed, but to assess the resulting activity patterns instead of the actions. Talen (1996) determined whether or not plans have had any impact on the facility distributions, by comparing the plan outlining public facility distribution with the actual distribution that occurred upon implementation. There are two types of success considered; the plan was successful if the facility was located in the place as intended, or if it stimulates community debate. More recently, Berke et al (2006) have used both the conceptual definitions of conformance and performance based approaches to understand the permit review process. To understand the permit review process, a quantitative approach was used evaluating plan quality, agency enforcement style, and contextual conditions. Research found that it was more difficult to achieve successful plan performance compared to conformance to plans.

2.2. **Critique of Plan Implementation and Evaluation Literature**

Plan implementation theory is still in the development process, as are methods to evaluate the implementation of plans, and the causes and factors that affect implementation. Likewise, because of the current state of urban planning theory around this topic, practitioners do not know the degree to which plans are implemented or why. There are several reasons why further research on plan implementation theory is necessary.

First, plan implementation is a unique area within urban planning practice because it bridges both policy and planning with the land development process, and there remain unknown factors. Second, methods to evaluate plans also focus quantitatively, and do not account for causes of variations in the implementation process. And lastly, there is some research on plan implementation around local, general, transportation, and comprehensive plans, but little around mixed-income development plans.

While researchers find a number of internal and external factors that influence implementation, it remains unknown how these factors play out on the ground, and the interplay between these factors. Planning practitioners and researchers do not know the specifics of where, and how commitment and external constraints, influence the implementation process. Based on the literature, conditions change throughout the implementation process, therefore actors involvement in the implementation process must be adaptable, and respond to changing circumstances throughout the process. Moreover, a single implementation strategy may not exist, and researchers must turn towards
understanding implementation based on different conditions, actors and interests. By adapting to evolving and changing conditions, the implementation of plans is more likely to be consonant with plan goals.

Plan evaluation has become the focus on developing theories and methods that address implementation and link plans, implementation, and outcomes. Moreover, this approach relies on evaluating only the success of plans, or the degree to which plans are implemented. Within plan evaluation, the limited studies that have been conducted focus on either performance, or conformance based approaches. These approaches to plan evaluation rely on limited studies that either use single case studies, or primarily quantitative methods. Quantitative methods can test a number of implementation criteria.

However using survey methods can be ambiguous, because respondents may interpret questions differently (Laurien et al, 2004). While this offers knowledge about the implementation process in relationship to whether plans meet performance or conformance-based criteria, these approaches do not take into consideration several factors. For instance, performance-based approaches have difficulty being applied to collaborative planning process, because it is difficult to determine the role that plans play. Likewise, conformance-based approaches fail to consider the context and diversity of different viewpoints found in the planning process. Moreover, the process of implementation in terms of how or why actors use plan goals to achieve project outcomes is overlooked. The approaches, do not focus on the influence of commitment in relationship to the institutional roles actors play. Understanding the role of individual actors and their commitment to plan goals during the implementation process, also informs how actors work to accomplish project plans, as well as the factors that influence actor commitment to plan goals. This can also inform researchers and practitioners about the process, and whether plan goals matter.

Although the plan implementation research outlines internal and external factors, there are also limitations to how actor commitment is defined and measured. There are also external factors that influence actor commitment. Actor commitment has been defined in several ways in the urban planning literature. There has been research identifying actor commitment in regards to the developer and planning agency with a focus on the interrelationships between capacity, knowledge, resources, and political support (Laurian et al, 2004). More specifically, developer commitment is based on several factors, to include: 1) developer's capacity, defined as the actors knowledge and resources, 2) developer's knowledge, defined as knowledge of the plan and understanding of the issue at hand, 3) developer resources in terms of financial resources and experience.

Additionally, developer commitment is derived from the actors’ sense of responsibility and commitment to the plan objectives. Planning agency commitment is focused on the action that the planning agency is responsible for,
as well as the political support to implement plans. Laurian et al (2004) found there was no direct effect of resources on agency commitment, which suggests that implementation is more so related to the commitment of planning agencies, as opposed to its resources. In this sense, the capacity of the planning agency to deliver the plan hinges upon its commitment, as well as its capacity. Dalton & Burby (1994), also analyzed actor commitment, and define planning agency commitment as, planners’ willingness to support state planning goals in their research, linking state mandates with local planning activities, and development management.

While commitment has been studied in the context of plan implementation, with a focus on developer and planning agency commitment, there is a gap in the literature specifically around the institutions, and the roles actors play within institutions in their efforts to maintain their commitment to plan objectives. I asked the question, can the development of commitment be extended to understand the range of actor commitment that exists within the implementation process? Within this context, an extension of the concept of commitment to plan objectives to develop archetypes that help to assess how actors played their institutional role, could provide a better understanding of commitment to HOPE VI ideals.

In addition to understanding the range of actor commitment, an additional void in the literature is seen where commitment intersects, or overlaps with external factors. These factors influenced how actors uphold their commitment to plan goals or not during the implementation process. In the plan implementation writings, researchers have identified the numerous factors that can influence implementation. However, what remained unknown are at what phases in the implementation process, were specific external factors present, and where, or why they influenced actor commitment to plan objectives. Moreover, understanding this interplay will reveal at what stages in the implementation process, actors maintained their commitments, or where commitment waned, or external constraints have potentially overwhelmed their ability to act on their intentions. This may be where external constraints have driven the implementation process.

This analysis will inform policy makers and practitioners about why some HOPE VI project goals and outcomes align, and others do not. Additionally, this research adds to the growing body of studies that look at plan implementation, which focused on local planning efforts (Laurian et al, 2004; Berke et al, 1989; Burby et al, 1997; Dalton & Burby, 1994; Berke et al., 2006) and assessed land use patterns (Talen, 1996).

By analyzing the interplay of commitment and institutional constraints, I expect to find a range of actor commitment to new urbanism across different groups of actors and individuals. I also expect to find that actors who did not follow new urbanist norms, followed competing norms and goals instead. This poses broader questions
about the extent to which external factors drives the implementation process, or were more important than the commitment to new urbanism. For instance, did actors supportive of new urbanism adjust their commitment in order to fit external demands, or were there other implementation factors present that drove the process? I also expect to find that a mix of contextual conditions and variations in actor commitment will account for compromises of new urbanist norms, at some phases more than others. By showing how commitment and institutional contexts matter, as well as the interplay between the two, my research will offer a lens to understand a range of ways that actor decisions and constraints influence HOPVE IV project plans.

2.3. **Summary**

This chapter summarizes a review of the literature on plan implementation and evaluation. Although policy implementation is well developed in public administration, policy, and political science, research on plan implementation remains an understudied area in urban planning theory. The broader literature on implementation theory focuses on top-down and bottom-up approaches, and contingency theories. Top down approaches require directives from government official to be followed on the ground, while bottom up approaches are driven by collaborative-based approaches that depend on input from a multitude of stakeholders. Contingency theories rely on a range of approaches to implementing policies that are based on contextual conditions.

Researchers in urban planning have identified internal and external constraints that impact implementation, as well as methods to evaluate the success of plans. Internal constraints focus on plan quality, the uncertainty that planners face, planners' biases, and flawed planning objectives. External constraints identified include: knowledge of the issue, community-wide context, local consensus on the issues, capacity of developers and partners, and relationships between agencies and partners.

Plan evaluation research rely on either performance or conformance based approaches to determine the success of plans. The conformance-based approach focuses on the link between plans and actual development, in which a plan is considered implemented if the patterns are consistent with the intended development patterns and meet policy objectives. The performance-based approach focuses on the planning process and considers the plan as a guide for future planning decisions, rather than a blueprint, as in the conformance based approach. The few studies that have been conducted using performance and conformance based approaches rely on quantitative methods which offer determinants of plan implementation for a large number of policies or plans, but fails to offer any insight about the process and why plans are not implemented. The current literature on implementation overlooks approaches to
understanding the implementation process that do not focus on successful outcomes. I draw from these bodies of work, instead to understand the relevant external factors in relationship to commitment that influence how actors use plan goals to guide plan implementation across development phases. I argue for an approach, which explores the similarities between planned and actual outcomes that take into account context and a diversity of actors. As a result, analyzing the interplay between commitment and external constraints can account for variation in the actual process of implementing plans and the individual roles actors played within their respective institutions.

The following chapter will provide the background and policy framework of HOPE VI to define the context used to explore the implementation process. To understand the context of HOPE VI, I explain the historical evolution of public housing and the turn towards mixed-finance, collaborative approaches to redevelop public housing. This collaborative approach is based on program theory, which draw from both the premise of income mixing and community design to redevelop public housing. Income mixing and community design focused on new urbanism form the crux of my research inquiry and whether these plan goals make a difference as actors implement project plans.
This chapter lays out the historical evolution of public housing in the U.S. Public housing was created as workforce housing in 1937, but soon became a major policy approach to assist poor communities. Linked with federal urban renewal slum clearance efforts, deteriorating areas of urban cities were demolished and replaced with new construction, developed by the private sector. While the public housing model was initially financially sustainable, because of changes in federal policies and mismanagement by PHAs, public housing became distressed by the 1980s. During this time, the decline in public housing also facilitated deteriorating neighborhood conditions where projects were located, which in turn created concentrations of poverty. To combat declining conditions found in public housing, the federal government implemented several housing programs that initially focused on promoting homeownership and rehabilitation, and later moved to a mixed financing approach to improve public housing. HOPE VI, initiated in 1993, was the last of these efforts aimed to provide mixed-income developments to deconcentrate poverty, improve physical housing conditions, and promote the upward mobility of low-income families.

As I explain the historical evolution of public housing in the U.S., I provide background information on the creation of public housing, and the subsequent premise of the HOPE VI program. Next, I outline the policy approach, which combines income-mixing and design strategies, and discuss how mixed-income developments work in practice. To address how actors use HOPE VI program goals to guide the implementation process, it is necessary to discuss public housing and the move towards mixed-income development and collaborative approaches to redevelopment efforts. Explaining the change in policy and project implementation, requires understanding the key tenants of new urbanism based, mixed-income community design.

3.1 U.S. Public Housing History & Evolution

In response to concentrated urban poverty and declining public housing – federal agencies and housing authorities have partnered with the private sector to develop mixed-income communities through the HOPE VI program. Fostering racial and social residential integration cuts against the grain of conventional real estate markets,
where households sort themselves into geographically distinct economic, and racial neighborhoods. U.S. government support for home ownership and infrastructure funding has directly and indirectly supported this segmentation. Prior to HOPE VI, there have been several federal programs that have focused on neighborhoods, and systemically reinforced segregation between the rich and the poor, typically at the expense of the poor. It is through these past failed attempts to meet the housing needs of the poor, that has led to the integrationist efforts of the HOPE VI program.

Two failed efforts that promoted homeownership among the working middle class at the expense of low-income residents residing in central cities were FHA and public housing (O’Conner, 1999). The FHA was established by the National Housing Act of 1934 in an effort to provide aid to families suffering from the loss of jobs and housing. The Act of 1934, provided mortgage insurance to support the housing credit system, which went beyond attempting to correct the problem of affordable housing, to a change in the way people were able to finance housing purchases. This allowed a larger segment of the population the ability to afford a home, and shored up the burgeoning middle class that was suffering during the Great Depression. While this served to rescue the middle class, this did little for poorer residents whom were unable to purchase homes, leaving a large segment of the population without assistance.

Similarly, in 1937, the public housing program was enacted, which created the foundation for public housing development, and became a major element in assisting poor communities. Public housing was initially planned as workforce housing, and was funded by the New Deal programs. Developments were constructed to provide housing and support for families during the Great Depression. To live in public housing, families were heavily screened, and required to be married, employed, and pay rent. Initially, public housing was considered an improvement from slum living, and was viewed as the most desirable housing option for working families.

The goal of early public housing was to reduce unemployment, eliminate slum areas, increase the supply of low-income housing, and support the housing industry (Fosberg, Pokin & Locke, 1996). Public housing was tied to urban renewal programs with the enactment of the 1949 Housing Act, which attempted to stimulate the economy, without competing with private markets. Public housing was therefore, appealing to private sector actors because a large component involved slum clearance. Local housing authorities purchased land designated as slum and blight, and contracted with public sector developers to build public housing. Linking public housing to the goal of slum clearance, led by local agencies, guaranteed the provision of public housing in central city locations. Public housing allowed for the formation of a broad constituency of support that included labor organizations, developers, and reform groups who had a stake in making a significant profit through the use of public subsidies on prime land.
The goal of the federal urban renewal program, was to demolish deteriorating areas of urban cities, by providing funding to the private market place to develop new construction. Coupled with highway incentives, and government subsidies, the urban renewal program between 1940-1960 destroyed many inner city neighborhoods, and displaced residents. Furthermore, 1949 Housing Act linked the creation of public housing with slum clearance, and became a major element in developing public housing in areas that were already poor. Local housing authorities purchased land designated as slum and blight and contracted with public sector developers to build public housing. The practice of slum clearing was controversial and received criticism from advocates for the poor, as housing policy moved towards decentralization, with local governments having control.

The public housing model was also considered financially sustainable, and a solid alternative to private sector housing. PHAs were able to support building low-income housing, because the PHA owned and operated the housing, and the federal government guaranteed the funding for the housing. Public housing was easily financed because there was little debt service, and PHAs were able to provide lower rents than the marketplace. Public housing was expected to be self-supporting, except for the development debt which would be covered by the rent payments. The rental payments were set at a threshold that would assure all operating expenses were covered.

Public housing proved to be an inadequate solution for providing affordable housing, and was marred by several problems. Problems associated with public housing included: controversial site selection, income restrictions, financial sustainability, and poor design. Site selection for public housing became a battleground as communities fought public housing siting, which in turn, relegated housing to areas that were already poor. Siting public housing in poor areas ensured that housing was located in undesirable, urban locations (Turbov & Piper, 2005). Also, the focus of public housing changed from workforce housing to housing for low-income families. The 1949 Housing Act, enforced income restrictions, in which only the lowest income groups were allowed to live in public housing. Since income was tied to required rental payments, residents that exceeded income limits were therefore, forced to find housing on the private market. This policy change, created severe problems for the long-term tenure of public housing, by creating high concentrations of low-income families. Also, the financial sustainability of public housing was a major issue, and there were limitations to the number of units produced and the quality of service in maintaining those units. Developments were built cheaply, and met only the minimum housing standards, which increased long-term maintenance costs. Furthermore, the 1968 Brooke Amendment restricted the amount of rent paid, to 25% of the residents' household income. This in turn, left PHAs with revenue shortages that led to deferred maintenance and building deterioration.
Also, by constructing high-rise towers to save on land costs, the internal building functions, modernist designs, and exterior site isolation in combination with poor maintenance, led to the rapid decline of public housing. Public housing design relied on modernist ideas about urban form, and became the precedent for public housing. Modernism was based on: a separation of land uses, a rejection of vibrant street life, treating buildings as isolated objects instead of part of the larger existing context, a reliance on two dimensional aspects instead of three dimensional forms, unformed space, rejection of traditional open space elements, and the demolition of cities to provide a clean slate for new buildings (Talen, 2005). A classic example of the modernist form exhibited in public housing is the Pruitt-Igoe Homes in St. Louis. Developed in 1954, this project consisted of 43, 11-story buildings, with 2,762 units, set in a massive open space with few external amenities, such as parks or play areas (Yancy, 1971). The project was highly isolated, with limited street access creating superblocks that were difficult to access, and distanced from surrounding neighborhoods. Buildings were designed with skip stop elevators, and glass internal galleries, to create individual neighborhoods within each building (Bristol, 1991). This style of high-rise design was thought to be the only viable option to respond to external policy and economic conditions. However, Pruitt Igoe represented a significant failure of architectural design and the demise of modernism. Pruitt Igoe was subsequently demolished in 1972.

By the end of the 1980s, public housing was viewed as a complete failure. With the combination of changes in federal policies, and inadequate maintenance and mismanagement by PHAs, public housing became distressed, leading to declining neighborhood conditions. These problems were further exacerbated by high concentrations of poverty, racial segregation, lack of public services, unemployment, and increased crime. With these problems, public housing, once considered desirable workforce housing became housing of last resort.

3.1.1 Mixed-income Development Proposals

The premise of the HOPE VI program was based on the concept of persistent urban poverty, and the belief that this was a major contributor to the social problems found in public housing. The external characteristics of urban poverty are defined by, geographic concentration in certain neighborhoods, with high rates of joblessness and welfare dependence; high proportions of female-headed households, out-of-wedlock birth, and teen pregnancy; and high levels of social disorganization, violence, and crime (Jencks & Peterson, 1991). Mixed-income development was a housing policy response to the factors of persistent urban poverty found in public housing. This housing policy response, derived from the neighborhood effects literature, and the belief that mixed-income development
contributed to reversing decades of racial, and socioeconomic segregation found in public housing. Income mixing formed the foundation and justification for HOPE VI plans.

Premise

In *The Truly Disadvantaged*, William Julius Wilson developed a comprehensive theoretical framework to understand the rapid deterioration of the inner city, and the growth of the urban underclass. Wilson characterized urban poverty as, a historical and discriminatory context, resulting in a weak labor force, and the social isolation of African Americans. The historical and discriminatory series of events leading to the rapid deterioration of inner cities, was caused by economic restructuring, and spatial mismatch. The economic restructuring of manufacturing jobs to service jobs, led to a loss of employment in inner city neighborhoods. The rise in joblessness served to increase the concentration of poorer individuals, which consequently resulted in a decline in the middle class population. Spatial mismatch also played a role as manufacturing jobs moved from the inner city, thus increasing joblessness among African Americans, which in turn increased concentrated poverty (Kain, 1968; Kasarda, 1989; Weicher, 1990; Kain 1992; Jencks & Mayer, 1990). Research shows that the deconcentration of employment sectors in the city, and the movement of manufacturing jobs to the suburbs in high concentrations, have left African Americans with less access to employment opportunities (Jencks & Peterson, 1991). In addition to spatial mismatch, available employment in the central city paid lower wages, which further reinforced the decentralization of accessible jobs with a living wage.

Due to economic restructuring and spatial mismatch, the result was social isolation of African Americans in inner cities. Unable to find higher wage unemployment in the inner city, African Americans with means migrated to the suburbs, which created an even larger gap between African Americans living in the city, and African Americans living in the suburbs. With the diminished middle class population, this also left neighborhoods void of any social buffering, and the full affects of joblessness were brought to the surface. The result of this social isolation was especially difficult in predominantly African American neighborhoods. Social isolation was more difficult for African Americans because previously, middle class families supported the black community with services, a stable environment, and reinforced mainstream behavioral patterns. With the exodus of the middle class to higher income communities in the city and suburbs, the most disadvantaged groups exclusively populated the inner city. This group of individuals has in turn become increasingly isolated socially from mainstream patterns, and social behavior (Wilson, 1987).

Public housing represented the most extreme effects of concentrated urban poverty resulting in social isolation. While public housing was initially built as temporary housing for families after WWII, it became a
permanent source of housing for generations of low-income families. Public housing became permanent housing for several reasons, which include: changes in federal policies, local politics, racial discrimination and mismanagement (Joseph, Chaskin & Weber, 2007). The impact of concentrated urban poverty in public housing has led the federal government to pursue mixed-income development as an alternative approach for housing for low-income families.

The purpose of mixed-income development is to counteract the negative effects (social isolation) of concentrated urban poverty found in public housing by introducing middle, and upper class families into developments with public housing residents. Research indicates that by transforming public housing into mixed-income developments, the quality of life for low-income residents can be improved in at least four ways: social networks as social capital, social control, culture and behavior and the political economy of place (Joseph, 2006).

First, social networks as social capital, assumed that the interaction of low-income residents with higher income residents would lead to established social networks that, in turn, would provide access to resources, and job opportunities for low-income families. This argument suggested that public housing residents are isolated from information and opportunity. Although social support networks may be in place, low-income families lacked access to instrumental information such as employment options. Therefore, the exposure to higher income groups will bridge that gap. The assumption that residents with varying income levels will interact due to proximity, has however been contested by Briggs because extreme differences in race, class, and culture may act as barriers that make it difficult for social interaction to take place. Additionally, there is limited evidence in mixed-income development research to date that there are significant relationships being built across income groups (Joseph & Chaskin, 2011). For example, at Lake Parc Place in Chicago, there was a degree of social interaction across income levels. However the development was comprised of similar income groups at 50-80% of the AMI, many of whom had previously lived together in public housing (Rosenbaum, Stroh & Flynn, 1998). Also, at New Holly in Seattle, a racially diverse development, there was a higher level of social interaction. However, social ties were formed between homeowners and renters that shared the same ethnicity, or native language. (Kliet, 2005). More recently at Westhaven Park and Oakwood Shores in Chicago, the level of social interaction across income groups has remained modest (Joseph & Chaskin, 2011).

Second, social control assumed that the interaction of low-income residents with higher income residents would strengthen interpersonal relationships, and lead to a higher degree of accountability for an individuals’ actions, which resulted in less delinquent behavior. This argument relied on the belief that higher income residents enforced normative rules of behavior to maintain order by calling the police, or alerting management to perceived or actual delinquent behaviors. This notion of social control was inconclusive at Lake Parc Place, where there was an observed
level of social control by non-project residents that might have contributed to security. However, the source of the control remained in question (Rosenbaum et al., 1998). Also at Maverick Landing in Boston, management enforced strict rule compliance that was moderately successful in ensuring order, but not sociability (Graves, 2008). In contrast, early experiences at Jazz in the Boulevard, found that developing effective strategies for governance through management regulation, including collective decision-making, and the development of formal rules were critical to the overall success of the community.

Third, culture and behavior is based on the idea of role modeling, and presumed that the behaviors of higher income residents will be observed, and emulated by lower income residents, and will result in improved self-sufficiency. This controversial argument is derived from literature around the “underclass” and “culture of poverty”, which implied that the values held by the poor impact and influence their non-mainstream behaviors (Massey, 1993). Therefore by exposure to families from more stable socioeconomic backgrounds, low-income families over time adopted more socially acceptable behavior such as looking for consistent employment, showing respect for property, and abiding by traditional social norms. In the case study of Lake Parc Place, as well as within the literature on mixed income communities, there is no evidence as to whether role modeling occurs, and remains a significant unanswered question for future research.

Lastly, the political economy of place assumed that higher income residents will be able to leverage external resources because market actors are more likely to respond to their presence, and increase investments in neighborhoods and services. Although there has been limited research on the ability, or inability to attract middle-income residents with or without children, case study research of four mixed income developments in Cincinnati, Louisville, Baltimore, and Washington, DC indicated that in tight housing markets, there is greater potential to attract middle-income singles, and childless couples, as well as moderate-income families with children. (Varady et al., 2005). Also, depending on the existing condition of the housing market, this impacted the viability of the mixed-income redevelopment. These preconditions have not been documented in previous research, and to what extent they help or hurt the success of mixed income communities.

3.1.2 The Policy Approach

The HOPE VI program evolved from focusing on promoting homeownership and rehabilitation, to a mixed financing approach to improve public housing. In 1989, the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing recommended a 10-year coordinated effort to “explore the factors contributing to structural,
economic, and social distress, and identified a way to remediate the problem in public housing” (Smith, 2006). The 1990 Affordable Housing Act also combined several programs that systematically changed the entire federal housing program. Congress created a series of programs called “Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere” (HOPE). The first of these programs, known as HOPE I and II were focused on promoting homeownership of subsidized multifamily rental housing (Public and FHA). The second of these programs were HOPE III, and were specifically for non-profits to rehabilitate single-family homes for low-income homeownership. The third, HOPE IV was geared towards elderly independence (Fosberg, Popkin & Locke, 1996). The last of the HOPE programs, HOPE VI is known as the Urban Revitalization Demonstration (URD), was created in 1992 for the purpose of revitalizing severely distressed public housing developments. The HOPE VI program in particular was intended to transform public housing by combining the physical redevelopment of public housing with community building initiatives, and supportive social services. This new approach to public housing development was largely the failure of prior HUD efforts (HOPE I-IV) to substantially improve the conditions of public housing.

In 1992, to counter the deteriorating conditions of public housing, and high concentrations of poverty, the federal government offered two distinct approaches to reform public housing: mixed income housing and a dispersal strategy. Broadly speaking, the solution to the problem of concentrated urban poverty as viewed by HUD, and carried out through the HOPE VI program was to demolish up to 220,000 distressed public housing units, and replace these units with low density mixed-income housing. The HOPE VI program had several goals. The primary goal was to improve the physical conditions of public housing. Additional goals of this policy approach were to reduce the concentration of poverty, provide mixed-income developments to promote the upward mobility of low-income families, and provide supportive services to build self-sufficiency. The dispersal program, Moving to Opportunity (MTO), was initially an experimental program modeled after the Gautreaux program in Chicago, which aimed to deconcentrate, and reintegrate the poor after years of systematic segregation and racial discrimination.

The Gautreaux program relocated low-income African American families to middle class white suburban communities throughout the six-county Chicago metropolitan area. Similarly, MTO supported families with housing vouchers, including those currently residing in public housing and gave them the option to move to neighborhoods that are racially diverse with lower rates of poverty. The goal of this program was to move minorities into majority neighborhoods, to further enhance low-income resident’s access to employment and educational opportunities.

The HOPE VI program was fully operational by 1993, and has since evolved to better meet the needs of public housing residents with significant changes in 1995 and 1996. In early HOPE VI plans, the focus was primarily
rehabilitating existing public housing units. Subsequent HOPE VI plans through 1995 focused on replacing existing public housing with new public housing units, and creating a broader range of incomes by increasing the number of working public housing tenants (Holín, Buron, Locke & Cortes, 2003). The most significant shift occurred in 1996, when the emphasis of HOPE VI began to use mixed-financing to deliver mixed-income communities that integrated public housing with tax credit, and market rate units (Holín et al., 2003). Developments were owned and managed by private firms, while the housing authorities maintained oversight of public housing units. Mixed-financing now allowed PHAs to partner with private developers to leverage HOPE VI dollars with additional private financing to create new, economically integrated developments with a range of housing options. Private developers assumed the lead role and packaged tax credits, city and state funds, public housing capital funds, and private funds, to develop public, affordable and market rate units. As the financing varied across projects, so did the unit mix. Mixed income housing can have 1/3 public housing, 1/3 affordable housing and 1/3 market rate, but these proportions depend on the local housing market conditions.

Also, in addition to promoting mixed-financing strategies, in 1996 HUD started to emphasize new urbanism, and larger neighborhood redevelopment strategies. The HOPE VI program coincided with the emergence of New Urbanism, and HUD worked with designers to apply new urbanist principles to the transformation of public housing. The Congress of New Urbanism (CNU) developed a series of fourteen guiding “Principles for Inner City Neighborhood Design,” specifically for the HOPE VI program to use as it reshapes public housing into vibrant redesigned neighborhoods (Congress of New Urbanism, 2001). New urbanist principles promote traditional neighborhood designs that encouraged a mixture of land uses, integrated housing types, and a range of public / private open spaces, which in turn aimed to facilitate social interaction.

### 3.1.3 The New Urbanism

The new urbanist movement began in the 1970s to build on urban design trends, with the aim of recreating traditional urban forms. Traditional towns built before WWII such as Annapolis, Maryland, Alexandria, Virginia, Savannah, Georgia, and Charleston, South Carolina, are the types of urban forms new urbanists aim to recreate (Bohl, 2000). The “new urbanism”, developed by architects and planners as part of the Congress of New Urbanism (CNU) in 1993, is predominantly viewed as an alternative to conventional patterns of suburban development. Along with a set of guiding design principles, the CNU has also developed the “transect”, which organizes design standards across six zones to establish parameters for rural to high-density development areas (Duany & Talen, 2002). The transect
offers a framework to identify the types of streets, buildings, and public spaces that are consistent with each zone, and allow for a more integrated approach to development. An integrated approach to development such as the transect, opposes mainstream zoning standards that promote single-use districts that produce suburban development. New urbanists contend that using integrated planning and design approaches based on the transect, will produce more contextual forms of urban development that are better connected with the larger city, and reflects historic patterns of urban form and architecture (Duany Plater-Zyberk & Company, 1999).

The CNU has advanced a set of design principles compiled from the prior ideas of urbanism. The new urbanist movement, led by the CNU, has developed a charter of twenty-five guiding principles to design communities. These principles aim to develop better cities across all scales of development from the region to the block, lot, and building. New urbanist design principles encourage developing neighborhoods that are compact, diverse, mixed-use, and pedestrian and transit oriented (Bohl, 2000). More specifically, these principles are used to develop diverse neighborhoods that emphasized several distinct neighborhood characteristics. New urbanist communities maintained diversity by incorporating a mixture of land uses, a range of housing types with different price points, access to multiple modes of transportation, a system of interconnected open space, street and pedestrian networks, and local architectural vernaculars representative of historical trends. CNU shared the belief that diverse neighborhoods will encourage walking and reduce car dependency, which in turn, would bring people into closer proximity, and facilitate social interaction. By bringing people into closer proximity through design principles, the CNU believed these interactions would promote a sense of community. There have been several studies that evaluate the functional performances of new urbanism in relationship to travel behavior (Joh et al., 2008, Khattak & Rodriguez, 2005; Krizek, 2003; Nasar, 2003), and also test CNU's claims regarding community building (Kim & Kaplan, 2004; Lund, 2002). Kim and Lund found in Kentlands, Maryland and Portland, Oregon, higher levels of a sense of community in neotraditional neighborhoods, than in conventional suburban neighborhoods.

New urbanism has provided not only an alternative to suburban development, but also offers options for brownfields, and urban and regional development. New urbanism is most identified with greenfields, or new communities such as Seaside, Florida; Kentlands, Maryland; and the Disney town of Celebration in Orlando, Florida. However, new urbanist principles have also been used to revitalize urban, brownfield sites (Bohl, 2000; Pyatok, 2000). As of 2001, there were 212 new urbanist infill/brownfield projects underway, or completed in 30 states (Steutville, 2001). Currently, the CNU website identifies 251 new urbanist projects (Congress of New Urbanism, 2013). New
urbanism is also being incorporated into comprehensive plans, regionally based transportation networks, as well as inner city redevelopment via HUD’s HOPE VI program.

3.1.4 New Urbanism and Income Mixing

With the addition of new urbanism to the HOPE VI program, a subset of fourteen, New Urbanist principles, geared towards inner city applications was established. This subset of new urbanist principles has become the core of the HOPE VI design program. These design principles broadly included diversity, connectivity, human scale, and equity (Cisneros, Engdahl, & Schmoke, 2009). Diversity is defined as both physical and economic, and is supported through a mixture of land uses and housing types that foster a range of incomes and backgrounds. Connectivity is considered as an integration of elements such as, interconnected networks of streets, and open space, pedestrian scale environments, and regional connections to the larger community. Human scale is defined as, features such as street oriented buildings, defined public and private spaces, and rich architectural detail. And lastly, equity is defined as social equity, which includes providing assessable supportive social infrastructure, such as social services, goods, and other amenities. These design criteria have been implemented in many of the 250 HOPE VI communities across the United States.

Based on these broad design criteria, new urbanist solutions for mixed-income developments do three things. These design ideals plan for places, uses and people. New urbanism plans for places, by developing plans that incorporate connections to the region, neighborhood and block, which served to reconnect existing neighborhoods to the larger urban fabric. Neighborhoods are connected to larger regional patterns and local transportation networks, through reestablished street grids that support a mix of land uses, open spaces and natural systems. Also, local architectural vernaculars are used to maintain context specific designs that blend into the surrounding community. These characteristics are implemented in Pleasant View Garden, a HOPE VI development in Baltimore, Maryland. The street grid was reestablished to replace the existing superblocks and reconnect the public housing site to the surrounding city. The existing park areas were also replaced with smaller, dispersed public spaces to reconnect the site, as well as, provide semi-private front and back yards. Both the Ellen Wilson Homes in Washington, DC, and New Holly in Seattle, Washington, used a variety of designs and architectural vernaculars to ensure housing types blend into the local context. The Ellen Wilson Homes created 30 different facades of five building types reminiscent of Capitol Hill’s historic architecture (Bohl, 2000). Similarly, New Holly used a “kit of parts” with multiple variations of floor plans and exteriors, for single-family homes and duplexes. The application of these principles aimed to effectively create a public housing site that is no longer isolated, but blended into the contextual surroundings.
New urbanism plans for **uses** through diverse and integrated housing, mixed-use development, and open spaces to support affordable and diverse environments. These principles of integrated uses are incorporated in mixed-income developments to maintain a melting pot of neighborhood homes serving a wide range of household and family sizes, ages, cultures, and incomes (HUD 1996; Day, 2003). To serve a range of households, housing integrated public, affordable, and market rate units that are indistinguishable from one another throughout the development. Integrated housing types are also supported by mixed-use development, which provided a variety of commercial and civic uses for residents.

Additionally, public open spaces and semipublic/semiprivate transitional areas are incorporated to break up the superblocks. Park DuValle in Louisville, Kentucky represented a HOPE VI project that incorporated a combination of well-integrated land uses. The project integrated a variety of housing types, priced to attract homeowners (450 units) as well, as renters (600 units); a mixture of retail, office and civic uses; and open space and recreational functions. The composition of Park DuValle made this project one of the most mixed-use and diverse HOPE VI projects. The application of these principles aimed to create a diverse environment that facilitated social interaction between households from different backgrounds, to foster a sense of community.

New urbanism plans for **people**, by encouraging a participatory process during plan development to facilitate social interaction, and providing access to goods and services. Community engagement is an important component in the redevelopment process, and new urbanism seeks to involve residents in the plan making process. Designers conducted participatory workshops that engaged stakeholders in public meetings, design charrettes, and presentations, to craft context specific designs, and place-based solutions. This community engagement aimed to facilitate social interaction and established a process for community building. New urbanism also aimed to foster economic opportunities for residents, as well as established a supportive network of services to support the community.

A HOPE VI project that attempted to combine both physical revitalization, with community development initiatives, is the Ellen Wilson Homes in Washington D.C. This project established an endowment fund from profit generated on market rate sales to fund ongoing community and support services. Additionally, 134 limited-equity cooperative units were developed with a portion set aside for low-income households. Similarly, New Holly in Seattle, WA has implemented community building, and self-sufficiency policies such as integrated service provision, and comprehensive self-sufficiency services on-site that include: childcare, educational training, and family support services (Cisneros et al., 2009). The broader goals of new urbanism sought to combine physical revitalization with economic stability and provided greater access to employment opportunities, and goods and services.
3.2 Critique of New Urbanism

While New Urbanism is used as a design strategy to promote mixed-income developments, there are several criticisms of this approach. Scholars question whether new urbanism is appropriate for mixed-income development and also facilitate a sense of community. New urbanism aimed to create a sense of community through its designs. However, it fails to question whether the middle class ideal of community is an appropriate goal for mixed-income developments. Community defined by new urbanists assumed that by integrating low-income residents with the middle class in well-designed neighborhoods, promised to relieve the isolation once faced by public housing developments. This ideal failed to address the nature of the differences in race, class and ethnic norms between middle class and public housing residents. Day argued that although new urbanism emphasized diversity as a key tenant of its design principles, it offered few strategies that actually promoted diversity (Day, 2003). In market rate new urbanist communities, this diversity is achieved by accommodating working class families in what would be considered as middle class communities.

In contrast, mixed-income developments strived for diversity by attracting middle and upper class families to live within poor and stigmatized communities. In market rate new urbanist developments, the notion of community played a very different role than in mixed-income developments. In market rate developments, people were attracted to a certain lifestyle and sought an active role in creating community. In mixed-income developments, market rate tenants were attracted for different reasons than public housing tenants. Public housing tenants had little choice in where they live, whereas more affluent families had many options in the private market. A market rate tenants rationale for locating to a mixed-income development is quite different, and they have different expectations when it comes to living conditions, housing quality, social and ethnic norms, and acceptable behaviors (Smith, 2006).

Because these differences are not acknowledged, in mixed-income developments a dominant ideology of middle class norms is enforced. In other words, based on differences among middle class homeowners, and low-income renters often results in catering to the normative and acceptable behaviors of middle class residents. Sociological research also argued that for social mixing to work in instances of race, class and cultural differences, lower class residents needed to assume middle-class economic status and demonstrate similar cultural and social behavioral patterns (Lees, 2008). This ideal demanded that for the working class to actually mix with the middle class in an acceptable form, the normative as well as the social and economic conditions would need to change.

New urbanism has also been criticized because of the assumption that fully integrated neighborhoods by housing tenure and type, can produce a sense of community on the ground. Most research on the link between
physical design, and social goals like community, recognized that there may be other indirect effects that facilitated social interaction. However the research acknowledged that increased neighboring has been found to result in feelings of safety, through the use of Oscar Newman’s idea of defensible space. Integrating a variety of housing types and housing prices, supported the theory that proximity bred interaction between households from different ages, races, and incomes.

However, research continued to indicate that proximity does not guarantee interaction. Briggs argued, “geographic proximity does not a neighbor make – at least not in the social sense” (Joseph, 2007). Similarly, Hebert Muschamp suggested that the CNU oversold the capacity of its designs to foster a strong sense of community, “if you increase density, you bring people into closer proximity, but as life in any city makes painfully clear, it is by no means that proximity guarantees social cohesion, or even social contact” (Smith, 1998). The assumption that residents with varying income levels will interact due to proximity is unrealistic because differences in race, class, and culture create social barriers that physical proximity, and appropriately designed spaces are unable to overcome.

Likewise, both Witold Rybcynski and Andres Duany acknowledged that to produce a sense of community within mixed-income developments, would take time – potentially a generation (Smith, 2006). Pyatok noted that a reliance on new urbanism to transform the physical environment may not be the most adequate solution to cure the social ills of the inner city, “both public and private developer, viewing the world from the middle of the class structure, see a well-designed environment as a higher priority than intensive people-oriented solutions” (Pyatok, 2000). While new urbanism acknowledged that physical design alone cannot solve the social and economic problems of central cities, new urbanists also contend that neither can economic vitality and community stability be maintained without a supportive physical framework (Day, 2003).

Talen also acknowledged the ambiguity found between design and establishing a sense of community because there is a need to distinguish between designing for community life that is already there, and designing in order to nurture a sense of community that is currently not there (Talen, 2003). Mixed income developments have to contend with both – a community that was once there, as well as nurturing a new form of community.

3.3 How Mixed-income Developments Work in Practice

Many different actors work to develop plans to redevelop public housing sites into mixed-income communities. Projects are planned across multiple phases of development with the agenda aimed at transforming communities where public housing was once located. Projects are generally initiated by the PHA or tenant
organizations by applying to HUD for funding to redevelop public housing locations. When funding is received from HUD, a development partner is procured to work the PHA to implement project plans with the PHA overseeing public housing units, and the developer overseeing affordable and for sale units. Also, to transform existing public housing sites, government officials and developers are encouraged to work in partnership with tenant organizations, community stakeholders, and CBOs to create plans that are reflective of the needs of the community.

Consultants are hired to facilitate a participatory planning process with the working group, or steering committee comprised of stakeholders, through meetings, focus groups, surveys, and design charrettes. These plans are ideally conceived with input from the working groups, and implemented by PHAs, city agencies, and the development teams. Implementation of project plans spanned the construction, sale and management phases of the development process.

There has been significant variation in mixed-income development outcomes in the implementation of HOPE VI plan goals across the U.S. There are a wide range of projects. Some are considered successful, while others are considered moderately successful, or total failures. In addition to the range of success, there are also a number of reasons why cases are considered successful, as success is determined by a number of factors.

For instance in Boston, Massachusetts, Vale (2002) studied three HOPE VI projects that had comparable funding and design teams, but had very different outcomes. Commonwealth development was considered a major success, and a model for future redevelopment efforts. Franklin Field was a moderate success, and West Broadway development was a complete failure. To understand these project outcomes, Vale developed a set of criteria for success by which to judge these projects situated within their different neighborhood contexts. Varying neighborhoods contexts resulted in different levels of project success.

However, success was attributed to seven different variables: smooth implementation, recognized design quality, improved tenant organization capacity, enhanced maintenance and management performance, improved security, progress on socioeconomic development, and resident satisfaction (Vale, 1996). Moreover, in these cases, there were different variables that determined different kinds of success, based on personal stakes and institutional affiliations.

Other cases such as New Holly in Seattle, Washington, and Park DuValle in Louisville, Kentucky have also taken different paths to work to achieve HOPE VI program goals. Each of these cases are considered successful, but for varying reasons that span the spectrum from innovative financing, strong partnerships, community building, and award-winning design (Cisneros & Engdahl, 2009).
New Holly is considered successful due to its extensive community process, financing mechanisms, and community building. The Seattle Housing Authority received a $500,000 planning grant in 1993 and $48M revitalization grant in 1995. This planning process, led by the Seattle Housing Authority in partnership with local non profit developers spanned three years and included town meetings, resident surveys, focus groups, and design workshops with a steering committee. Also, the commitment to income mixing was unique with a broad range of incomes tiered across 1,200 units for public housing and subsidized units, as well as for sale housing. Financing focused on limiting the use of the city’s general fund and housing levy monies, to ensure that New Holly would not consume a large share of the city’s resources. Instead LIHTC and bond funds were used for the subsidized units. Additionally, New Holly also implemented an extensive network of community building from on-site employment services, to joint partnerships with the Seattle Library and South Seattle Community College. A full-time community builder was hired to help foster the engagement of all residents regardless of income, in community-wide services and events.

Park DuValle is also considered a successful case because of community based mobilization efforts, strong leadership, and a comprehensive neighborhood revitalization that integrates innovative architectural and urban design elements (Cisneros & Engdahl, 2009). The redevelopment of Park DuValle arose from a failed bid to win federal empowerment zone (EZ) status for West Louisville in 1994. In an effort to secure funding for revitalization, Louisville amassed a constituency of 150 government representatives, community stakeholders and residents to develop a strategic plan for job creation for EZ consideration. Unfortunately, West Louisville was not selected for EZ designation. In an effort to secure redevelopment funding for Park DuValle, the mayor of Louisville, Jerry Abramson teamed with the Housing Authority of Louisville (HAL) to tap into the existing constituency to further engage with public housing residents, and community stakeholders to develop a comprehensive plan. The city and HAL subsequently applied for HOPE VI funding in 1995, and received $50M, which included $31.4M secured in 1995, and an additional $20M in 2006 (Turbov, Piper, 2005). To implement the project, HAL created a non-profit, the Chauncey Development Corporation to deliver the first phase, and later phases were developed by The Community Builders, a national non-profit developer.

Urban Design Associates (UDA), a well-known new urbanist firm developed the master plan and accompanying pattern book to guide the master plan. To develop the master plan and pattern book, UDA engaged residents and stakeholders through a participatory process that included monthly meetings, surveys, presentations and charettes. The result of this process was a comprehensive neighborhood plan that focused on open spaces to connect
to the signature community gateways, cohesive housing design, and an integrated system of commercial, civic and residential uses. The overall development consisted of about 1,000 units of mixed-income rental and for sale units.

Based on a number of cases touted as successes across the U.S., as well as those considered moderately successful, or failures, researchers and policy makers have identified a number of reasons as to what defines a successful HOPE VI project. However, what remains unknown is a detailed analysis of the planning and implementation process that these projects undergo to achieve their perceived, or real successful outcomes, or why projects have variations in outcomes. It remains unknown as to the details of how the projects were implemented on the ground from beginning to end.

While Vale (2002) acknowledged smooth implementation, the focus is on adherence to contract timetables and budgets in terms of indicators of success, as well as the political clout associated with the project and tenant mobilization. Joseph (2009) also analyzed 10 projects in Chicago to understand developer and service provider experiences in the redevelopment process. Three phases of development are outlined from Relocation and Demolition; Construction, Return Readiness, and Marking; and Post-Occupancy and Community Building. However, there has yet to be a comprehensive effort to analyze two things; the first is actor commitment to new urbanism across all groups involved in the development process; and the second is a detailed analysis of critical planning episodes.

Success has been the variable in which, researchers and policy makers have attempted to focus their attention, but there is a need to step back from the focus on determining plan implementation success. Instead, a focus on where plans have failed and why; whether plan goals matter; and why some project goals and outcomes are aligned, and other are not, can provide an alternative way to study how projects are implemented on the ground. Studying plan implementation in this case, does not attempt to define success, but rather how to understand the actions, consequences, and results of decisions made by actors involved in the development process, and how this, in turn, influences project outcomes.

3.4 Summary

This chapter summarizes a review of federal housing policies, and the turn towards collaborative approaches to affordable housing. I discuss the foundation of HOPE VI program theory to outline the central components used; income-mixing and new urbanism. Income mixing is represented by the integration of a range of housing tenures, which include rental and for sale units across public, affordable, and market rate housing. New urbanism is comprised of four broad elements that form the basis of the HOPE VI design program. Mixed-income design goals
aim to have projects that include, 1) physical and economic diversity through a range of land uses, 2) integrated street networks, open spaces, and broader community connections, 3) defined public and private spaces, and 4) social equity by incorporating supportive neighborhood services and amenities. Social and physical mixing strategies form the basis for my analysis to trace actor commitment and understand whether the use of these plan goals by actors matter, in the implementation process.

The following chapter will outline a conceptual framework, which uses the literature review and HOPE VI program theory as a foundation to analyze mixed-income development plan proposals. Based on the gaps in the plan implementation, evaluation, and mixed-income development research, my proposed framework will build upon the current knowledge. I will accomplish this by describing how I will trace the interrelationship between actor commitment to new urbanism, and implementation constraints in the development of mixed-income communities.
4. Conceptualizing Plan Implementation for Mixed-Income Developments

“Players in both the public and private sector plan: that is, they consider sequences of decisions in the face of uncertainty about the future demand for development and uncertainty about what actions others will take.”

(Hopkins, 1998:25)

This chapter uses the literature review as a foundation to develop a conceptual framework. Based on the gaps in the plan implementation and evaluation literature, I offer a framework that will build upon the current knowledge. I will accomplish this by extending the concept of commitment, in particular, how actor commitment adjusts to institutional constraints, and where these decision points influence the implementation process.

My framework is comprised of two components, commitment to new urbanism, and institutional constraints. I define and develop two ways to consider commitment. First, commitment to new urbanism is defined as actors who support new urbanism, or impedes new urbanism based on how actors use plan goals to guide mixed-income projects. I use the concept of a plan to describe how individual actors playing their respective institutional roles made plans to achieve project goals at critical phases in the development process. In this case, I do not use plans to refer to a document titled ‘plan’, but how individual actors engage and interact to implement new urbanism into project plans. Furthermore, commitment describes how each actor contributes to plan implementation and the actual outcome. I describe both institutions, as well as the different functional roles played by individual actors within their institutional roles and how each are involved in the implementation process. I show how individual actors engaged in planning can fulfill their commitment to new urbanism by upholding a set of commitment criteria. These commitment criteria are based on normative institutional roles and how each can integrate HOPE VI plan goals.

Secondly, institutional constraints are also combined into “planning constraints”, which either reinforces plan implementation, or inhibits plan implementation. The planning constraints focus on five broad dimensions. These dimensions include, consensus among stakeholders, legal, financing, market conditions, and politics. I position my argument within the plan implementation and mixed-income development literature. I argue the reason for differences in outcomes in HOPE VI developments, is that commitment by actors to initial ambitious plans for social and physical mixing, changed during the implementation process. Changes in the level of commitment by actors to the HOPE VI program goals are caused by the institutional constraints actors face, that lead actors to follow competing norms and goals instead, to fit external demands. I argue that there is a need to understand a range of actor
commitment to plan goals to help understand how actor commitments shape the planning process and whether plans do in fact contribute to project outcomes.

4.1. **Conceptual Framework**

My conceptual framework was drawn from two bodies of literature; the first on plan implementation, which conceptualizes actor commitment, as well as specific external factors that are assumed to influence the implementation of plans. The second is the literature on mixed-income development community design, which served the purpose to inform the dimensions of new urbanism that I used to trace actor commitment and the general planning and implementation process.

My framework borrowed from the plan implementation literature a pragmatic approach that assessed the observable linkages between plans goals, activities, and outcomes. More specifically, my research does not analyze the success of plans in terms of understanding objectivity or precision, but how plans are enacted. I took a pragmatic outlook that incorporated the existing context and diversity of actors to understand whether commitment to plan goals made a difference as actors work to implement HOPE VI projects. In particular, I used the concept of commitment, to study how much and how well each actor integrates their own institutional role, individual expectations, and HOPE VI plan goals as they implement plans.

My framework is comprised of two dimensions, which included commitment to new urbanism, and institutional constraints. I used commitment to new urbanism with the purpose to extend the current definitions of how individual actors, within their institutional roles carry out project plans. To extend the concept, I first defined commitment in the context of my research and outlined commitment criteria for institutions involved in the implementation process. Commitment described how much, and how well actors integrate new urbanism plan goals to inform decisions and judgments made during each phase of implementation. I assess commitment based on how actors integrate HOPE VI plan goals within their respective role, and whether they commit to plan goals as they play out their role in the face of external influences. These commitment criteria reflect the differences as to how actors either supported or impeded the use of new urbanism in project plans.

After defining commitment, I provided a framework to understand how I explored commitment throughout my cases. Commitment to new urbanism is considered as actors who supported new urbanism, or impeded the use of new urbanism based on how actors integrate plan goals to guide mixed-income projects. The assumption is that if actors responsible for implementation did not share this commitment to new urbanism, they would not take the
practical steps to assure the outcomes the plan hoped to achieve. This framework aimed to illuminate how actors used deliberate purposeful attention to plan norms and project goals as a commitment, or guide for the way they played their institutional role.

Actors also made decisions about plans with external influences and within varying institutional contexts. Institutional constraints challenged actor commitment, which in turn altered plans and the project trajectory, which inevitably shape how and whether commitments are maintained. To understand the interplay between commitment and institutional constraints, I provided a framework to understand how I will explore institutional constraints. Institutional constraints are combined into “planning constraints”, which either reinforced plan implementation or inhibited plan implementation.

The planning constraints focused on five broad dimensions, which include: consensus among stakeholders, legal, financing, market conditions, and politics. By staying focused on the broader planning constraints, and whether these factors reinforced or inhibited implementation, would allow for the assessment of changes in actor commitment, as well as to understand where these factors acted as barriers or drove the process. Analyzing both commitment and planning constraints in relationship to each other would help to understand that even the best laid plans encounter challenges. Plans do not work as a blueprint, but as a kind of practical judgment that adjusted to the different institutional challenges that arose during the planning process.

4.1.1 Defining Commitment

To understand how commitment is assessed, I describe the key dimensions of new urbanism I focus on to trace whether actors integrate new urbanism into project plans. Next, I outline the institutional commitments and the roles that individual actors play in project efforts to integrate new urbanism into plans. There are four broad dimensions of new urbanism I trace across cases, which include: diversity of use, connectivity, physically well-defined spaces, and equitable distribution of services. Diversity of use is exhibited by developing projects which offer a range of housing types across public, affordable, and market rate units, and incorporating mixed land uses which include retail, civic, recreational, and commercial. This is represented by both physical and economic diversity, which aims to encourage diverse, mixed-use neighborhoods to bring people into closer proximity, and facilitate social interaction.

Connectivity is based on the ability to establish connections within the development through an interconnected network of streets, pedestrian paths, and transit-oriented development. These characteristics are exhibited by
constructing a neighborhood that is compact, with a system of interconnected open space, street and pedestrian networks to promote pedestrianism, and also broader transit connections to regional systems in place.

Physically well-defined spaces are based on the ability to bring people into close proximity, and enabled residents to create a safe and stable neighborhood by encouraging interaction and community identity. Physically well-defined spaces are exhibited by introducing features such as street oriented buildings, defined public and private spaces, and rich architectural detail that reflects local traditions into project plans.

Lastly, equitable distribution of services is based on the ability to provide accessible and supportive social infrastructure for residents living in mixed-income developments. This characteristic can be displayed by incorporating community-based social services and access to neighborhood amenities within the development and community that are accessible to residents. Likewise, these community characteristics also include: comprehensive self-sufficiency services and broader neighborhood support systems focused on improved access to education, employment training, and family support services.

I used commitment to the issue of new urbanism to understand how much, and how well actors integrate new urbanism to guide their decisions and judgments. To further define commitment to analyze across cases, I described both the institutions, and individual actors, as well as, the way their commitment to new urbanism is expressed in the implementation process. As previously mentioned, the five institutions I focused on have different roles in the development process. Therefore the way institutions and individual actors exhibit their commitment to new urbanism is varied.

I started by outlining the institutions and individual actors by describing how commitment to new urbanism is expressed based on a set of commitment criteria. These criteria defined commitment for each institution, and individual actors within these institutions.

**PHA**

The CHA and Habitat, operated as partners with Habitat overseeing the CHA in certain aspects. The CHA is required to provide funding, project supports, oversee and coordinate the project implementation of the project based on their HOPE VI Revitalization plan approved by HUD. Habitat on the other hand, may be in an oversight role for the CHA, but their role is to oversee funding and provide project support, but also to maintain their commitments to achieving the required income mix for the project that is in alignment with Gautreaux. Although, these two institutions are partners, they operated independently in their roles, where Habitat maintained an oversight and not
necessarily an enforcement role in this relationship. The distinction between these two groups, is that the CHA is required to provide, and Habitat, to oversee the CHA in its efforts to maintain their commitments.

**City Departments**

City Departments are comprised of seven entities, whose commitment to new urbanism played out in how well this institution, and individual actors provided support to the development team. The required actions of city departments are to provide infrastructure support such as ensuring streets and transportation elements are planned and built, and additional land is made available to the development team. Additionally, resources to manage and oversee open spaces are required, as well as resources to support education, business development, and social service delivery. And lastly, the city is also expected to provide political support and an overarching vision for the project that is in alignment with the project plan goals. While there are seven entities across city departments, some are more important in terms of the services, resources, and support provided.

**Developer**

The developer in some cases are partnerships between several partners, and in other cases there is a single team. The development team essentially is required to integrate new urbanist elements throughout all development phases. These commitments span across the Project Planning + Design, Construction, and Sale + Management phases, to develop both housing, as well as community supports. The requirements of the developer are derived from the HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, and also based on the development agreement with the CHA. These are not always the same, so there are variations between these two documents in some cases. There can also be variation within the development team and across multiple actors, therefore there may be a range of actor commitment to new urbanism in this case.

**Stakeholders**

Stakeholders are generally comprised of different groups from the Local Advisory Committee (LAC), legal advocates, and CBOs. The LAC is the governing resident body that represents the residents, legal advocates may represent the LAC or resident committees. And CBOs, may represent multiple constituents within the broader community. All of these groups play different institutional roles, all of which may display variations in actor commitment to new urbanism. More specifically, the LAC committee displayed their commitment to new urbanism by mobilizing residents to participate in and support the planning process. Legal advocates, have yet another role as their
commitment is obvious by enforcing or negotiating housing mix and tenant rights throughout the implementation process. And the last stakeholder group comprised of CBOs, display commitment by whether CBOs are able to mobilize the broader community to participate in, and support the planning process, as well as provide social services that are consistent with plan efforts.

Consultants

Consultants such as architects and planners are generally comprised of different private firms that range from an Architect of Record and architects that are subcontracted to work on different parts of the project plans. In this case there may be varying degrees of actor commitment across multiple firms, as well as across individual actors. For planners and architects, commitment to new urbanism can be determined based on whether new urbanism and the required housing mix are integrated into the master plan and build out. I articulate the primary actors and how actors exhibit commitment to new urbanism in TABLE I.
TABLE I

COMMITMENT CRITERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSIONS</th>
<th>INSTITUTIONS</th>
<th>COMMITMENT CRITERIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHAs commitment to NU</td>
<td>Chicago Housing Authority</td>
<td>Commitment to consistently provide funding, project support, and oversee and coordinate implementation of project based on new urbanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Habitat Company</td>
<td>Commitment to consistently oversee funding, project support, and ensure implementation of project based required housing mix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Departments commitment to NU</td>
<td>Chicago Park District</td>
<td>Commitment to consistently provide infrastructure, land, resources, business development, improvements to education and neighborhood amenities, social service support, and political support to implement new urbanism</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chicago Public Schools</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dept. of Housing</td>
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<td>Dept. of Human Services</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mayors Office</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dept. of Planning &amp; Development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Local Aldermen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developer's commitment to NU</td>
<td>Master Development</td>
<td>Commitment to integrating new urbanism in plan implementation focused on housing and community building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders commitment to NU</td>
<td>LAC Committee</td>
<td>Commitment to mobilize residents and are consistently supportive of implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Horner Residents Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal Advocates</td>
<td>Commitment to enforce or negotiate housing mix and new urbanism consistently during implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local community based organizations (CBO)</td>
<td>Commitment to mobilizing community, provide services, and consistent support of implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultants commitment to NU</td>
<td>Architects + Planners</td>
<td>Commitment to consistently implementing new urbanism and required housing mix into final build out</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.2 A Range of Actor Commitment

My research aimed to extend the plan implementation literature around commitment to show the different ways that individual actors integrate HOPE VI planning ideals into their institutional roles. There are two broad categories to describe actor commitment; supporting actors and impeding actors. Supporting actors are those that meet commitment criteria in a way that supported the integration of plan goals based on new urbanism. Actors that impeded the process represent those that met commitment criteria to a lesser degree, or did not integrate plan goals due to either individual expectations or external constraints. Within these two categories, I have uncovered five archetypes or patterns of behavior that describe actors’ range of commitment to new urbanism. These archetypes offer a way to assess the level of planning integration and commitment of individual actors. These archetypes lie between the extension of the concept of commitment as defined in the urban planning literature and my research findings.

Based on in-depth interviews, there is a range of actor commitment to the social and physical mixing goals of HOPE VI. I found there are five archetypes or patterns of behavior that described actors range of commitment to new urbanism. These archetypes include: 1) the idealist, 2) the realist, 3) those that are indifferent, 4) opportunists, and
5) the non-believers or cynics. Supporting actors can take the role of either idealists, realists, or non-believers, while imped ing actors can take the form of idealists, those that are indifferent, opportunists, and non-believers. While each individual actor represented an archetype that enabled them to play out their role in the planning process, sometimes these commitments shift throughout the process, and other times, actors maintain a similar level of commitment throughout the planning process. This range of actor commitment helps to understand the different types of actors and how much new urbanism guides their decisions in their efforts to implement HOPE VI plans.

First, there are the idealists that have a commitment to HOPE VI ideals and adapt their institutional role to plan for those ideals, or their commitment serves as a hindrance to practical judgments and actions, and these actors inadvertently impede the implementation process. Actors that act in the capacity as idealists, tend to be on two ends of the power spectrum; either in the capacity as the developer that holds a significant amount of power in the decision making process, or as architects/planners, who lack any decision making authority, yet are instrumental in guiding the design process. Both of these groups of actors may be committed to the social and physical mixing goals, but their roles are significantly different in terms of their decision-making authority.

Second there are the realists, that have a commitment to HOPE VI ideals, but integrate a mixture of competing plans and goals. In this case, realists are part idealist, yet do not trust other institutional players to adhere to the program goals, and work to hold actors accountable in an effort to maintain said commitments. Actors that play the role of realists are those that are traditionally left out of the planning process. However, in this case leveraged their resources and connections to hold more powerful actors accountable to commitments made in the planning process. In this case, legal advocates, resident committees, and community leadership use their networks to not only engage in the planning process, but also leverage their positions to have decision-making authority to ensure plan goals are met. These actors at times may attempt to impede the planning process in an effort to support their commitments in the process of holding others accountable.

Third, there are those that are indifferent, or acknowledge HOPE VI ideals but fail to make any effort to integrate plan goals with other institutions or external plans. Indifferent actors simply focus only on their specific job without any concern for the consequences in the later development phases. Actors that play their institutional role as parties that are not invested in the planning process, ironically, oftentimes have the most to lose. However, these actors such as the CHA and city agencies are insulated from the consequences their lack of indifference contributes to achieving, or more likely not achieving plan goals. These actors act as facilitators in the implementation process,
and therefore their indifference represents actors that impede the implementation process, either through disregard or purposeful intention.

Fourth, there are those that play the role of opportunists, who favor their own institutional and personal plans and only pursue HOPE VI plan goals when they also advance their own plans. Actors that represent opportunists tend to be at the top of the power structure such as the CHA and city agencies. Therefore, when it is convenient, they will take responsibility for any positive outcomes, and when plans fail, these actors allow others at the forefront of the development process to take responsibility for their lack of action. These actors impede the implementation process due to their lack of action.

And lastly, there are the non-believers or cynics, who dismiss the program goals of social and physical mixing, but either ironically enacts their role in a way that pursues the program goals, or disrupts the planning process as they pursue their own agenda. There are two sides to the role of non-believers; On one hand, actors that are non-believers such as developers, may not believe in the HOPE VI program goals, but due to their cynical belief system treat HOPE VI projects just like any other large-scale redevelopment effort, and focus on achieving a high quality, well designed product. This can often represent actors that are supportive of the plan implementation process. And on the other hand, cynicism can play out in a disruptive manner with resident committees, or the surrounding community making it quite challenging to achieve project buy in or support. When this happens, this can represent actors that impede the plan implementation process.

I use these five archetypes to describe how actors use meaningful practical planning efforts to achieve plan goals and keep plan ideas alive during a complex development process. These five archetypes play out differently within and across the various planning stages. Projects that are more consonant with plan goals, have actors primarily considered idealists and realists along the way that keep the plan ideas alive, and maintain an accountability check. While those projects that are less consonant with plan goals may have actors primarily represented by non-believers or cynics, opportunists, and those that are indifferent.

4.1.3 Planning Constraints

In addition to commitment, as I construct accounts of the implementation process, I also consider how planning constraints influence how actors integrate HOPE VI plan goals into project plans. I draw from the plan implementation literature, as well as the literature on mixed-income developments to focus on five specific planning constraints that are assumed to influence plan implementation. These constraints include: the ability to secure
financing, the condition of the local housing market, legal parameters, consensus among stakeholders, and political support. (Laurian et al., 2004b; Talen, 1996). The planning constraints are segmented into two categories; planning constraints that reinforce the implementation of plan goals, or inhibit the implementation of plan goals. By exploring the relationship between actor commitment and the planning constraints, this will help to understand how these constraints may cause actor commitment to wane, or serve as barriers to actor commitment, but do not influence actor commitment.

**Financial Feasibility**

The degree of implementation is significantly constrained by the ability to secure sufficient financing for the project. Mixed-income development projects require significant public and private resources, therefore success is partially dependent upon sufficient funding. To secure financing, a degree of financial flexibility is required as local actors forge public/private partnerships and collaborate across a multitude of actors. Turbov & Piper note that flexible financing was important to the overall project success for both Park DuValle and Centennial Place. At Park DuValle, innovative financing mechanisms were used such as subsidy programs, creating a non-profit organization to administer development services, and an unprecedented multi-year commitment of tax credits. Similarly, at Centennial Place, by taking the mixed-income/mixed-financing program to scale, the AHA was able to improve its financial and operational performance, as well as, work with public and private partners to develop a strategic vision to revitalize public housing (Turbov & Piper, 2005).

**Legal Parameters**

Legal parameters also play a significant role in the implementation process that influences how decisions are made. Legal statutes may apply city-wide, or be project specific. In the case of Chicago, a city-wide consent decree known as Gautreaux applies to all new construction. This consent decree is in place due to a lawsuit filed in 1967 by public housing residents alleging that the CHA had engaged in systematic and illegal segregation. The courts determined that the CHA had in fact discriminated against blacks by locating public housing and tenants in segregated areas. Therefore, the CHA and HUD was subsequently required to implement a metropolitan-wide relocation effort of Gautreaux residents to remedy past discrimination, and this also applies to all HOPE VI funded projects. Project specific legal parameters that dictated how projects are planned include Henry Horner and Cabrini Green in Chicago, which represented redevelopment plans that were marred by litigation due to lack of resident inclusion, and support of the redevelopment plan. Each case has a consent decree in place that required the CHA and developers
to reach agreements with the Horner Residents Committee (HRC), and Cabrini LAC on all matters related to the redevelopment. While public housing residents were able to secure long-term benefits through an established consent decree, the litigation extended the timeframe for the redevelopment process.

**Market Conditions**

Market conditions constrain plan implementation and are based on two limitations; the first is the strength of the housing market and the second is whether the mixed-income strategy can in fact attract market demand. The strength of the housing market is based largely on the development location, access to amenities, and market demand. The ability to attract higher income households is also contingent on such issues as the size, design and condition of the development, racial and ethnic composition of the development and surrounding neighborhood, and the state of the regional housing market (Schwartz & Tajbakhsh, 1997). The location of mixed income housing is therefore critical to its ability to attract higher income residents, as are the physical characteristics, configuration and amenities of the development. Although there has been limited research on the ability, or inability to attract middle-income residents with or without children, case study research of four mixed income developments in Cincinnati, Louisville, Baltimore, and Washington DC, indicated that in tight housing markets, there is a greater potential to attract middle-income singles and childless couples, as well as moderate-income families with children. (Varaday et al, 2005).

**Consensus Among Stakeholders**

Consensus among stakeholders is a key factor that affects major reforms such as public housing redevelopment. Consensus among stakeholders is achieved by engaging the community in the planning process to ensure community-wide support. Since HOPE VI projects require input from a multitude of actors, this requires a collaborative approach to build consensus. Without strong community support for the redevelopment project, the project can be delayed or even blocked, which inevitably influences the implementation process. In Chicago, all redevelopment efforts were governed by a working group, which is the principal collaborative mechanism to oversee implementation of development. The working group works in various capacities that are either facilitated or coercive. Roosevelt Square represents facilitated efforts, which engaged the working group and broader community to guide plan decisions. On the other hand, Westhaven Park characterizes coercive or negotiated outcomes, based on prior legal decisions. Alternatively, Park DuValle and Centennial Place represent collaborative efforts to engage working groups, LACs and residents. Each forged multiple partnerships in a collaborative process to secure HOPE VI grant funds, and
oversee the redevelopment efforts. A collaborative process conducted by PHAs was able to not only create trust, but also facilitated greater interest and support in the master plan, which was critical to the overall success of the projects.

**Political Support**

Plan implementation is also constrained by the ability to secure political support for the project. The political support of both elected officials and the community are also important factors that shaped the PHAs capacity, and commitment to the plan. Political support is measured by the strength of the relationship between the PHA, city agencies, city council and community based organizations (CBO) in garnering political support for the project. Political support examined the support of elected officials and the capacity of local government to raise the resources needed for redevelopment through CDBG funding, developer incentives, TIF funds, etc. Therefore, without political support for the project, actors are unable to commit to the plan, which in turn, limited their capacity to implement the plan. Understanding the working relationship between local government actors, and how well they are able to secure staff, resources and political support for the project is essential. Securing staff and resources are based on the ability of city agencies to allocate staff to departments that support HOPE VI projects in terms of resources, to support providing infrastructure, business development, and land acquisitions. Political support is tied to the city agencies ability to also have the capacity and commitment to plan goals.

Figure 1 proposes the directional flow that either supports/reinforces plan implementation or impedes/inhibits plan implementation.

Figure 1. The directional flow between actor commitment and planning constraints

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLANNING CONSTRAINTS: REINFORCES IMPLEMENTATION</th>
<th>PLANNING CONSTRAINTS: INHIBITS IMPLEMENTATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACTOR COMMITMENT: IMPEDING ACTORS</td>
<td>ACTOR COMMITMENT: SUPPORTING ACTORS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.4 **Planning and Implementation Process**

There are five significant phases of redevelopment for mixed-income developments: Project Initiation, Project Planning + Design, Plan Review + Adoption, Construction, and Sale + Management. In the project initiation stage PHAs apply for funding from HUD and the federal agency either accepts or rejects the proposal for funding. Once HUD grants funding, money goes directly to the housing authority, which manages the operational funding, administers the program, and oversees resident relocation. During the project planning + design stage, the master
developer is selected, who is responsible for land assembly, private financing, and planning oversight. At this stage consultants are also hired to carry out the participatory process with key stakeholders in the community to produce a planned development for review. Also, social service providers are contracted to administer a range of services including relocation assistance, and community building activities. Once the final plan has been completed and approved by the PHA and working group, the process moves into the plan review + adoption phase where the plan is presented to the jurisdiction which grants the PHA its authority for approval. Once the plan is approved by the jurisdiction, the redevelopment can now move into the construction, and sale + management phases. During the construction phase, architects with oversight from the PHA and the developer finalize construction drawings, the construction budget, and construct the project. Lastly, at the sale + management phase, the developer and PHA, market, sell and lease the units, and implement community building services. These criteria are the basis of the development phase outline (see TABLE II).

### TABLE II

**DEVELOPMENT PHASES AND PRIMARY INSTITUTIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Initiation</td>
<td>PHAs apply for funding from HUD and if funding is granted, the monies go directly to the housing authorities who manage the operational funding and administer HOPE VI program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Planning + Design</td>
<td>The PHA and developer oversee the planning and design and secures financing, while consultants work with stakeholders to develop plan alternatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan Adoption</td>
<td>The final plan is presented to the plan commissions and city council for approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Architects with oversight from the PHA and developer finalize construction drawings, construction budget, and construct the project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale + Management</td>
<td>The developer and PHA market and sell the units and implement community building services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the purposes of this research, I will focus on the most important phases where a commitment to new urbanism is critical: Project Planning + Design, Construction, and Sale and Management. Due to my research focus, I outline the development process and highlight key phases in my conceptual model (see Figure 2).
4.2. **Summary**

This chapter summarizes my conceptual framework, which focuses on the interplay of two dimensions; commitment to new urbanism and planning constraints. Analyzing commitment and planning constraints across phases of development, offers the ability to trace actor commitment to new urbanism in a more pragmatic way, and consider whether commitment to plan goals matter. Moreover, extending the concept of commitment to describe roles that represent a range of commitment found across individual actors, explains why in some cases plan goals and outcomes are not aligned. This framework can also help policy makers and practitioners understand the implementation process in detail. This will be particularly helpful when looking across development phases and ‘critical implementation episodes’ that describe critical points in the process where challenges arise, and how actors can work effectively to mediate planning constraints. Or this can also provide insight into the types of constraints that actor commitment simply fails to overcome. Planning constraints in some cases may reinforce the process, and in other cases inhibit plan implementation. Changes are inevitable, but understanding how actors use plan goals to adapt to changing circumstances, or unforeseen conditions at critical planning episodes, can lead to further development of urban planning theory and practice.
The following chapter will outline a methodological approach, which further describes how I will trace the interrelationship between commitment to new urbanism, and planning constraints in the development of mixed-income communities. I used my framework to develop a comparative case study approach across three cases in Chicago, in which I used qualitative data collection methods that include original documents, interviews, and observations. In an effort to understand the variation in plan implementation, I presented a typology of HOPE VI cases and charted my case selection process based on how well plan outcomes fit program goals.
5. Method: Comparing Implementation in Mixed-income Developments

“Sometimes we simply have to keep our eyes open and look at individual cases – not in the hope of proving anything, but rather in the hope of learning something.”
(Eysenck, 1976:9)

This chapter outlines the qualitative research methods I use to explore the implementation process. These methods include my research design, data collection strategies, and case selection process. I employ a comparative case study approach to understand plan implementation in mixed-income developments. I use three cases that exhibit different outcomes. Within this comparative case study approach, I use a process analysis that aims to bridge the gap between HOPE VI housing policy, the theoretical foundations, and how these ideas are implemented in practice on the ground. The planning efforts I use to understand the implementation process, focuses on how practice can inform how intentions shape project outcomes.

5.1 Research Design: Comparative Case Study Approach

To understand how differences in implementation contribute to differences in project outcome requires the study of how implementation works for developments that achieve some, or even just a few, of the outcomes. A case study approach asks “why” or “how” questions to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result (Schramm, 1971). Because my research asks “why” or “how” questions to explain a set of decisions made about plan implementation in mixed-income developments, a case study method is quite valuable.

Additionally, a case study lends itself to research with large amounts of information, from multiple sources and methods, to “explain the presumed casual links that are too complex for survey or experimental strategies” (Gebhardt, 2009). To understand casual links, a case study offers a unique set of possibilities that allow researchers to not only discover the rationale behind a set of decisions, but also help to establish explanatory links about real life cases. The strength of the case study also lies in its ability to uncover contextual conditions and the belief that these conditions may be pertinent to the object being studied.

I explore how local actors commitment to plan goals, across key development phases, contributes to differences in project outcomes for HOPE VI developments. A case study is also valuable because it can also be
explanatory in nature when it deals with tracing operational links over time to show cause and effect. The case study allows for an in-depth analysis of an individual group of actors, historical contexts, and institutional frameworks that can capture the interactive and interpretive details of how ideas and intentions shape plans.

To understand how plans are shaped, a case study can show how the planning process is embedded in the relationships across local actors, and how planners negotiate the market driven and political interests of housing authorities, planning agencies, developers, and the local concerns of public housing residents, and community organizations. A comparative case study approach that includes a collection of plans, and their implementation process can facilitate learning how differences in plan implementation contribute to the variations found in mixed-income development build outs.

To unravel how plan implementation works across mixed-income developments with very different outcomes I examine three planning efforts in Chicago. My dissertation aims to understand how changes in actor commitment to the physical and social goals of the HOPE VI program contribute to project outcomes. In a comparative case study, the most important condition to consider is how the object of study performs in different environments (Stake, 2005). Different contexts are important in this case because each planning effort provides different comparable projects to study how actors integrate plan goals as each contribute judgments and actions to complete projects.

I use a comparative case study analysis to assess how a range of actors integrated HOPE VI plan goals into the project plans they used to guide judgments and actions at critical phases of project development. More specifically, I describe the similarities and differences of the plan implementation process across three comparable mixed-income developments in Chicago. I compare how local actors in Chicago work to accomplish the design and income mix across the implementation process for each project. I assume that each project shares the same initial starting point of submitting a HOPE VI application, and receiving HOPE VI funds to redevelop existing public housing sites.

Likewise, I assume that plans are based on similar physical and social mixing goals of the HOPE VI program, which implies each project will incorporate a mix of housing types across public, affordable, market rate, and incorporate new urbanism to some degree into project plans. I also frame the comparative case study within the organizational and institutional contexts in Chicago, which has its own set of varied norms and expectations. I focus on key institutions and individual actors involved in the process because these actors take the initial program ideas and develop plans that are in real time on the ground. Because the case of Chicago has mixed-income developments, with a wide range of how well plan outcomes fit program goals, a comparable case study shows how plan integration or commitment addressed the complex challenges of institutional norms and constraints. My cases show if and how...
integration of plan goals contributed usefully to efforts to create project results that incorporate HOPE VI goals. By understanding how actors, while developing plans, responded to institutional norms and constraints provides a way to understand what planning means for critical project decisions made across development phases. This in turn will help practitioners and policy makers understand how individual actors respond to the complex interactions that exist when making plans for large-scale projects.

**Research Question 1: How much and how well do actor planning commitments pursue HOPE VI ideals across all phases of development?**

My primary research question aims to understand during the implementation process, how much, and how well, actors integrate new urbanism and social mixing plan goals to guide their decisions and judgments. With a focus on HOPE VI developments, I explore the similarities and differences of the plan implementation process to compare how local actors in Chicago work to accomplish the design and income mix policy goals to account for how the current outcomes were produced. By reviewing three cases that exhibit different outcomes, helps to illustrate if a commitment to HOPE VI ideals matters when implementing plans for mixed-income developments, or whether other factors are at work regardless of actor commitment. Actors make decisions about plan goals that are guided by their institutional role in the planning process. Therefore, competing norms and expectations play a significant role in determining whether actors will be committed to plan goals, or if other expectations overwhelm their ability to act on good intentions. There are a range of individual actors, as well as constraints that play into whether actors maintain their commitment, as they work to achieve plan goals.

**Research Question 2: How do actors adjust their commitment to HOPE VI ideals in response to contextual conditions at each phase?**

My secondary research question aims to understand, whether actors are committed to integrating new urbanism and social mixing plan goals, and at what phases do actors adjust their commitment in response to challenging contextual conditions. More specifically, I focus on the implementation constraints, which comprise five constraints that are assumed to influence individual actors and their decisions, such as: consensus among stakeholders, legal parameters, the condition of the local housing market, the ability to secure financing, and political support. I seek to understand at which ‘critical implementation episodes’ implementation constraints act as barriers to actor commitment, and inhibit plan implementation or reinforce plan implementation. Understanding the interplay between
commitment and institutional constraints will help reveal how actors can work more effectively within constraints to complete HOPE VI projects.

5.2 Data Collection and Analysis: Process as Focus

To understand how mixed-income developments are implemented, my dissertation employs a process study to understand how commitment to new urbanism shapes the physical appearance and performance of mixed-income developments. The analysis is explanatory and will focus on understanding the implementation process. By focusing on process, I examine major episodes within development phases with specific decision points. I compare and contrast major planning episodes of mixed-income developments, which include decision points and actors involved in making decisions along a timeline. I analyze these planning episodes, where the commitment to HOPE VI ideals are influenced by implementation constraints. With a focus on process, this approach lends itself to incorporate the aforementioned implementation constraints. This demonstrates at which episodes within the development process, decisions about new urbanism are affected.

Based on my previous work experience that spanned eight years as an architect, urban designer, and planner, I had the opportunity to work on a variety of public housing, mixed-income developments, and large-scale master planning projects. These professional experiences provide the context to understand the planning, design, and development process, as well as the key actors involved in the redevelopment of HOPE VI projects in Chicago. I use both my professional experience and academic literature to identify the primary actors involved in the implementation process and the key phases of development to focus my data collection strategies.

I employ two primary data collection strategies between August 2013 – August 2014; reviewing original documents and interviews. Additionally, I use spatial analysis and observations to examine specific questions, frame qualitative findings, and act as a supplemental analysis.

Original Documents

I use documents to recreate the plan implementation process and form the initial basis for understanding the history of each project, the neighborhood, the planning process, and the key participants. In particular, documents serve as the foundation to understand whether actors express a commitment to new urbanism in their implementation roles. I also use documents to verify information from interviews to determine whether actors privately, and publicly express a commitment to new urbanism. I collect a variety of documents which includes: HOPE VI reports, CHA
archives, media accounts, internal and public reports, plans, RFP’s, letters, press releases, lawsuits and court records, meeting agenda’s and minutes, newsletters, speeches, firm archives, and promotional videos.

**Interviews**

While the document and archival research form the initial basis for understanding the redevelopment process, I conduct in-depth interviews with actors in the planning process, which offer additional empirical data about the implementation process. I use a purposive (Chaskin & Joseph, 2009; Patton, 1990) sampling strategy that targets individuals playing different, but instrumental roles in the development process. In each case, the sampling frame is comprised of CHA and Habitat officials, City of Chicago officials, the development team, stakeholders, and consultants. By focusing on these five groups of informants, this allowed for the specific questions related to the actors’ commitment to new urbanism and the institutional constraints that influence this commitment to address various perspectives. These sampling frames are based on the literature, previous HOPE VI reports, and documents that identify the central actors involved in the development process for mixed-income development projects.

I conduct 43 interviews across the five primary actors; 16 for Roosevelt Square, 17 for Westhaven Park, and eight for Jackson Square. Interviews with local actors are the primary data collection tool to understand the actors’ commitment to new urbanism, and also how implementation constraints influence what elements to adopt or abandon. In particular, I organize my interviews around the aforementioned development phases and ‘critical implementation episodes’ to maintain a consistent interview process. I ask actors a common set of questions based on each group of actors and their institutional roles such as: What were the key ideas used to develop and implement the plans? (How much commitment was there to the ideas of HOPE VI; How were decisions made about what was included or excluded in the plan and build-out? (How was judgment determined); What kinds of implementation constraints played a role in influencing decisions made? (Where did implementation constraints influence actor commitment to HOPE VI plan goals); What were the results of planning decisions? (What was the final result?; What was learned?; What was done differently as plan implementation continued?).

By interviewing a range of actors, I am able to triangulate different perspectives based on what actors said, how they used or did not use plan goals, and their actions. Additionally, I request referrals and sought to identify additional contacts through snowball strategies. TABLE III illustrates a breakdown of the interviewees across cases,
by actors that represent: public officials, CHA, Habitat, and city agencies, the private sector development team and consultants, stakeholders, resident committees, legal advocates, and CBOs.

### TABLE III

**PROFILE OF INTERVIEWEES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewees</th>
<th>Number of Interviewees</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Transcription</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt Square</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Officials</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westhaven Park</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson Square</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Officials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Interviews</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After I completed my fieldwork, I transcribed 37 of 43 interviews, which I then analyzed to identify emerging themes and general patterns. I created 9 descriptive and 44 interpretive codes to classify data, as well as using the qualitative software NVivo to code transcriptions. My descriptive codes detailed information about each actor and their institutional role, and interpretive codes were categorized across critical implementation episodes and further stratified by planning constraints, role orientation, and findings that captured the key concepts of the research. The data analysis revealed multiple facets of each case, which included the variation in actor commitment, role orientation of actors, and where planning constraints influenced commitment. More specifically, my data analysis highlighted four distinct ways that actor commitment played out across critical implementation episodes; where actors were committed, where impeding actors influenced commitment, where inhibiting planning constraints influenced commitment, and where commitment waned. Furthermore, this data also provided insight into the role orientation of actors based on participant’s descriptions of their role in the implementation process. After completing initial coding to determine whether actors where supporting or impeding actors, I was able to further categorize actors by archetypes; idealist, realist, opportunists, indifferent, and cynics. These archetypes were developed through an iterative process of analyzing interview data, in addition to document analysis across each critical implementation episode.
The interviews I use for each case with the support of original documents, are from actors accounts who are involved with the ongoing PFT. Because the PFT is still in progress, I conduct interviews privately and commit to maintaining confidentiality for interviewees. However, because of the scrutiny of the CHAs PFT and ongoing development of mixed-income communities, actors are aware of this highly charged, politicized atmosphere and are candid, yet careful about their responses. In addition to the fact that redevelopment efforts are still in progress, actors are aware they are part of a small group of participants involvement in the development process. Very few CHA and City of Chicago officials were willing to grant interviews, or provide supporting documents related to the PFT. In an effort to mask the source of quotes, respondents are only identifiable by pseudonyms. While interviewees are quite candid, the narratives and findings of my research must take into consideration, this ongoing policy context that makes it difficult for actors to be completely open.

Therefore, I rely on interviews with the development team, stakeholders, and consultants that were integral to plan implementation. Likewise, it is challenging to obtain documents from the CHA and HUD, so I use primarily documents that are available to the public online or documents from secondary sources. Across cases there are also variations in regards to how accessible actors are for interviews. On one hand, at Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park, access to the private sector and stakeholders is easily obtainable. On the other hand, Jackson Square is the most difficult case to gain access to all interviewees, and resulted in fewer interviews.

**New Urbanism Dimensions**

I assess each case based on four new urbanist dimensions I derive from the literature, to determine the actors’ commitment to incorporating new urbanism into mixed-income development plans. These design principles include: diversity of use, connectivity, physically well-defined spaces, and equitable distribution of services.

Diversity of use exhibits a range of housing types across public, affordable, and market rate units, incorporating mixed land uses, which include retail, civic, recreational, and commercial. Diversity is assessed by two characteristics; structure type mix and dwelling unit mix (Talen, 2006; Ryan, 2013). Structure type mix is defined as the percentage of residential and non-residential structures. Dwelling unit mix is defined as percentage of dwelling units by type and income (public rental, affordable rental/for sale, market rental/for sale).

Connectivity is based on the ability to establish connections within the development through an interconnected network of streets, pedestrian paths, and transit-oriented development. These characteristics are
exhibited by creating a neighborhood that is compact, with mixed uses available within walking distance, and also broader transit connections to regional systems in place.

Physically well-defined spaces have the ability to bring people into close proximity, and enable residents to create a safe and stable neighborhood by encouraging interaction and community identity. Physically well-defined spaces are exhibit features such as street oriented buildings, defined public and private spaces, and rich architectural detail that reflects local traditions. Physically well-defined spaces are assessed by the percentage of public spaces in relationship to the overall development acreage (DPZ, 2009).

Equitable distribution of services is based on the ability to provide assessable and supportive social infrastructure for residents living in mixed-income developments. This characteristic is exhibited by incorporating community-based social services and neighborhood amenities within the development that are accessible to residents. Equitable distribution of services will be assessed based on descriptive characteristics such as land uses.

I collect descriptive data to document the urban form conditions for each case study site to offer supplementary, visual information for background purposes. To document the urban form conditions for each case study site, I use: photography, observations and base mapping. Photos on the ground provide a visual reference of each case study site. Observations complement photographs by recording spaces that are exemplary, and I use as vignettes to discuss how the spaces are used. Base mapping provides the spatial data for each case study site.

**Photography**

I use photographs of typical conditions at each case study site to document the existing conditions. Typical conditions are considered neighborhood level, block level and building level. Photos at the neighborhood level consist of panoramic photos of land use transitions or nodes of development, site boundaries, and open space features. Photos at the block level consist of photos of street views / sections, and perspectives views of blocks. Photos at the building level consist of photos of building elevations and perspective building views. I am compiling these photographs into a database and using them to create summaries of the neighborhood, block and building levels for each case study site.

**Observations**

I use observations to complement the photographs and further document case study sites. I visit each case study site during peak times in the afternoon and evening to observe specific spaces. The focus of my observations
are on new urbanist designs, such as the integration of housing, quality of open spaces, street connectivity, pedestrian characteristics, and architectural quality. These observations offer additional insight into how the space usage.

**Base Mapping**

To supplement photographs and observations, I use geographic information systems (GIS) to collect demographic and geographic data for descriptive purposes to map spatial characteristics. The demographic data includes data such as population, employment, and income data to understand the larger neighborhood context for each site, as well as, the project characteristics. I collect and download data from the U.S. Census website as a summary file with separate datasets. The geographic data includes spatial information such as community areas, land uses, census blocks, parcels, building locations, transportation, and streets. This data is from the U.S. Census website, City of Chicago online Data Portal, and the Urban Data Visualization Lab (UDVL) at UIC. I use the geographic data to display a series of maps about the urban form and include: site context, land use, amenities, circulation, demographics, and socioeconomic indicators.

**5.3 Case Selection Process: A Unique Typology**

To answer the previous research questions, I examine three planning efforts in Chicago, each representing a different degree of program outcome success. Cases selected are based on different HOPE VI project outcomes, because the purpose of my research is to understand how differences in implementation, affect differences in outcome. Given this purpose, I organize cases based on their outcomes and use broad criteria to select cases as it relates to the more specific parameters of the HOPE VI program theory. I employ a purposeful case selection process, and identify cases based on the housing mix (income mixing) and land use mix (design) in their final projects. The case selection is purposeful because I select cases from a single PHA – the Chicago Housing Authority. By focusing on cases within a single city, each case selected is generally affected by the same contextual factors.

To select the cases, I developed a typology of HOPE VI projects. Initially, I reviewed 250 cases that received HOPE VI funding from 1993-2008 and chose to focus on 71 cases across the 20 largest public housing authorities, which includes both very large (10,000+ units) and large (2,000-9,999 units) housing authorities across all geographic regions, spanning projects that are located in varying urban contexts. These 71 cases were divided across two time periods of the HOPE VI program and initial funding for projects that delineate the turn in policy objectives for the HOPE VI program. From 1993-1997, early HOPE VI redevelopments were funded. However, many of these projects did not adhere to the policy and design goals when they were implemented because they were not clearly
articulated until 1996. By 1998, the HOPE VI policy and design goals were officially adopted by HUD in alliance with CNU, based on a series of fourteen guiding “Principles for Inner City Neighborhood Design.” The majority of projects implemented at this stage either integrated new urbanist designs or income mixing, or some combination of the two, but the degree varied across cases. Within this sample of cases I identify three types of HOPE VI redevelopment outcomes:

**Low Fit: (minimal design & minimal income mixing)**

There are 20 cases, 11 of which were developed between 1993-1997 and nine that were developed between 1998-2008, that implemented a minimal degree of design ideals and income mixing strategies. Minimal design ideals can be operationalized as incorporating some mixture of land uses, but not in a comprehensive manner. Developments that are predominantly comprised of only residential development and lack additional land uses such as retail, civic, or open space, are not comprehensive projects based on program goals. Minimal income mixing strategies are defined as limited housing mix, predominantly incorporating rental units that are either public housing, or a combination of both public and affordable housing.

**Moderate Fit: (moderate design & moderate income mixing)**

There are 25 cases, 15 of which were developed between 1993-1997, and 10 that were developed between 1998-2008, that introduced both a moderate degree of design ideals and income mixing strategies. Moderate design ideals can be operationalized as incorporating some mixture of land uses in a comprehensive manner. In this case, developments may have a small component of retail, civic, or open space features. Moderate income mixing strategies are defined as moderate housing mix, incorporating primarily only rental units across public housing, affordable, and market rate, with a lesser degree of diversity across “for sale” market rate units.

**High Fit: (maximum design & maximum income mixing)**

There are 18 cases, one of which was funded and developed between 1993-1997 and 17 that were funded between 1998-2008, during the time frame of official adoption that implemented some form of both design ideals and income mixing strategies. Maximum design ideals can be operationalized as incorporating a mixture of land uses in a comprehensive manner. In this case, developments integrate residential, retail, civic and open space elements across the master plan. Maximum income mixing strategies are defined as maximizing housing mix across both rental, and for sale with public, affordable and market rate units.
I use a purposive sample and select Chicago to analyze three mixed-income developments for several reasons. First, Chicago has a mixed-income development that fell under low fit, moderate fit, and high fit, therefore, I could select cases across each HOPE VI typology. Second, focusing on Chicago allows for the ability to control for contextual factors such as politics, housing market conditions, orientation to public housing, and capacity of the PHA and city agencies to deliver the projects. Based on this typology, I organize the Chicago HOPE VI cases by type, while selecting one case from each category (see TABLE IV).

**TABLE IV**

**CASE SELECTION TYPOLOGIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award Year</th>
<th>Implementation Variation</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Rent</th>
<th>Sale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Low Fit: minimal design &amp; minimal income mixing</td>
<td>Jackson Square at West End</td>
<td>Chicago, IL</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>260/220/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Moderate Fit: moderate income mixing &amp; moderate design</td>
<td>Westhaven Park</td>
<td>Chicago, IL</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>258/121/88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>High Fit: maximum design &amp; maximum income mixing</td>
<td>Roosevelt Square</td>
<td>Chicago, IL</td>
<td>2,443</td>
<td>755/297/92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4 **Summary**

This chapter summarizes the research design, primary and secondary data collected, and case selection process. My research design is based on a comparative case study approach that I use to understand the implementation process. In order to answer my research questions, I use multiple methods of data collection, in which the primary sources are interviews, and the secondary sources are original document collection, observations, and base mapping. These methods of data collection are methodologically complementary, and allow me to track and cross check patterns found during data collection. Through the in-depth interview process, I was able to check the validity of any archival research findings or observations found to ensure accurate interpretations.

Likewise, I use a detailed approach to selecting three cases in Chicago that exhibit different outcomes; Jackson Square (low fit), Westhaven Park (moderate fit), and Roosevelt Square (high fit). Chapter four will situate these three cases into the broader historical narrative of Chicago. This narrative will include the CHAs orientation to public housing, an analysis of existing conditions, and neighborhood change for the select cases, and how the planning process is generally carried out.

“Chicago is a symbol of what’s wrong with public housing in the United States. If we can turn it around here, we can turn it around anywhere”
(Former CEO of CHA - Shuldiner, 1998)

This chapter describes the historical and current institutional and contextual conditions of Chicago to illustrate the unique characteristics that exist around public housing redevelopment. These conditions offer a backdrop to understand how the City of Chicago and CHA make and implements plans for affordable housing from 1940-60's urban renewal programs to the current impacts of HOPE VI policy and the CHA's PFT.

Chicago has a history of aggressive approaches to develop and redevelop public housing projects, as well as a history of discriminatory housing policies, which will be discussed. This overview aims to give a clear context to the Chicago planning/institutional orientation to public housing redevelopment, which is evident in the planning process, hierarchy and stakeholder interests. In the following sections, I synthesize several elements that are integral to understanding how my HOPE VI project sites are situated within the broader context of Chicago. First, I discuss the institutional and contextual conditions associated with public housing development, and transformation to mixed-income communities in Chicago. Second, I provide an overview of the case study areas, where I highlight key spatial patterns, and neighborhood change, to understand the neighborhood context of my cases. Third, I outline how the planning and implementation process appears to work, by describing the network of local actors involved in the plan implementation process in Chicago.

Lastly, I describe the development phases and significant ‘critical implementation episodes’ that I use as a framework to compare, and contrast the process of redeveloping public housing in Chicago across three planning efforts.

6.1 Public Housing in Chicago

Public housing efforts in Chicago have always relied heavily on slum clearance efforts, racial segregation, and powerful interest groups and institutions. Arnold Hirsh, in Making of the Second Ghetto, describes the making of the second ghetto in Chicago from 1940-1960, with the decline and dismantling of south side African American neighborhoods, due to urban renewal slum clearance efforts. The first ghetto was created as African Americans migrated from the south to northern industrial cities such as Chicago between 1910-1930. Deteriorating
neighborhood conditions in south side African American neighborhoods were considered a threat to the nearby success of the downtown area. Therefore the City of Chicago, business interest groups, and institutions used urban renewal, slum clearance efforts as a mechanism to clear deteriorating neighborhoods, and displace African Americans in favor of building public housing (Hirsh, 1983).

Slum clearance legislation was passed in 1947 creating the Chicago Land Clearance Commission (CLCC). With the assistance of government aid, the CLCC and CHA worked with business leaders and politicians to pursue urban renewal and public housing programs (Gebhardt, 2009). Aggressive slum clearance efforts were used to clear ghetto neighborhoods, and public housing was sited in predominantly African American communities.

The siting of public housing reinforced segregation, as well as the interests of powerful groups and institutions. Public housing was located in African American communities because of the staunch opposition from white and middle class neighborhoods, to locating public housing development in their communities. The challenges to siting public housing were fueled by racial tensions and violence. This tension led to severe segregation and limited quality housing options for African Americans in Chicago by 1950 (Goetz, 2013).

Moreover, public housing was located on cleared industrial corridors, or isolated areas confined by highways and separated from the rest of the city of Chicago. Additionally, for public housing to be economically feasible, high-rise construction was used to obtain enough density to accommodate displaced and new residents. Most of Chicago’s public housing was built between 1940-1960, and initially accommodated working families. However, eventually the housing was oriented towards serving the poorest residents in the city. This was due in large part to income guidelines implemented by the CHA, that restricted those residents that worked to improve their economic outcomes.

The CHA built expansive high-rise development on the west and south sides of the city, most notably, the State Street corridor in the Bronzeville community. Along the stretch of State Street from 22nd to 53rd street were the infamous Robert Taylor Homes, which contained over 4,000 units; Stateway Gardens with 1600 units, and the Dearborn and Ickes Homes with 800 units each (Goetz, 2013). By the 1980s, public housing was considered the housing of last resort and occupied primarily by African Americans in impoverished neighborhoods.
6.1.1 The Legacy of Gautreaux and HUD Takeover of the CHA

Gautreaux

The legacy of Gautreaux, is a key factor that impacts the redevelopment of public housing in Chicago. Based on several court rulings, Gautreaux affects all HOPE VI redevelopment efforts that include building new on-site public housing units. In 1967, Dorothy Gautreaux, a black community activist and public housing resident, spearheaded the campaign for fair and equal housing as a representative for over 40,000 black families residing in public housing. The lawsuit argued that the CHA, with the financial backing of HUD, had engaged in systematic and illegal segregation. In 1969 the court determined that the CHA had in fact discriminated against blacks by locating public housing and assigning tenant on a racially segregated basis (Rosenbaum, 2000).

Moreover, developments were specifically located in predominantly poor black neighborhoods. A judgment against the CHA was entered in which the CHA was ordered to undertake a comprehensive effort to provide desegregated housing throughout the city of Chicago. More specifically, the order divided Cook County into “general” and “limited” areas, the former were areas with 70% white population, and the latter were areas with 30% or more African American population (Wilen, 2006). Public housing units were developed based on a 3:1 ratio; three units in the general area were required compared to one public housing unit in the limited area. Over time, the ratio was lowered to 1:1. Additionally, “revitalizing areas” were also added to the decree, which represented areas that had a large minority population undergoing redevelopment. These “revitalizing areas” were considered buffer zones between “limited” and “general” areas, which were considered to have significant potential for redevelopment, and did not have to meet the 1:1 ratio. Areas that were designated as “revitalization areas” included Henry Horner, Cabrini Green, ABLA, and Kenwood-Oakland (Wilen, 2006).

In addition to creating these areas, the courts also determined that HUD had knowingly supported the CHAs discrimination efforts, and required a metropolitan-wide effort to remedy past discrimination. Consequently, in 1976, a consent decree was entered that required HUD to fund a demonstration program that supported Gautreaux families and relocated them beyond the city limits and throughout the six-county Chicago metro area. The CHA provided 7,100, Section 8 vouchers to current and former public housing residents who were relocated to areas that were less than 30% African American (Popkin, Buron, Levy, & Cunningham, 2000).

Families were unable to enroll in the program until 1984 where families were now able to find housing in areas that were predominantly white, and non-impoverished. The Gautreaux program became a social experiment
where policy makers hoped that providing families the opportunity to reside in neighborhoods outside of the city, would give low-income families the chance to improve their quality of life. This concept of mobility sought to racially and economically integrate suburban communities, by relocating low-income black families into middle class white suburban communities. This has been the basis for the much larger Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program.

In 1997, the court (Judge Marvin Aspen) ruled that the Gautreaux ruling would also apply to HOPE VI funds received by the CHA. As a result of this ruling, the CHA must provide 1:1 scattered site units for any sites built using HOPE VI funds, in a “limited” area, or designate the area as “revitalizing”. If the area is designated as “revitalizing”, then the CHA does not have to meet the 1:1 scattered site unit threshold. In this case, Gautreaux plaintiffs counsel have used this as a mechanism to achieve racial integration in mixed-income communities. The Gautreaux plaintiffs counsel was Business and Professional People for the Public Interest (BPI), led by Alexander Polikoff who played a key role in representing the Gautreaux plaintiffs for all HOPE VI sites undergoing revitalization. BPI’s main focus has been ensuring that public housing residents are not segregated and income mix is consistent with the desegregation order.

6.1.2 HUD Takeover

In 1987, the CHA was placed under receivership for their scattered site program, due to financial mismanagement and inability to maintain the housing stock. Habitat was hired to oversee the scattered site program. With the Gautreaux consent decree in place, Habitat also inherited responsibility for all new public housing construction. Public housing projects undergoing rehabilitation remained under the control of the CHA. Therefore, Habitat became a key local actor in all HOPE VI sites undergoing revitalization. Habitat is a co-grantee with the CHA for all HOPE VI funded revitalization efforts, and oversees all phases of redevelopment specifically in regards to all new construction of family public housing units such as developer selection, planning and architecture, and construction oversight.

While the receivership was recommended by HUD, it was not immediately acted upon, and instead, Vince Lane was hired to turn around the CHA. Lane implemented aggressive tactics to reform public housing such as police sweeps and development lockdowns. But these efforts failed to decrease crime or violence in public housing projects. By 1995, the CHA remained on HUDs list of most troubled housing authorities, due to its mismanagement of $26 million in federal funding, high vacancy rates, and poor rent collection records. Therefore, HUD decided to take over the CHA and placed Joseph Shuldiner, former HUD assistant secretary, and Director of the Los Angeles Housing Authority in charge of cleaning up the CHA. Although HUD questioned whether it was a good idea to run
a housing authority it was charged, with monitoring, the condition of the CHA required an “unprecedented model of intervention” (Smith, 2006). HUD recommended the following; secure long term leadership, develop a strategy for the recovery of CHA, evaluate HUDs intervention as a pilot program to determine its effectiveness for other housing authorities, establish clear standards for future interventions of troubled public housing authorities, and provide increased support for resident management corporations (RMCs).

The long-term goal of the HUD takeover subsequent recommendations, was to return the CHA to local control under the leadership of Mayor Richard M. Daley. In an effort to meet the long-term goals, HUD required several changes by the CHA. There were four major actions the CHA was tasked with achieving: privatized management of the Section 8 program, reduce the size of the CHA, and improve security, maintenance, and rent collection. Because HUD would not provide any monetary support to achieve these tasks, the CHA had to establish partnerships with the City of Chicago and local organizations such as the Metropolitan Planning Council (MPC). The MPC was a driving force in building a base of support for mixed-income development at Robert Taylor Homes, Henry Horner Homes, ABLA, and Cabrini-Green.

There were several reforms implemented by the CHA by the end of 1995 to reach the long-term goals stated by HUD. The CHA privatized the Section 8 program by hiring Washington D.C based Quadel Consulting Corporation to manage 14,000 certificates and vouchers. Quadel formed a subsidiary, CHAC Inc. to manage the housing choice voucher program. The CHA also increased its rent collections, evicted non-compliant tenant, and privatized management at project specific locations (Smith, 2006). By implementing a number of operational changes, the CHA was taken off of HUDs troubled list by 1998. Additionally, the city of Chicago negotiated with HUD to officially take back the CHA in mid 1999. With the city of Chicago back in control of the CHA, a new vision was promoted by Mayor Richard M. Daley aimed to transform public housing in Chicago. This new vision was called the Plan for Transformation (PFT).

6.1.3 The Plan for Transformation

After securing grants to redevelop its public housing, the City of Chicago and the Chicago Housing Authority employed a particularly aggressive strategy known as the Chicago PFT. HUD approved the PFT in early 2000 and committed $1.5 billion over a period of 10 years. The PFT goal was to decrease the number of public housing units from 38,000 to 25,000 units by demolishing thousands of low rise and 15,000 units of gallery style high-rise buildings. Also, 6,000 public housing families were relocated through the use of housing choice vouchers either temporarily or
permanently. Considered as the largest and most ambitious redevelopment effort of public housing, the broad goals of the program were to not only redevelop public housing, but also to revitalize neighborhoods and integrate these new communities into the larger social, economic and physical fabric of Chicago (Vale & Graves, 2010). The plan also hoped to provide services that would help residents with job training and placement, educational programs, and social services for struggling residents.

More specifically, the PFT was developed because of the prior struggles of the CHA to provide public housing. Several of those issues included:

- A high concentration of extremely poor families.
- A large stock of physically obsolete family housing, plagued with crime and drugs.
- A new Federal policy environment that includes mandatory building closure rules, affirmative efforts to deconcentrate poverty, and stricter performance standards, especially in the area of physical condition.
- Limited capital funds to meet needs.
- Excessive overhead costs and a lack of internal management capacity.
- Resident programs that were duplicative, poorly coordinated, and without substantive performance measures and outcomes. (Chicago Housing Authority, 2000)

To address these problems, the PFT had several different goals aimed at creating a new approach to public housing in Chicago:

**Property Management**

Strategies were focused on “Getting the CHA out of the business of managing real estate”, resulting in lower costs and better services. In order to do this, the CHA planned to place all senior and family properties under third-party managers by transferring management services to private management firms (Smith, 2006). Private management firms would have the authority and resources to oversee day-to-day resident services, leasing, and management of public housing units, while allowing the CHA to increase its operating funds to private managers.
Leasing and Occupancy

Standards for residing in new family public housing units were also significantly raised. This included higher lease compliant standards such as work requirements, drug testing, no history of or engagement in criminal activity, and being up to date with rental payments. By having stronger leasing standard, the CHA aims to encourage residents to work or be engaged in job training or education programs to create stable communities.

Human Capital Development

The focus was on connecting residents to the appropriate social services in the community by establishing development-based community workers, who acted as “service connectors.” Within this service connector model, local CDCs acted as the lead, and worked with on-site outreach workers to identify already existing services, and collaborated with other public and private agencies to support residents. The main goal of service connectors, now called Family Works, is to promote self-sufficiency, by providing a support system for residents. The CHA planned to commit $7.1 million annually to establish service connectors at each development site.

Protective Services

This aimed to shift the responsibility from the CHA to the Chicago Police department to provide private security services and police functions at each property. These measures provided additional security measures to combat crime and sustained a “safe, healthy, and productive living environment” for public housing residents. (Chicago Housing Authority, 2000).

Housing Choice Vouchers

Formerly called Section 8 rental assistance, this program provided housing subsidies for public housing tenant to rent housing on the private market, or use their certificate at a project-based CHA location. Now called, housing choice vouchers, this program consolidates Section 8 and voucher programs, which focuses on resident mobility and assisting public housing residents with finding housing on the private market. Programs include landlord outreach, and mobility counseling, to connect residents with landlords and make the program more attractive to both voucher holders and landlords.
Minority and Woman Hiring

Focused on hiring MBE/WBE businesses and increased the number of contracts by guaranteeing 50% of contracts to minority and disadvantaged firms.

Although the PFT envisioned completing 25,000 units of housing over a ten-year period, in 2006 the CHA reached an agreement with HUD to extend the timeframe an additional five years, to 2015. There were several reasons the PFT required an extended timeframe: 1) a reduction in federal funds, 2) an increase in construction and labor costs, and 3) a higher level of involvement with public private partners (Vale & Graves, 2010). As of 2013, 85% of the 25,000 units of public, senior, scattered site and mixed-income developments have been completed. (Chicago Housing Authority, 2013). Additionally, the CHA serves more than 37,000 families through the housing choice voucher program. According to the latest available report, there remains approximately 14% of families waiting to satisfy their Right to Return. Annual incomes for working public housing residents have risen from $10,000 in 1999, to $19,000 in 2013, and in mixed-income developments families earn an average of $24,000 annually (Chicago Housing Authority, 2013). Additional research shows that relocated residents feel safer in their new communities, and surrounding neighborhoods. Areas where mixed-income developments are located have had a positive impact on neighborhood services and property values.

In 2012, the CHA after twelve years implementing the PFT, has turned to a new approach yet again for public housing redevelopment. Due to changes in the economy, and local, state, and federal government, the CHA is now promoting “Plan Forward: Communities that Work”, released in April 2013. The CHA’s mission has evolved to include, “to leverage the power of affordable, decent, safe and stable housing; to help communities thrive and low income families increase their potential for long term economic success; and a sustained high quality of life.” There are three primary goals “Plan Forward” aims to achieve. The first goal is to revise the final phase of the PFT and coordinate public and private investments to help meet the existing commitments of the PFT and provide the necessary services to sustain healthy communities. The second goal is to work towards maintaining a sustainable housing portfolio. This focuses on ensuring that all housing has sufficient support through local and federal housing subsides, and can be financially maintained. Lastly, the third goal is to expand services to more residents so that residents are able to access services when needed.
6.1.4 Challenges to Implementing Mixed-income Developments

While HOPE VI had lofty aims, there have been several issues with program implementation by PHAs that are in conflict with the larger policy goals of the program that sought to improve the conditions of public housing for existing public housing residents. There are three policy additions that affected the way in which housing authorities administered the HOPE VI program: The 1995 Rescissions Act, the Section 202 of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriation Act, and the 1998 Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act.

The aforementioned policy changes have led to PHA challenges in three key areas that include: relocating public housing residents, developing replacement housing, and having clear objectives as to who the housing is for. First, the 1995 Rescissions Act, which eliminated the one-for-one replacement of public housing units, has allowed PHAs to use a very different approach to redeveloping public housing units. PHAs prior to the Act had to replace 50% of public housing units with replacement housing and the other 50% could be replaced with housing vouchers (Gebhardt, 2009). This new standard allowed for all demolished units to be replaced with housing vouchers, systematically decreasing the number of housing units a PHA would need to provide. Given this dynamic, in the case of Chicago, the demolition of public housing units has been done at a pace far exceeding the minimal replacement of rental units in mixed-income developments, or affordable housing units in the private market. The relocation imperative of PHAs assumes that neighborhoods will be improved by the removal of large amounts of public housing. Research has indicated that the CHAs efforts to deconcentrate public housing is marginal at best, with the majority of residents being relocated to census tracts that are as racially segregated and as impoverished, as the areas they are leaving. Many public housing residents simply get lost in the shuffle as the CHA attempts to quickly relocate public housing residents without enough relocation assistance from counselors. This has further exacerbated the difficulty of the relocation process for public housing residents who are unaware of their options and end up in impoverished neighborhoods with poor housing, not unlike their prior housing project.

Secondly, the Section 202 of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriation Act has allowed the CHA to demolish “non-viable” public housing at a rapid pace through poor oversight and maintenance. This change in federal law allowed housing authorities to conduct a viability test to determine whether or not to demolish public housing units. A public housing site could be demolished if the cost to rehabilitate the building exceeded the cost for new construction. With this allowance, the CHA was able to deem 60% of its units or 18,000 units as non-viable and provide a justification for rapid demolition over a shorter period of time.
Lastly, the 1998 Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act gave PHAs the ability to severely restrict existing public housing tenant from returning to mixed-income developments. Those families that are able to return to a mixed-income development, must endure the housing authorities extensive screening process to be allowed to relocate into a new mixed-income development. Under the federal one-strike and you’re out” rule, PHAs can evict households that have any member of the family with a drug violation, or felony convictions. Also implemented are housekeeping inspections for tenants that want to relocate to mixed-income developments to ensure that residents have proper living environments. Within the PFT, the CHA has also implemented stringent work requirements for public housing residents to have the option to return to redeveloped mixed-income sites. Although residents have a contractual right to return to public housing, the contract stipulates that families must meet certain property specific tenant screening criteria. There are two sets of requirements: the authority-wide Minimum Tenant Selection Plan (MTSP), and local tenant selection plans adopted by each development (Smith, 2006). The MTSP is applied to all developments within the CHA, and the working group at each redevelopment develops the tenant selection plans. Within both of these programs, the CHA has implemented rigid work requirements with the primary leaseholder being required to work a minimum of 30 hours per week. In the MTSP, all family members must also work 30 hours per week, or be engaged for that time in alternative activities such as, enrollment in an economic self-sufficiency program, employment counseling, basic skills training, or enrollment in educational programs (Smith, 2006). For displaced families who hope to return to the mixed-income developments, this minimum work requirement presents a significant barrier.

These requirements have further added to many public housing families being displaced by this redevelopment process. Under HOPE VI, more than 130 public housing developments, predominantly high rises, are being transformed into low density mixed-income communities, subsequently reducing the number of public housing units (Popkin et. al, 2000). There is already a shortage of affordable housing units for low-income families. Setting aside units for more affluent residents, and imposing strict regulations on those public housing residents eligible to return, means there are fewer units for public housing families in need. Ultimately, the policy goals of providing affordable housing and deconcentrating poverty, have not exactly worked to meet the needs of the existing low-income families that once resided in public housing. Instead, housing authorities like the CHA, have been given wide latitude through the revision of federal policies linked to the HOPE VI program to rapidly demolish public housing. Thus these constraints have limited the potential redevelopment process to meet the overarching program goals.
6.2 Case Context

The three cases selected, are a part of the City of Chicago and the CHA strategy to redevelop public housing as part of the PFT. The PFT has 15 mixed-income development sites across the Chicago area, with the majority located on the south side of Chicago. I focus on Jackson Square, Westhaven Park, and Roosevelt Square, which are located in close proximity to one another on the near west, and near south sides of Chicago. Roosevelt Square is in the affluent Little Italy neighborhood, and is the largest of the project sites comprised of 100 acres. Westhaven Park is just west of the growing west loop area and sits on 26 acres. And lastly, Jackson Square is on the near west side in the East Garfield Park community and is on 17 acres. Given the close proximity and shared spatial patterns around these mixed-income developments, this offers a powerful analysis where the contextual conditions for each project are similar, yet each redevelopment has different outcomes. The maps below (Figure 4) highlight the HOPE VI locations in Chicago and (Figure 5) the Project Study Area:

Roosevelt Square

Roosevelt Square is one of the largest and most high profile PFT cases comprised of a multitude of powerful actors. This project planning was initially completed by Telesis, and Related was hired for the project implementation in 2000. The implementation team was comprised of a high profile developer, consultants, and a non-profit developer, to ensure
adherence to the community building initiatives. Roosevelt Square received $35M in HOPE VI funds and this group of actors conducted a full-scale planning process that included a multitude of stakeholders and community leadership. Despite this robust team of local actors and expertise, Roosevelt Square was heavily constrained by the inability to build consensus across different actors, housing market conditions, and the planned development process. More specifically, the development team aimed to implement a 100-acre, $600M development with 2,443 units in 10 years. The entire project was leveraged upfront in expectation of a big payoff at the end. However, there was no flexibility built into the planning process. Therefore, there was an inability to account for less than perfect conditions along the way. Roosevelt Square was only able to complete 1.5 phases out of 6 with a total of 591 units completed between 2000 and 2010. This inability of the development team to adapt to changing conditions, left a well-designed project frozen in place, and after being on hold for four years, the development team is faced with cracking open the planned development and restarting the planning process. This new planning process will include a new set of actors and will have to adapt to a different economic climate.

**Westhaven Park**

Westhaven Park has been touted by the CHA as a model case for the PFT, and has had a different trajectory than many Chicago mixed-income developments. The redevelopment process was initiated by a resident lawsuit led by the Sargent Shriver National Center On Poverty Law in 1991. Residents wanted the CHA to be prohibited from “de-facto demolition” of Henry Horner, and demanded that the property be maintained with habitable residential units. A consent decree was reached in 1995 that required the former Henry Horner redevelopment to be completed in phases. Also, the CHA and developers were required to reach agreements with the HRC on all matters related to the redevelopment. The role of the consent decree allowed for a unique planning process where residents had decision-making authority and were not displaced. As a result, Westhaven Park had a 60% return rate of existing residents and the development does not adhere to the 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 housing mix as does many CHA developments. Additionally, Westhaven Park residents were not required to have work requirements or drug testing. Because the redevelopment process was led by the consent decree, the planning process was a negotiated effort between powerful public-private partnerships, that held actors accountable. The CHA received $18.4M in HOPE VI funds in 1996 and hired the development team of Brinshore Michaels in 2001. Brinshore Michaels was experienced in developing mixed-income communities and understood the complexities of not only building housing, but also how to integrate the community supports for residents. This led to a pragmatic development process where planning alternatives met the income mix and design goals and were viable not only in the short term, but the long term. Flexibility was built into the
PD process at each stage and lessons learned were applied to future stages of development. Westhaven Park is 70% complete with 547 units and is on track to be the first PFT mixed-income development completed with 782 units.

**Jackson Square**

Jackson Square is considered a low profile case in comparison to Westhaven Park and Roosevelt Square. The redevelopment efforts received relatively little attention from the CHA or City of Chicago, which is evident by the $5.5M received to revitalize the development. In addition to a smaller amount of project funding, Jackson Square faced significant barriers to complete the 882-unit project. The development team of Eastlake had been involved with the site management since 1996, and was hired to redevelop the former Rockwell Gardens site in 2001.

The planning process was faced with difficulty obtaining project buy-in from stakeholders, and the surrounding community, as well as the majority of former Rockwell Gardens residents taking housing vouchers, and leaving the community. Without having a community to plan for, or stakeholder support, made for a difficult planning process where few actors were involved to provide project support. Additionally, there were many plans started with various firms, as well as failed plans that never got off the ground. Limited collective planning, and even less support from key actors responsible for plan implementation, left this project half built without the necessary community support systems in place. Additionally, Jackson Square remains a primarily low-income rental community with 354 rental units that have struggled to build and sell, for sale units.

This project was heavily shaped by consensus among stakeholders, financing, and housing market conditions. This project has remained on hold since 2010, and the development team hopes to jumpstart development by 2016, but is unsure if there will be financial support to move the planning and implementation process forward.

**Existing Site Conditions**

This section provides a descriptive overview of the study area, highlighting each case study site, and its existing site conditions. I outline relevant site conditions to understand the context of these sites within general proximity to each other, which offers yet another lens to analyze these cases. I detail the land uses, amenities, transit, and vehicular circulation patterns in relationship to the surrounding neighborhoods. In addition to site conditions, I also document the neighborhood change of the study area. I highlight each case study site and show how demographic and socioeconomic indicators have changed from 2000 to 2010. I explain the neighborhood changes in relationship to median household income, percent poverty, racial diversity, and population.
TABLE V presents the site conditions and context of the study area.

**TABLE V**

**GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CASES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Information</th>
<th>Roosevelt Square</th>
<th>Westhaven Park</th>
<th>Jackson Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Little Italy</td>
<td>Near West</td>
<td>East Garfield Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developer</td>
<td>Related</td>
<td>Brinshore Michaels</td>
<td>Eastlake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Planner</td>
<td>Destefano + Partners</td>
<td>Destefano + Partners</td>
<td>Okrent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Landon Bone Baker</td>
<td>Landon Bone Baker</td>
<td>Pickarz Associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOPE VI funding</td>
<td>$35M</td>
<td>18.4M</td>
<td>$33M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Acres</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Units (prev / planned)</td>
<td>3,500 / 2,443</td>
<td>14,000 / 782</td>
<td>1136 / 882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density (prev / planned)</td>
<td>35du / 24du</td>
<td>538du / 30du</td>
<td>67du / 52du</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental</td>
<td>755/297/92</td>
<td>258/121/88</td>
<td>260/220/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Sale</td>
<td>0/374/2925</td>
<td>0/44/271</td>
<td>0/60/271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Complete</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Residential / Non-residential</td>
<td>77% / 23%</td>
<td>77% / 23%</td>
<td>92% / 8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Open Space</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Habitat, 2013; Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning (CMAP) & City of Chicago

**Land Use**

There are broad ranges of land uses, including commercial and institutional uses along the main arterials. Residential and recreational uses are present within the study area and within each case study site. Roosevelt Square is comprised of mostly residential uses, and land areas slated for future construction. Secondary land uses within the site boundaries are open spaces (18%) and commercial areas along Roosevelt Road and Taylor Street. The institutional uses are in flux, with one site converted to open space, one site still in use, and the others remaining vacant. Residential uses represent 77% and non-residential uses make up approximately 23% of the site area. Westhaven Park is primarily comprised of residential uses and areas slated for construction. Along the site boundary on Washington and Lake Streets, there are some commercial uses, and one institutional use. Residential uses represent 77% and non-residential uses make up approximately 23% of the site area. There are limited open spaces, with only 5% making up open space. Jackson Square is predominately residential with institutional and commercial uses along Western and Madison Avenue. Residential use represents 92% of land uses, and non-residential land uses make up approximately 8% of the site area. Within the site boundaries, there is a planned park. However, there are currently no open space land uses.
Amenities

Within the overall study area where Jackson Square, Westhaven Park, and Roosevelt Square are located, there are a series of institutional facilities including schools, churches, hospitals, universities, community parks, and police/fire stations. Roosevelt Square has several institutional uses and sits just outside the University of Illinois Medical District and South Campus, as well as St. Ignatius High School College Preparatory. Within the site boundaries are also two major community parks that are assessable to residents: Foscoe Park and Adams Park. Westhaven Park also has a few institutional uses, one that is located on the project site: Suder Montessori Magnet Elementary School, and nearby Malcom X College and Crane High School. There are two major community parks nearby, which include Ellen Gates Starr Park and Union Park. Additionally, Westhaven Park is located in close proximity to the United Center.

Jackson Square has a major institutional use onsite, with Phoenix Military Academy and adjacent playground areas. In addition to Phoenix Military Academy, the site is also near Crane High School and Malcom X College. There are two residential projects currently underway within the Jackson Square project area. Maplewood Courts is currently under construction by Brinshore Michaels with 76 subsidized rental units, and across the street along Western Avenue, The Community Builders are rehabilitating 261 mixed-income units at St. Stephens Terrace.

Figure 5. Land use map

Figure 6. Neighborhood amenities map

Source: Chicago Metropolitan Association of Planning (CMAP), & U.S. Census
Transit

The project study areas have access to two transit alternatives including multiple CTA “El” routes and bus routes. There are four CTA “El” stops within the project study area, each of which serves a specific project site. The Pink line stop located at Polk and Ashland, as well as a second stop on the Blue line along the Eisenhower expressway at Racine, service Roosevelt Square. A second Blue line stop sits along the Eisenhower expressway at Damen Street and serve the Jackson Square community. And lastly, the Green line along Lake Street has two stops that serve Westhaven Park, with stops located at Ashland Avenue and Morgan Street.

Additionally, there are nine bus routes that traverse the surrounding neighborhoods and service Roosevelt Square, Westhaven Park, and Jackson Square. The majority of the bus stops are along major streets including Western Avenue, Damen Avenue, Ashland Avenue, Roosevelt Road, Harrison Street, Jackson Boulevard, and Madison Street. Westhaven Park and Jackson Square have greater public transit options with accessibility to both the El and bus routes. Roosevelt Square has several bus routes, but has less accessibility to El stops, which are roughly a ½ mile to 1 mile in distance from the project site.

Vehicular Circulation

The study area has good access to a number of vehicular transportation options. The Eisenhower expressway sits along the southern boundary of Jackson Square, with exit ramps at Western Avenue, Damen Street, Ashland Street, and Racine Street to easily access each case study site. There are several primary arterials within the study area that carry traffic through the Chicago area. Roosevelt Square is well served for vehicular transit with two primary arterials along Roosevelt Road and Ashland Street, and four secondary access points at Racine Avenue, Loomis Street, Taylor Street, and 14th Street. There are also two residential streets that intersect the site and provide vehicular access. Westhaven Park has less access with two primary arterials along Lake Street and Damen Street providing access through the site. There are also two secondary access points at Wood Street and Leavitt Street, and residential access at Hoyne Street and Oakley Boulevard.

With the existing Horner Superblock in the middle of the site, there is limited access through the entire site. Jackson Square has the least vehicular access, with the primary arterials Western Avenue and Madison Street serving the site. Jackson Boulevard and California Avenue also serve as a secondary arterial, and Campbell Avenue allows for residential vehicular access.
Neighborhood Change

An analysis of census data reveals that across Roosevelt Square, Westhaven Park, and Jackson Square, from 2000-2010, there have been significant increases in median household income (145%-193%), and the poverty rate has decreased by (60%-81%). There have also been significant gains in racial diversity at Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park, and to a lesser degree Jackson Square. Additionally, the total population has increased at both Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park from (18%-70%). However, Jackson Square has seen a major reduction in total population (68%).

TABLE VI presents the neighborhood change of the study area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Roosevelt Square</th>
<th>Westhaven Park</th>
<th>Jackson Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>10 Year Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>2171</td>
<td>2564</td>
<td>-18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Residents in Poverty</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>-81.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Household Income</td>
<td>15,229</td>
<td>40,296</td>
<td>165%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race + Ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>328%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1432</td>
<td>-25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>828%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>316%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>199%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census 2000 & 2010
**Household Median Income**

In 2000, the median household income for the census tracts containing Roosevelt Square was $15,229, and in 2010, the median household income was $40,296. This represents a 165% increase in median household income since 2000. Similarly, at Westhaven Park, in 2000, the median household income for the census tracts containing Westhaven Park was $18,248, and in 2010, the median household income was $44,766. This represents a 145% increase in median household income since 2000. Jackson Square also had increases in median household income from 2000-2010, however incomes continue to remain lower compared to Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park. In 2000, the median household income for census tracts containing Jackson Square was $6,267, and in 2010, the median income was $18,382. This represents a 193% increase in median household income.

**Percent Poverty**

The increases in household median income for the census tracts containing Roosevelt Square have resulted in a significant reduction in the poverty rate between 2000 and 2010. In 2000, the poverty rate was 53% of the population and this number has decreased by 81% to 10.4% by 2010. Westhaven Park also saw a significant reduction in the poverty rate between 2000 and 2010. In 2000, for the census tracts containing Westhaven Park, the poverty rate was 56.1% of the population and by 2010, this number was 13.4%, representing a reduction in poverty of 76% over a 10-year period. Jackson Square has also seen a major reduction in the poverty rate for the census tracts from 2000-2010. In 2000, the poverty rate was 77.6% of the population and this number had decreased by 60% to 31.3% by 2010.
Racial Diversity

The racial diversity has also increased at Roosevelt Square, where the population in 2000 was 89% African American. As of 2010, the census tracts containing Roosevelt Square, African Americans continue to make up the majority of the population at 56%, which represents a 25% population decrease. There has been increased in racial diversity among White (26%), Asian (7%), and Hispanic (8%) populations. Westhaven Park has seen a shift across census tracts from being primarily African American (93%) in 2000, to also seeing racial diversity comprised of White (10%), Asian (3%), and Hispanic (7%) populations. The population remains majority African American as of 2010 at 79%. Jackson Square, was and remains predominately African American from 2000-2010, although there has been a 70% decrease in the African American population. There have been some racial diversity comprised of an increase in White (3%) population, and a decrease in Hispanic (7%) population.
Figure 13. Racial Diversity 2000

Figure 14. Racial Diversity 2010

Source: U.S. Census 2000

Source: U.S. Census 2010

Population

In 2000, the population for the census tracts containing Roosevelt Square was 2,171, and in 2010, the population was 2,564. This represents an 18% increase in population over a 10-year period. Similarly, at Westhaven Park, in 2000, the population for the census tracts was 1,226, and in 2010, the population was 2,081. This represents a 70% increase in population since 2000. Jackson Square, however has had significant decreases in population from 2000-2010, largely because the census tract boundaries have remained the same from 2000-2010. In 2000, the population for census tracts containing Jackson Square was 2,376, and in 2010, the population was 755. This represents a 68% decrease in population.
6.3 Network of Actors and Institutions

Within the context of HOPE VI policy and the PFT, there is a complex planning process to develop mixed-income developments. The following section outlines the key networks of institutions and actors involved in the planning process across all cases. Each institution is considered an institutional agent, which has a specific function in their efforts to achieve project goals for each phase of development. I refer to agencies and organizations as actors. These institutional agents each follow rules and policies that shape how individual actors play their institutional role. Further, I describe the major institutional agents and actors, and the institutional demands and expectations on individual actors, as well as the influence of interactions among them as each makes decisions about how to plan for project goals. Actors play different roles, which I also identify to compare the similarities and differences, as well as their varying capacities to accomplish project goals.

Working groups govern each redevelopment site, which involves project oversight and making decisions as it relates to the development. The working group is a collaborative effort, which aims to integrate specific project concerns ranging from political requests, to deals and demands. These working groups are instituted by the CHA to involve community stakeholders in the planning process. The working group is generally comprised of: the CHA, Habitat Company (as receiver for the Gautreaux court), LAC, City of Chicago Department of Housing, City of Chicago Department of Planning, the Gautreaux plaintiffs (represented by BPI), aldermen, and in certain cases a community representative appointed by the alderman. The development team and consultants are also part of the working group, but are not voting members and are there more so in a guiding role. At each development, the working
group comprises the same key actors, but the actual participants, and their relationship in the planning process varies with each development.

Working groups across project sites have been more or less effective, depending on who runs them, who sits on them, and whether the aldermen participate. Both Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park had strong and actively engaged working groups, with the majority of the aforementioned actors present for all working group meetings. Jackson Square did not have the same support from the working group. Although all the actors initially attended working group meetings, there was a clear lack of commitment to engage at the same level as the other developments over time. This was evident in the level of participation, which at Jackson Square only included four key actors; the CHA, Habitat Company, the Gautreaux plaintiffs, and the LAC. The CHA in the case of Jackson Square did not attend all meetings and relied more heavily on the Habitat Company to oversee the working group meetings.

To further understand the various institutional agents, next I will identify the agencies and organizations (actors) and the different functional roles played by individual actors in the ongoing project development as part of the working group:

**Chicago Housing Authority (CHA)**

CHA is responsible for applying for and receiving the HOPE VI revitalization grants, overseeing the administration of the program and planning and selecting the master developer. The CHA's main concern is ensuring that the required replacement units are provided either on-site, or through scattered site locations. The CHA assigns a development manager to each project. The manager is responsible for coordinating and overseeing the working group meetings, additional staff, and implementation of each HOPE VI site to support the project. The CHA development manager is typically experienced in mixed-financing, project management, land use planning, and housing development. He or she is the principal point of contact for residents, consultants, federal officials, and community service providers. The CHA designates three project coordinators to work with the development manager and social service provider to administer the Community and Supportive Services (CSS) program.

The expectation of the CHA project coordinators is to attend and lead working group meetings, as well as ensuring the smooth implementation of required replacement units, administering HOPE VI funds, and supporting the development team. Across Roosevelt Square, Westhaven Park, and Jackson Square, the CHA development managers have varying capacities to support project implementation. With both Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park, there was consistent participation of the CHA development managers throughout the project. However, at
Jackson Square there was constant turnover of the CHA development managers, which made it difficult for the working group to have a clear sense of leadership and direction. Because both Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park had consistent leadership and participation from CHA development managers thought project development it was easier to move the project forward. In the case of Jackson Square, because of the CHA development managers inconsistent involvement in the working group, oftentimes Habitat had to step in to guide the process. This made for strained relationships amongst the working group and confusion about the direction of the project.

**Habitat Company, as receiver for the Gautreaux court**

Habitat is a co-grantee for all HOPE VI funds. In this role, Habitat is responsible for allocation of funds, co-issues all RFPs, and chairs the working group meetings. Likewise, Habitat also negotiates all building closures, and processes redevelopment proposals through the City of Chicago and HUD (Gebhardt, 2009). The Habitat team for each development site designates development manager, development coordinator, and administrative assistant. The development manager attends all working group meetings and is the direct point of contact for all HOPE VI projects. While Habitat is the receiver, their primary role still focuses on ensuring units are not segregated. Therefore, the decision-making authority about project plans, still lies with the CHA, who they work closely with to implement all aspects of the HOPE VI Revitalization Plan. Habitat will make recommendations to the CHA, but the CHA makes the final decisions.

The Habitat development manager is expected to attend all working group meetings, oversee funding, and ensure the developer implements the required housing mix. The Habitat development manager for Roosevelt Square, Westhaven Park, and Jackson Square work in the same capacity to operate and administer the redevelopment efforts, as the receiver for Gautreaux. In each case, their role is the appointed direct receiver of all public housing units, undergoing redevelopment. This is to ensure there is no segregation. Habitat supports redevelopment efforts equally across each case, and in several instances there are the same development managers overseeing redevelopment efforts simultaneously. In this case, having the Habitat development manager in a role supporting project goals provides the necessary oversight to manage the working group.

**Legal Advocates**

For each case, there are multiple legal advocates that are part of the working group. The primary legal advocates that cut across Roosevelt Square, Westhaven Park, and Jackson Square are the Gautreaux plaintiffs, represented by BPI. BPI has been included in the working group and is part of negotiations at all redevelopment
sites. BPI works to solidify Gautreaux by ensuring that all public housing units are integrated into mixed-income development plans. It requires 1/3 of public housing units on-site, for returning residents, consistent with Gautreaux program goals of relocating residents to off-site housing units.

In addition to BPI, on the Westhaven Park working group, there is the counsel for the Horner Residents Committee (HRC). The tenant representative for the HRC represent the Horner residents based on the consent decree in place. The tenant representative is an external participant that works with residents, the HRC, and the CHA to negotiate any issues that may arise during the planning process. Likewise, Bill Wilen of the Sargent Shriver Center on Poverty Law represents the HRC and due to the governing consent decree has the authority to take the CHA to court on behalf of the HRC if problems arise during the planning process. In this instance, the working group and development team must consult the HRC, HRC counsel, and tenant representative on all matters related to the redevelopment of Westhaven Park. The interests of the BPI, counsel for the HRC, and tenant representative for these groups focuses on resident rights, and ensuring replacement units are available for residents that want to return to the redeveloped project site.

While each case has the Gautreaux plaintiffs, represented by BPI as part of the working group, Westhaven Park public housing residents have additional legal support of the HRC and HRC counsel. The consent decree provides the HRC with the capacity to have decision making authority in the redevelopment process. The consent decree sets Westhaven Park a part from both Roosevelt Square and Jackson Square because the HRC and HRC counsel have the governing authority to drive the planning process and hold other actors accountable to fulfilling commitments.

**Local Advisory Committee (LAC)**

The Local Advisory Committee (LAC) is the governing body that represents all of the existing residents of the former public housing sites. The LAC has the legal authority to participate and represent the residents. The LAC generally has 2-3 representatives present at meetings accounting for two votes. LAC committees hire representatives to assist them at the working group meetings, to better understand the process and make decisions. In this case, each project LAC works in a different capacity to represent existing public housing residents. The LAC in certain cases have a significant position of power in the decision making process because the LAC has the legal right, based on the HOPE VI policy requirements, to be involved in the planning process. Given this position, the LAC has the ability to bring lawsuits against the CHA, if it is deemed that the redevelopment process is negatively impacting the existing residents.
The LAC is expected to mobilize existing public housing residents to provide input to the working group about the needs of residents. This role can be both adversarial or collaborative depending on the positioning of the LAC committee as a voting member of the working group. For instance, in the case of Roosevelt Square, the LAC and tenant representative garnered a significant amount of power, led by a strong president, and an attorney who serves as their tenant representative. The LAC worked directly with the CHA in support of redevelopment efforts in exchange for benefits for public housing residents. Such benefits include the “right to return” stipulations and employment opportunities. This negotiated relationship allows the LAC to leverage the relationship with the CHA, and in return the CHA does not have to resolve issues through the court system. Because of prior lawsuits by the Concerned Residents for ABLA (CRA), the threat of a lawsuit and ongoing litigation was not in the best interest of moving the redevelopment process forward. Both the LAC and CHA found it beneficial to work in collaboration.

The Westhaven Park LAC works in a different capacity, in large part because of the control and leverage the HRC, counsel for HRC, and tenant representatives have based on the consent decree. In this case, only the LAC president is included in the working group meetings, to maintain a balance, and ensure that not only the needs of the HRC were represented, but also the public housing residents. The HRC is unique because the residents have two representatives that protected their involvement in the planning process. One was the counsel for the HRC, which was the legal representation, and the HRC tenant representative that worked in the capacity to negotiate on behalf of the HRC when disagreements arose with the working group.

The Jackson Square LAC, works differently than both Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park. This is largely because the majority of former Rockwell Garden residents opt to take housing choice vouchers and leave the community. This meant that there were fewer residents to represent, and therefore the working group was perceived as only representing their own interests, which were only 1-3 people. The Jackson Square LAC brought in an architectural consultant to help bridge the void between the development team and the architects, to improve their understanding, and help to communicate their ideas. While the LAC president is vocal about concerns related to the redevelopment process, those concerns are taken into consideration, but lack the same ability, as Roosevelt Square or Westhaven Park, to leverage decision-making capacity.

For both Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park, the LAC is able to leverage its position to advocate on behalf of existing public housing residents. In this case, the LAC has more authority to dictate the terms of project plans because of its relationship with the CHA at Roosevelt Square, and the consent decree at Westhaven Park. However, at Jackson Square the LAC does not have a similar mechanism or ingrained relationships to leverage its position. In
turn, the LAC at Jackson Square acts in the capacity to mobilize residents in an adversarial process, which impedes collaboration of the working group.

**Development Team.**

The developer is responsible for managing the entire redevelopment process, which includes securing the private financing, land acquisition, construction, marketing, property management, and contracting social service providers (Joseph, 2010). With a number of responsibilities, the developer also has wide decision making capacity as it relates to the redevelopment plan, and the procurement of the affordable and market rate units. Developer interests are focused on the financial sustainability of the project, and primarily on the bricks and mortar plan components. Planning and architectural consultants work with developers to design the master plan and architectural components of the development. But these entities have limited power in the decision making process. The role of the master planner and architect is to foster collaboration among the various interest groups. This collaboration is to create a vision for the community, and ensure the design of the developments are consistent with the goals of the HOPE VI program.

The overarching expectation of the developer is to manage the redevelopment process as it relates to project implementation of housing and community building services. In most cases the developer will secure financing and integrate input from the design team and working group to develop redevelopment plans. For both Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park, both development teams opt for joint ventures to encompass partners that combine experience, with both bricks and mortar and community building.

At Roosevelt Square, the development team comprises of three developers. Related, (formerly LR Development) is the primary developer and oversees and manages the entire planning, implementation and construction process. Quest Development partners with Related on the for sale housing. Heartland Housing is a non-profit partner that works on the rental, and social service components. Despite the death of Bruce Abrams, the head of LR Development (currently Related), the CHA and Habitat felt a strong team has been procured. The purchase of Related is viewed as an advantage by the CHA and Habitat because Related is a strong organization that secures high-end housing, with significant resources. Although their offices were based in New York, Related assures that the project will operate locally through Related Midwest. Related runs a tightly controlled planning process, based on its model for large-scale development projects. This style is effective in terms of being task oriented, but does not allow for the collaboration necessary across a number of stakeholders and competing interests.
Likewise, at Westhaven Park, the development team consists of a joint venture between Northbrook, IL-based Brinshore Development, and New Jersey based Michaels Development. Both teams oversee and manage the entire planning, implementation and construction process. Brinshore Michaels was selected as the developer in May 2001, in large part because of their commitment to provide the largest amount of public housing out of all the respondents. Brinshore Michaels is known for its dedication to affordable housing and collectively completes thousands of units of mixed-income housing across the U.S. The approach that Brinshore Michaels uses is more comprehensive, with a focus not only on housing, but also on the community building aspects of the plan. In terms of the bricks and mortar, Brinshore takes the project lead. For the community building components, Michaels experience with mixed-income communities, ensures a nuanced knowledge of how to provide social services, and community building activities on the ground. The planning process at Westhaven Park requires negotiation efforts across all parties – at times collaboration is effective, and other times decisions are ultimately made by the courts.

Jackson Square takes a slightly different approach. Eastlake Development is the sole developer for the project and was selected because of their previous role managing the former Rockwell Gardens public housing community. Eastlake is a minority business enterprise and its principal has over thirty years of experience developing, financing, and managing over 10,000 units of housing in the Midwest. Additionally, Eastlake completed 700 units of LIHTC housing. Eastlake has in-depth knowledge of the community, and familiarity with local and federal regulations, regarding public housing management with the CHA. However, Eastlake had challenges implementing Jackson Square based on the required funding streams, and lengthy periods of time in which the developer was required to hold the property, constantly changing the conditions for redevelopment. With a number of challenges to redevelopment, the working group was a divisive process that pitted Eastlake against the LAC in many cases, which in turn, did not lead to collaborative based planning efforts, with decisions made by Eastlake based on financial feasibility.

The development model used at Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park were advantageous in comparison to Jackson Square because having multiple partners with individual specializations could more easily accommodate the complexity of integrating both housing and community building elements. Additionally, both Related and Brinshore Michaels were larger development companies with more experience implementing large-scale projects. Roosevelt Square has a development team with a history of working in affordable housing, and large-scale development. Further, Westhaven Park, also has a team with a background for planning and executing mixed-income development projects. Jackson Square is led by a team known for affordable housing in Chicago, but does not have experience in large scale, or mixed-income community projects. These differences lead to different capacities to support project
implementation. Moreover, the joint ventures at Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park were more robust with access to additional personnel and financial resources to adapt to the changing economic climate and long-term nature of redeveloping public housing in Chicago.

**Consultants**

The design team in partnership with the developer is responsible for using their expertise, as well as input from the working group to integrate HOPE VI ideals into the required housing mix and final project build out. Both Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park decided to use a structured design team for the master planning and architectural services. Taking this into consideration, these projects have several overlapping consultants. To deliver the planning and architectural services, Related partners with Destefano Partners, as the master architect who structured the process after a model the firm used as managing architect for Chicago Public Schools. Destefano Partners acted as the master architect and managed the planning and design process. Three MBE/WBE architectural firms – Smith and Smith, Urban Works, and Brook Architecture - were subcontracted to design and build individual buildings on the site.

This allowed for one point of accountability, which was meant to improve the coordination process and considered an easier method by the development team, to manage multiple architects and build out the project. Related primarily worked with the working group and communicated recommendations to the design team. The design team developed and modified alternatives that were presented at public community meetings, but were not an integral part of the working group planning process. Having a structured design team was complicated when the construction process started. There were a number of issues that arose around coordinating four architects and contractors, to deliver the build out.

Similarly, at Westhaven Park, Brinshore Michaels partnered with separate planning and architecture firms, to deliver the planning and architectural services. The firm switched design teams entirely from the earlier phase II (2A west) and later phase II (2A east, 2B, 2C, 2D). For the earlier phase II efforts, the planning firm hired Skidmore Owings, and Merrill (SOM), a Chicago based, internationally renowned firm responsible for site planning and infrastructure design. This firm was not used past the initial schematic design. Instead, for architectural services and solidifying the master plan, Brinshore Michaels partnered with Destefano Partners as the master architect. For later phase II efforts, Brinshore Michaels used the same structure and partnered with Landon Bone Baker as the master architect, who coordinated the MBE/WBE architecture firms of Brook Architecture and Johnson and Lee. This was
done to streamline coordination efforts with the architects and contractors. The design teams were involved in the planning and implementation process with the working group, to develop and modify alternatives, and incorporate community recommendations into the final plans.

At Jackson Square, Eastlake took a different approach and opted to not use a structured design team process. Instead, Eastlake partnered with Piekarz Associates, a Chicago based firm for architectural services, because of the working relationship, and prior projects Piekarz Associates worked on with Eastlake. After Phase I was completed, Eastlake brought Okrent Associates onboard for master planning services, to work with Piekarz Associates on Phases 2 and 3. Okrent is a Chicago based firm of planners and architects specializing in plan development and land use planning. Gilmore, Kean LLC was hired by Eastlake for HOPE VI consulting services.

Gilmore Kean also assisted with the planning and implementation process, and executed the Community and Supportive Service (CSS) Plan. In contrast to the majority of HOPE VI developments in Chicago, Eastlake opted to work with a single architect, as opposed to having a master architect, managing multiple architects of record for each phase. This allowed for a smaller team requiring less coordination. The development and design team felt they could deliver a diverse product without having multiple architects of record.

City of Chicago

The City of Chicago works with the CHA to manage the public perception, support the redevelopment efforts, provide resources and approve the final plans. The Department of Housing, Department of Planning, and aldermen offices are part of the working group. Their role is to provide support in the way of resources, for infrastructure, environmental remediation, business development, social services, and political support. Roosevelt Square, Westhaven Park, and Jackson Square, for much of the redevelopment process share the same aldermen. For instance Aldermen Madeline Haithcock (2nd), Danny Solis (25th), Robert Fioretti (2nd) had parts of their ward located within each development. However, Westhaven Park was the only development located in Walter Burnett’s (27th) ward, which made a difference in terms of the focus and time contributed to the planning process.

The City of Chicago, with the backing of Mayor Richard M. Daley, made the transformation of public housing a top priority for the city. A designated manager oversaw all city agencies, specifically for the HOPE VI project and sought to work with the CHA to alleviate delays that have slowed down the project. For instance, prior to 2011 Mayor Richard M. Daley had Chiefs of Physical Infrastructure and Human Infrastructure, convene regular meetings across all relevant departments working on HOPE VI projects to ensure smooth project implementation (Rockwell Gardens
HOPE VI Application, 2001). With the change in leadership of the Mayor’s office to Rahm Emmanuel in 2011, there has been less project support, and public housing development is no longer a priority of the mayors office, and the City of Chicago. The position created by Mayor Richard M. Daley as a liaison to all city agencies, specifically for HOPE VI projects, no longer exists, and currently there remains limited knowledge across the working groups, who the delegated city agency representatives are.

Although city departments and aldermen are expected to participate in the working group and provide necessary project support related to infrastructure, resources, and political support – their capacity varies across developments. Because Roosevelt Square, Westhaven Park, and Jackson Square were located across three aldermanic wards, aldermen were not as intricately involved in the planning and implementation process. Aldermen were brought in to manage problems, or issues that arose during the planning process, and make final decisions. They were not a part of the day-to-day decision making at regular working group meetings. Likewise, because of the changes in structure in the mayors office, city agency representatives are not as integrated into the working group process as they once were. In this case, because of the lack of consistent participation of city departments and aldermen in the working group, coordination of redevelopment activities is more difficult to achieve. Coordination is paramount to implementing comprehensive neighborhood plans and without consistent participation the integration of plan goals are not always implemented.

Community Leadership

Across each project, there are varying degrees of community leadership that are generally supported by a CBO. In this case, the CBO may also provide social service support, as well as represent the broader community stakeholders at the working group. The purpose of the CBO is to mobilize the existing public housing community, as well as the surrounding community to ensure stakeholders have a voice in the working group.

Both Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park had strong community leadership that was integral to the working group and planning process. In the case of Roosevelt Square, a community representative from the University Village Association (UVA) was delegated by Alderman Madeline Haithcock to represent the broader community and local institutions, which included UIC, IMD, and St. Ignatius. Their role was primarily to ensure there was a voice at the table that represented the community leadership in the existing broader Little Italy community. The UVA is a strong community organization with deeply vested interests in the Little Italy community. UVA used this influence and leveraged its decision-making authority with local aldermen, to garner a position of power within the working group.
Westhaven Park had the support of the Near West Side Community Development Corporation (NWSCDC), which had already been involved with the first phase of Henry Horner. During their involvement with the first phase, the NWSCDC administered the Home Visitors Program, which helped connect residents to supportive social services. Currently the NWSCDC is the service provider for the Family Works program that directly services all public housing residents at Westhaven Park. The NWSCDC acts as a liaison to the broader public housing community. While the NWSCDC is part of the working group, the organization does not have voting power.

Unlike Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park, Jackson Square had little involvement from CBOs or organizations representing the broader community. While Jackson Square briefly had support from the Salvation Army, their neighborhood boundaries fell outside of many active CBOs. In this instance, not having the support of community organizations limited the ability of Jackson Square to provide community building initiatives or build support for redevelopment efforts.

Since Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park had strong community involvement and support, in turn garnering support for the project was much more effective than at Jackson Square. Without having a strong community base or lead CBO to mobilize residents and provide community services, this put the Jackson Square community at a distinct disadvantage. In contrast to Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park, Jackson Square does not have the same level of community engagement, services, or amenities for residents.

The following diagram (see Figure 17) illustrates the relationship of institutions and their position in the planning process:
6.4 Critical Implementation Episodes

In this section, I outline ‘critical implementation episodes’ within development phases, to compare and contrast major planning episodes of mixed-income developments. This includes decision points and the key actors involved in making them along a timeline. The development process has five phases: Project Initiation, Project Planning + Design, Plan Adoption, Construction, and Sale and Management. For the purposes of this research I will focus on the most important phases in which a commitment to HOPE VI ideals are critical; Project Planning + Design, Construction, and Sale and Management.

These phases are based on a synthesis of project schedules in the HOPE VI Revitalization plans, as well as my professional experience. These phases are important decisions are made about the plan, build-out, and occupancy in specific planning episodes. Figure 18 articulates the ‘critical implementation episodes’ that will examine actor commitment to new urbanism and overlap with institutional constraints.
The Project Planning + Design phase is an important phase of development in which several decisions are made that have a significant effect on future development phases. The first stage is plan alternative development, the second is the public participatory process, and the third is the final plan development.

**Plan Alternative Development**

During the plan alternative development stage, the CHA submits a HOPE VI revitalization plan to HUD for approval of funding, to start the planning process. Once the HOPE VI revitalization plan is approved by HUD, the CHA issues a Request for Proposal (RFP) for master developer services. A development team is selected by the CHA and Habitat, and a master development agreement (MDA) is procured. This process can also happen during the Project Initiation Phase depending on the project trajectory. Once this is done, the master developer works with the team of consultants, consisting of architects and planners, to develop preliminary plan alternatives. In the plan alternative stage, a commitment to new urbanism establishes the development of master plan alternatives, that will guide development. Program requirements and various strategies are debated to achieve the plan vision and goals. It is
at this particular stage where the CHA, City of Chicago, developer and consultants work to develop plan options and package preliminary financing. Plans are also done one of two ways: a master plan is developed for the entire site, or plans are done for each phase of development one at a time.

**Participatory Process**

After preliminary plan alternatives are developed, the development team presents the ideas to the working group. This group encompasses the CHA, Habitat, LAC and tenant representatives, community stakeholders, and legal advocates. The development team organizes design charretes, and presents plan alternatives to the working group over the course of three months to one year. The working group provides feedback about the program, layout, vision, and goals. The developer oversees this process, and the consultants present the plans and facilitate workshops. This is to obtain information for possible changes to the plan alternatives that can then result in final plans to submit in order to gain permission to move forward with development concepts. While plan alternative development requires commitment to new urbanism, this commitment has to be shared by the working group, if plans are to move forward. In this stage, decisions about project plans are made by the working group, as actors hope to gain their support.

**Final Plan Development**

The final plan development stage is a cumulative set of actions of the prior phases of plan alternative development and the public participatory process. In the prior stages, a commitment by actors to develop plans that incorporate new urbanism is important for the final plan to adhere to program guidelines. In this stage, the final plan will guide development, and buy-in is now required to sell the plan to the city council. Final plan requirements are established and various strategies are debated by the working group to not only achieve the plan vision and goals, but also to ensure that the plan fits the aims of city agencies and officials. At the final plan stage the CHA, Habitat, the developer, and consultants work to develop a final planned development (PD) and remain in oversight roles, as architects and planners work together to finalize the design and develop the final PD. Once the final master plan is completed, the plan is submitted to the Department of Planning and Development (DPD) for review and approval. Upon DPD approval, the plan it is submitted to the planning commission for approval. Once the plan is accepted by the planning commission, it goes for final submission to the city council as a PD. This phase is critical in determining what NU principles might have to be compromised in order to satisfy different stakeholders external to the plan development process but who nonetheless determine if the plan can move forward.
Construction Phase

The construction phase is an important phase of development where plans move from the design stage to final production and construction. This phase of development is important because at this point decisions are made about which physical features will be constructed. The first stage is contract documents, the second is value engineering, and the third is construction.

Contract Documents

During the contract document stage is where the ideas cemented in the planning + design phase, are now translated into working drawings, and specifications by the team architects. These drawings are more detailed, and specifications are prepared that define the project materials and installation. As part of the contract document phase, construction documents or blueprints, are used to establish the construction costs to build the project, and are part of the construction contract. While the commitment to new urbanism is established in the planning + design phases, it is actually carried out in the construction phase. In this stage, technical decisions are negotiated and finalized by the CHA, the developer, and architects. It is at this particular stage where architects present final construction drawings to the CHA and developer, to further refine design decisions, and determine specific plan and building components.

Value Engineering

After the contract document stage, the value engineering stage takes place, which occurs once all construction drawings are complete, and there are accurate construction estimates and operating costs. Value engineering serves to determine whether the construction drawings, as submitted, are economically viable based on the construction budget. In this case, construction drawings are compared against the developers construction budget, and revisions to the design or original concepts, are made by architects. In the value engineering stage, the commitment to new urbanism is critical because financial constraints of the project significantly impact which physical features remain in the final construction drawings, and move forward to the construction stage. Final decisions about the design and project costs, and which physical features are adopted or abandoned, are made by the CHA and developer, and carried out by the architects. This phase is critical in determining what new urbanist principles might have to be compromised in order to reduce costs.

Construction

The construction stage moves forward the decisions made in the prior contract documents and value engineering stages. In this phase, construction is overseen by the developer and architects with a project manager.
on the ground overseeing day-to-day activities and progress of work on site, identifying and containing potential cost overruns, and processing any plan changes required during construction. Architects visit the construction site and oversee the work of contractors to determine if the project is being constructed according to the construction drawings and specifications. The CHA and the developer are informed of the project's progress, and finance any necessary construction draws.

**Sale + Management Phase**

The Sale + Management phase is the last phase in the development process and several decisions are made that are not necessarily cumulative and that also can be modified. The first stage is marketing, the second is occupancy, and the third is community building.

**Marketing**

During the marketing stage, a commitment to new urbanism is established through the marketing strategy that guides the sale of market rate, and affordable residential units. It is at this stage where the development team works to decide on the best approach to market for sale units, and generate market demand. Mixed income developments with public housing is an untested typology for public housing developments. Developers use a variety of approaches to attract buyers such as, financing incentives and innovative phasing strategies, to attract market demand. The marketing strategy depends on several factors such as, the unique market conditions, location, amenities, and physical design of the community. In the marketing stage, actors are also making decisions about the funding to potential homeowners. In this stage, the development team is making decisions about the most effective marketing strategy to use. The developer is also making decisions about the incentives available to purchase a home, and the lenders are deciding as to whether to fund incentives and home loans for potential residents.

**Occupancy (Sale + Lease Management)**

During the occupancy stage is where a commitment to new urbanism is evident by the income and ethnicity mix across public, affordable and market rate housing. The income mix is established in the planning + design stage. However, the final determination of income mix occurs during the occupancy stage once rentals are leased and affordable and market rate units are sold. The CHA oversees the occupancy of public housing units, and the developer oversees the occupancy of affordable and market rate for sale units. It is at this stage, the CHA and management company work to lease up remaining public housing units with eligible tenants. The developer is also
working to close sales on the affordable and market rate units, and to ensure the Home Owners Association (HOA) is set up to manage and maintain the for sale units. The CHA works to meet the income mix goals of the plan, to provide public housing units.

**Community Building**

During the community building stage is where a commitment to new urbanism is evident by the incorporation of community building services and activities that will promote integration, and build a sense of community. This is initially established during the project planning + design phase, and is further solidified in this final stage of development. It is at this stage where the CHA, City of Chicago, developer, and CDCs, work to implement social service options to support the community. The CHA oversees this process, with local CDCs and the City of Chicago providing technical assistance, and also implementing on-site services and engagement activities for residents. In some cases, development teams employ on-site resident service coordinators, to provide social services, and connections to broader neighborhood support systems. Community building initiatives range from traditional social services, to broader community supports. Some examples include, creating non-profit organizations, health care networks, educational programs, job training, financial literacy, and community engagement activities.

**6.5 Summary**

This chapter establishes the context in which the CHA is working to redevelop public housing in Chicago. I provide a backdrop of the prior and current conditions of the CHA, and describe the legal constraints in place for all HOPE VI projects in Chicago. I also explore three planning efforts to redevelop public housing within the broader city context, as well as the parameters of the PFT and the current Plan Forward agenda. In addition to providing the broader context of Chicago public housing redevelopment, I also analyzed of the existing site conditions, and neighborhood change around the three selected case study sites. This is to provide a more in-depth perspective of the current neighborhood conditions. I provide a broad narrative of the actors involved in the planning of mixed-income communities in Chicago, and the network of institutions and actors involved in the PFT across each of my project sites.

The varying degrees of the capacity of different actors to carry out HOPE VI project plans, are also relevant in shaping the planning and implementation process. This will be further discussed in the case study chapters using the framework I developed based on ‘critical implementation episodes’ intended to explain how the implementation process is expected to work in general in Chicago. The following chapters – seven, eight, and nine - offer a detailed
analysis of the planning and implementation process at Roosevelt Square, Westhaven Park, and Jackson Square, within the framework and context presented in this chapter.
This chapter describes the planning and implementation of Roosevelt Square. I first outline the key actors and episodes that this case study explores. Second, I provide the context of the former ABLA Homes and the planning process from 1998-2000 that preceded the plan implementation for the current Roosevelt Square HOPE VI development, which occurred between 2001-2014. Third, the episodes I examine start with the plan development process, where the development team is selected to move the project forward. I identify and describe how, and in which areas actors are committed to plan goals, and where implementation constraints play a role through nine ‘critical implementation episodes’. And lastly, I outline key findings, which show how the range of actor commitment plays out throughout project plans.

Roosevelt Square is a high profile case that received $35M in HOPE VI funds to transform the former ABLA Homes. What makes this case unique is its location in an already stable Little Italy community. This makes for a planning process that is comprised of a multitude of actors (see Figure 19). The most important actors in this project are Related, the CHA, the LAC, community leadership, and the design team.

Roosevelt Square is an example of a planning process that is guided by a strong development team, high profile design consultants, extensive resources, and an affluent location with actors and institutes deeply invested in the projects success. The working group consists of an LAC president and community leadership that are supporting actors, who hold the development team, and the CHA accountable for commitments made to both public housing residents, and the broader community. However, idealism curtails practical decision-making at critical points in the implementation process.

There are five ‘critical implementation episodes’ that are important in the story of Roosevelt Square; the participatory process, final plan development, construction, occupancy, and community building. It is in these episodes, where critical decisions are made by actors that that contribute to whether project plans are achieved. In the public participatory process, and final plan development, commitment matters and the planning constraints further reinforce the planning process. In addition to the participatory stage, the final plan development stage also
serves to show the commitment of Related, and the community leadership, to moving the project forward. In the construction and occupancy stages, actor commitment is limited by planning constraints, which in turn alter project plans. In this case, despite commitment to integrate plan goals, the barriers in place cause actors to choose different plans. The occupancy stage also faces similar challenges and is equally influenced by the housing market decline. In the community building stage, commitment adjusts to both, inhibiting planning constraints and impeding actors.

Overall, Roosevelt Square had significant potential to develop plans that were consonant with plan goals, but a number of inhibiting planning constraints, and impeding actors, caused project plans to change. This case illustrates how actors used plan goals to guide their decisions and judgments, and how a combination of actor commitment and planning constraints, contributed to the lack of development at Roosevelt Square. In this sense, commitment played a significant role in the earlier development stages. But where there were overwhelming inhibiting planning constraints and impeding actors at later development stages, commitment failed to matter and was constrained.

The following diagram (Figure 19) illustrates the participants and relationships in the planning process:

Figure 19. Participants and relationship in the planning process at Roosevelt Square
7.1 Background

The ABLA (Addams, Brooks, Loomis, and Abbott Homes) homes are located on the near southwest side of Chicago, just outside of the Loop in the Little Italy neighborhood. This group of residential buildings was developed over the course of a 25-year period from the 1930s to the early 1960s. The Jane Addams Homes were the first public housing units built in Chicago, and were constructed in 1938. This development consisted of 1,027 units in 32 low-rise buildings. The next phase constructed in 1943 was the Robert Brooks Homes, which had 834 row houses. The remainder of ABLA was completed between 1943 -1961. This included the Loomis Courts with 126 units, Grace Abbot Homes with 1200 units, and the Brooks Extension with 449 units. When the development was fully completed, ABLA had a total of 3,500 units over 100 acres.

Figure 20. Photographs of ABLA

Source: Photographs by Brule Laker

Figure 21. Aerial of ABLA

Source: Photograph by Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning (CMAP)

Figure 22. Building figure ground of ABLA

Source: Figure by the author based on data from CMAP

Figure 23. Block figure ground of ABLA

Source: Figure by the author based on data from CMAP
Over the course of the next several decades starting in the 1940s, the near west side underwent a significant transformation. This area was drastically changed by the construction of the University of Illinois, expansion of the Illinois Medical district, and highway expansion that left this area largely isolated from the rest of the near west side. The subsequent decline in population of the near west side after the riots following the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., and hundreds of public housing units demolished at ABLA, left the community physically deteriorated. It was in the 1990s, that the city of Chicago, and major stakeholders such as UIC, took a renewed interest in the neighborhood and began a series of public improvements and private residential investments.

**Initial ABLA Redevelopment Plans**

The planning for redeveloping ABLA into a mixed-income community, started in 1995 after residents of the neighborhood called for a redevelopment plan. The ABLA LAC subsequently received a $200,000 planning grant from HUD. The initial planning for ABLA started with the Brooks Homes, Brooks Extension high rises, and row house reconfiguration. In 1996, the CHA applied for and received a HOPE VI grant for $24M to redevelop the Brooks Homes. While HOPE VI was primarily used for redeveloping high-rise buildings that were dilapidated, poorly maintained, and with outdated infrastructure systems, the Brooks Home renovation was done largely to ensure that the LAC president, Bethany maintained her support for the larger redevelopment of ABLA. Subsequently in 2000 the Brooks Homes underwent a substantive renovation to have the architectural context fit within the rest of the neighborhoods. Playgrounds and tot lots and onsite parking were added, and the number of overall units decreased from 834 to 329. The Jane Addams homes were planned for demolition and conversion to mixed-income housing. The Grace Abbot Homes were slated for demolition, with the Loomis Courts rehabilitated with 126 units of project-based Section 8. In 1998, the CHA was again granted $35M from HUD to revitalize the entire ABLA site.

Residents and business owners in the community were initially supportive of the redevelopment plan and encouraged the process. Initially, the ABLA LAC did not oppose the original plan, but a group of former residents, who formed the Concerned Residents of ABLA (CRA), had some concerns about the initial plan. After the plan was announced, the CRA hired the Sargent Shriver National Center On Poverty Law. This was an attempt to block the plan, because the CRA believed it would have a disproportionate impact on the existing minority women and children by concentrating replacement housing south of Roosevelt Road (Bennett, 2006; Gebhardt, 2009).

In turn, the CHA disregarded the CRAs arguments and proceeded to block them from the redevelopment process since the issue did not come from the governing Local Advisory Committee (LAC). The position of the CRA
was undermined largely because of the position of the LAC led by Bethany, who since 1994, had worked closely with the CHA and supported the redevelopment process. Because the LAC was the governing representation for local residents, their support for the redevelopment process greatly legitimized the position of the CHA. Subsequently, to oversee the development of the master plan, a working group was created without the CRA. With the CRA being blocked from the planning and design process, the group filed a lawsuit against the CHA in 1999 to block the redevelopment plan.

In the past, other resident groups, at both the Henry Horner Homes and Cabrini Green, used these tactics to gain entry to the planning process. Therefore the CRA used this as a way to gain some form of control in the redevelopment process. However, the lawsuit was dismissed, and it was ruled that due to the final redevelopment plan being incomplete, it was premature to demand intervention. Moreover, with the lawsuit dismissal, the CRA was subsequently removed from the planning process.

The final redevelopment plan for ABLA was overseen by the working group, and in 2000, the City of Chicago issued an RFP to find a master planner to design the redevelopment. The master planner was responsible for determining existing site conditions, land uses, site design, and a community assessment plan, to submit a HOPE VI Revitalization Plan to HUD. The master plan was awarded to Telesis Corporation, a planning firm based in Washington D.C. Telesis did a report titled, “Taking Stock”, which included developing land use, and mapping for transportation, infrastructure, and an extensive community assessment. The community assessment included interviewing health agencies, schools, training facilities, and community service programs. In-depth interviews were conducted with local residents to assess how they were using social services. This planning document was a supplement for the firm that would later be selected as the master developer, and used as a guide.

Telesis also developed a master plan based on a two-year participatory planning process that included monthly meetings with the working group, public meetings, and design charrettes. Calthorpe Associates, led by new urbanist Peter Calthorpe, was also brought on to develop several layers of neighborhood and land use planning that became the baseline map the master plan program was based on. The master plan incorporated a number of new urbanist designs in an effort to reintegrate the ABLA site with the existing neighborhood. Specifically, to address the physical isolation of the site, the master plan called for reinstituting the traditional Chicago street grid throughout the site, in an effort to improve access to land uses.

The street grid aimed to recreate both east-west and north-south connections to the site with walkable pedestrian friendly streets. Connections also included, incorporating a variety of land uses that included multiple housing types, community facilities, and the restoration of Taylor Street and Roosevelt Road, as vibrant commercial
Additionally, the master plan sought to integrate open spaces, in cooperation with the City of Chicago’s Department of Parks. Proposed open spaces included a five-acre public park, and smaller park spaces to create linkages throughout the community. In addition to the proposed design elements, the initial ABLA redevelopment plan included 1,084 public housing units, 846 affordable units, and 966 market rate units (ABLA HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, 2001). (See Figure 24).

Figure 24. Telesis / Calthorpe Neighborhood Synthesis Plan

Source: ABLA HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, 2001

In conjunction with the master plan development, Telesis also ran a community planning process for the CSS Plan for ABLA, which sought to complement many of the plan’s physical design strategies. To accomplish this task, the CSS Plan aimed to strengthen connections between neighborhood and citywide resources to improve ABLA resident’s
quality of life, and promote self-sufficiency. There were several community meetings, a resident survey, three community forums, a Community Congress held by the West Side Consortium, and meetings with community stakeholders.

These meetings identified three major areas for the future master developer to focus on: education, employment and job training, and health. The initial recommendations included establishing a Community Academy and Computer Learning Center, an Employment Council, to assist residents in retaining job opportunities in the Illinois Medical District, an ABLA taskforce on education to address the educational deficiencies, revisiting the UIC taskforce on health care to link residents with quality health care, and facilitate a planning process for a Jane Addams public housing museum (ABLA HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, 2001). In addition to the CSS efforts, the City of Chicago also agreed to provide Growing Home, an urban agriculture non-profit, with land to develop a greenhouse on the ABLA site, and offer employment and education opportunities for ABLA residents.

To ensure safety for the new redevelopment and lower crime rates, a new police station and fire station were planned for the ABLA site. In addition to the CSS efforts, the HOPE VI Revitalization Plan also called for a specific assessment of schools in the community. Proposed was an educational task force to develop, and coordinate recommendations to improve the existing neighborhood school around Roosevelt Square, as well as work with CPS to implement recommendations. The task force had four primary purposes which included: evaluating the current school options, identify deficiencies, explore creating new educational school models, and improve the technological capacity at schools. The task force was intended to include CPS, ABLA residents, UICs College of Education, St. Ignatius, local school administration, and philanthropic organizations. (ABLA HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, 2001)

The RFP for the master developer for the entire ABLA site was issued in 2000. There were six responses to the RFP. The top two respondents were a locally supported entity, Team Chicago, and LR Development. According to Richard, a senior development manager at Habitat, Team Chicago was viewed as being compromised, because several of the development team members were closely involved as institutional players in the planning process. Also, the pricing did not benefit the entire 100-acre site. Rather than run a compromised procurement process, Team Chicago was eliminated, despite the LACs desire to work with Team Chicago, led by a former alderman. Ultimately, the CHA and Habitat decided to hire LR Development. LR Development was selected for several reasons, which included their background as an affordable housing developer, local presence, and their partnership with Heartland Alliance who had significant experience with social services. The team partnered with Quest Development for the for sale housing, DeStefano Partners as the master architect, and four architects of record – Smith and Smith, Urban Works, Brook Architecture, and Macando.
With the procurement of LR, now Related, the team started immediately with plan development. Telesis was selected to manage the planning process, and Related was essentially selected as the implementation team. Because Telesis had already developed a land use plan, Related’s responsibility was to develop a finance schedule and design imperative, using the land use plan as a guide. Because there were two different teams, Related still had to repeat the plan development and participatory process, even though they were selected as the implementation team. This process was necessary in large part for Related to reconcile the prior master plan, and the financial feasibility of delivering the project. Elizabeth, Vice President of Community Relations at Related, explained the challenges of having two different teams for planning and implementation:

“...When Telesis put the plan together with their pro formas, we were not able to implement them based on the program they had previously set up. That was the primary reason and I think one of the biggest lessons learned, over the course of the 15 years, was that it is prudent to have the same team do the planning, as well as the implementation, particularly as it relates to financing. Because at the end of the day, these are real estate transactions that have to make sense in order for them to be implemented.”

(Interviewed on 11.24.2013)

For Roosevelt Square, this was a unique set of circumstances because of the evolution of how HOPE VI plans were being implemented. In an interview with Victor, a development manager at the CHA, the initial plans for Roosevelt Square were to include a different
developer for each phase. However the strategy changed, and the decision was made to select a single development team to implement the initial Telesis master plan. According to Victor, the rationale for selecting a single developer was:

“More about consistency, accountability, responsibility, and having the single point of contact. Also, efficiency with the procurement process, because bidding it out six, or eight, or ten times could be a battle that you would have to do a lot more often, whereas if you just do it once, then you know who your partners are going to be for a long term.”
(Interviewed on 01.16.2014)

While reasons behind the CHA selecting different teams to plan and implement Roosevelt Square were meant to streamline the process and more easily hold actors accountable, this posed significant challenges for Related. To have one team assemble a plan and financing package, and another implement the project based on those plans, would prove cumbersome. This process necessitates the importance of having the same team for both the planning, and implementation phases. This is essential for executing the plan, because the master developer assumes the financial risk, and would only take on a project that is financially feasible.

**Establishing Unit Mix and Financial Feasibility**

In order to maintain a commitment to new urbanism during the plan development stage, Related had to ensure that initial financing and designs were consistent with the unit mix to achieve income mixing, and present a framework that allowed for the HOPE VI goals to be achieved. Establishing the unit mix and financial feasibility of implementing Roosevelt Square, required extensive private investment by the development team, and the ability to use the work done by Telesis as a guide for future development. Since Telesis had already developed the initial master plan, there were several decisions made that Related had to adhere to, which included allowing the Brooks Homes to remain on-site, and determining how the unit-mix needed to be achieved.

Related had to figure out how to arrive at an overall unit mix that recognized the continued existence of the Brooks Homes (See figure 26). In addition to the Brooks Homes, Related also had to include enough new public housing units, tax credit units, and market rate units to achieve the agreed upon 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 mix. Therefore, the decision was made to have the first two rental phases with 2/3 public housing. Having the Brooks Homes on site was different than other developments, according to Patrick, Vice President of Acquisitions at Related:

“Because, it was a site condition that could not be modified, and there was not the option to mix the unit count and phasing that would be 2/3 tax credit, 1/3 public, or 1/3 market, 1/3 tax credit, 1/3 public – the flexibility was not there because of the consent decree.” (Interviewed on 01.24.14)
The existing ABLA site with the Brooks Homes was a constraint that inhibited Related’s ability to modify the unit count. This in turn influenced the strategy used to propose and implement plans for Roosevelt Square. Taking into account the existing site constraints, the overall proposed unit count was 2,441. Of these, 1,241 were for sale and the balance of 1200 were planned for rental. The rental component was comprised of 755 public housing units and 445 affordable units. Of those units, 2/3 of the public housing units, and 1/3 of the affordable units, were between 60-80% AMI. Additionally, for sale housing had a small component of affordable, for sale housing for people who earned up to 120% of the AMI.

Figure 26. Photographs of Brooks Homes

Taking into account the existing Brooks Homes, as well as the strategy to achieve the desired unit mix into account affected the financing, and operations of the project. Patrick presented the challenges faced on the developer side and discussed with me in our interview how the desired unit mix affected how much Related could build and how much of a fee could be earned. The overall economic financial feasibility of the project was important, and Related needed to develop a substantial number of market rate for sale units to make the development work. Patrick recalls, the rationale for Related’s financial approach:

“We made a bet as a development company that given the project’s location and amenities, that the market rate product, principally the sale product, actually exclusively the for sale product would be sufficient to produce a total return that was good enough for us as developers to pursue, and at the same time, would result in a rental product, given enough subsidy, would be able to sustain itself.” (Interviewed on 01.24.14)

Financial feasibility was a major factor to make the project work in the plan development stages, so the developer fee had to be sufficient to undertake a project the scale of Roosevelt Square. Related took a market based risk that resulted in the rental units being skewed towards public housing, 2/3 public housing and 1/3 tax credit with
a balance down by a for sale component that was predominantly market rate. Overall, with the Brooks Homes taken into account, the 1/3,1/3,1/3 mix was achieved.

There were a number of public and private funds secured in addition to HOPE VI funds to build Roosevelt Square. Sources included the LIHTC, Roosevelt/Racine TIF, HOME funds, IHDA, Federal Home Loan Bank Affordable Housing Program (FHLB AHP) funds, and conventional debt and equity. First, tax credits were expected to account for a total of $10M from the city and state to subsidize the affordable housing units. Second, the Roosevelt / Racine TIF district, according to the 2001 HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, was initially passed in 1998 and was set to expire in 2021. The TIF would cover site acquisition costs, site preparation, and professional fees. All taxes generated by new construction can be leveraged to pay for eligible TIF costs. Overall, roughly $39M could potentially be generated by the TIF, and of this, $2.34M was proposed to be generated by the rental units (ABLA HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, 2001). The TIF was required for the build out of Roosevelt Square because any TIF funds allocated to rental units were completely dependent on the success of the for-sale units. Likewise, 100% of the infrastructure costs would be paid for by the City of Chicago. These funds would come from the general obligation bonds that were set aside annually to cover the costs of infrastructure improvements.

Third, even with the HOPE VI funds, TIF funds, tax credits, and city general fund resources, there still remained a gap in funding between the uses and sources of funds. To fill those gaps, HOME funds and a combination of 11% of other city funds, were proposed to cover the gap over a ten-year period. Fourth, the IDHA trust fund assumed an allocation of $750,000 for various phases to be used for units with households earning up to 80% AMI. Fifth, FHLB AHP funds were available up to $500,000 per allocation and was limited to households earning less than 60% AMI. Sixth, half of the for sale units were expected to use funds from the Homestart program, which generated $19M in profits (ABLA HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, 2001). The Homestart funds further reduced the gap in financing required. And lastly, developer equity, which was about 10-20% of the construction loan, in which the equity is returned to the developer as profit, once the for sale units are sold and loans paid off. With mixed-financing under HOPE VI, the $35M in grant funds offset the predevelopment costs allowing the project to move ahead more quickly.

Related took on the major risk associated with the Roosevelt Square project. This financial risk was perceived by Related to support their commitment to implementing HOPE VI project plans. In my interview with Elizabeth, she commented on the developer's commitment to social and physical mixing in project plans:
“You have individual personal commitments, and convictions and then you have what I will call the institutional convictions. I would say, as a developer our first and foremost goal was to be able to build a product that was financially feasible, it was very difficult for us to get our hands around what felt like social engineering. And that’s probably the downfall of the PFT. It’s very difficult to mix business and philosophical goals, and its hard work to mix business and philosophical goals. It’s expensive and I don’t think unless you have the purse strings and the wherewithal it’s impossible...So, to the best of our ability as a development team we did try to maintain the philosophical goals, the HOPE VI goals, and we did believe in them. But I would say that even within our team - we had a very large team, so we had five architects, three general contractors and two attorneys, two different syndicators, we had a HOPE VI consultant. Are you going to get a shared perspective? With all of those organizations and individuals? No. But, it was our task as the developer to keep the vision, to keep the goals, at the forefront.” (Interviewed on 11.24.2013)

Patrick, concurs with this assessment and further explained Related’s commitment to developing a HOPE VI project in relationship to financial feasibility:

“So being smart developers, we said, okay, let’s run with this, figure out what we can do that makes sense financially, and that produces a product that fits the intent of the HOPE VI guidelines, which is mixed income, mixed use. And so that’s what we tried to do. Our philosophy at the time, was that we could achieve the community mix that we needed, meaning the integration of people and cultures and lifestyles, that we could integrate those by essentially physically integrating for sale units and rental units so that if you walk down the completed phases of Roosevelt Square today, not every building on a particular block is rental. There’ll be some for sale. And that was our approach to community building, if you will.” (Interviewed on 01.24.14)

Despite the challenging financial risk associated with Roosevelt Square, and doing what felt like social engineering, the development team was committed to keeping the social, and physical plan goals of the PFT alive throughout the implementation process. As long as the project remained financially viable, the social and physical plan goals would remain at the forefront of the development process. However, it was clear that planning constraints that inhibit implementing HOPE IV plan goals from this perspective, were primarily about the financial feasibility to carry out the intended plan goals. In other words, to implement the proposed HOPE VI plans goals, a number of public and private resources needed to be procured to move the project forward.

Likewise, Related acknowledged the numerous institutions and individuals that comprised the redevelopment team and across these institutions, a shared perspective may not be feasible. But in this case, the responsibility fell upon the development team to maintain their commitments throughout the implementation process, in an effort to guide their team. This idealism in the plan development stage worked to the benefit of Related, which was evident in their financial investment, and their partnership with Heartland Housing. Related wanted to reinforce the philosophical goals, yet understood that although they had experience building stand alone affordable housing, that was different than building mixed-income communities.
7.3 Participatory Process: Division of Interests

After plan development was underway, the next step in the planning process was to move forward with working group and public meetings. This is a part of the participatory process to propose a revised master plan for implementation. The participatory process started in 2002, and the working group held meetings over the course of one year specifically on the master plan development. The working group remains an ongoing series of meetings that have continued from 2002-2014, and will be referenced further throughout the development process. The working group process served as a forum where actors used their interests to guide their decisions and actions to plan Roosevelt Square.

There were two distinct factions within the working group, one led by the president of the LAC committee, Bethany, and the other led by Brian of UVA, which represented the community leadership. Within their institutional roles, these two actors supported different constituents during plan implementation, and mobilized support for the master plan across both public housing residents, and the broader Little Italy community. The LAC represented the interests south of Roosevelt Road, where the majority of public housing existed. In this case, just as in the initial planning stages with Telesis, the president of the LAC largely set the tone for the working group as the governing body representing public housing residents. Bethany wielded a great deal of power because of the LAC's alliance with the CHA in support of the redevelopment process.

By acting as supporting actors, Bethany was able to assist the CHA in the negotiation of decisions made in the working group, while also negotiating the needs of public housing residents, as it related to tenant selection and employment. The CHA in return for the support of the LAC made the public housing population a significant priority. In an interview with Walter, the LAC tenant representative/attorney, he discussed how Bethany,

“Was the consummate politician, and developed excellent working relationships with the CHA, Related, and property management better than any other working group in Chicago…She used these relationships to wield influence in the working group decision-making process to ensure the needs of public housing residents were met” (Interviewed on 03.07.2014).

In addition to effective negotiating, Richard also acknowledged that the Roosevelt Square process always had the threat of a lawsuit hanging over the redevelopment, based on the earlier CRA lawsuit. Therefore, it was likewise in the best interest of the CHA to negotiate with the LAC committee in an effort to alleviate any future court proceedings, due to disagreements that would slow the development process down.
On the other side was the community leadership, which represented the interests north of Roosevelt Road in the working group. There was a great deal of resistance by the community leadership in the planning process because of the CHAs alliance with the LAC and priority on public housing, as opposed to managing the broader expectations of the Little Italy community. Led by Brian, the community leadership was also well connected, and leaned on its connections with the Mayor’s office, city agencies, and aldermanic offices to ensure that community leadership recommendations were taken seriously. Community leadership interests focused on ensuring that the affluent Little Italy community remained a middle to upper-middle class community, long-term with residents and physical design that reflected the existing community. In the case of both the LAC and community leadership, what initially started off as building support, and mobilizing public housing residents and the broader community, also became a concerted effort to hold the working group accountable to achieve the intended HOPE VI plan goals.

While the working group led the participatory process, the powerful LAC, and formidable community leadership, from a very active and engaged Little Italy community, led to a contested public participatory process. In this case, the participatory process was more robust than at other HOPE VI sites because of its location within an existing community. Because of the division of interests, Elizabeth explained how Related sought to mediate the working group process, with the goal to:

“Work to balance all of the voices because they often have divergent interests and so at the end of the day what guided the process was, it’s the housing authorities land, so the CHA was technically our client. And we had to just strike a balance between the community leadership and the working group.” (Interviewed on 11.24.2013)

To balance the different interests of the working group, the development team also worked to educate the community on the philosophical goals of mixed-income, and how the community would be developed with affordable and market rate units on the same block, side-by-side. Not only were working group meetings held, but Related also held one-on-one meetings with the community leadership as well. The participatory process at Roosevelt Square was a challenging process because of the clear division of interests between the north and south sides of Roosevelt Road, and remained a recurring element throughout the plan implementation.

**Defining the Roosevelt Square Community**

The major issues that were debated amongst the working group included: defining the Roosevelt Square community, unit mix distribution, tenant selection, and physical design. Defining ownership of Roosevelt Square and the types of residents that would be welcome was a major discussion point of the working group because of
Roosevelt Square’s unique location within an existing community. As Elizabeth told me in our interview, while there were few points the LAC and community leadership agreed upon, from the beginning of the public participatory process, both the LAC and community leadership agreed that Roosevelt Square would not be a new community. In contrast to many HOPE VI projects, such as Cabrini Green and Park Boulevard that erased much of the existence of the former public housing community, Roosevelt Square would integrate new plans within the context of the existing community. It was very important to both the public housing residents, and the community leadership, that newcomers to the community respect the indigenous population that had coexisted for decades. In our interview, Brian further described to me the dynamics of the Little Italy neighborhood:

“People in this community were used to seeing people in public housing as part of every day life, and there have been antagonisms and racism involved both ways for that matter. But there was coexistence. This area is plenty economically stable, so it’s something that you want to integrate with and build upon, not challenge. You’re not creating an island of wealth or better incomes, amidst the edges of which if you go west of here and you go to Rockwell, okay, Rockwell’s gotta be – or you go over by the United Center, what they created there is the best there is. It’s better than anything around it, okay? That’s not true here…I mean it’s just – so there’s something to anchor here” (Interviewed on 01.17.14)

However, this sense of coexistence played out in an oftentimes, contentious fashion in the working group, as both the LAC and community leadership wanted their interests to guide the development process. While defining the Roosevelt Square community was important to both groups, their perspectives on how this would be achieved were expressed in different ways. On one hand, community leadership was concerned about integrating new residents into an already economically stable community and building upon and integrating with what currently existed. Brian asked poignant questions of the working group, such as, “how do we build a stock of housing that’s gonna be here 40 years from now? As opposed to, how do we take care of people who have lived in public housing?” (Interviewed on 01.17.14).

The perceived short-term, immediate focus on public housing, and the desire to keep the support of the LAC, was viewed as a limitation to the long-term success of Roosevelt Square. While long-term outcomes were a key focus of the community leadership, Walter also claimed that the impression given by the community leadership was that whites moving into the area might move away if too many public housing units were built. This viewpoint coincides with the assumption that there may be too many blacks coming to the community. Taking this into consideration, the community leadership at multiple working group meetings, reinforced that the development of for sale housing should be viewed as just as important as building replacement rental housing. This would ensure the long term sustainability of Roosevelt Square.
On the other hand, public housing residents were also concerned about the new residents that would be coming into the community, but initially, the biggest priority was more focused on the new CHA population. The LAC expressed their interests, by focusing on how to determine tenant selection criteria, and right to return qualifications. The LAC was squarely involved in the development of the tenant selection plan for all public, and income restricted affordable housing units with specific tenant eligibility guidelines. Preference would be given to lease compliant residents, those that met income guidelines, and who also satisfied a one-year length of employment requirement (Roosevelt Square Tenant Selection Plan, 2004). There were two components of the income threshold; households with incomes from 0-60% AMI, and those with income no more than 60% AMI.

Moreover, based on the prior CRA lawsuit, there was still some lingering fear amongst public housing residents, that the for sale components of the development would be completed by the development team on the north side of Roosevelt Road, and the public housing units would be relegated to the south side of Roosevelt Road, therefore not creating a true mixed-income community. While the community leadership felt there was no basis for this concern, part of the development team and Habitat’s role, according to Howard, Director of Development at Habitat, was also ensuring that both sides of Roosevelt Road were dealt with equitably in terms of unit mix and distribution.

Overall, to plan a community long-term, both perspectives needed to be incorporated – one that provided for existing public housing residents, but offered a clear vision as to what Roosevelt Square would look like as residents changed and the community over time is developed. These two groups put their divergent interests aside and mobilized their efforts to support redevelopment plans that ensured the unit mix, and tenant selection was adhered to. Discussions focused on long-term efforts to build a sustainable community, proved to move plans forward that aligned with project goals.

Urban Design

The urban design components for Roosevelt Square were debated in the working group, between Related, the community leadership, and design team. An architect shared with me in the interview, that determining the urban design for Roosevelt Square was a tightly controlled process by Related. Design ideas were debated in the working group, and recommendations made by the group were communicated to the design team, to incorporate into plans. Furthermore, Patrick recalled in our interview, that the urban design for Roosevelt Square was based largely on the initial land use plans developed by Telesis. These land use plans integrated new urbanist principles such as, connecting the street grid, neighborhood integration and scales, and variety of housing types. Therefore, new urbanism was a
Patrick describes the process Related took to facilitate new urbanism into project plans:

“Well, in terms of the new urbanism principles, as developers, we chose architects that shared those principles and could produce plans and drawings and work product consistent with those principles. So because we had already been given land use plans, in terms of -- the land use plan was the driving new urbanist principle, okay? Our task as developers and as designers or as the developers charging the designers with what to do, was to preserve work within the framework of that land use plan to create essentially a walkable neighborhood, which is why at the end of the day, we didn’t close down streets. We kept streets open. We recreated the street grid in many instances. And it was all for the purpose of making sure that at the end of the day, Roosevelt Square would look like any other Chicago neighborhood.”

(Interviewed on 01.24.14)

While the land uses, street connections, alleys, and sidewalks in most instances were already set, DeStefano Partners used the framework of the Telesis master plan to further develop specific schemes for block layout, building locations, building typologies, landscaping, and locations for open spaces. An architect described to me in greater detail, how the proposed master plan included a focus on maintaining traditional Chicago scale blocks, with multifamily buildings at the corner, and in the middle of the blocks, incorporating low-density walk-ups and townhomes. Furthermore, to ensure that the plan was integrated, each block was designed to have a combination of both rental, and for sale units to create both variety, and visual interest. On one hand, because DeStefano Partners developed the master plan, as well as individual building designs, there was a broader understanding and support of the nuances of new urbanism, to include features into the plans.

However, an architect of record admitted to not knowing, nor desiring the need to know, what new urbanism was. Because the architects were assigned buildings to design and given specific parameters, there was no need to be involved with the broader urban design plan features. The differences found within the design team, reinforces how a range of actor commitment exists, even within institutions. Although this represented both idealism coupled with indifference, this was not detrimental to project plans. In this case, because of both the commitment of Related, as well as that of Destefano Partners, to consistently implement new urbanism into project plans, this remained at the forefront of revisions to the Telesis plan.

**Building Design**

Building design proposals throughout the master plan development also varied between Related, the design team, the community leadership and CHA. The goal of Related was not to build massive single buildings, but to incorporate low-scale development in terms of height and bulk, with a mixture of mid-rise buildings, to achieve
the necessary density. The development team and the architects agreed that it was key for Roosevelt Square to be consistent with the surrounding neighborhood, particularly with the housing stock north of Roosevelt Road. Based on the land use plan, the goals were to create different housing densities that were cost effective, and also achieve the unit, and income mix that the plan required. A variety of building types were incorporated.

For example, 2-3 flats, 20-40 unit buildings, and 50-unit buildings. In this particular case, the community leadership did not want to see a proliferation of multi-unit buildings. They continued to urge Related to maintain the initial Telesis master plan proposals, with a majority of 3-story, low-rise apartments. If specialized units were required, they were to be no more than 6-stories. (A UVA Position Paper, 2000; Working Group Memo, September 2003).

Likewise, the CHA also did not want to develop any buildings considered as mid or high-rises. However, according to an architect, the development required a menu of building types to obtain the required unit mix, and balance a variety of urban schemes. While low-density buildings would be the primary housing type, there was also a need to provide a mixture of larger-scale buildings, if the designated unit mix was going to be achieved.

To achieve the desired unit mix and total count, plans required a menu of building options that included larger, multi-story buildings. However, because of the perception of mid or high-rise buildings by the CHA, and community leadership, there were challenges to get these actors to get past the negative stigma associated with mid or high-rise development. For instance, the CHA has a policy that no public housing families can live on any floor higher than the third story of a building. In this case, this affects the unit mix, as well as having units that are indistinguishable from each other. If residents live in a five-story building, then it is easy to determine which residents are public housing residents.

In addition to not wanting mid or high-rise development, several informants claimed that the CHA also did not want to incorporate front porches, despite this being considered a key component of new urbanism. There was a perception issue, and porches were not allowed because of how people might be perceived hanging out in front of the buildings. This was an issue debated among the design team, because in some cases, architects wanted to incorporate porches, and traditional neighborhood designs. However, density was important for Related in terms of being able to achieve the unit count and mix necessary to make the plan work.

Therefore the density pushed the building design away from porches. While the unit mix and count is important to achieve, there also needs to be a balance maintained between using, new urbanist principles that integrate low-rise development, porches, and traditional neighborhood designs. Additionally, making the project work in
terms of meeting not only the unit mix, but also integrating traditional neighborhoods designs, were hindered by the negative perceptions of actors, which influenced overall building designs.

**Commercial Development**

The question of how retail and commercial development would be developed was also discussed at the working group. The initial Telesis plan envisioned commercial use along Roosevelt Road. Likewise, the initial plans by DeStefano Partners included multiple convenience retail locations along Roosevelt Road, which the community leadership staunchly opposed. Richard explained that the community leadership was opposed to development along Roosevelt Road because they wanted immediate attention paid to Taylor Street with a large plan for grocery stores, and large restaurants. The community leadership wanted to avoid the over-commericalization of the neighborhood, and did not want to create too much traffic and congestion. They also didn’t want to take away from any potential housing opportunities. The group overall wanted to see plan proposals that included pedestrian scale retail development along Taylor Street, and primarily residential development for Roosevelt Road (A UVA Position Paper, 2000; Working Group Memo, January, 2003).

In addition to building up Taylor Street, the community leadership wanted more control over bulk and density on Taylor Street, compared to Roosevelt Road. In opposition to development along Taylor Street, public housing residents desired to see commercial development along Roosevelt Road and south of Roosevelt Road. Between the LAC and community leadership, each wanted to see retail and commercial used incorporated into the plans differently, but these decisions ultimately were based on whether it was financially feasible for Related. Overall, the master plan proposals included additional retail along both Taylor Street and to a lesser extent Roosevelt Road. The proposed retail along Taylor Street remained smaller scale, and along Roosevelt Road the proposal included a mixture of housing types, as well as larger scale retail options, such as CVS.

**Open Space**

Open spaces, and the overall function of the community were central to the working group among the LAC and community leadership. The LACs major concern was around the open spaces, and more so how the community would function on a daily basis, versus how the community would look. This implies that more important than the physical design, was how the spaces that were created would be used by the residents living at Roosevelt Square, particularly the public housing residents. Patrick described the aspects that the LAC were concerned about in terms
of functionality, such as how and where residents could gather, and whether there would be stoops, or places to barbeque. Overall, Patrick mentioned that residents wanted to know things like:

> So, “Can we barbeque? Where can we gather?” If we’ve been used to sitting on our stoops and talking to people and you don’t have stoops, so how’s that gonna work for us? So their concerns were more at the level of, “How is this community gonna work?” As opposed to, “How’s it gonna look?” (Interviewed on 01.24.14)

This was based in large part on the previous experiences of residents of not having public-private spaces, and concerns about security. There were the challenges of making the distinction between what was considered community space, and defensible space. For instance with the importance of incorporating open spaces, and pedestrian friendly streetscapes that would promote walkability, there was also a battle between what was defensible space and what was defined as community space. Community space was considered spaces that could be used by community residents for dedicated activities, such as pocket parks, tot lots, or areas to barbeque. Defensible space was more about allowing for community engagement, and public / public-private spaces, while also delineating boundaries between the community and the public to ensure residents safety. Richard, also acknowledged the difficult questions that were posed such as:

> "How do you make sure that the gangway has a gate, but at the same time people feel free to walk around the neighborhood and they’re not alone out there in the canyon? Or how do you have neighborhood community spots, whether it’s a tot lot or a coffee store, inside of a condo building that’s accessible to the public, but not having to worry about gang hangouts or unwanted activity? So there was a lot of dynamic tension in the people that were pushing the original new urbanism design." (Interviewed on 11.26.13)

Designing for both community spaces, as well as defensible space brought about resistance to some of the original new urbanist concepts in the master plan. Much of this concern arose from the lack of understanding new urbanism, and how these designs would allow for greater ability for residents to control for safety. For instance, integrating pocket parks, and tot lots, offer opportunities for residents to gather and promote walkability, but there is also the fear associated with spaces being used in ways other than intended, either by existing residents, visitors, or the general public. The challenge was to find ways to develop innovative ways that allowed for dedicated community spaces, or public-private spaces that could also be controlled within courtyards areas or pocket parks.

While the LAC was concerned with functionality of spaces, the community leadership was focused on ensuring that public open spaces were proposed as part of the overall master plan. The master plan proposed limited open space south of Roosevelt Road, and none north of Roosevelt Road, which was a change requested by the community leadership. The community leadership supported a designation of at least 10% of the project for park
or recreational purposes (A UVA Position Paper, 2000). In addition to adding more public open space, determining how the City of Chicago landscaping requirements would be met was an issue to ensure walkability. Overall, proposed parks and extensive landscaping requirements were incorporated into master plan proposals.

Throughout the participatory process to develop the master plan, the LAC and community leadership played their institutional role in a way that far exceeded the commitment of consistently mobilizing residents, and the broader community to support project plans. Their role became one of advocacy and support for both unit mix, and additional design features that improved the master plan. While at times, their actions could be perceived as impeding the planning process, overall, their contributions to the master plan were aligned with the goals of new urbanism. Many of their recommendations were taken into consideration by Related, and later incorporated by the design team. The LAC and community leadership held actors accountable to maintaining the visions set out in the Telesis plan, while making necessary improvements.

7.4 **Final Plan Development: Big Plans, Limited Action**

For the final plan development stage, a PD process to finalize the master plan occurs where the CHA, and Related submit the master plan to the City of Chicago. From this point, the plan goes through numerous steps to be approved. The plan is reviewed by Chicago Plan Commission, City Council Committee on Zoning, the full City Council, and DPD, which approves the PD. The PD includes:

- underlying zoning
- permitted land uses
- bulk regulations
- detailed site plan with building foot prints and improvements
- building designs and elevations
- landscape plans
- street locations
- open space requirements
- parking locations
- street character guidelines

Upon approval, these components are essentially locked into place, and require an amendment by repeating the process for approval of changes.

The outcome of the participatory process directly influenced the PD process. However, before the PD was finalized, there were a few additional issues the community leadership wanted addressed, before supporting the PD. Most of these issues were outlined in a working group memo to LR on September 14, 2003, which focused on the housing typologies, business locations and type, and open space. Because the master plan was implicit with the types of buildings for Roosevelt Square, community leadership wanted the ordinance to reflect the mixture of two, three, and four story buildings that shared similar external characteristics of the established community. Also, the community was adamant about limiting the number of large building footprints along Roosevelt Road, and wanted a maximum number placed on large-scale buildings.

In addition to housing typologies, there was also a desire to see additional open space added to the overall project, with the assurance that there would be adequate open space in each sub area of the plan. And lastly, small-scale, limited retail business locations were restricted to Taylor Street, Ashland Avenue, and a portion of Blue Island, which were in alignment with the master plan. Likewise, Taylor Street should follow “street characteristic guidelines,” and ensure that it remained a pedestrian oriented commercial street. According to the finalized PD, many of these issues were resolved and the PD reflected the key components of the master plan. The Roosevelt Square PD was approved in 2004 and contained 166.37 acres total (City of Chicago, January, 2004).

Related made the decision to do a single PD, as opposed to doing a PD for each of the six phases of development, planned over a ten-year period. Other HOPE VI developments in Chicago, such as Westhaven Park, opted to do a separate PD for each development phase. The goal was to use a more incremental approach that did not lock in decisions for the entire site, and allowed for more flexibility to change plans over time. According to Related, the rationale behind doing a single PD was because Related could make it work financially, and take on the whole risk upfront for the entire site with the designated 2,441 units (see TABLE VIII).
The challenge with doing a single PD is that major decisions were made without any foresight of changing planning constraints, and the general evolution of the Roosevelt Square project. The PD can be updated over time, but once the PD is approved it can be a major undertaking to revise, as the process must be repeated. Doing a single PD also assumes that there will not be an ingrained learning process where the development team can easily adapt to changing circumstances. Therefore, a single PD was done based on the current economic climate and the financial feasibility of completing the project across six phases in ten years. The process itself made the attempt to implement a linear process that banked on the ability to build out the project in 10 years, make a profit, and move on to the next project.

In this case, as in many other HOPE VI projects in Chicago, the timeframe for completion has become a moving target, and project timelines have varied significantly from what was expected. Therefore, although there was a robust planning and public participatory process, where a master plan was developed with new urbanism built in as a driver – the master plan was essentially frozen in place.

The master plan was constrained by an idealistic approach to the PD process, which limited its ability to be implemented. For Roosevelt Square, this is one constraint that significantly stymied development, and 12 years later, Related is faced with cracking open the PD and revisiting the entire process yet again.

**TABLE VII**

**ROOSEVELT SQUARE UNIT TOTALS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Rental Units</th>
<th>For Sale Units</th>
<th>Total Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Affordable</td>
<td>Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2A</td>
<td>Planning Phase</td>
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<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2 for Sale</td>
<td>Planning Phase</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining Phases</td>
<td>Planning Phase</td>
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<td>186</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Completed</td>
<td></td>
<td>245</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Planned</td>
<td></td>
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<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Units</td>
<td></td>
<td>755</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Habitat Company, 2013

7.5 **Construction: Equitable Plan Implementation**

Project construction on the housing at Roosevelt Square started in 2004 and ended in 2008. Over the course of this timeframe several final master plan components were implemented, but there were significant planning constraints that influenced the project build out. In late 2004, construction at ABLA started on Phase 1 and was completed in 2006. Phase I consisted of 181 public and affordable units, 233 affordable and for sale units, and 15,000 square feet
of new retail. Phase II was partially completed in 2008, and consisted of 177 public and affordable rental units, 233 affordable and for sale units, a new park and retail. Retail components included a CVS along Roosevelt Road and a number of eateries on Taylor Street completed in 2010. Related and the CHA also worked closely with CDOT on the timing of street and alley construction, and aimed to have streets completed before residents moved into units (ABLA Redevelopment Working Group Meetings, July 26, 2007).

The construction process for Roosevelt Square was based on decisions made in the project planning and design phase, proved to be somewhat complicated. The challenges faced with implementing such a complex project revolved around coordination, value engineering, and phasing and unit distribution. A challenge that presented itself early in the construction phase was the decision to have multiple architects working on the project. While the rationale for having a master architect, and four MBE/WBE architects of record, was done to ensure a diverse product and team, it was difficult to implement. According to Patrick, “The more cooks in the kitchen, the more difficult to execute a plan.” (Interviewed on 01.24.14).

The disadvantages of having this arrangement is that each architect was assigned a specific lot and building type, so each architect was in charge of designing buildings that may be right next to each other, and may be constructed at the same time. In this case, the master architect is charged with ensuring that there is continuity in design, but also ensuring there is variety in all buildings. So there is a challenge to maintain a balance between consistency and diversity, at the same time as construction occurs. An architect concurred with the challenges of coordination, by also explaining to me in our interview, the difficulty to streamline and coordinate building construction details across four different architects. In some cases, each architect had different sets of building construction details, and in other cases all the architects used the same details. Identifying what details would be the same, versus which would be different was important to establish early on, to avoid difficulties down the line.

The entire contract document, value engineering, and construction process was tightly controlled by Related. The development team worked closely with the contractor through the design phase and contract documents, getting feedback from the contractor about where the pricing might end up. By doing this, Related was constantly adjusting, managing the architects, and working with the contractors so that as the final contract documents (CD)s were completed there was a high level of confidence in the cost to build out the project. As Patrick pointed out, “LRs hallmark is control”, which helped to alleviate major issues down the line with the construction of Phase I and Phase II. (Interviewed on 01.24.14).
Decisions were made early in the process about where the bulk of the money would go in terms of building design. The majority of the budget went towards the building exterior, as well as the streetscaping to adhere to the City of Chicago landscaping ordinance. There was significant effort to provide for walkable and pedestrian friendly streets with high level design and materials (See Figure 27). Unfortunately, this left less money for the interior of the buildings. Based on what the community leadership requested, only brick was used for construction materials, and the majority of the buildings were built separately. However, it made for a faster and easier construction process because buildings could be done individually with no party walls. To cut costs, utilities were done above ground instead of below ground, despite the recommendations of the community leadership.

Figure 28. Photographs of Roosevelt Square

Because of the prior CRA lawsuit that was filed, as well as overall resident concerns about unit phasing and distribution, the development team was very responsive to ensuring that there was an equitable number of units constructed across the north and south side of Roosevelt Road. Units also had to be constructed simultaneously, which was complicated because the majority of the land was south of Roosevelt Road. The construction process

1 DeStefano Partners master plan was used for analysis but I was unable to reproduce plan graphic
itself was not difficult, yet the challenge was developing construction phasing to accommodate the unit mix, and simultaneously timing the construction of rental and for sale units. Patrick recalls how the plan designs were much easier to achieve in comparison to the construction:

*Since we were already given a land use plan that stressed walkability and stressed new urbanism principles, we didn’t have to worry about that. We simply had to worry about physically when it comes to construction, how do you time the construction of rental versus for sale. How do you make sure that you don’t cross-contaminate lots when you’re doing excavation? So it actually resulted in a more complex logistically construction project, because you do have this mix of ownership.* (Interviewed on 01.24.14)

He further explained the challenge was also, “Arriving at a scheme that allowed for the 1/3,1/3,1/3 mix and working within the framework of the land use plan imposing that mix, and the final modified PD.” (Interviewed on 01.24.14). So, Related did the rental phase first and backfilled with the for sale units to achieve the required unit distribution. Subsequently, the process of developing the actual unit mix and scheme, and figuring out how to build on both sides of Roosevelt Road simultaneously, proved to be a logistical challenge. To date, Related has completed 1.5 of the six phases planned. The Phase II for sale component was significantly affected by the housing market decline with only 233 for sale units completed. In this case, there were many empty for sale lots interspersed between rental buildings, which made it easy to discern which housing was rental, or for sale. This defeated the purpose of having indistinguishable units and creating a true mixed-income community.

The commitment of Related to carry out the construction plans was influenced by inhibiting planning constraints, particularly changes in the housing market. These changes operated as barriers that influenced the construction schedule, which ultimately led to a partially constructed development. Subsequently, there has been no construction at Roosevelt Square over the past six years, and the project has been indefinitely delayed after completing only 591 housing units.

Figure 29. Roosevelt Square photographs of vacant for sale lots

![Vacant for sale lots](source: Photographs by author)
7.6 Marketing & Occupancy: A Change in Plans

The marketing of Roosevelt Square by Related exhibited their commitment to creating a community that would be integrated within the existing community, as well as promoting mixed-income living. However, there were challenges with recruiting families because of the lack of high performing neighborhood schools in the area and the tight real estate market across Chicago. In terms of marketing strategies, Related was forthright about Roosevelt Square being a mixed-income community from the very beginning. For instance, Elizabeth noted that Related hosted several community programs for children because they thought that was what old, and new residents would have in common. However, this approach did not always work, as the development attracted more singles and couples as opposed to families with children. Related found that even purchasers that qualified for affordable units were reluctant to commit (ABLA Redevelopment Working Group Meeting Minutes, October 18, 2007).

Likewise, Related also faced difficulty finding qualified applicants to fill the public housing units according to the Tenant Selection Plan. In addition to difficulty recruiting families, the for sale closing for Phase II remained uncertain because of the need to extend the TIF to cover the $8.2M in gap financing. The TIF extension was required to make the for sale units in Phase II financially feasible (ABLA Redevelopment Working Group Meeting Minutes, November 10, 2008). The approval of the TIF extension did not occur until July 19, 2013, with 12-years added, since the TIF was nearing its 25-year expiration date. In this case, despite Related's commitment to leasing and selling Roosevelt Square based on plan goals, the housing market and financing inhibited the project feasibility and proved to act as barriers to maintaining their commitment. Related was unable to move forward with additional for sale housing
in addition to having trouble with lease up of public housing units, and the sale of affordable units. These inhibiting constraints, in turn influenced the overall occupancy of Roosevelt Square.

In 2010, the development team and Habitat wanted to restart the construction process and move forward with completing the remaining for sale units in Phase II, and complete Phase III as rental instead of for sale, based on the current market conditions. However, there was such strong opposition from the community leadership to develop the rental piece, which hindered the redevelopment process. This was due in large part to the community leadership being opposed to moving forward with a third phase of rental instead of the planned for sale. The primary reason behind the opposition to moving forward with rental was fear. The community leadership was fearful that too much rental built upfront would deter future sales of for sale units.

Therefore, Brian requested a responsible pace be maintained so that rental and for sale units could be built concurrently, as originally planned. He also suggested holding off on phase III if the for sale market would not bear the pace of the subsidized rental units. According to Howard, Habitat made attempts to mediate the concerns of the community leadership, as well as convince the CHA, that not moving forward with rental, would result in an extremely long wait, and thus units would remain unfilled in the long term. What further complicated moving the project forward was the change in mayoral and aldermanic leadership that essentially stalled the decision-making process. Despite the mediation attempts, the CHA decided not to move forward with a rental phase due to the significant resistance of the community leadership, and the tenuous political climate.

In 2013, the for sale units planned near the Brooks Homes were difficult to market and sell. The Brooks Homes integrated with for sale homes, was perceived as a poor location, and Related had a difficult time selling the for sale units in close proximity to Brooks Homes. To sell the lots near the Brooks Homes, an alternative proposal was accepted by the CHA to sell fourteen of the for sale lots to SOS Children’s Village, which is a foster care village for at-risk youth. The CHA Board approved the land transfer for the lots, and the homes are planned for completion by late 2014 (ABLA Redevelopment Working Group Meeting Minutes, August 19, 2013).

This was an alternative that still maintained a commitment to providing low-income residents with housing, as Richard noted, “There is a certain commitment to populations but also alleviates Related of the effort of trying to market for sale buildings right across from Brooks”. (Interviewed on 11.26.13). While, this was not an ideal option, this allowed Related to offload land it was unable to build on, and at the same time provide housing for families at risk, which was complementary to the philosophical goals they desired to uphold. In turn, this decision did not reduce any land that was designated for public housing residents.
Related and Habitat’s inability to build consensus or political support between the community leadership, CHA, and the City of Chicago to move the project forward, further stalled Roosevelt Square. The community leadership was focused on maintaining their own interests, and protecting the Little Italy community from an influx of public housing units. This served to impede the implementation process. Because of the housing market decline, Related and Habitat both agreed that the best interest of the project was to continue moving forward. Although, moving forward with rental instead of for sale was not in the project plans, having flexibility to continue development offered an alternative to Roosevelt Square remaining on hold indefinitely. However, Related opted to adhere to the demands of community leadership and Roosevelt Square was placed on hold until 2014.

7.7 Community Building: Little HOPE, Little Transformation

There were two components to the community building initiatives at Roosevelt Square; traditional social services, and the broader neighborhood amenities proposed in the CSS Plan. Heartland Housing was tasked with carrying out the social service delivery, but Related did not have a clear plan to implement the CSS Plan initiatives. Related was primarily tasked with the bricks and mortar. Although community building was part of the HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, as well as the planning process, it was difficult for a development team that specializes in building housing to simultaneously maintain an equal commitment to community building. Elizabeth added:

“I think it feels very aspirational during the planning process; everybody wants to talk about borrowing a cup of sugar from their neighbor that is the aspirational image of a functioning community. And you can talk pie in the sky all day, but when it comes to implementation - and it serves a purpose to talk about it on the front end, but you don’t really get to figure it out until the back end.” (Interviewed on 11.24.2013)

In the case of Roosevelt Square, although there were a number of community building components planned in the earlier stages. These initiatives were not fully conceptualized until the later stages of the project. Overall, Heartland Housing provided case management services for public housing residents, and several social services were put in place. However, the community building goals of creating a non-profit organization, using a portion of the $7.5M in CSS funding for education, employment, and health, did not happen. In addition to those pieces that did not come together, Roosevelt Square was also drastically impacted by school closures, which left the community with limited access to neighborhood schools.

Heartland Housing used a portion of the $7.5M CSS grant to provide case management services for public housing residents at Roosevelt Square. Heartland was involved with the tenant selection process, which was always a contested issue. Existing residents viewed tenant selection criteria as a way to screen residents out from potentially
returning to Roosevelt Square. Heartlands role began at this stage according to Gregory, because “our approach based on our work of working with homeless people, our goals as an organization was more to do what we can to screen in people, versus screen people out.” The challenge with developing the tenant selection criteria was:

“There’s inherent tension between the goals of the CHA, the residents and the development team in trying to develop a tenant selection criteria that you know it does benefit the existing residents, but also provides some ability for...the management company to do what’s appropriate relative to leasing out the apartments.” (Interviewed on 01.24.2014)

The main focus in negotiations of the tenant selection criteria was what could be done around the work requirements. Because the CHA started to advance a work requirement, Heartland Housing’s major priority was working with residents that fell into three categories. These categories included residents that 1) met the work requirement, 2) were working to meet the work requirement, or 3) did not meet the work requirement. If a resident currently met the work requirement, were working to meet the work requirements, or were actively engaged in a job training or education program, then residents could be placed in a unit. For residents that fell into the working to meet work requirements, Heartland Housing provided one year of intensive services.

Initially, there was a 20-hour workweek requirement, which has over time increased to 30-hours per week. To help residents achieve the work requirement, the majority of the services provided to residents were focused around eliminating the barriers that might be in place to getting a unit in Roosevelt Square. With the year of pre-occupancy services, residents were assigned a case manager to work towards becoming lease compliant. Once residents were placed in a unit, they received a year of post occupancy services that were designed to help them maintain, and make adjustments to moving into the new mixed-income housing. Such services included financial literacy, paying utility bills, and budgeting programs. In addition to the pre and post occupancy services, Heartland also focused on a transitional jobs component. The transitional jobs component was essentially a supported work environment, which is based on a work first model. The work first model, placed residents in employment, and Heartland Housing provided a stipend. A case manager worked with the residents through any issues or challenges that might serve as a barrier to continue in the program. This program served as a way to get residents actively engaged in sustained employment.

**Broader Neighborhood Amenities**

Implementing the broader neighborhood amenities and support systems for residents at Roosevelt Square, is where Related's commitment to plan goals changed. A community building initiative that was decided in the early planning stages was for Related to create a non-profit organization for Roosevelt Square. Related agreed that 10% of
the developer fees were going to be used for seed funding for a non-profit organization. The goal of the non-profit was to sustain the community, and identify the programs and services that would serve as a catalyst and hub to bring people together at Roosevelt Square. According to Elizabeth:

"In theory this was a great idea, however, it was difficult for us to get traction because it also became a negotiation of who was going to be in charge of the non profit, was it going to be the developer, who from the community had influence, and this is happening simultaneously with us trying to manage design, architecture, and construction. And so it ended up becoming a low priority because we were also preparing LIHTC applications and trying to get the financing lined up and it was probably something that I could say in hindsight should have been at the top of our to do list and it should have been staffed with the same level of importance as selecting a general contractor but I think that you don't know until you know." (Interviewed on 11.24.2013)

While Related had a dedicated staff person to focus on the needs of the community, the community building piece, and creating a non-profit got lost in the planning and construction of Roosevelt Square. It was difficult to deal with issues related to broader programming and community needs, and really required a full staff to assume those responsibilities. Overall, the community building initiatives were a low priority for Related. Instead of maintaining a commitment to both building housing, and supportive social infrastructure, their commitment to the latter waned over time.

There were challenges to implement the initial Telesis CSS Plan recommendations, partially due to resources and staffing, and also because actors involved in the planning process did not want to take away from their institutional interests to focus on the broader community supports needed such as parks, schools, and community building initiatives. Therefore, in theory the initial CSS recommendations made sense for the Roosevelt Square community, but were not implemented. For example, the additional recommendations for a community academy and computer learning center, employment council, taskforce on healthcare, and employment opportunities with Growing Homes, did not materialize. The Jane Addams public housing museum is still in the works and has raised $3M in funding. However, it remains to be seen if the museum concept is financially sustainable (ABLA Redevelopment Working Group Meeting Minutes, January, 7 2013).

Implementing the education component of the CSS Plan also proved to be beyond the scope of the working group, or the development team. Although the DPD and CPS were aware of the community needs for improvements in education and neighborhood amenities, based on the HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, neither was willing to take on the task of spearheading the education agenda. Related initiated engagement activities with the CPS administration and local schools such as John M. Smyth Elementary School. The counsel for Gautreaux also urged
more coordinated efforts by the CHA and CPS in regards to education planning at redeveloped public housing sites. However, the educational goals required CPS and the City of Chicago at the table throughout the planning process because it was bigger than what Related could manage on its own. Even though the educational planning was part of the HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, it is actually out of the purview of Related based on the Development Agreement.

To plan for educational opportunities for Roosevelt Square, Elizabeth noted,

"In a large planning process, you can't do this with just the CHA. You need CPS, CPD, and every sister agency that comes in the governmental structure at the table… they needed a department in the city that was just about these neighborhoods because CHA as an agency was not, they didn't have the capacity to manage implementing this type of program. Quite frankly I don't think the City of Chicago in addition to managing the city of Chicago was prepared to implement these plans simultaneously across the entire city of Chicago. (Interviewed on 11.24.2013)

Because these entities were not engaged in the planning process, nor was there any coordination between the CHA and CPS, there was a significant breakdown in terms of figuring out how to provide high performing neighborhood schools, or improve the existing schools for Roosevelt Square community residents. The hindrances to effectively building consensus, and lack of commitment to broader community supports, such as schools and parks, has been perceived as a missed opportunity by the City of Chicago to rebuild not only housing, but also communities.

**Education Reform**

The Roosevelt Square community in particular was hit hard by the neighborhood school closures. According to Counsel for Gautreaux, CPS has a pattern of consistently closing neighborhood schools due to declining CHA populations, as developments undergo redevelopment, but once the developments are occupied, CPS opens up new selective enrollment schools that are not accessible to neighborhood residents. When the ABLA high-rise housing was demolished between 1998-2004 and the number of public housing families reduced, there was little consideration as to how this would impact the local schools. Subsequently, three neighborhood elementary schools were closed in the Roosevelt Square community - Riis, Jefferson, and Medill. Since these three schools closed, John M. Smyth Elementary School became the receiving school, and **only** neighborhood school to serve the entire Roosevelt Square community. Massive school consolidation was a significant challenge for the local school administration at Smyth School, as students from three different schools with varying levels of academic performance were relocated.

Therefore, the school consolidation affected residents at Roosevelt Square in terms of not having a current high performing neighborhood school that was accessible to all community residents. At this time there were several high performing elementary magnet schools north of Roosevelt Road such as Andrew Jackson Language Academy,
and Galileo Scholastic Academy of Math and Science, which had limited neighborhood slots and required a test for entry. Subsequently, these options were limited according to Orlando, Executive Director of C4C, because this gave Roosevelt Square residents four options; either residents were successful in the lottery and could attend one of the three high performing magnet schools, attend Smyth School, which serves a predominantly low-income African American population and was dealing with school consolidations, attend private school, or residents could move to another community where there were high performing neighborhood schools.

Since the City of Chicago and the CHA were not actively engaged to improve access to education, or support building a new school to support the existing community, there were several initiatives developed by the community leadership, non-profit organizations, and local CPS administration to tackle this issue. First, Orlando, worked to develop an intermediate term strategy in 2009 to keep Roosevelt Square residents from leaving the community, by proposing the development of Science Technology Engineering and Math Magnet Academy (STEM). Orlando contended that this proposal served the short term purpose to provide an alternate high performing elementary school for Roosevelt Square residents and stem the tide of residents leaving the community for better education opportunities. The long term strategy of STEM was to work in partnership with Smyth School and the local administration to reverse integrate the schools, and work to strengthen and build the school in the process. This was done so that Roosevelt Square also had a high performing neighborhood school. STEM opened in 2011 as a K-3 school and will expand into a K-8 school by 2019. While this served both a short and long-term goal for the Roosevelt Square community, this proposal was also perceived as reinforcing the barriers between the north and south sides of Roosevelt Road says William, the Smyth School Principal:

“Opening up a STEM school in the middle of all the schools north of Roosevelt Road says that we like this dividing line between Roosevelt Row and the Village. Middle class Black people don’t wanna go to school with poor Black folk and White folk don’t wanna go to school with poor Black folk. There is some reason that we believe they have horns and tails and if their middle class children interact they will become what their greatest fear is, but nobody communicates what their greatest fear is.” (Interviewed on 12.13.2013)

In addition to STEM opening, between March and May of 2011, BPI decided to bring together its efforts around both public housing and education to look at all of the areas that were either public housing or mixed-income to understand their current educational needs. BPI initially started to work with the remaining neighborhood school Smyth to engage the administration, and community to make improvements and ensure residents at Roosevelt Square had a high performing neighborhood elementary school. BPI worked to engage the development team, CPS administration, and Smyth School administration around strengthening Smyth. While, CPS administration was not
involved throughout the planning process, it was also at this time, that BPI became involved with a larger community engagement process led by CPS.

This community engagement process was called the Smyth Educational Advancement Team (SEAT) that was a planning committee led by the current CPS Chief Area Officer (CAO) for Area 9 that ran in partnership with BPIs efforts (ABLA Redevelopment Working Group Meeting Minutes, February 14, 2011). The goal of the process was to capitalize on the potential of Smyth School to be a high performing neighborhood school. These efforts included various community engagement activities over a period of three months with public meetings and focus groups that included Related, social service providers, non-profit organizations, city agencies, aldermen, the LAC, CHA, and CPS administration. SEAT also visited schools with similar populations in terms of poverty and race, such as South Loop Elementary School and North Kenwood-Oakland (NKO), University of Chicago Elementary Charter School to determine a proposed model for Smyth school.

This planning process, however was filled with tension and mistrust by the existing community and Smyth school administration, which perceived the process as a future mechanism to close yet another CPS neighborhood school. Given the contention that arose as part of the education planning, the parties involved were unable to arrive at a consensus. Therefore, BPI is no longer involved in education planning at Roosevelt Square. However, SEAT and its advisory committee, as well as Smyth School administration have continued to make significant improvements at Smyth. The school obtained (International Baccalaureate) IB status in 2005, incorporated literacy and early childhood programs, weekend school, and improved reading and math test scores from 19-28% in 2004 to 53-73% in 2012 (http://smythibworld.org).

While Smyth has made significant improvements, Roosevelt Square remains highly segregated in terms of schools, with the majority of public housing residents attending Smyth school. For instance Smyth has 93.3% African American enrollment comprised of 96.5% low-income population compared to 20-32.6% African American enrollment comprised of 35.1-72% low-income population for Galileo, AJLA, and STEM. The following (TABLE VIII) illustrates the segregated characteristics within the schools in the Roosevelt Square School District Boundaries.
TABLE VIII
PRIMARY SCHOOL CHARACTERISTICS WITHIN NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOL BOUNDARIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Ideal Enrollment</th>
<th>Latino</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>African American</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>Low-income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Galileo</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>63.3%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>72.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJLA</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEM</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smyth</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>93.3%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>96.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Connecting 4 Communities, “Central City High School” Proposal

In terms of high school, in the immediate community is St. Ignatius, which very few public housing residents attend. The majority of public housing residents attend Crane high school on the near West side, which is in the process of being converted to a medical preparatory school. Also, few public housing residents attend Whitney Young, which is a magnet high school, or Jones College Prep, which accepts a small number of neighborhood residents through selective enrollment.

Plans are currently underway for a Central City High School proposal as a new model for a CPS high school by C4C, in partnership with Smyth School administration. The proposal for a Central City high school includes developing a comprehensive approach to build a high school at Roosevelt Square that serves seven existing elementary schools across 4 attendance areas, which include Galileo, AJLA, STEM, Skinner, Smyth, South Loop, and Washington Irving. The purpose is to have a neighborhood high school that all of the K-8 schools can feed into and serve the Roosevelt Square community (Central City High School Proposal, 2012).

Roosevelt Square is currently in the process of procuring a new master planner after an RFP was issued in April 2014 to procure master planning services to evaluate the current site conditions, community building initiatives, and offer future planning solutions to complete the project. Because Roosevelt Square was done as a single PD, Related is faced with cracking open the PD and revising phase III, as well as determining a long-term strategy to complete the remaining 4.5 phases of development. Opening the PD will also require going through another participatory process with the working group and community leadership. Revisiting a plan proposed approximately 12 years ago will now face a different economic climate, as well as new participants and interests in the planning process.
7.8 **Summary**

The case of Roosevelt Square illustrates the range of actor commitment to social, and physical mixing goals from idealists, realists, and those that are indifferent. The implementation process was guided by Related, who were driven by their idealism. The LAC and community leadership, played the role of realists, and the City of Chicago and the CHA were largely indifferent. This plays out in different ways throughout the implementation process. First, my case study showed that actor commitment to plan goals matter in the plan development, public participatory, and final plan stages, where there are multiple supporting actors, as well as planning constraints that reinforced plan goals. Second, this research also shows where planning constraints acted as barriers that inhibited plan goals from being met, and forced project plans to change, despite continued actor commitment. This case illustrated these interrelationships at the construction, marketing, and occupancy stages.

Lastly, actor commitment waned under the pressure of multiple impeding actors, and inhibiting planning constraints during the community building stage. In this sense, when actors who acted as facilitators, and were key to implementing plans are indifferent, this impeded the ability of actors who were committed, to carry out project plans. In addition to impeding actors, inhibiting planning constraints are detrimental barriers, but could have been overcome with the support of facilitating actors. TABLE IX, illustrates these relationships, which I will further explain:

**TABLE IX**

**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACTOR COMMITMENT AND PLANNING CONSTRAINTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reinforcing Planning Constraints</th>
<th>Inhibiting Planning Constraints</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plan Development: <strong>Financing and Consensus</strong></td>
<td>Construction: <strong>Financing and Market Conditions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Participatory Process: <strong>Consensus</strong></td>
<td>Marketing: <strong>Market Conditions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Plan Development: <strong>Politics</strong></td>
<td>Occupancy: <strong>Consensus and Market Conditions</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impeding Actors</th>
<th>Supporting Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marketing: <strong>CHA and Community Leadership</strong></td>
<td>Plan Development: <strong>Related, CHA</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupancy: <strong>CHA and Community Leadership</strong></td>
<td>Participatory Process: <strong>Related, Architects, LAC, and Community Leadership</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Building: <strong>CHA, City of Chicago and Related</strong></td>
<td>Final Plan Development: <strong>Related and Community Leadership</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Construction: <strong>Related, Architects, and LAC</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marketing: <strong>Related</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occupancy: <strong>Related and Habitat</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Building: <strong>Stakeholders</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Where Actor Commitment Matters**

During the project planning + design phase, there were multiple actors that were supportive of plans goals, and the planning constraints further reinforced how HOE VI ideals were integrated into project plans. For instance, the
CHA and Habitat selected Related, a high profile team that had experience in affordable housing. Related subsequently built a team around Heartland Housing and Destefano Partners, that were aligned with the goals of refining the Telesis Plan, integrating new urbanism, and achieving the unit mix. According to Elizabeth and Patrick, Related took into account all factors related to financing, fees, and construction and development costs to determine the feasibility of the project upfront. The idealism of the development team was based on financial feasibility, and having consensus among the key players as to the expectations of working to achieve the desired vision for Roosevelt Square. Additionally, Related expressed their commitment to project plans by their financial investment, which was the driver in terms of implementing the plan goals.

In the participatory process, Related maintained their commitments, which was also reinforced by actors that not only supported project plans, but were also actively engaged in holding Related, the CHA, and the City accountable. The LAC and community leadership, led by Bethany and Brian respectively, acted in the capacity as realists and did more than mobilize support for the plan, they also ensured that the interests of both public housing residents and the broader community were met.

This played out in a number of ways with the LAC president, Bethany, negotiating benefits for public housing residents through employment opportunities, resident relocation rights, and tenant selection criteria. And the community leadership led by Brian ensured the urban design, and building types developed in the Telesis plans were also carried through in the master plan developed by DeStefano Partners. Related and the design team were also supporting actors. By taking into consideration the needs of both public housing residents, and the broader community, they incorporated unit mix and new urbanist designs into the master plan. Consensus among these two groups was rarely reached. But the negotiated efforts of Related to build consensus served to manage actor differences, and integrate the physical and social mixing goals during the plan development and participatory process stages.

At Roosevelt Square, the development team continued in their role as supporting actors, and took a significant risk in their approach to the planned development. As both Elizabeth and Patrick acknowledged, Related was unable to get the original Telesis plan to work financially. Therefore, the new master plan developed was based on doing a single PD to ensure that financially, Related could take on the risk associated with the entire project, and still make a profit. Likewise, Brian and their community leadership used their political connections with community organizations, and aldermen to reinforce that the final PD supported, not only urban design components, but also the long-term sustainability of the existing Little Italy community. However, the PD process had unrealistic expectations of being able to complete the project over a ten-year period, without any changes taking place with the initial plans.
Therefore, a PD for the entire site was put in place that essentially created a plan that was frozen in place, with little opportunity for changes to happen. The idealist perspective of Related, though committed, brought about project challenges that would be encountered later in the planning and implementation process.

**Where Actor Commitment is Maintained, but Planning Constraints Influence Project Plans**

The construction phase was led by the idealism of the development and design teams, and the LAC as realists to ensure how the project would be constructed based on their prior CRA lawsuit. Although the CRA lawsuit was determined to not have any merit, the threat of a lawsuit was enough for actors to maintain their commitments to build an equitable distribution of rental and for sale units across Roosevelt Road simultaneously. In addition to maintaining equitable distribution of units built on both the south and north sides of Roosevelt Road, Related also worked closely with the contractor and architects throughout all phases of development to alleviate major issues down the line with construction. Where there were limitations, more were directed towards the building exterior, and streetscaping requirements put in place by the City of Chicago. In this instance, all of the money went towards the building exteriors and streetscaping to ensure that Roosevelt Square fit into the existing affluent Little Italy neighborhood. However, a detriment of focusing money towards the exterior components, left little money to work with to build the building interiors, which resulted in construction of units meeting only the minimum required HUD guidelines.

Related, the design team, and LAC served as supporting actors in the construction phase, but it was not enough to overcome the inhibiting planning constraints that forced project plans to change, despite actor commitment. For instance, the inability to secure an extension on the Roosevelt Square TIF; as well as the housing market decline, left a significant portion of for sale units undeveloped. While the Roosevelt Square TIF financing slowed the project construction down, the housing market decline in 2007 caused a complete halt to any further construction. Because of the project going on hold, this left only 1.5 phases completed with clear differences between rental and for sale housing due to the vacant lots planned for the for sale units. In this case, despite having supporting actors willing to build out the project based on the agreed upon unit mix, phasing, and design goals, the planning constraints acted as barriers that actor commitment was unable to overcome.

In the marketing and occupancy stages, Related, the LAC, and community leadership maintain their supportive roles, but planning constraints also acted as barriers that forced project plans to change. Project plans changed due to inhibiting planning constraints around the housing market decline, and building consensus. In the case of Roosevelt Square, as Elizabeth and Patrick noted, the development team remained committed to attracting
residents that would fit into the already existing community, in large part because of both the LAC, and community leadership demanded that specific residents be recruited to the community. Bethany and Brian continued to represent the role of realists in ensuring that the development team focused on attracting families that knew the type of community they would be residing in, and several community outreach efforts, and open houses geared towards families were held to reinforce these ideas. However, the housing market decline made it difficult to recruit residents for affordable, and for sale units. Likewise, Related found it difficult to lease public housing units because applicants did not meet the tenant selection criteria.

Because of the challenges to recruit residents and build for sale units, there were adjustments that actor made for the project build out. For instance, because Related was unable to sell for sale lots located near the Brooks Homes, the CHA approved a proposal by SOSCV to construct 14 homes to house at-risk youth. In addition to having to change the occupancy, Related is also faced with having to turn to building a rental phase instead of the planned for sale phase. Because of the changing market conditions, Related had to put the project on hold for six years despite having the option to move forward with a rental phase of development. With strong opposition by the community leadership to any rental housing being constructed despite the direction of Habitat, Related and the CHA decided to forego any future rental development and wait for the housing market to improve. The community leadership and CHA in this case, acted as impeding actors that reinforced the planning constraints, which limited the project from moving forward. Overall, a combination of consensus among stakeholders, and market conditions influenced Related’s ability to move forward to adjust the master plan, and adapt to the altered market conditions.

**Where Actor Commitment Waned**

Actor commitment waned when supporting actors, shift to impeding actors, and key facilitating actors, such as the CHA and City of Chicago, become indifferent to project plans. While there were planning constraints such as financing, and consensus that played a role in inhibiting the implementation of plan goals, these constraints were less important than the actor indifference that served to wholly impede plan implementation. For instance, Related was able to implement the baseline CSS Plan and Family Works program through its partnership with Heartland Housing led by Gregory, to maintain its initial commitments. However, the remaining community building efforts failed due to the indifference of the development team, the CHA, and the City of Chicago.

Related was unsuccessful in implementing its broader community building initiatives that were part of the CSS Plan, which included using 10% of its developer fees as seed funding for a non-profit organization. Likewise, the
additional recommendations for a community academy and computer learning center, employment council, taskforces on healthcare, and employment opportunities with Growing Homes never materialized. Additionally the Jane Addams public housing museum is still in the works, but it remains to be seen if the museum concept is financially sustainable. These broader community-building initiatives were not implemented because they were a low priority for Related, who focused on housing, as opposed to the community building initiatives. In this sense, actor commitment waned against the challenges of building consensus with the CHA and City of Chicago, as well as opting to use the designated 10% of the developer fee for bricks and mortar, instead of community building.

Also, implementing the education component of the CSS Plan was much more difficult as CPS closed three neighborhoods schools, and consolidated them into Smyth school when the ABLA high rises were demolished. School closures affected Roosevelt Square significantly, and although Related initially had engagement activities with the CPS administration, and the local Smyth school administration, a much more coordinated effort was needed that remained outside of their Development Agreement. The lack of coordination by CPS, CPD, and CHA to determine how to develop both housing and education support systems, resulted in community organizations spearheading these efforts. One effort by C4C included the creation of STEM, a K-3 school, which will expand to a K-8, to serve the population and stem the tide of residents leaving the community for better education opportunities. Another effort by BPI, in partnership with SEAT, sought to engage the community through public meetings, focus groups, and school visits to better support the existing Smyth school.

While this process was unable to develop consensus on an education plan, this did provide an avenue for SEAT and its advisory committee to make significant improvements at Smyth. While Smyth has made significant improvements, Roosevelt Square remains highly segregated in terms of schools, with the majority of public housing residents attending Smyth school. Likewise, Roosevelt Square residents also do not have a viable alternative for attending a neighborhood high school. This dynamic has created a pattern of unequal access to education at Roosevelt Square, and has subsequently made it difficult to build a community without a strong network of neighborhood schools that are accessible to all residents.

**Intermediate Mechanism**

I also found in the case of Roosevelt Square that by having an intermediate mechanism to hold actors accountable during the implementation process reinforced actor commitment to achieve project plans. In this case the prior lawsuit filed by the CRA in an attempt to block initial plans served the purpose to provide leverage for the LAC
and public housing residents throughout the implementation process. The initial lawsuit filed by the CRA argued that the redevelopment would have a disproportionate impact on the existing minority women and children if replacement housing was concentrated south of Roosevelt Road. Although the lawsuit was eventually dismissed due to the final redevelopment plan being incomplete, the LAC elected to form a mutually beneficial relationship with the CHA to support redevelopment efforts in exchange for benefits to residents. The support of the LAC for the redevelopment process greatly legitimized the position of the CHA, while also avoiding future legal opposition. Likewise, the development team and consultants also took heed to the initial resident concerns about phasing and unit distribution. For instance, as noted by both Habitat and Related, ensuring an equitable number of units were dispersed across the north and south sides of Roosevelt Road simultaneously was a top priority during the construction stage. In this instance, it was the threat of future litigation, which kept actors committed to equally distributing public, affordable, and market rate units across the site eliminating any concentration of public housing. Additionally, the LAC used the threat of future litigation as a negotiation tactic to gain employment opportunities for existing public housing residents. By having an intermediate mechanism to hold actors accountable throughout the implementation process allowed the LAC to gain entry to the planning process and ultimately decision-making authority about the direction of redevelopment efforts.
8. Westhaven Park: Power and Public-Private Partnerships

“Community groups can influence redevelopment, and though the potential for conflict always exists, it does not preclude cooperation based on mutual goals.”

(Sagalyn, 2008:12)

This chapter illustrates the planning and implementation of Westhaven Park. First, I describe the key actors and episodes my case study examines to understand the interrelationships found between commitment, and planning constraints. Second, I outline the history of the former Henry Horner Homes, the litigation between the CHA and Henry Horner residents from 1995-1999, and the first phase of replacement housing that predates the redevelopment of Westhaven Park. Third, I describe key implementation episodes and the nature of the public-private relationships that guide this planning effort, and actors varying degrees of commitment to HOPE VI ideals. Lastly, I provide key findings, which show where actors integrated plan norms, the planning constraints that act as barriers despite commitment, and where commitment is affected in the face of planning constraints and impeding actors.

Westhaven Park is touted by the CHA as a model case for the PFT, and many of its outcomes are significant. Westhaven Park received $18.4M in HOPE VI funds to redevelop the former Henry Horner Homes in 1996. The critical actors in this project include the developer, Brinshore Michaels, the CHA, the HRC, Counsel for HRC, HRC tenant representative, LAC, and the design team (see Figure 33). Overall, Westhaven Park is the story of a redevelopment process that is guided by committed, powerful public-private partnerships that hold actors accountable. The Brinshore Michaels team has varying viewpoints; the team is pragmatic and highly experienced in building mixed income communities. They understand the complexities not only of building housing, but also the nuances of creating viable community support systems. On the other hand, this case has a multitude of powerful legal advocates that leverage the consent decree to create a decision-making process, in which public housing residents have a role in shaping plan proposals. With the pragmatic approach of the development team, and a host of stakeholders that hold key actors accountable, this combination leads to a plan implementation process that is slow, but steady – taking small steps across phases to ensure planning alternatives meet the income mix and design goals and were viable not only in the short term, but the long term. Additionally, flexibility is built into the plan structure at each stage, allowing valuable lessons learned by the development and design teams to be applied to future stages of development. Although the planning process had to contend with a myriad of different interests and varying levels of commitment
to plan goals, public-private partners were in place at most stages to ensure the plan goals are upheld even when actors failed to maintain their commitments.

Five ‘critical implementation episodes’ are significant in the story of Westhaven Park: the participatory process, final plan development, marketing, occupancy, and community building. These five episodes illustrate the differences in actor commitment, based on the institutional roles each played. In the participatory process and final plan development, there is a high level of actor commitment, which illustrates its importance in relation to new urbanism in those phases. Similarly, the public participatory stage, the final plan development stage also serves to show the commitment of the developer and the design team, which made key decisions early on that would later prove to allow for smooth development and implementation of plan goals. In the marketing stage, actors adjusted their commitments to both inhibiting planning constraints and impeding actors. The occupancy stage, like the public participatory stage, and final plan development stages, are guided by supporting actors and planning constraints that reinforce project plans. And lastly, the community building stage is where actor commitment is constrained by planning constraints, and impeding actors, which in turn alter project plans. In this case, despite commitment to plan goals, the barriers in place overwhelm actors abilities to act on good intentions.

Overall, Westhaven Park is an example of how pragmatic and incremental approaches to implementing plans are used. What sets Westhaven Park apart from other developments is the consent decree, which reinforces planning constraints that holds actors accountable, and keeps the project on track where proposed plan goals align with final outcomes. This case illustrates the importance of having supporting actors that are committed to integrating the social and physical mixing plan goals, suggesting that much of the implementation success of Westhaven Park is attributed to a high level of commitment by actors. Likewise, the importance of an accountability mechanism throughout the implementation process appears to have played a key role in preventing actors from easily adjusting and moving away from intended plan goals.
The following diagram illustrates the participants and relationships in the planning process:

Figure 33. Participants and Relationship in the Planning Process at Westhaven Park

8.1 **Background**

Westhaven Park is located on the near west side of Chicago, just west of the Loop area, and is home to the former Henry Horner Homes, which encompasses 26 acres. The Henry Horner Homes were constructed between 1957 and 1968 and contained 920 units in 18 high-rise buildings and were located within a 10-block area. The Henry Horner Extension was completed in 1961 with 736 units comprised of 7 high-rise buildings with duplex apartments. The Henry Horner Annex was comprised of 109 units in mid rise buildings with two and three story walk-ups. At the time, these projects were considered a better option than the slum tenements that existed in other parts of the city. In the beginning these buildings were well maintained with strict screening guidelines, which offered an improved lifestyle for city residents. Over the next 10 years, the condition of the Henry Horner Homes changed significantly and between 1981 and 1991, the vacancy rate went from 2.3% to 49.3% and the buildings were rapidly deteriorating.
because of cheap construction and inadequate maintenance from the CHA (Wilen, 2001). The Henry Horner Homes subsequently by 1991 were considered one of the most distressed public housing developments in the U.S.

**Initial Horner Redevelopment Plans**

Due to these deteriorating conditions the residents at Henry Horner retained the legal counsel of the Sargent Shriver National Center On Poverty Law, and filed a lawsuit to improve the deteriorating conditions. In 1991, “The Henry Horner’s Mothers Guild,” made up of current tenants, filed a class action lawsuit against the CHA and HUD. Residents wanted the CHA and HUD to be prohibited from continuing “de-facto demolition” of Henry Horner, and demanded that the property be maintained with habitable residential units (Wilens, 2001).

In 1995, a consent decree was reached that required any Henry Horner redevelopment to be completed in phases with minimal resident displacement. Families at Henry Horner were offered their choice of replacement housing, and a one-for-one replacement was adhered to. The decree also required the CHA and developers to reach agreements with the Horner Residents Committee (HRC) on all matters related to the redevelopment. Therefore, with the consent decree, tenants were able to enter into a binding agreement with the CHA that allowed residents to not only be included in the planning process, but to also have decision-making authority.
To protect the rights of Henry Horner residents, Phases I & II were guided by both the consent decree and the one-for-one replacement clause. The consent decree established unit mix guidelines for the redevelopment of Westhaven Park. Phase I of the redevelopment provided a total of 466 replacement units on site, where 233 were reserved for Henry Horner residents, and 233 for public housing residents from other developments with income between 50% and 80% of the AMI. There were also 233 additional public housing units that were built off-site (Wilen & Nayak, 2006).

Phase II was governed by the one-for-one replacement clause as well as motions filed by the Henry Horner’s Mother Guild in 1998 to contest fast track demolition of the site. As a result, redevelopment for Phase II had to be phased to limit the displacement of Henry Horner residents. Also, Westhaven Park residents were not subjected to the 30-hour workweek, or drug testing requirements because of stipulations set forth in the consent decree. This was a significant departure from other CHA developments where residents were required to adhere to these regulations in order to obtain a unit in mixed-income developments.

The Henry Horner community still suffered from neglect with high rates of crime, dilapidated housing, and poor public services at the time of the initial redevelopment plans for Phase I. With HOPE VI plan proposals underway, Westhaven Park has seen renewed community investment with the United Center built nearby and the west loop experienced expanded residential construction. The proximity of Westhaven Park to the west loop has benefited from new amenities such as elementary and high schools, a community college, health center, and public facilities.
As previously mentioned, Phase I of Westhaven Park was built as public housing replacement units in compliance with the consent decree. The first episode I examine is the plan development stage for Westhaven Park, which focuses on the Phase II, mixed-income component. Westhaven Park was granted HOPE VI funding in 1996 to fund Phase II in the amount of $18,435,300. Because of the prior consent decree in place, the CHA, Habitat, Counsel for Gautreaux Plaintiffs, NWSCDC, HRC, and Counsel / tenants representative for the HRC worked to negotiate an agreement for the number of public housing units for Phase II starting in 1999. The negotiations lasted for over one year. The discussions were based on trying to come to agreement on the number of replacement public housing units that would be provided for Phase II.

The CHA wanted to use the 1/3 public, 1/3 affordable, and 1/3 market rate; Counsel for Gautreaux Plaintiffs wanted between 20-25% public housing units; and the HRC and Counsel / tenant representative for the HRC wanted to see a significantly higher number to accommodate 220 public housing units for the existing Henry Horner residents. According to Counsel for the HRC, part of the negotiation included conducting a survey of the existing residents and 75% wanted to stay and move into Phase II. So having enough public housing units to accommodate the existing Horner residents was very important to the HRC. Since the consent decree required the HRC to be on board with all redevelopment
decisions, and the parties were so far apart, this presented a significant problem. Consequently, because the three parties were unable to come to an agreement, a mediator, John Schmidt, a former Justice Department official, was appointed by the Judge to help the parties come to an agreement. Eventually, the parties agreed on 32.5% public housing units or 220 units, in which the greater of the two would be included in Phase II.

In addition to finalizing the unit mix, the parties spent ten months negotiating the language for a RFQ that was issued in November 2000 to bring in a master developer to plan, and build Phase II. In addition to the existing parties, the working group also included the DPD. The RFQ received four responses; a joint venture between a Boston developer and the Chicago NWSCDC; a Boston developer, The Community Builders; a Chicago developer, Holsten/Kenard; and a joint venture between a Northbrook, IL and New Jersey developer (Wilen, 2006). The Horner working group selected the Illinois-New Jersey joint venture between the Brinshore Michaels development team.

The working group made the decision to procure Brinshore Michaels in 2001. Brinshore Michaels was selected in large part because of their commitment to provide the most public housing out of all the respondents. Brinshore Michaels was also known for its dedication to affordable housing and had collectively completed thousands of units of mixed-income housing across the U.S. Also, the approach that Brinshore Michaels used was more comprehensive with a focus not only on housing, or the bricks and mortar, but also on the community building aspects of the plan. In my interview with Louis, Senior Vice President at Brinshore, he explained that Brinshore took the lead on Westhaven Park and the development team focused on a pragmatic and incremental style of development, based on their prior experience building affordable housing.

While Brinshore acknowledged the social and physical mixing goals, Louis, asserted that at the forefront of the decision making process was building a high quality community and not necessarily integrating the HOPE VI plan goals. This was evident in future stages of development in which the philosophical plan goals did not guide the decisions of Brinshore Michaels. Angela, Vice President of Development at Michaels Development Company described their blended approach to redeveloping public housing, in which, the bricks and mortar, as well as the community building components were considered equally as important. Because of Michaels prior experience on many HOPE VI development projects, the development team understood the nuances of how to integrate the physical and social mixing project goals.

For example, Michaels staff for HOPE VI projects included a community builder to work with the development team throughout the planning and implementation process to ensure housing and community building were integrated into project plans. In this case, the two development teams complemented each other, and supported
incorporating social and physical mixing. Although Brinshore exhibited a level of cynicism to plan goals, the development team was committed to planning and building a quality mixed-income community. The cynicism held by Brinshore, in this case, did not impede the planning process during project planning + design, but helped to ensure that a pragmatic approach was taken in plan proposals.

Brinshore Michaels, partnered with Destefano Partners as the master architect for Phase 2A West. Destefano Partners managed the planning and design process and subcontracted to three MBE/WBE architectural firms – Smith and Smith, Urban Works, and Brook Architecture were the architects of record and designed and built individual buildings on the site. For later phases 2A east, 2B, 2C, and 2D, Brinshore Micahels partnered with Landon Bone Baker who managed the planning and design process and subcontracted to two MBE/WBE architectural firms – Brook Architecture and Johnson and Lee.

The first task of the development and design team was to develop a master plan to serve as the formal Revitalization Plan required by HUD. The initial master plan was developed my Skidmore Owing and Merrill (SOM), which developed a schematic master plan for the entire Henry Horner site. However, having planners design the master plan caused an issue early on because the plan did not reflect the actual building types and necessary urban form that would be used and integrated into the plan by the architecture team.

An architect stated in the interview that the schematic plan did not include parcels, road networks, land uses, specific building types or the detailed unit mix. Louis also noted in our interview that this was an early lesson learned that the master plan must be done by the architecture team that would be designing and locating the buildings. While Roosevelt Square had to contend with being given a master plan developed by Telesis to implement, Related learned that the planning and implementation teams needed to be the same to make the project work financially.

Similarly, Brinshore Michaels learned that for the master plan and building design to align, the master plan required the planning and architectural design to come from the same firm. This is largely because the architecture teams are developing specific building types for construction, which need to be incorporated into the master plan. To implement a seamless master plan with urban design, as well as building designs, it is more effective for a single firm to complete. Therefore, Westhaven Park did not use the SOM schematic master plan. Instead Brinshore Michaels worked with the team of Destefano Partners and the working group to develop a master plan to submit to HUD for the HOPE VI Revitalization Plan.
Similar to Roosevelt Square, Westhaven Park also had a unique set of circumstances as the development and design teams prepared to develop the master plan. Based on the consent decree guidelines, Henry Horner tenants and the existing buildings remained on-site during the redevelopment process. Unlike other mixed-income development sites where the buildings were demolished and tenants relocated, at Westhaven Park the development team had to plan around existing buildings and residents. While the consent decree paved the way to limit resident displacement and move residents directly from the existing Henry Horner high-rises into newly built mixed-income units, the site conditions were challenging to work around. New buildings had to be constructed, and tenants later moved into the new buildings, before an existing Henry Horner high-rise could be demolished. In addition to working around existing buildings and adhere to the consent decree relocation imperative, in the middle of the site was the Superblock, which was the Phase I replacement housing. Because of deterioration of the Superblock site, the development team had to build around the Superblock. These existing site conditions were challenges for the development and design team to not only plan around, but also to construct Westhaven Park within a set of complicated constraints.

8.3 Participatory Process: Planning a Community - Legacy of Influence, Who Wins?

To move forward and plan Phase II required input from the working group, so the public participatory process started in 2001. Approximately 15 meetings were held over the course of four months to develop the Phase II plan, which was comprised of a series of different meetings. First, there were four design charrettes held where the working group workshopped design ideas and developed different alternatives. Second, there were three meetings for Henry Horner residents and the broader public where information was provided about the planning process to receive feedback about plans for phase II (Henry Horner HOPE VI Revitalization Grant, 2001). And lastly, Brinshore Michaels facilitated three CSS meetings to get feedback from community organizations, city and state agencies, and social service providers interested in working with Westhaven Park residents. In response to the initial CSS meeting, there were also four focus group meetings held that focused on employment, education, health, and youth services (Henry Horner HOPE VI Phase II – CSS Plan, 2002).

Obtaining Community Buy-In

Because of the earlier lawsuit and consent decree, there was a significant amount of mistrust on the side of public housing residents on the HRC and LAC, which made the participatory process quite challenging. In this case, the HRC and LAC mobilized their constituents to support project plans, but on their terms. This meant the consent decree gave the HRC a certain degree of power, which Counsel for the HRC used to fight for their interests.
The CHA was on the other side as a supporting actor, but because of the prior lawsuit and mistrust, the planning constraints inhibited the progress of the project due to a lack of consensus among these key players. During this time, Louis recalled the contentious dynamics between the CHA, HRC and LAC:

“More than anything, the CHA, wanted to see peace. There was a terrible, terrible relationship between the CHA and residents. A lot of mistrust, and animosity and they spent all their time arguing with lawyers in court. And now they just wanted somebody to take it off their hands so that it could be moved forward without a fight. So as the developer we came in and we stood between the parties and we were trusted, not completely initially, but to move it forward because we didn’t have the history that the CHA had.” (Interviewed on 10.18.2013)

Initially in the planning process, the CHA and public housing residents wouldn’t even sit in the same room with one another. As a way to show good faith and pursue ideas from both sides, the Brinshore Michaels team listened to both sides, which shared different viewpoints in terms of how Henry Horner would be transformed into a mixed-income community. On one side, were the residents, led by the HRC and LAC, which believed that the buildings should be renovated, and on the other side was the CHA who was against renovating the buildings and wanted them to be torn down. This was viewed as a major bone of contention because each party was resolute in their position and would not budge, regardless of any rationale. To support negotiating this conflict, in our interview Louis described a story that brought both sides together:

“The residents were given money by the court to hire consultants including engineers, contractors and others to renovate a unit in one of the mid-rise, seven story buildings. And they did this to demonstrate to the city, and the CHA that it would be a good idea to renovate the buildings instead of tear them down. And they brought it to the working group and wanted to make the case that we shouldn’t tear them down, and should renovate them. They just finished renovating a unit and so we set up our next working group meeting at that unit so we could all look at it and they could show us how wonderful the renovated units would be and how they would be attractive to a mixed-income clientele. We had been very skeptical with the idea of renovating the unit, so we kind of wanted to see what they had done to see whether or not it made any sense. So, very soon after this working group meeting we scheduled a time to go out to view their renovation and we got there and it hadn’t been more than two or three days after the working group meeting and between when they finished renovating the unit and when we got out there, vandals had broken a hole in the brick wall, and there was a huge gaping hole in the wall for them to get in, they had stolen everything that had been put in - the stove, refrigerator, they even stole the heating off the walls, ripped out all the copper, stole the sinks, smashed the windows, and so we all got up there waiting for the residents and their consultants to show us how great the unit would be for mixed-income and when we got there all we saw was a wreck, a hubble. And all we could do was have a collective laugh and we just laughed and were like I don’t think we need to discuss this any longer. And even the residents at that point were like you know what we’ll let this drop”. (Interviewed on 10.18.2013)

This story also reinforced the developer imperative to build new construction, and this incident provided a rationale for supporting the CHA decision, as well as the interests of Brinshore Michaels. Also, by building consensus on the issue of doing new construction instead of renovating the buildings, this offered the opportunity to address
additional issues around the perceptions of high-rise development. The CHA was against building any elevator buildings because of past failures and the stigma associated with high-rise development. And the residents wanted elevator buildings, because that was all they knew. The development team was in support of the CHA largely in part because of the prior failures to manage and maintain these building types. To negotiate this conflict, the development team brought residents and CHA officials to the top of one of the existing seven-story buildings, stood on the roof and looked east from the building and saw a marvelous view of the Hancock Tower, the Sears Tower and the United Center, according to Louis:

“We all said, oh man, we have to build an elevator building here. This view was just too valuable to throw away, and the residents were right but for the wrong reasons. What they were right about was the ways that we could attract market rate buyers by giving them something unique and valuable and one of the things that we could give them was the view.” (Interviewed on 10.18.2013)

With this in mind, the development team convinced the CHA that an elevator building would work if there were no families placed in the building. By not having any families in the building, this would alleviate the concerns of the CHA in terms of managing and maintaining large 3-4 bedroom family units in elevator buildings, which was problematic in the past. This resulted in planning and building a 113-unit building that was nine stories with one-bedroom units on the eastern most part of the site, which had the best views. This was one of the most pivotal examples of how the development team was able to cut through the mistrust and tension between the CHA and residents, and settle on an alternative that served the interests of both parties.

**Urban Design**

Once there was a better working relationship established within the working group between the CHA, HRC, and LAC, discussion started about the more specific planning and design components. Each actor had different interests in terms of what they wanted to integrate in the master plan and there were several specific planning and design elements that were at the forefront of the working group meetings. The focus of the working group meetings were geared towards reconciling several issues: the residents focus on security, unit sizes, open space, the overarching design goals of the architect's and developer; and unit mix preferences of Counsel for Gautreaux Plaintiffs and the developer.

On the resident side, both Angela and Louis acknowledged that the HRC and LAC were more concerned with the current conditions, and didn’t quite understand what the future conditions could look like. For instance, residents wanted to see high, strong fencing in the development because security was a major issue. Therefore the development team had to explain to residents that, “the new development was going to be secure not because there
was electrified fencing around the place, but because it’s going to be mixed-income, and there would be a higher level of policing to prevent crime.” While the development team worked to assure the residents that the new community would be different, it was actually very difficult to get the residents to believe the changes would happen. It wasn’t until Phase 2A West was completed that the residents finally realized that the new development would be completely different than the public housing that existed before.

In addition to security, residents were also concerned with pragmatic issues such as the size of the units, bedroom space, and park space. They were not particularly interested in the planning concepts, or ideas about new urbanism. For example, residents wanted to have large bedrooms, and public park areas where their children could play outside, or families could walk, in addition to tot lots and playground areas that were near the residential units. While the residents may not have used the terms new urbanism – expressing a desire for open spaces and a walkable community – their requests were aligned with the proposed master plan goals. An architect described that discussions around urban design were generally left for the design team, but architects took the feedback from the HRC and LAC and integrated their recommendations into numerous site plans. The HRC and LAC in the case of Westhaven Park, had more bargaining power than at other developments, in terms of having their interests considered in the planning process. Likewise, in my interview, Counsel for the HRC reiterated the importance of the consent decree in the decision-making process at Westhaven Park:

“We had this consent decree, and that was critical so we knew that. They go to these meetings at other developments and are just told what is going to happen, here the residents are a part of deciding what is going to happen and if we can’t reach an agreement we can go back to the judge. That is so important because CHA, HUD, and the developer know we have that option, and so that is always in their mind when they are sitting down. We have to reach agreement with these folks, or we are going to have to start over with a court case. So I think more than anything, that distinguishes Horner - more power than they have at some of the other developments. And it just makes it so that an agreement is a lot easier to reach when you are operating under those rules.” (Interviewed on 09.13.2013)

The Westhaven Park planning process around the master plan was more collaborative in nature, as opposed to the process at Roosevelt Square, which was tightly controlled by the development team. In this case, the master plan development was a deliberative planning process where the HRC and LAC had a voice in the working group meetings. Otherwise, The Counsel for the HRC and the CHA would end up back in court, which would inevitably slow down the progress of redevelopment.

The proposed plans integrated urban designs that were consistent with the use of new urbanism, although there were different viewpoints held about the application of new urbanism in an urban setting. On the developer
side, there was a belief that there was no place for new urbanism in an urban setting, so the acceptable urban design ideas used were around good urbanism, as Louis told me:

“There is no such thing as new urbanism in a real city, in city planning, its urbanism. New urbanism is what you do in a cornfield. New urbanism is not what you do in Chicago. There is good urban design and bad urban design. You want to know how to do urban look at what the pattern of development was in 1900 on the exact same block that we are redeveloping, that’s good development. That’s urbanism, not new urbanism.” (Interviewed on 10.18.2013)

In our interview Ellen, Senior Vice President at Michaels Development Company described in more detail the perspective of new urbanism, but also concurred with Louis:

“I don’t really like to think of it as new urbanist, because it’s really old urbanism. I mean it’s the way communities developed over the years. So absolutely it was based on the traditional neighborhood, that families would be living there. We wanted to make sure that it was a safe community. There were eyes on the street that everyone saw that they had their own home so to speak, by giving everybody a front door. Or at least as much as possible, giving as many front doors as possible.” (Interviewed on 02.05.2014)

In this case, urbanism is related to how cities function, and new urbanism is applied to suburban, not urban development. While this is a perception of the application of urban design, it does not acknowledge the historical underpinnings of new urbanism, which are based on traditional neighborhood forms, comprised of the already existing ideas of urbanism. Originally, new urbanism was applied as an alternative to suburban development, with its isolated location, Euclidian single use zoning patterns, lack of street connectivity, and walkability. New urbanism provided a solution by striving to incorporate a mix of uses, diversity of housing, street connectivity, and public open spaces to create vibrant communities (Haas, 2008). What Louis failed to acknowledge were the similarities between existing public housing sites, that were also isolated from their surrounding communities, built on superblocks without street connections, lacked a mixture of land uses, had few boundaries delimiting public or private open spaces, and limited pedestrianism. While new urbanism was conceived as an alternative to suburban sprawl, the urban form of public housing also lacked traditional neighborhood design elements, in which new urbanism served to incorporate. The distinction between good or bad urban design implies that good urban design is represented only by urban patterns of development, and bad urban design is relegated to the suburban environment.

Taking into consideration, the development teams perception of new urbanism, and the architects design strategies; new urbanism was used as a guide to develop the master plan. This is shown in the planners and architects decisions to reinstitute the original street grid, by connecting road networks and alleviating the site isolation.

Additionally, an architect explained to me in our interview that the proposed master plan incorporated a diversity of
housing types with a combination of mid-rise, walk ups, three flats, and six flats, maintain a traditional neighborhood environment through the use of porches, and integrating private yard spaces at the rear of units. The master plan focused on creating walkable, and pedestrian friendly streets by fronting buildings when possible, along the street, and anchoring blocks with larger buildings at street corners. An architect explained to me further, that the idea was to create a traditional Chicago neighborhood with character void of monolithic structures, but more low-rise buildings with classic elements reminiscent of the existing community housing. Master plan proposals consistently reflected a commitment by the architects and development team with the aforementioned urban design and building design concepts, which served as guides for the PD process and build out.

**Commercial and Open Space**

Westhaven Park, was also meant to be comprehensive, but in this case the retail and open space components were difficult to secure in the proposed master plan. For the master plan to align with project goals, additional land uses such as commercial, education, and open spaces should have been included. However, the project focused primarily on building housing and two mixed use buildings instead of a more comprehensive set of land uses. Housing development was the most important element, which the developer was tasked to rebuild, but building a comprehensive plan required city agencies to take the lead.

The development team can build mixed-use buildings and attract smaller tenants. However, according to Angela, “to attract large-scale commercial development, typically the city has to be a catalyst for that. It is not likely that Brinshore Michaels can get a meeting with Target.” (Interviewed on 09.24.2013). Additionally, the development and design teams encouraged the City of Chicago to consider a new train stop at Damen or Western, to serve the Westhaven Park community, but were told there were not enough resources to build a station at those locations. Although, both the development team and residents wanted to see more comprehensive commercial development, the responsibility lied with the City of Chicago to attract businesses to the area. Based on proposed plans for Westhaven Park, the City of Chicago is not only responsible for providing infrastructure support and assist with land acquisition, their duties also include providing business development, as well as providing the resources and maintaining public open space. While the City of Chicago provided infrastructure support for the project, they did not follow through on business development and resources for open spaces. The indifference of the City of Chicago coupled with inhibiting planning constraints, particularly financing, led to a plan that was not as comprehensive as it could have been. Brinshore Michaels was able to attract small retailers to the mixed-use buildings, but in terms of park spaces,
the Chicago Park District did not want to manage any park spaces under two acres. Because the City of Chicago was unwilling to support a more comprehensive plan, Westhaven Park has some small-scale retail in its mixed-use buildings, and smaller parks that the development team manages.

Figure 39. Photographs of Westhaven Park neighborhood

Source: Photographs by author

Establishing Unit Mix

The unit mix, and distribution of units remained a contentious battle throughout Phase II. These disputes primarily involved the CHA, Counsel for Gautreaux Plaintiffs, LAC, the HRC, and Counsel / tenant representative for the HRC. For Phase II, 2A West, the issue that arose was how to distribute the units in the nine story mid-rise. There were two distinct opinions in this case. One, the development team did not support building integration of rental and for sale units, and two, the Counsel for Gautreaux Plaintiffs wanted to see both rental, and for sale in the same building. The Counsel for Gautreaux Plaintiffs wanted to maintain the concept of integrating rental and for sale units not only by block, but also by building. On a fundamental level, the Counsel for Gautreaux Plaintiffs were there to enforce integration, and ensure that public housing residents were not segregated at Westhaven Park. Becky, a Senior Staff Counsel expressed the perspective held by the Counsel for Gautreaux in my interview:

“Our fundamental perspective is – well, there’s several things. One is that there should be a mix of incomes. So we support a full range of mixing. We like the big vision of the full income mix including for sale and rental. That’s number one. Number two it’s very important that the public housing be spread throughout the development and as much as possible within buildings. So mixing within buildings. There are some buildings in the transformation plan where you just have affordable housing and public housing, but that’s not a mix. That’s not a situation that I like to see. I like to see a full mix…It was our view that if there was to be a condo building, it should have public housing in it. We do object when – or we did at the time. As a matter of philosophy, we think all the buildings ought to have a mix of incomes in them so that you’re not segregating people again. We were advocating that the for sale buildings, to the extent that they could, would also have public housing in them. So if you build a single family home, of course, that isn’t possible. If you build larger building with condos, there was a way. Legally, there is a way to have public housing residents in those units.” (Interviewed on 01.16.2014)
The developer on the other hand thought this was a bad idea for two reasons: one, the financing was more complicated and two, the challenge with integrating rental, and for sale tenants in the same building. Louis explained that rental and for sale integration is a bad idea because:

“It increases tension, it leads to decreased property values, it's not a positive thing. It’s actually ideology over common sense. Well, people who are making the most important investment decision of their lives, their home purchase, want to live alongside people who share their same sense of ownership. And, they want to be able to maximize their approach together that way. And if you don’t do it that way, then the value is greatly decreased. Because there is a marketing problem and it creates tension. It’s just a lot of problems. The buy in between renters and owners is clearly different. I think it’s great to have them on the same site, and largely on this site the owners are the advocates on cracking down on bad behavior on crime, drug sales, hanging out, all those things. And so it’s really important to have them there. To have them checker boarded together is not necessarily a positive thing.” (Interviewed on 10.18.2013)

The Counsel for Gautreaux Plaintiffs continued to fight for unit integration across rental and for sale. They were eventually successful in securing a commitment by the development team to mix rental and for sale in the mid-rise building. The two parties compromised, and agreed the mid-rise building would not have any families, and would only be one-bedroom units that would accommodate 79 condos and 34 public housing units. While there was compromise made between the two parties, the condo buildings still failed to allow public housing families to live in mid-rise buildings, which reinforced the perceptions held against public housing families that they should not live in mid-rise buildings. This was more of an issue of the prior stigmas associated with public housing families living in deteriorating buildings, rather than the mismanagement by the CHA. Likewise, the development team in this case were impeding actors, and appeared to reinforce a lack of commitment for actual income integration across Westhaven Park. This is in direct opposition to HOPE VI ideals. Having legal advocates to maintain an accountability check in the case of Westhaven Park, proved to be invaluable to ensure that the needs of public housing residents were considered in the decision-making process. This project, more than Roosevelt Square, had inhibiting planning constraints, such as building consensus as a major factor throughout the planning and implementation process. But in this case supporting actors had more leverage because of the consent decree in place.
8.4 **Final Plan Development: Incremental Planning for the Future**

For the final plan development stage, the development team implemented a unique structure as to how Westhaven Park would be implemented for its PD, based on their past work on mixed-income development projects. Instead of using the master plan to guide the development process, the first phase was planned, and each subsequent phase was planned one at a time. The concept of a master plan was not revisited. Instead, as one phase of the site was developed, the overall plan was updated, so there was an individual PD done for each phase. Louis outlined this approach to me:

“It becomes a series of plans that are different parts of the same site, without a master plan. And as you develop one part of the site, you update the quote and quote master plan, of what you are now proposing in that piece of the plan. So we got individual plan development as we developed them. And I think that is very wise because for someone to get a plan development over a master plan assumes, that you are not going to learn anything from the time you design it and the time you build it which could be 15 years later. So, you want to leave maximum flexibility to allow you to learn from what you have done and that’s what we did.” (Interviewed on 10.18.2013)

This pragmatic approach to development proved to be a smart decision for implementing a mixed-income development site, with many moving parts and uncertainty. Obtaining a PD for the entire site at the beginning of the planning process locks the development in, and those parameters must be followed, or the participatory and approval process must be repeated. Doing a single PD for the entire site also assumes that something new will not be learned from the time the plan is designed to when it is built. By doing each phase one at a time and doing individual PDs, this allowed the development team more flexibility, limited the risk associated with the project, and allowed for a slower pace and time to obtain feedback about each phase from the working group. So for each phase there was a cyclical
process of plan development, participatory process, and construction. The process itself was not linear, but an iterative process that allowed for the development team to learn from each phase, and adapt to changes from design to build out. Throughout each phase of development, the design and development team learned what worked and what didn’t work in an effort to make changes the plans and build out.

### TABLE X

**WESTHAVEN PARK UNIT TOTALS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Rental Units</th>
<th>For Sale Units</th>
<th>Total Units</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Affordable</td>
<td>Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2A west</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2A east</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Phase 2C</td>
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<td>Phase 2D</td>
<td>Planning Phase</td>
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<td>Planning Phase</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Completed</td>
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<td>78</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Units</td>
<td></td>
<td>258</td>
<td>121</td>
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Source: The Habitat Company, 2013

#### 8.5 Construction: Implementing Grandiose Plans

As the project moved to the construction phase from 2002-2004, there were several problems that arose, which included the challenge of constructing buildings on an existing site, balancing the value engineering process, and coordinating construction. Oscar, a member of the development team discussed the difficulty of implementing the first phase of development, “It was the first phase. A lot of promises were made and when it comes to implementing, in reality it’s a lot harder than all of the grandiose plans.” (Interviewed on 10.21.2013). The first phase, 2A West, included 155 rental units in 18 buildings, and were comprised of 87 public housing units, 31 affordable units, and 37 market rate units. Later 2A East included rental and for sale units with 34 for public housing, 19 affordable, and 120 market rate. These units were built on the two bookends of the site, the eastern and western most sides of the site. This arrangement was done to maintain the requirements of the consent decree because residents had to be moved from the existing buildings directly into the new buildings. The only way to make it work was to keep the buildings on the site during construction, build around the existing buildings, and then move residents. According to Louis, this in itself was a challenging feat and made for a slower process of redevelopment. This is in comparison to other HOPE VI sites in Chicago that tore down the buildings, scattered the residents, and then built new buildings and invited people back under new screening criteria. Because of the consent decree, that was not an option, and residents had to be moved directly from the site into the new units.
Value Engineering

In addition to the phasing challenges, the value engineering process also revealed several issues. In general, the majority of the value engineering was not major. For instance, there were minor changes in unit size, carpeting, or window types, because based on the construction documents, major changes could not be made. In contrast, what was more problematic were the changes that appeared to be relevant, and would result in price reductions, but instead proved to be more trouble than it was worth. One such issue involved the decision to use a townhouse style because HUD was willing to pay more for townhouses. Therefore, the development team designed a handful of these buildings, which were essentially two bedrooms on the first floor and duplexes above, instead of designing stacked flats. Because this decision was made at the design stage, and value engineering changes were made, it caused more problems once the project was constructed. Oscar explained to me an example that illustrated this point:

“In order to get the two bedroom big enough you really got these huge units above. So in order to squeeze these units down to a more manageable size, instead of a 2000 square foot house, which was kind of ridiculous, we cut out a little section and made a knot in the building, which was fine and it got us $ amount of square footage reduction. It probably didn’t help at the end of the day with the exterior walls, it probably didn’t help as much as we though it would. One of the things we have had to deal with since then is now we have an exterior stair that runs up and then a landing that’s above this and below so there is a roof with a landing and then there is a bedroom below it. So we have had a couple of water leaks there. It’s a really difficult to get to because we have to pull up all the boards to get to it, it’s essentially a deck on top of a roof. So to save $100,000 in a $25M project, we cut this little corner out and we have had to go back and deal with that situation. So that’s kind of classic value engineering, not a huge catastrophe but a situation where you’re like what are we really getting?” (Interviewed on 10.21.2013)

This was an example of the challenges faced during the value engineering process. The developer is working within the constraints of uncertainty, and attempting to balance making the project financially feasible at the design stage, without any insight into future issues that may arise down the line that negate the changes made.
One of the biggest challenges faced by the development team also came in the way of a decision that was made early on in the planning process. The decision to assemble one team with a master architect and three MBE/WBE architects under the master architect, proved to be a great conceptual idea, but was a significant challenge to implement. Oscar explained that it was difficult to coordinate and streamline building construction details across three different architects. For instance, since there were three different architects working on the project, there were also three different sets of building construction details. This was problematic for the contractor who has his/her own in-house, building construction, detail development, in which they don’t necessarily price the construction based on three different sets of details. In this case, when there are multiple sets of building construction details, contractors will have to submit a request for information (RFI), which has to go through DeStefano Partners, the master architect, instead of the MBE/WBE architects who were responsible for the designs.

For the contractor, value engineering tends to come back and hurt in the end because something was taken out, but the ramifications of that decision in detail development are not entirely thought through. While, the structure of having a single point of accountability with a master architect was meant to make the process easier to coordinate, initially it was more challenging. As the project progressed, the design team was able to work through the coordination issues, and streamline building construction details. In addition to coordinating multiple architects during construction, the development team also had to deal with the complications of the market decline in 2008, in which sub contractors went out of business, and third parties had to be brought in to complete the job. The combination of coordination, and hiring new sub contractors during construction inevitably slows down the construction process, and increases the cost of development.

**Changes in Construction Model**

For the remaining phases, the design team shifted in 2003 as the project also moved along to focus on building for sale condo units. For phases 2A East, 2B, and 2C, Brinshore Michaels decided to move towards a design build model, to eliminate the coordination issues that resulted in design, bid, and build. There were two components to Phase 2A East that consisted of a mid-rise building, and also low-rise buildings. For the mid-rise development, Brinshore Michaels worked with McShane Construction and Cordgan Clark and Associates, both of whom had a lot of experience working together. Likewise for the low-rise development, Landon Bone Baker was selected as the master architect, and New England Builders was selected as the contractor. Landon Bone Baker, who had an ongoing working relationship with Brinshore Michaels, collaborated on Legends South – the former Robert Taylor Homes, as
they were both familiar with the structure and process. New England Builders, a home builder had also done a lot of work in new homes for Chicago and some of the scattered site housing development. Landon Bone Baker was the master architect, and the MBE/WBE architects were Brook Architecture for 2B and Johnson and Lee for 2C.

The planning process started in 2003 and Landon Bone Baker designed the buildings for 2A East based on the existing overall plan completed by DeStefano Partners, and also reworked the overall plan and started to move forward with phases 2B, 2C, and 2D. Just as in the Phase 2A West, there was a participatory process over the course of one year where monthly meetings were held with the working group to obtain feedback for 2B, 2C, and 2D.

8.6 **Participatory Process: Cyclical Process of Development Pays off**

By doing an individual PD for each phase of development, this provided the opportunity for the development and design team to fix mistakes phase by phase, as the team learned what worked and what didn’t. The development and design team showed their commitment to consistently implementing new urbanism and the required housing mix into project plans. This was accomplished by using a cyclical process with plan development, participatory process, and construction for each PD. First, with Destefano Partners as the master architect for 2A West, and second, with Landon Bone Baker as master architect for the remaining phases. In this case, the planning approach and principles implemented were in some ways similar, but in other ways quite different for the later phases. While many of the core issues remained the same in terms of the overall plan vision, what changed was what was learned over the course of the first phase of development, and moving forward what was done differently. There were five elements addressed in the later stages of Phase II by Landon Bone Baker, which included: the change in households, treatment of streets, the need for private outdoor spaces, eliminating unnecessary spaces, and addressing accessibility.

There were new things to take into consideration for the remaining phases, particularly because of the length of time it took to build between phases. Barbara, a principal at Landon Bone Baker pointed out in the interview that one consideration that had to be determined was how to deal with the changing family structures, Due to the time span between the construction of 2A West (2002), 2A East (2004), 2B (2006-2008) and 2C (2010) there was a need to evaluate who the buildings were being constructed for. Barbara explained:

“So where there might have been a household with a family with high school aged children, by the time we get to the next phase, well those high school aged children are now in their 20s or 30s and they have a child. So suddenly a household that needs four bedrooms is really two households needing two bedrooms. So it was constantly in flux.”

(Interviewed on 10.09.2013)
Therefore, in future phases there was not the same need for large family units, but more of a need for two and three bedroom units.

Second, the approach towards the design around streets and parking, was adjusted in later phases of the project. In 2A West, some of the buildings did not face towards the streets. Therefore, for subsequent phases, all of the buildings faced the street, particularly along Lake Street. Parking was provided in the rear along alleyways to make the entrances to parking as unobtrusive as possible. The design focus on the rear of the buildings was much more urban in style.

Third, based on 2A West, all residents in every single unit needed private outdoor space. This was particularly important at Westhaven Park. According to Ellen, the development team learned if private outdoor space is not provided, the space that is available would be used in an undesirable way. For example, creating a parking lot wasn’t ideal because it became a place for people to loiter. Louis further acknowledged learning this lesson as he recalled:

“Because if you don’t provide outdoor space - people have friends and the people will visit and want to hang outdoors. So if you don’t give them private outdoor space away from the street to entertain, they will probably be outside the front door and probably create a very undesirable atmosphere. So, we learned that we had to incorporate outdoor space either on porches, patio’s, in every unit. It’s really critical.” (Interviewed on 10.18.2013)

In addition to providing private outdoor spaces, another thing that was learned according to Louis, is that, “nothing good ever happened in a side yard in Chicago”. So in this case, by phase 2C, the developer and design team eliminated all side yards, and instead connected buildings together in row house style.

And lastly, dealing with accessibility also got better over time as the design team worked with an accessibility consultant procured by the CHA to make a certain number of units accessible. Also, the design team developed clever ways to design both mixed-used and residential buildings that were handicap accessible. For instance to integrate mixed-use and residential an L-shaped building was designed with commercial on the ground floor on one side and residential on the other side of the building so first floor residential units were wheelchair accessible.
8.7 **Construction: Streamlining and Learning from the Past**

The remaining phases included Phase 2A East (for sale), 2B (rental), Phase 2C (rental), and 2D is slated to have a mix of rental and for sale. Phase 2A East and 2B were constructed in 2006-07, a nine story, mid-rise with 79 condos, and 34 public housing units, all one bedroom units with no families. There were also seven buildings with 60 condos in three-story walkups that were scattered throughout the site, faced the street, and had parking off the alley. Phase 2B was all rental with 70 public housing units, 30 affordable units, and 27 market rate units. Phase 2C was the final phase constructed between 2008-2010 and designed by Johnson and Lee. The contractor was Linn Mathis, who had done affordable housing development, as well as market rate units since the 1980s.

This phase included four buildings and 92 units, with 46 public, 32 affordable, and 14 market rate rentals. The buildings were slightly larger with 20 plus units per building. The row houses are six flats, connected to a three flat, connected to a duplex, over a flat, and consists of 23-25 units. This phase also included a four-story elevator building.
with a management office, a community center on the first floor, and an L shaped building. One side of the “L” is a
duplex over a flat, and the other corner is a four story walk up with commercial space on the first floor. There was
also a park planned for 2C that the park district still hasn’t built. Currently, Phase 2D is on hold, and proposed to have
a rental portion with 59 units, and for sale with 176 units. Currently, there are 547 units completed out of 755. There
have not been any decisions made about when to finish phase 2D, and for the past three years there has been no
additional construction at Westhaven Park.

Phase 2A East, 2B, and 2C were easier to implement. Coordination between the architect and contractor was
much more efficient because each phase had only one architect, so there was a single set of building construction
details created and then implemented. Unlike in 2A West, there weren't three different sets from three different
architects. However, the design build model did have some challenges. The design build system is quite different
from the earlier phase in which there were engineering drawings that were priced, and if there was a problem, the
design team had to fix it. With the design build model, the mechanical, electrical, and plumbing were designed by the
contractors that built them, so there was not as much risk. Because the contractor implements the project, they are
implementing their own plans. This in turn took a lot of risk out of the construction process. The only challenge with
the design build model, Oscar described to me was:

“You don’t then get a system that an engineer designs, you get an engineered system but it’s what the contractor gives
you. So you have to be cautious I think or clear with the contractor with what you want. So they can sell you essentially
a Cadillac or a Chevy or anywhere in between, you never know, unless you give them a set of specs to design to and
say we want x, y, and z. And we did not do that, but I think we got a decent product, kind of a middle of the road
product.” (Interviewed on 10.21.2013)

While the design build model offers a smoother implementation process with less risk, it also may vary in
quality. Also, the economic downturn in 2008 negatively affected the construction for Phases 2B and 2C. In the
interview, Barbara told me that there was one way of doing HOPE VI projects before and after 2008:

“For instance before 2008, we really interspersed the homeownership with the rental, and after 2008, when the
homeownership didn’t get built, you’ll see a lot of just empty lots in between sites and that became a problem. So after
2008 we started rethinking. Maybe we should have a whole street of rental and then the site across the street from that
might be homeownership.” (Interviewed on 10.09.2013)

In this case, the housing market decline served as an inhibiting planning constraint, that despite actor
commitment, was unable to be modified in a way that was not detrimental to the project. This example highlights the
challenges to integrate for sale and rental, to be indistinguishable. Because of the vacant lots, it’s easy to distinguish
what is rental, and what is for sale, because the lots are empty. Therefore, Phase 2B lots are integrated, and 2C lots are not, so it is not as noticeable. Barbara acknowledged that to actually implement the checkerboard integrating homeownership, and rental units within the same blocks was actually much more difficult to do in reality, than was conceptually planned. According to Ellen, in addition to the market decline that played into the decision to rethink how to integrate homeownership and rental, was also the fact that, “homeowners liked to be close to other homeowners.” (Interviewed on 02.05.2014).

This was another lesson learned in the later stages that played into providing more homeownership units that were adjacent to one another versus scattering them throughout the site. The philosophy in terms of integration of homeownership and rental by block in this case, changed over time due to both the market decline, as well as the preferred social norms. In this sense, inhibiting planning constraints acted as barriers to fulfilling building out the project as desired, with rental and for sale interspersed and indistinguishable.

8.8  **Marketing and Occupancy: Different Prevailing Interests, Residents or Neighborhood?**

Phase 2A East for sale units went on sale in 2002, and 2C became available in 2009. The marketing for Westhaven Park focused on the value of the property, rather than attracting residents based on the social, and physical mixing goals of the HOPE VI program. The value model was the focus for selling the for sale units, because the concept of mixed-income was viewed as a negative, and not a positive in terms of marketing the project. In this case, actor commitment was influenced by financing, but also from commitment waning on the part of the developer to follow through with their commitments in the marketing stage. In our interview, Louis further explained the rationale for not supporting income mixing in their marketing strategies:
"I don’t think any marketing could fool anyone. If you really want to live, if you’re the kind of person who wants to live in a diverse economic community, or a diverse race community for that matter, I wouldn’t say that these are the places where you would choose to live. You would choose to live in Evanston, Oak Park, Rogers Park, and Hyde Park. You wouldn’t choose to live on a former public housing site. It’s just not, there just is no way in the world that that case works, you aren’t offering enough in that regard. A true diverse community doesn’t have 35% public housing in it. It’s just too high a percentage. So, no, I don’t think any marketing in the world to the folks who buy in farms and live in Evanston would ever in a billion years convince themselves to move themselves with their children to Westhaven Park. There are no schools, there are no good parks, there is no shopping, it doesn’t have any of the elements of a diverse community that people who crave that would want.” (Interviewed on 10.18.2013)

Because of this perspective, the development team focused on developing units that were equal or better than what was available across the market. They also marketed the great location, and attractive price points to sell the units. By focusing on a value model, Westhaven Park also attracted residents that wanted to flip the property and make money, or hold on to the property for a while and capitalize on the investment opportunity. So along with those looking for a good deal on new construction, there are also those that primarily bought into the development for investment purposes. These buyers did not share the goals of building a mixed-income and diverse community, and this dynamic has been problematic for Westhaven Park. For instance, when the market collapsed in 2008, according to George, Executive Director of NWSCDC:

“You had a lot of pissed off people who lost money; couldn’t get out and were highly resentful of the fact that they couldn’t get out. Not to mention the fact that they didn’t move in to build community, they moved in to enhance their real estate portfolios and duck out, but some of them couldn’t, or waited too long.” (Interviewed on 09.17.2013)

Those that work in the community, as well as the public housing residents, are dealing with the aftermath of that reality. Similarly, the problem with marketing Westhaven Park as a value based model according to both Patricia, the LAC president and Ken, the HRC tenant representative, was that there was no recruitment of residents that would support the integration efforts, the plan hoped to achieve. Instead the focus was geared toward marketing a “new” community where middle class residents and only working class families resided. Ken asserted:

“There is a kind of false advertisement to the market rate folks you’re trying to recruit — here’s a great starter apartment for you. Yes, this used to be a public housing site but luckily its been obliterated to the ground, we erased it. There are a few public housing people left in the community, but it’s the crème de le crème”, because it’s no longer public housing.” (Interviewed on 10.11.2013)

Patricia also echoed similar feedback she received from current for sale residents:
"Those residents that bought into the development were told that there were only going to be a few low-income people, there were going to be no public housing residents. They told me there would not be any on the 9th floor, on the 8th floor, cause you get up there you got a very nice view, they told me there would not be anybody in there. They told us that the people that were going to live there were going to go to work and go to school. Now I've bought into a property and I've invested in a market that's crashed and now I can't get out of this jungle." (Interviewed on 10.25.2013)

As far as some for sale residents were concerned, Westhaven Park was marketed as a new community – one where the buildings would be gone, the residents would be gone, and only those residents that were employed, or went to school would be living in the development. While this was partially true, in the case of Westhaven Park, there was a 60% return rate for public housing residents, the largest of any HOPE VI project in Chicago. Therefore, there was a significant amount of tension that existed, as some middle class families that bought into the development felt they were sold a total lie. Instead of creating a community based on diversity, and attracting residents that shared the same goals of building community, the differences have fueled the community because there was no opportunity given for residents to bond based on a shared understanding of what a mixed-income community could, or would look like. George further acknowledged that marketing is critical, and must be grounded in reality. Furthermore this would have offered the opportunity to find ways to bring people together early on and work out differences so the various groups could function as a community.

In addition to the perspectives of the developer, LAC, HRC tenant representative, NWSCDC, and Counsel for Gautreaux Plaintiffs, also weighed in on this issue with a different perspective. Becky acknowledged that because Westhaven had such a big gap between incomes across the existing Henry Horner residents, and new for sale tenants, this actually created more of a problem specifically in areas like the condo building, where this gap was reinforced. She explained in the interview how:

“I felt for a long time that it's, if you have an income mix that's just public housing residents and pretty wealthy homeowners because the condo are super expensive and nothing in between, it's not a very good social mix. It's also not a very natural mix, right? I think the Westhaven condo building had a lot of problems. There's been a lot of stories about the issues. There's a racial overlay. There's a very strong class overlay. I think one of the things that I have come to realize, I've learned is that there is also a huge issue, maybe the biggest issue beyond race and class is between renters and owners. The biggest conflicts are really between renters and owners. So if you have a building like that condo building where you have mostly white owners and black public housing residents, so they're not only renters, but they're poor renters, some of who are paying almost no rent. Then you have people who've paid a lot of money for their mortgages. You set a dynamic that's very hard to make healthy. Let's put it that way. So again, I think having a full spectrum of mix is much better because you don't have that gigantic gap." (Interviewed on 01.16.2014)

Applying a marketing strategy that focuses on attracting residents that are supportive of the underlying goals of income mixing, or at the very least, understand the purpose of living in a mixed-income community is important.
This is important because the challenges faced as Westhaven Park for sale tenants will continue, once residents find out the degree of income mixing, that had a high rate of return of public housing residents. In addition to more honest marketing strategies, the working groups might evaluate whether incomes with large gaps that also reinforce racial gaps are also part of the problems that have played out at Westhaven Park between renters and owners. In this case, regardless of marketing strategies used, the large gaps in income may have been the real problem, which was then made worse by the value based marketing model that Brinshore Michaels applied to sell the project.

The consent decree played a significant role in the occupancy rates for public housing residents at Westhaven Park. Since Westhaven Park had the highest level of resident participation of any CHA development, the residents were able to obtain concessions that other CHA developments were unable to negotiate. For instance, the plan does not adhere to the 1/3/1/3/1/3 income mix adopted in many CHA developments and a higher percentage of original residents (60%) returned. Also as a result of the consent decree, redevelopment had to be phased to limit the displacement of Henry Horner residents. Unlike other CHA sites, residents were not forced to leave and relocate, and instead replacement units were constructed and provided on-site, or residents remained in their old units until new units were available. Also, Westhaven Park residents were not subjected to the 30-hour work-week or drug testing requirements because of the consent decree. This is a significant departure from other CHA developments where residents were required to adhere to these regulations in order to obtain a unit in mixed-income developments. Therefore public housing residents had an easier time in terms of securing housing at Westhaven Park.

As far as the market rate units, based on the marketing strategies used and significant discounts offered to buyers, all but a few of the 139 for sale units at Westhaven Park were sold and occupied. However, by 2008 the market decline had a significant affect on selling for sale units, and there remains 176 for sale units left to build in phases 2B, 2C, and 2D.

8.9 Community Building: Paradox of Creating Neighborhoods

Westhaven Park had several community building initiatives that were closely aligned with the initial HOPE VI Revitalization Plan that were successful in providing support systems for public housing residents. The community building component was a central focus of NWSCDC early on during Phase I, and Brinshore Michaels continued to expand the services available to public housing residents through the Horner engagement program, education programs, and job training options. However, what was less successful were the aims to bring community building to the broader neighborhood through public parks, community spaces, and schools.
Initially there were differences as to what types of services residents should have. The NWSCDC felt it was important to prepare public housing residents for the transition from public housing to mixed-income development, and the LAC, at the time, didn’t think it was necessary. George noted that, “there was nothing to prepare them for the transition – so if it was going to be successful, there had to be something in place to enable the residents to make that move.” (Interviewed on 09.17.2013). There were differences in what was deemed necessary, and the two sides needed to find common ground. As time moved on, and the LAC leadership changed, there was an agreement made between the NWSCDC and the LAC on the need to prepare families that were moving into Westhaven Park Phase II.

The Home Visitors Program (HVP) prepared public housing residents for the transition to Westhaven Park. The HVP became a central program that was actually implemented early on in the Phase I occupancy stages by the NWSCDC in 1999. This program was focused on working with families that would be transitioning from public housing to mixed-income developments. There were five specific areas the program addressed, which included: economic development, which helped residents find jobs; financial management, which helped residents with financial literacy; lease compliance, which focused on ensuring families stayed lease compliant; family stability which linked residents to resources such as abuse counseling; and community integration, which was around getting resident involved in the community to take ownership of their new homes through block clubs.

**Broader Neighborhood Amenities**

Building from the initial community building plans submitted in the HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, as well as what came out of the participatory process, there were also several other community building activities pursued at Westhaven Park. There were three main efforts that were pursued which included: the Horner Engagement Program, Michaels on-site community building manager, and various programs were implemented through partnerships with universities and non-profit organizations. The development team and NWSCDC were supporting actors that ensured the community building initiatives around self-sufficiency, and employment were achieved. Where Brinsho Michaels was less successful was around improvements to education access, which were inhibited by planning constraints, as well as impeding actors that were indifferent to providing quality education for Westhaven Park residents.

The Horner Engagement program, now Family Works, was the first service connector program implemented as part of the PFT broader service connector model. The service connector, is an effort by the CHA to outsource the delivery of social services by relying on community-based partnerships that assist residents with identifying and accessing adequate social services. At the core of this initiative is to identify points at which services can support housing
choices within lease compliance, employment, family stability and community integration (Snyderman & Steven, 2001). Westhaven is served by the NWSCDC, and differs from the majority of mixed-income developments in terms of requirements and service delivery. To deliver employment case management services, NWSCDC partnered with Project Match (PM) a non-profit organization to create the Horner Engagement Program, which replaced the service connector model at Westhaven Park. The Horner Engagement Program is a two-year program that is open to all public housing residents in Westhaven Park. Public housing residents are required to participate in monthly meetings with PM case management staff and commit to 15 hours of engagement activities per week for the first year. This increased to 20 hours per week during the second year. Suitable engagement activities are working full or part time, vocational training, educational programs, community service, substance abuse, mental health and domestic violence services.

To deliver the Horner Engagement Program, PM adapted Pathways for public housing residents known as Pathways to Rewards (PTR). The goal of the PTR program was to promote stabilization of the family and community by providing many of the same supports in place for the welfare based Pathways Case Management System. The program provided structure, support and incentives for the entire family including support services for adults, teens and young children by working towards individual goals. PTR had four components: an activity diary, a monthly group meeting, and an incentive based component. Requirements of the program include having all members of the households to set quarterly goals in an activity diary for obtaining employment, lease compliance, academic and extracurricular achievement, and community involvement.

A central program element was also the monthly group meeting where each participant gets 15 minutes to review the prior month’s plan and negotiate a new plan for the coming month. The new plan built on recent accomplishments and combined activities that counted towards engagement activities, as well as those towards fulfilling the prior optional work requirements. Also every quarter a catered event is offered to publicly celebrate families’ accomplishments in the program. As of mid 2010, PM no longer partners with NWSCSC to deliver the program and the NWSCDC has since followed the new parameters set fourth in the revised Horner Engagement agreement. The new agreement still requires engagement activities. However, these activities are no longer optional and public housing residents are now required to work 20 hours per week, or be involved in engagement activities.

Michaels Development also offered on-site community building services, through their community development arm, which has a resident service coordinator tasked with overseeing resident services. The model Michaels Development used according to Deborah, Vice President of Interstate Realty Management, is one that, “starts with the individual resident, assess and try to meet their needs, and we work our way out to the broader
community” (Interviewed on 12.02.2013). The first step is assessing the resident to first find out if there are any barriers for the person or household to meet the work requirements, and second to determine what their strengths are to figure out how to help them become self-sufficient.

There are a number of programs that have been developed to support existing residents. For instance, Inspiration Café is an organization that works with extremely disadvantaged residents to develop skills in food service and management. To bring Inspiration Café to Westhaven Park, Michaels Development opened the community center to host their eight-week training program. There are also youth programs focused on math and science sponsored by Columbia College, and a number of programs that focused on literacy programs that help youth with basic skills. Michaels Development also partnered with local schools to help parents determine the best school to send their children. A focus of all the programs are not necessarily to have an on-site presence at Westhaven Park, but to connect residents to organizations and programs that are available in the community.

**Education Reform**

Although access to education is a significant piece in the transformation of public housing into mixed-income developments, this remains a component that is out of the purview of the development team. The development team relied on the City of Chicago to ensure mixed-income developments have the necessary services, and amenities to function as a community and attract middle and upper class families to Westhaven Park. Subsequently, the development team was unsuccessful in getting the City of Chicago to provide high quality schools for Westhaven Park. To provide quality education for Westhaven Park, therefore remains the responsibility of the City of Chicago, and its sister agency CPS. However, because CPS operated independently of the CHA there has been little progress made in figuring out how to build consensus across the two agencies, and coordinate both housing development and education reform simultaneously.

Similar to Roosevelt Square, the Westhaven Park resident population has been directly impacted by multiple CPS closures. At Westhaven Park, the CPS pattern of closing neighborhood schools due to declining CHA populations, only to later re-open schools as city-wide selective enrollment schools, remains a significant problem. There were two main schools that served the Westhaven Park population, Victor Herbert and Dett Elementary Schools. Victor Herbert was closed by CPS and the Dett student population was relocated into the Victor Herbert building. Becky pointed out in the interview the affect of school closures at Westhaven Park:
“Dett was actually a higher performing school, and was moved to Victor Herbert, which has historically been a tough place for Westhaven Park kids north of Madison Street to go down to Victor Herbert. So CPS took an effective school and placed it in a tough location further away from the kids at Westhaven Park. So now they have no Dett, Suder’s a Montessori school they don’t want to go to and they do have Brown…Brown is the only one left standing, so it does disrupt peoples’ lives quite a bit when that happens.” (Interviewed on 01.16.2014)

There continues to be a disregard by CPS regarding the challenges faced by existing residents to cross neighborhood boundaries to attend schools further away. In addition to relocating Westhaven Park residents to Dett, CPS also closed the existing on-site neighborhood Suder Elementary School when the CHA started to demolish the public housing units. However in 2005, CPS opened Suder Montessori Magnet Elementary School on-site in the same building that is now open to students city-wide, and does not serve the Westhaven Park residents. Other elementary schools in the broader community are Brown W.H. elementary school, and further north Skinner West. The primary high school that serves the Westhaven Park community is Crane, which has been underperforming and plagued by crime and is currently in the process of turning into a medical school program. In addition to Crane, the other nearby high schools are selective enrollment schools, or charter schools such as Noble Street High School.

Without high performing neighborhood elementary schools that were centrally located to Westhaven Park, there were difficulties to attract middle and upper class families to the development because an important factor for families is quality access to neighborhood schools. Louis argued that:

“The city completely failed us in terms of making the mixed-income work because they didn’t provide the schools. And they demonstrate over and over again that they are incapable of doing it. They bungled up on this whole issue of closing schools and we have to improve the schools that are there; they should have just built new schools and top-notch schools.” (Interviewed on 10.18.2013)

Becky concurred with Louis’ assessment and explained further the importance of high quality schools in mixed-income developments like Westhaven Park:

“We need a really good school that can be the centerpiece of that community. If you look around the country on mixed income sites, HOPE VI places that have been really successful, they frequently include a really attractive school, a really good school. That sort of thing hasn’t happened here. And it just doesn’t seem to be part of the plans from anybody’s direct – not from CPS, the developer, CHA or anybody because the bureaucracies don’t work together. Developers can’t build schools. They don’t have the money to do that, but there’s just no effort. Now if it were a priority for the City, right, City sort of controls all the pieces here, well, there might be a different perspective, but it just hasn’t happened here. It’s a really big missed opportunity.” (Interviewed on 01.16.2014)
The City of Chicago and CHA are facilitating actors when it comes to implementing any education reform in mixed-income developments. While improvements to education are outside of the purview of the development team, the City of Chicago is responsible for education improvements, and show little commitment to improve access to education at Westhaven Park, evident by the school closures. There are two additional problems with the CPS pattern of closing neighborhood schools, and then opening up city-wide schools; Without having any high performing neighborhood schools at Westhaven Park that are not selective enrollment or charter schools, hinders the potential to also integrate the existing low-income, and middle class families with children. In addition to integration, what is also troubling is that when public housing residents return to their communities, the schools they attended are no longer open, which hurts not only individual families, but the entire public housing community.

In addition to not having high performing schools for residents to attend, planned public parks have also not been built. On the development team side, parks were planned for Phase 2C through a land swap, however the City of Chicago Parks Department has not built the park because of resources to maintain and manage large parks. Angela, explains that the Park District will only take on a park over 2 acres, otherwise the developer must own and also operate the park. So the park spaces have decreased in size, so they are more manageable for private operation. That's why the public parks from the original master plans have become smaller, that Brinshore Michaels now owns and operates.

8.10 Future Development: The Superblock - A Mixed Bag

The Horner superblock is located in the center of the Westhaven Park site, and is part of the Horner redevelopment governed by the consent decree. The superblock was part of the larger $50M replacement housing effort in Phase I between 1996-2000 that demolished 466 units of public housing, and replaced 461 units across both the superblock and scattered site housing (Wilen, 2006). The superblock is comprised of 200 public housing units, and is currently slated for renovation because after 15 years, there has been a decline in the housing condition. Specifically, the CHA contends that the superblock, “have experienced more wear and tear than any other units at Horner,” and thus are “in poorer condition than the balance of the Horner redevelopment” (Henry Horner Mothers Guild v. CHA, 2012). The Counsel for the HRC, argued that the superblock exteriors are in good condition, and there is a need for minimal renovation of some unit interiors, exterior balconies, and stairwells.

While waiting for 2C to be completed, planning started for the superblock in 2011. Originally, Counsel for Gautreaux Plaintiffs, the CHA, and HRC and Counsel for the HRC had agreed to the unit mix for the superblock
renovations. Under the consent decree as well as an agreement with Counsel for Gautreaux Plaintiffs, half of the 200 units were for families between 0-50% AMI of the Horner families that elected to stay onsite, and the other half were for working families at 50-80% AMI. Since Counsel for Gautreaux Plaintiffs, the HRC and Counsel for the HRC were in agreement, the renovation of those units could move forward. However, in December 2011, the CHA filed a motion instead to convert the superblock to townhome, or two flat units so that the site would be fully integrated into the new mixed-income community.

The CHA argued that the current AMI of residents no longer reached the threshold of the prior consent and Gautreaux agreements, and had become an “island of public housing” in the midst of the mixed-income portions of the Horner redevelopment (Henry Horner Mothers Guild v. CHA, 2012). The CHA would allow the original 73 Horner families living on the superblock to stay, but everyone else had to move so the units could be rented to higher income, non-public housing residents. When the CHA filed their motion, public housing residents comprised 74% 0-50 AMI, and only 26% 50-80 AMI, instead of the 50% required by the decree. Therefore, the CHA wanted to continue with the planned renovations, but modify the income mix to better align with the transformation to mixed-income by introducing higher income residents.

In response, the HRC and Counsel for the HRC, filed a response in March 2012. The response argued that residents on the superblock are already a mixed-income, mixed race community with higher rates of employment, and engagement than public housing residents living in the mixed-income portions of Westhaven Park. For example, since 2000 for the census tract containing the superblock, median income has risen from $26,051 to $38,145, a 46% increase. Also, the poverty rate from 2000 to 2010, has declined from 56% to 22.8%, as well as an increase in the White, Non-Hispanic population from 2.8% to 9.8% (Henry Horner Mothers Guild v. CHA, 2012). The parties continued to negotiate with the assistance of Ken, the HRC tenants representative and in November 2013, an agreement was reached. Brinshore Michaels will convert the 200 superblock units to mixed-income housing after the renovation is completed.

To ensure that all of the Horner families are accommodated, instead of 73 units, there were 95 public housing units, 50 tax credit units, and 55 market rate units. The most important component of this agreement is that of the existing superblock residents that were surveyed, 95 wanted to stay and the remaining families preferred to take a housing choice voucher. So, for those Horner families that wanted to stay, the 95 units will now ensure they can stay on the superblock, during renovations, and then receive a new replacement unit. Ultimately, the CHA did prevail
in converting the superblock to mixed income, and the HRC and Counsel for the HRC, were able to ensure that residents at 0-50% AMI that wanted to stay, had that option.

The superblock negotiations were an important example of how the consent decree plays a unique role at Westhaven Park. Ken explained that, “the relationship with the CHA is almost completely adversarial in the sense that issues arise when the CHA departs from the consent decree, and then we sort of call them to account.” The consent decree essentially held the CHA accountable for their actions when they decide to move forward, and make decisions about the redevelopment without due process. The Counsel for the HRC is there to force the CHA to stand by its commitments. Ken added:

“The CHA constantly resents the constraints of the consent decree, but I think they constantly benefit from it as well. In the literature over the years, they will hold Horner up as this example or model project for the PFT, I think it’s great they do it, but they were dragged kicking and screaming. If they could have rolled over Horner residents like they did everywhere else, they would have - they just couldn’t do it because they had the Counsel for the HRC and the troops blocking the way. The fact that the Counsel for the HRC was there every time they departed from the consent decree has made for better outcomes and they end up touting Horner as a result. So it’s kind of a paradox. But the CHA fought it. They didn’t embrace the principles, they fought it. And now they can say this is what the PFT is all about.” (Interviewed on 10.11.13)

In this case, had the CHA had its way, all of the Horner families would have been displaced during renovations, and then only 73 would be allowed to return – if they returned at all. Therefore by filing a motion, it forced the CHA to negotiate an option that resulted in not having residents displaced. It also accommodated all of the Horner families that wanted to stay in the newly renovated buildings maintained the commitment to the original Horner families. And in the process, the CHA also gained a higher portion of affordable and market rate rental units.
8.11 Summary

Westhaven Park highlighted a broad range of actor commitment to new urbanist norms. In this case, actor commitment ranged from idealist, realists, non-believers, and to a lesser degree indifferent actors that maintained their roles throughout the process. The development team was comprised of both idealists and non-believers; the HRC, Counsel for HRC, HRC tenant representative, Counsel for Gautreaux Plaintiffs, and the LAC acted as realists; the City of Chicago and CHA either acted in the capacity as opportunists, or played the role of being indifferent. The way actors played their institutional role at Westhaven Park had a distinct influence on the plan implementation process. In this case, having a large contingent of public-private actors represented by the realist perspective, with the weight of the consent decree, afforded these actors decision-making capacity in the implementation process, where the majority of decisions were either based on collaboration, or were negotiated throughout the development process.

This case also illustrated how commitment played out at different ‘critical implementation episodes.’ Actor commitment mattered at the plan development, public participatory, final plan development, and occupancy stages. At these episodes there was the most supporting actors, as well as implementation constraints, that reinforced project plan goals, such as consensus and legal parameters. Next, my research showed where implementation constraints acted as barriers that inhibit plan goals from being met, and cause project plans to change despite actors commitment. Westhaven Park shows these interrelationships at the construction and community building stages. At the construction stage, a decline in market conditions led to a change in the construction timeline, as well as how rental and for sale units were integrated. Likewise, in the community building stage, there were inhibited implementation constraints, but also impeding actors that are key in the planning process that were indifferent, which make it difficult to implement the broader community and neighborhood support systems. Lastly, actor commitment waned under pressure of inhibiting planning constraints in the marketing stage, which actors chose to follow competing norms and goals instead of remaining committed to project plans. TABLE X, illustrates these relationships, which I will further explain:
### Where Actor Commitment Matters

The project planning + design phase had the most supporting actors and planning constraints that further reinforced how project plans were achieved. The key planning constraint that influenced the project planning + design phase was building consensus among the actors involved in the working group. The team of Brinshore Michaels led by Louis, Angela, and Ellen were comprised of non-believers, and idealists. Brinshore Michaels was selected in large part because of their commitment and ability to provide the highest number of public housing units, as well as their expertise with community building. This dynamic actually proved to drive the project forward, as Louis a pragmatic cynic negotiated the contentious relationship between the CHA and residents, and mediated the participatory process in an effort to build consensus and buy in for the project plans. While the CHA was adamant about new construction and residents wanted the buildings to be rehabbed, Brinshore Michaels was able to get each side to see the benefits of not only doing new construction, but also mid-rise construction to take advantage of the site location.

Westhaven Park also had the involvement of the HRC and Counsel for HRC, HRC tenant representative, LAC, and Counsel for Gautreaux Plaintiffs that enforced actor commitment to the physical and social goals, when actors wanted to make changes that did not serve the interests of the plan goals. For instance, Counsel for Gautreaux Plaintiffs fought for unit integration to adhere to the goals of mixing various income ranges and housing types. They were successful in convincing the development team to integrate the mid-rise building with both rental, and for sale units. These groups served to hold actors accountable, as well as mobilize support for project plans, that ensured the income mixing goals were achieved in the plan proposals.

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### TABLE XI

**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACTOR COMMITMENT AND PLANNING CONSTRAINTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reinforcing Planning Constraints</th>
<th>Inhibiting Planning Constraints</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plan Development: <strong>Consensus, Legal</strong></td>
<td>Construction: <strong>Market Conditions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Participatory Process: <strong>Consensus, Legal</strong></td>
<td>Marketing: <strong>Financing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Plan Development: <strong>Consensus</strong></td>
<td>Community Building: <strong>Consensus and Financing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupancy: <strong>Consensus, Legal</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impeding Actors</th>
<th>Supporting Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marketing: <strong>Brinshore Michaels</strong></td>
<td>Plan Development: <strong>Brinshore Michaels, HRC, Counsel for HRC, HRC tenants representative, Counsel for Gautreaux Plaintiffs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Building: <strong>CHA, City of Chicago</strong></td>
<td>Participatory Process: <strong>Brinshore, HRC, Counsel for HRC, HRC tenants representative, LAC, Counsel for Gautreaux Plaintiffs, Architects</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Final Plan Development: <strong>Brinshore, Architects</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Construction: <strong>Brinshore Michaels, Architects, HRC, Counsel for HRC</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occupancy: <strong>HRC, Counsel for HRC, HRC tenants representative</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Building: <strong>Brinshore Michaels, NWSCDC</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The development and design team, as well as HRC and LAC also expressed their commitment to new urbanism during the participatory process. There was a shared commitment to follow the overarching urbanism or new urbanist principles by reintegrating the street grid, building low density development, creating walkable pedestrian friendly streets, and integrating blocks with rental and for sale units into plan proposals. The area that was challenging for the development and design teams to plan for, was the comprehensive nature of new urbanist plans that aimed to include a mixture of land uses, and public open spaces. Despite actor commitment from the development and design teams, it was difficult to garner support from the CHA and City of Chicago in terms of the broader, more comprehensive components of the projects plans. While the City of Chicago provided infrastructure support, in terms of additional support for mixed-use development or public open spaces, the CHA and the City of Chicago appeared indifferent in their support of these projects.

Louis, Angela, and Ellen, as part of the development team, also played pivotal roles in the final plan development stage by implementing a phased PD process that was based on realistic plan goals that could be implemented. Brinshore Michaels opted for a phased PD processes, having worked on mixed-income development projects previously and had a more nuanced approach to how the project might change over time. Therefore, each phase had a separate PD, and there was a public participatory process that occurred for each phase, which offered more flexibility to adapt to changes over time. With this framework, actor commitment was easier to maintain, as adjustments could be made to ensure that the physical and social goals could be met. Having an incremental planning process allowed for the development and design team to learn from prior phases, to make changes to upcoming phases to either urban design, building designs, or unit distribution on the site. For instance Louis and Barbara recalled making changes to unit sizes, building frontages, private open space, and distributing rental and for sale differently after 2008. Without a phased PD process, changes are more difficult to make, particularly when the economic climate shifts. A single PD, as in the case of Roosevelt Square does not take into consideration how changes may influence the initial PD.

The occupancy stage was also guided by supporting actors and planning constraints that reinforced the integration of the existing Henry Horner residents, with new market rate tenants. The consent decree was the guiding factor that ensured that Westhaven Park had enough public housing units to house all of the Henry Horner residents that wanted to stay on-site. Likewise, the HRC, Counsel for the HRC, and Ken played a significant role in ensuring that Horner residents were not displaced when the CHA decided to make changes to the superblock income mix. With the CHA deciding to transform the superblock from all public housing to mixed-income housing also brought to the forefront the opportunistic role played by the CHA to change prior decisions that were already made in
the best interest of the existing Horner residents. The HRC and Counsel for the HRC continued to enforce prior commitments in this stage, and ensured a balance of public, affordable, and market rate rental while also maintaining their commitments to the Horner residents. In this case, based on prior lawsuits with the CHA, the HRC and Ken maintained their role as realists, and sought to enforce commitments made by the CHA, and did not rely on good faith beliefs that any commitments would be adhered to. Without the legal parameters of the consent decree at Westhaven Park, it would have been increasingly difficult to hold the CHA accountable to the Henry Horner residents.

**Where Actor Commitment is Maintained, but Planning Constraints Influence Project Plans**

Similar to Roosevelt Square, the construction stage was led by the idealistic, yet cynical development team, and the HRC and Counsel for the HRC as realists to ensure the project was constructed in phases to limit displacement of Henry Horner residents. Again, the consent decree acted as the reinforcing planning constraint that guided the construction process. For instance, the consent decree was a guiding factor in how the buildings were constructed on the two bookends of the site to maintain the guidelines, and move residents from existing buildings directly into new buildings. This was significantly more challenging than having a clean slate to develop the project, and inevitably was a slower process, and limited resident displacement. Additionally, the development and design teams remained committed to implementing the planned new urbanist concepts. They were tasked as well to responding to new developments that arose over time, with the project construction, such as modifying units to accommodate changing households, the treatment of streets, the need for every resident to have outdoor spaces, and addressing accessibility.

Where inhibiting planning constraints acted as barriers to continuing the project was the 2008 market decline. This caused the project to slow down, and eventually be put on hold. In this case, Westhaven Park was further along in the build out, so the last two phases, 2C, and 2D suffered the most in terms of not being able to complete the remaining 176 for sale units. Also, because of the halt in construction, the vacant for sale lots make an obvious distinction between rental and for sale, which reinforces who occupies, which units. Also, to better deal with this issue in later phases the design team opted to build homeownership on one side of the street, and rental on the other side. While this solved the problem of having interspersed vacant lots, this subsequently created another issue around ensuring rental and for sale housing were fully integrated by block. Implementing the checkerboard proved to be more difficult within the implementation constraints. However, a major goal of new urbanism is to develop mixed-income communities where housing is indistinguishable and there are no external differences between rental and for sale.
At Westhaven Park, having these distinctions have created more tension between renters and owners. Despite the ongoing commitment by a number of actors, the market decline influenced the long-term project plans, which to date have remained incomplete.

The community building stage also suffered from a number of planning constraints that inhibit implementation, as well as key impeding actors that cause plans to change despite Brinshore Michaels and the NWSCDC maintaining their commitments to incorporate community building. Brinshore Michaels maintained the idealist / non believer perspective to implement community building initiatives, and community development partner NWSCDC acted as realists to also administer the Family Works and HVP programs. However, due to inhibiting planning constraints, which resulted in a lack of consensus between facilitating actors who impeded the implementation process, the broader community building initiatives were not implemented. In this case, despite actor commitment, impeding actors like the CHA, and the City of Chicago acted as barriers to incorporating the community building goals intended in project plans.

Brinshore Michaels approach to community building at Westhaven Park was successful because the NWSCDC was already engaged in the community from Phase I and integrated the Horner Engagement Program with Project Match to provide on-site case management services for phase II. These services helped to provide residents with preparation for the transition from living in public housing to mixed-income development, and connected them with employment, education, and community service opportunities. These programs were aligned with the CSS Plan, as well as what came out of the public participatory process, which served the community well, and supported Brinshore Michaels commitment to promoting self-sufficiency for public housing residents.

Brinshore Michaels was less successful implementing the planned open spaces, and the unforeseen circumstances that arose with the multiple school closures that left Westhaven Park without a strong neighborhood school to anchor the community as well as attract future homeowners. This was due partially to a lack of consensus among actors, and partially due to not having the financing to go above and beyond the CSS Plan objectives. However, the barrier that Brinshore Michaels was unable to overcome, was the indifference of the CHA and City of Chicago to implement additional education improvements, despite a focus in the CSS Plan to improve access to education for Westhaven Park. CPS makes decisions on school closures independent of CHA redevelopment projects. The CHA in turn does not pursue avenues to improve the lack of coordination between the working group, and CPS despite efforts by the developer to encourage the placement of high performing schools to showcase Westhaven Park. Consequently, closing two neighborhood schools, and reopening of Suder Montessori School on-site for city-
wide enrollment impacted the individual families living on-site, as well as any potential new families moving to the community. The responsibility for providing improved access to education is the responsibility of the City of Chicago, but without coordination between the CHA and City of Chicago there remains a significant challenge to reconcile simultaneous housing redevelopment and education reforms in Chicago.

**Where Actor Commitment Waned**

In the case of Westhaven Park, Brinshore Michaels was not wed to the program goals, and marketing took the approach of the value based model, and selling a quality product. As stated by those considered realists, Ken, Patricia, and George explained how the development team marketed the project to prospective buyers as a good financial investment, or starter home. Planning constraints that inhibited the development team from maintaining their commitment to social and mixing goals, was primarily the need to sell units and generate revenues. While this allowed the development team to fill units, for sale residents ended up feeling as though they had been sold a dream, particularly with Westhaven Park having a 60% resident return rate, and the superblock remaining on site. By using a marketing strategy that was not focused on building a diverse community, this has resulted in contentious relationships between some homeowners and renters. Further complicating the relationships between homeowners and renters, Becky acknowledged that the large income gaps between public housing residents and for sale tenants, particularly in the condo building may have exacerbated the contentious dynamics found at Westhaven Park. This reinforced questions about the ideal mix of tenants, as well as the income spectrum that would facilitate marketing Westhaven Park as a mixed-income community. Even if the development team had adhered to their commitment to promote mixed-income living, the large income gap between renters and homeowners may have still been too much to overcome.

**Intermediate Mechanism**

Similar to Roosevelt Square, I found the consent decree to be a very powerful tool, which acted as an intermediate mechanism to hold actors accountable during the implementation process. While Roosevelt Square’s intermediate mechanism was premised on the threat of a lawsuit, Westahven Park had an actual consent decree in place. This consent decree required any Henry Horner redevelopment to be completed in phases to limit resident displacement, as well as adhere to the one-for-one replacement. Additionally, the consent decree gave public housing residents decision-making authority on all matters related to redevelopment efforts. In this case, the consent decree guided all aspects of the redevelopment efforts at Westhaven Park, which was a significant departure from other
CHA developments. By having the consent decree in place, and the support of the Counsel for HRC, HRC tenant representative, and Counsel for Gautreaux Plaintiffs, when actors such as the development team or the CHA sought to make changes that did not follow the ideals of HOPE VI, legal advocates and residents had the capacity to negotiate decisions. Legal advocates and residents were able to achieve not only the desired design goals, but also unit integration across both blocks and buildings, as well as a phased construction process, which moved residents directly from existing public housing into new mixed-income units. Because of the consent decree, Westhaven Park is unique in the sense that decisions were part of a negotiation process, and if decisions did not coincide with the consent decree or the interests of public housing residents - the HRC and Counsel for the HRC had the option to take the CHA to court. By having this option to hold key development partners accountable to the ideals of HOPE VI, ensures the project trajectory is more closely aligned with project plans. Ultimately, this intermediate mechanism was essential to limiting resident displacement and achieving the desired income-mix plan goals. Without the consent decree at Westhaven Park, it would have been increasingly difficult to hold the CHA accountable to the Henry Horner residents.
9. Jackson Square, On the Outside Looking In: Connections, but no Buy-In

“Whether power corrupts, the lack of power surely frustrates.”
(Forester, 1982:67)

This chapter describes the planning and implementation of Jackson Square. I begin by describing the key actors and episodes to understand the interplay between commitment and planning constraints. Second, I provide a brief background of the former Rockwell Gardens site, before I examine the current Jackson Square HOPE VI development, which occurred between 1999-2014. Third, I examine the plan development process beginning with the episodes where the development team is selected, financing is secured, and the HOPE VI Revitalization Grant is submitted. I describe how, and where actors are committed to plan goals, and how planning constraints and impeding actors influence actor decisions across nine ‘critical implementation episodes’. And lastly, I outline key findings, which show the limitations to actor commitment, and the planning constraints and impeding actors that contribute to project plans for Jackson Square.

Jackson Square is considered a low profile case since it received relatively little attention from the CHA or City of Chicago. The CHA received $33M to redevelop and transform the former Rockwell Gardens site. Jackson Square is isolated in the East Garfield Park neighborhood, with few amenities and little community support, which made for a small number of actors that participated in the redevelopment process (see Figure 46). The most important actors in this project included Eastlake (developer), the CHA, City of Chicago, the LAC, and architects/planners. Moreover, Jackson Square is an example of a planning process that was guided by a combination of actor cynicism and indifference, as well as detrimental planning constraints that inhibited plan implementation. Although the development team had extensive experience in affordable housing development, Eastlake had limited experience in large-scale mixed income developments. Coupled with little collective planning, and even less commitment from key development partners responsible for implementation, left this project team to work within the project constraints. In this case, commitment by the development and design team was not allowed to drive the process, because impeding actors like the LAC, CHA and City of Chicago did instead. Additional challenges such as, difficulties securing financing, building consensus among actors, and declining housing market conditions, posed significant barriers to completing the project.
There are five ‘critical implementation episodes’ that are important in the story of Jackson Square: the participatory process, final plan development, marketing, occupancy, and community building. It is in the public participatory stage where cynical and indifferent actors, as well as inhibiting planning constraints lead to decisions that failed to reinforce HOPE VI ideals. In addition to the public participatory stage, the final plan development stage also illustrated that despite commitment by Eastlake and the design team, solidifying plan proposals were influenced by the indifference of the City of Chicago along with political constraints. In the marketing, occupancy, and community building stages are where impeding actors are present, but commitment adjusts because of inhibiting planning constraints. In this case, despite commitment to plan goals, the barriers in place cause actors to choose different plans than intended.

Overall, commitment to physical and social mixing goals at Jackson Square failed to make much difference in the implementation process in the face of cynical and indifferent actors, as well as planning constraints that caused project plans to change as actors had to adapt to new conditions. This case illustrates the necessity of having facilitating actors onboard with project plans, because without their support projects plans will not be aligned with project goals. Additionally, Jackson Square also shows in later development stages that inhibiting planning constraints can also constrain commitment in ways that are more detrimental to project plans than the indifference or cynicism of key actors. While actor commitment was largely constrained, this case also illustrated the need to have measures in place to hold actors accountable to initial promises made, because without any accountability measures, it was easier for project plans to move further away from initial plan goals.
9.1 **Background**

The former Rockwell Gardens, now Jackson Square at West End is located on the west side of Chicago in the East Garfield Park community. Rockwell Gardens was built in 1961 on a 17-acre site as an experiment by the CHA. In an attempt to move beyond the traditional high-rise developments situated within superblocks and isolated from the community, the Rockwell site instead left the street grid in tact and interspersed eight, 13-story buildings with 1,136 units (Bowly, 1978). Because the original community was comprised of two and three story flats, the high rises were too large and different to be absorbed into the community, and instead the development ended up resembling other CHA developments.

Similar to other CHA developments, Rockwell Gardens suffered from poor management from the start, and the poor maintenance by the CHA caused the buildings to deteriorate rapidly. With declining conditions there was an increase in vacancy rates and subsequent criminal activity. Rockwell Gardens had the highest crime rate of any CHA development and in the 1980s, and in response the CHA implemented Operation Clean Sweep, a comprehensive program to clear public housing projects of gangs, drugs, and crime. This was eventually expanded into a more comprehensive Anti-Drug Initiative. However the efforts were not successful and failed to offer the range of services initially planned. By 1994, the vacancy rate at Rockwell was 45%, and Vincent Lane, CEO of the CHA, described
Rockwell Gardens as “per capita, the worst and most dangerous place in the country” (Popkin et al., 2000). Unable to improve the conditions at Rockwell Gardens through crime reduction strategies, drug prevention and improved oversight, the CHA looked to other alternatives to ameliorate the declining conditions of Rockwell. With federal housing policy changes underway, the CHA assessed Rockwell Gardens to determine if it passed the viability test, and in 1998, Rockwell Gardens was declared “nonviable”.

Redevelopment plans for Rockwell Gardens initially began moving forward with a submission of a HOPE VI application in 2001. The plan was to demolish 708 units and rehab 346 existing units. However, the plan was expanded by the CHA to demolish all of the buildings and replace the site with a new mixed-income development. At the time of the HOPE VI application, the near west side was in transition from a declining commercial and industrial environment to having more residential development in the community. Because of this transition to residential there was also a significant amount of land speculation. Currently, the East Garfield Park community has undergone significant revitalization with nearby residential development, several small-scale commercial businesses, a new grocery store, and Westhaven Park located within one mile of the project site. It also experienced some of the highest levels of foreclosures during the start of the recession.

Figure 48. Photographs of Rockwell Gardens

Source: Photographs by Okrennt Associates
9.2 Plan Development: Failed Plans and Broken Promises

The master developer selection for Jackson Square at West End (Jackson Square) actually occurred prior to the HOPE VI application submission in 2001. The City of Chicago and CHA worked in conjunction with Habitat as the receiver and solicited developers in 1999. The CHA selected Eastlake Development in large part because of the already existing connections that Eastlake had as the property manager for Rockwell Gardens. To develop the HOPE VI application and Revitalization Plan, Eastlake partnered with Piekarz Associates, a Chicago based firm for architectural services. After Phase 1 was completed, Eastlake brought onboard Okrent Associates for master planning services to assist Piekarz Associates on Phases 2 and 3. Gilmore, Kean LLC was hired by Eastlake for HOPE VI consulting services to assist them with the planning and implementation process, as well as implementing the CSS Plan.

The redevelopment process for Jackson Square did not follow the typical process for developer selection and site planning. Initially the plan was to renovate Rockwell Gardens. Later the CHA decided to demolish the existing buildings and transform the community into a new mixed-income development. The original plan offered a mixture of housing types with a total of 780 units. Of those units, 543 were planned for the former Rockwell Gardens site, and the remaining 237 as scattered site housing. The units were planned for completion over three phases with a portion of onsite...
and offsite units in each phase. To complete the 237 units off site, lots were identified for 193 of the units, with 22 lots required for the additional 44-offsite units, which were planned for the city to acquire. Eastlake planned to build out the 780 units over the period of seven years.

Maplewood Courts, a seven story, mid-rise building with 130 units adjacent to Rockwell was initially part of the Eastlake contract, and slated for renovation. However, Habitat decided to do a separate procurement for Maplewood Courts, and selected Brinshore Michaels to demolish and build a new mixed-income development on the site. Planning for Maplewood Courts started in 2011, and construction started to develop 76 rental units with 25 public housing units, 30 affordable units, and 21 market rate units in a single phase. The 129 unit Midwest Terrace senior building on the site was to be fully renovated with only senior public housing.

**Site Constraints**

There were a number of challenges faced by Eastlake in their efforts to redevelop Jackson Square. This included an isolated site location, existing residents leaving the community, and lack of administrative support from the CHA. Since Eastlake managed Rockwell Gardens since 1996, the development team had the advantage of knowing the existing residents, and understanding well the community as a public housing development. Transforming Rockwell Gardens into a mixed-income development presented numerous challenges for Eastlake, despite their intimate knowledge and working relationships in the community. As a proposed mixed-income development, the site was very isolated, with a significant amount of infill housing. There were few amenities and businesses around the development site. Further, it did not lend itself to housing development, with the Eisenhower Expressway on one side, Western Avenue as a major thoroughfare and truck route on another side, and bounded by a rail line to the west. Because the location was not only isolated, but also lacked nearby storefronts and businesses, there wasn’t the critical mass to attract larger retailers to support the community. The former Rockwell Gardens location also didn’t have a stable, or up and coming neighborhood to build off of, such as Little Italy with Roosevelt Square, or the West Loop like Westhaven Park – the location was simply the near west side. So, in the case of transforming the community, the location proved to be a significant hurdle and how to make mixed-income development attractive to potential residents.
While challenging, the site conditions for Jackson Square were in some ways also ideal for the development team, and in other ways proved to be challenging. Because Rockwell was completely demolished, Eastlake had a blank slate to work with, which offered the ability to plan and build seamlessly without existing buildings on the site. However, in addition to the poor location, Eastlake also had to contend with the history and stigma associated with the former Rockwell Gardens. Unlike other CHA sites that were redeveloped, Rockwell Garden residents did not want to return to the mixed-income community. Before Rockwell was demolished, it was considered one of the most dangerous and impoverished developments in Chicago. Therefore when residents were given the option to take a housing voucher, the majority of residents took advantage of their opportunity to leave the community. Even those residents that initially considered returning once the development was completed, opted to leave and not return. The process of defining what exactly was going to be done was challenged by the mere fact that there was not an existing community of residents to plan for. This in turn left questions as to, who would be the future occupants of Jackson Square, and how Eastlake would plan for an uncertain population.
Financial Feasibility and Administrative Support

The financial feasibility of redeveloping Rockwell Gardens was also a major challenge for Eastlake to redevelop the site. The project received a number of both public and private funds to support redevelopment efforts. Sources of funds included HOPE VI, LIHTC, TIF mortgage, Federal Home Loan Bank Affordable Housing Program (FHLB AHP), city funds, IDHA, and private equity and conventional debt financing. In terms of public funds, Rockwell Gardens received $33.5M in HOPE VI funds to redevelop the site, and $1.5M in CSS funding (Rockwell HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, 2002). In addition to HOPE VI funds, Rockwell Gardens also received city funds totaling $19M for infrastructure improvements, the IDHA trust fund allocated $2.25M, and the TIF mortgage allocated $2.1M in financing. Private funding sources included tax credits, which were expected to account for a total of $27M from the city and state, to subsidize the affordable housing units. And FHLB AHP funds were available up to $1.5M, as well as private funds totaling $69.7M. Overall, the total funding allocated to the redevelopment of Rockwell Gardens was approximately $157.4M (Rockwell HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, 2002).

Although the redevelopment of Rockwell Gardens received $157.4M for redevelopment efforts, the project had to contend with inhibiting planning constraints of financing, as well as building consensus among development partners. Continued funding for the project was difficult because of the administrative and legal costs necessary to make the financing work. Harriet, Development and Asset Manager at Eastlake explained in our interview the challenges to finance Jackson Square:
“The per-unit total development cost of these deals we were doing, aren’t like any other deals we had previously done. We had just tons of administrative, especially legal, costs that ... I mean, just would kill a deal anywhere else. You would need to get astronomical amounts of tax credits, in order to pay for some of this. We exhausted, basically, all the city’s funding sources for soft funds for everything else. And I know that was difficult for other people that want to do development as well. But I think there weren’t cost controls put into the place, to make these things affordable. And the developers certainly weren’t trying to take two-and-a-half years to close anything, ’cause that’s money we’re paying. You know, we have holding costs for all of that, we’re paying taxes. But the process, and I think the costs, it was just ... ridiculous.” (Interviewed on 12.05.2013)

Consequently, because of the differences between Jackson Square and prior affordable housing development completed by Eastlake, mixed-income development was particularly difficult because of the extended period of time the developer had to hold onto the units. The length of time to complete Jackson Square was unexpected, with an initial completion date of December 2007. This extended timeframe in turn increased the financial burden for Eastlake, and left limited alternatives for other funding streams to complete the project.

In addition to challenges to make the project financially feasible, Harriet, also contends that Rockwell Garden did not receive the same kind of administrative support from the CHA and City of Chicago, as did higher profile developments. The CHA is responsible for project funding, oversight and support, and the City of Chicago is responsible for consistently providing funding and resources for infrastructure, and land development. In this case, on one hand throughout the development process there are instances in which prior commitments made in the HOPE VI Revitalization Plan were not upheld by the CHA or the City of Chicago. These prior commitments, which were not upheld related to land acquisition, infrastructure and technical support, and physical design efforts to build a comprehensive project (Rockwell HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, 2002). Initial commitments made by the City of Chicago for land acquisition included 37 on-site lots, and 86 off-site lots. However, according to Eastlake, particularly, land off-site for Phase 1 infill was not provided, which in turn left areas of Phase 1 infill unbuilt. Likewise, infrastructure and technical support to build out streets and park spaces as part of the Chicago Park District (CPD) Campus Park Program initiative failed to happen. The Campus Park Program aimed to develop campus parks that combine neighborhood schools, and its adjoining parkland, to transform communities and provide recreational amenities and gathering spaces. Additionally, in terms of physical design efforts, the original 2001 HOPE VI application was done with Smith Group JJR, who did the master plan, but turned out to be a short-lived partnership. Later, there was an attempt to bring Skidmore Owing and Merrill onboard to plan the field house, opens spaces, and management space, but it never happened. Harriet notes:
“Like a lot of our stuff we would do, it just would never get off the ground. So we would work with people, but only be able to go so far, because “I’m sorry, we can’t get the funding,” or “We don’t know when we’re going to get it.” (Interviewed on 12.05.2013)

In these instances, there were challenges with both financial support to hire consultants to develop master plans for Jackson Square, as well as what were perceived as being overlooked by the CHA and City of Chicago in terms of their administrative support of the project. This in turn left Eastlake feeling as though these actors were not equal partners in terms of the responsibility for redeveloping Rockwell Gardens.

However, in my interview, Edward, Director of Development at Habitat, offered another perspective and asserted, “I don’t think the city really pushed any one project over another as much as they pushed the projects that were pushable. If you could get it, if you could queue it up they would get excited about it. I mean there was a lot of work trying to get this one done.” (Interviewed on 05.07.2014). In this case, while Jackson Square was a smaller site than Westhaven Park or Roosevelt Square, and was a lesser known redevelopment project, the City of Chicago and CHA appeared more supportive of projects where the development teams were able to financially get the projects going. This turned out to be a significant hurdle for Eastlake as building out the project was difficult due to the financial constraints, which in turn influenced how much administrative support the development team could garner from the City of Chicago and the CHA.

9.3 Participatory Process: Out on a Limb - No Project Support

The participatory process for the initial Phase 1A started in 1998-1999, and for phase’s 1B, 2, and 3 started in 2005 and was comprised of the working group, which in the case of Jackson Square was a small contingent. The primary participants were the CHA, Habitat, LAC and LAC tenants representative, and Counsel for Gautreaux Plaintiffs. The working group at Jackson Square was much smaller on one hand because the development team was a single entity, and on the other hand because there was less participation by the City of Chicago, the CHA, and broader community in the working group process. Jessica, Senior Staff Counsel for Gautreaux Plaintiffs, explained to me in our interview the dynamics of the Jackson Square working group:
“At West End, you just have Eastlake, so it's already smaller because it's just that. I mean, they have their management. Eastlake is one thing. So it's already fewer people around the table… I think they're invested in the property clearly, but it's just them. You don't have this big team that comes in and all that. That already sets up a difference. They have architects. They even have their own construction company and all that. So they're a smaller entity. It's also a much smaller site. So you have the two, a public housing resident or two, occasionally three that came to a meeting. There were no real active community representatives. For some time, the Salvation Army came regularly, but didn't really participate very much. It was hosted in the school, which was nice. So in theory, the school was a community partner, but the city didn't come regularly to that one, although it came to others. So people would come in and out… Habitat was always there. CHA was always there, but I think that there were CHA staff assigned to the working group that were not as committed to the working group process as perhaps at some other working groups. “(Interviewed on 01.30.2014)

With a scattered working group, the participatory process was facilitated by Habitat, and largely led by Eastlake. While planning for mixed-income development was new for Eastlake, their commitment to the project was based on having been ingrained in the community since 1996. They had a desire to implement a for-profit project that also had a purpose to improve the former Rockwell Gardens, through physical and social mixing. Similar to Westhaven Park, Eastlake had to contend with the mistrust of the LAC, as well as mediate the differences across multiple actors. There were three primary parties within the working group that impeded the working group process; the LAC, the CHA, and the City of Chicago. Moreover, the major planning constraint that inhibited the participatory process was a lack of consensus among stakeholders.

Overall, there were two significant challenges Eastlake had to navigate with the working group process: resident buy in and project support from the City of Chicago and the CHA. First, Eastlake had to contend with not having an existing public housing community to plan for, yet had to answer to an LAC that represented only a few constituents. The public housing residents at the former Rockwell Gardens felt abandoned, and chose to take housing vouchers and leave the community altogether. This posed a major problem because there was no community to plan for, therefore it was more about planning a community that would be filled with wait listed public housing residents, and newcomers with few ties to the existing community. While this might make it easier – like working with a cleared site, it also was complicated by the LAC, which in this case did not have a body of residents to represent, so they represented themselves. The participatory process was very much guided by the LAC and what could be leveraged for themselves and their families. This type of process did not lend itself to obtaining buy in, or getting consensus among the working group, particularly because the LAC was very vocal in regards to design, vision, and planning for the community. While Eastlake supported getting buy-in, the way it happened was not an effective process because a single party, the LAC had most of the control. Edward, explained the challenges of working with the LAC:
The LAC president was very involved...there was sort of a competition in a sense amongst the LAC leaders. They would see each other every month at the CAC (Central Advisory Committee) meetings and they would see each other at the board meetings and they would talk about what they were getting, and the LAC president always thought that the other people were getting the good stuff, and would express that at inopportune times...but the time to talk about sort of the allocation of space in the units is when it's on paper not when it's in concrete. And there was a lot of, almost, you know, custom design being done for the LAC president because she was this vocal person as opposed to the CHA asserting itself as client and you were not allowed to do this.” (Interviewed on 05.07.2014)

In our interview, Sarah offered another perspective of the LAC, and described how there was a general unhappiness and dissatisfaction between the LAC and Eastlake:

“...The LAC felt that the services being provided weren’t up to par with other redevelopment transformation sites. And so there was always a little bit of back and forth at every working group meeting from either the resident representation saying you know this person is complaining about water damage in their unit or you know the way you designed this unit, the layout is too small, the layout is clunky, it doesn’t flow well. You know what you’re proposing for the next phase is not gonna be much better. So those are some of the things and then you know it got to the point where the LAC... unofficially requested another developer to be procured and the master development agreement to be terminated.” (Interviewed on 08.05.14)

In addition to having to mediate the relationship with the LAC, Eastlake also had to adhere to existing mandates of what the CHA and Habitat, and the Counsel for Gautreaux wanted to see in project plans. So, in this case as Harriet told me in our interview:

“It’s very difficult to serve a lot of masters, which for something like this to work, you had to have these different masters. But they had to all buy into what the end vision was going to be. And I don’t know that all of our masters bought into that vision, for whatever reason.” (Interviewed on 12.05.2013)

Because there was not a broader existing community that was engaged in the planning process, there was no community organizing, or additional voices to add to the process. Therefore the working group meetings revolved around a core group of 1-2 residents, who didn’t actually know any of the people they represented anymore, and felt the physical product was not what they expected. Additionally, Eastlake was unable to achieve consistent buy-in from development partners, which was evident in the low level of participation in the working group by the City of Chicago and the CHA.

**Phase 1A and 1B Planning - Urban Design and Building Design**

The initial infill development and Phase 1A and 1B plans for Jackson Square in 2002, were led by Eastlake and Piekartz Associates, which worked with the working group to develop a number of master plans in an effort to meet all interests. Key debates centered around the urban design, and building design for the site, as well as a number
of plan changes. Although the development and design team came up with a number of plan alternatives, in the end, there was an overall lack of communication and investment by the CHA and City of Chicago, that led to plan changes that were not consistent with the vision laid out by the working group for Jackson Square.

For Phase 1A and 1B, new urbanism was a key focus of the initial proposed plans with a number of concepts that were adhered to based on revising the street grid, maintaining smaller scale development, and promoting mixed-use development and open spaces. According to the design team, a mandate from the working group was reconnecting the street grid to reintegrate the site with the existing community. The decision was made to orient the streets in the north-south direction, instead of east-west to create an urban grid. Orienting the grid north-south was also done to alleviate cut through traffic, and would allow for better exposure for buildings in terms of lighting.

There was also a focus on creating smaller scale buildings to promote a sense of ownership and spatial defense. The design team tried to keep buildings at a similar scale typical of Chicago neighborhoods with larger scale buildings along busier streets like Western and Van Buren, and on the interior streets maintained smaller scale buildings. Residents however were opposed to multi-family buildings, and wanted to keep the development as primarily single-family housing. Therefore Phase 1A was primarily infill with multi unit buildings ranging from six to ten units along Western and Adams, to provide density and bulk and create a hub at the intersection. Phase 1A was also more traditional in style to fit into the existing context, which was mostly infill walk-ups.

Similar to both Westhaven Park and Roosevelt Square, the LAC were more focused on unit sizes and layouts, common shared spaces, and public-private spaces, as opposed to the broader urban design features. Residents were concerned with what the actual units were going to look like, as well as the layout, and bedroom mix. The design team started with designing conventional unit layouts typical of newer construction where the living room, kitchen, and dining areas were all in a single space with the bedrooms in the back. Residents however, preferred a more traditional older layout with the living room in front, bedrooms in the middle connected by a corridor, and the kitchen in the back. This was preferred for several reasons, particularly because this allowed families the option to be in the kitchen and see into the backyard. Habitat also wanted to see duplex units where the kitchens were on the first floor in the rear and could function as homework spaces and promote blended families where there would be more family space available. Megan, Development Director at Habitat also noted in our interview that these concepts supported Habitat’s focus on how best to develop functional units for large families. In addition to using a more traditional older layout for units, the housing types also were primarily larger four bedroom and three-bedroom units, and some two-
bedroom units for public housing families. This allowed for family mixing as well, since there were also large families or families that had grandparents, aunts, and uncles so in this case families could be split across units as well.

**Open Spaces**

Residents also had open space preferences, which were aligned with the ideas of new urbanism, and included having both shared and public-private spaces. For instance, residents liked the idea of having shared outdoor spaces where they could interact, therefore, the design team integrated a number of different types of outdoor spaces. In Phase 1A and 1B, Henry, Senior Associate at Piekarz Associates, explained that it was a bit easier to incorporate open spaces because the lot sizes were longer than standard Chicago lots. With longer lots, this allowed for more green space to be provided at the rear of the units, as well as a bit more space in the interior as well. In addition to private backyard space, having porches for interaction was also important as residents preferred to have front stoops where they could see their neighbors. Residents wanted to have the option to sit on their front porch or sit on the stairs in front, and the development and design team thought this would help to foster interaction, and build a sense of community amongst residents in a way that backyard spaces may not provide. However, due to the CHA mandate at most HOPE VI sites to not have porches or stoops in the front of the units, all of the activity was pushed to the rear of the unit where people couldn't see each other and interact. According to Henry, pushing activity to the rear of the unit also brought up concerns around safety as well. In phase 1A and 1B, the design team used chain link fencing in the rear because it allowed people to see out to their cars, however this became a safety concern because people could also see in. So there was a balance that had to be struck that allowed for space to let kids play out back, but also where people were not able to see your kids, so the switch was made to wood privacy fencing in later phases to deal with the issue of safety.

**Phase 2 and 3 Planning**

For Phase 2 and 3, Eastlake brought in Okrent Associates to develop a comprehensive master plan in 2008 to link Phase 1A and Phase 1B development with the rest of the existing site area. In this case, the development and design team were committed to building a cohesive community plan and felt they needed additional expertise to develop a comprehensive master plan. Developing the master plan this time around with the working group took a different turn. While the initial phases were heavily informed by the LAC, for Phase 2 and Phase 3, the CHA made most decisions regarding plans, which were oftentimes in conflict with the recommendations from Okrent Associates.
The major debates were focused on how to integrate the entire site and incorporate new urbanism, but the process was largely constrained by both the technical capacity and institutional policies of the CHA.

Since Phase 1A and Phase 1B did not include a comprehensive site plan, Okrent Associates focused on the broader site features with the aim to create a cohesive community for Jackson Square. A planner described to me in our interview that there were five main concepts that guided the proposed master plan for phases 2 and 3; reconnecting the street grid in the north south direction, reconfiguring the site to integrate Midwest Terrace and Maplewood Court; refocusing the community around a network of green spaces integrated throughout the development; redefining the site boundaries; and re-establishing a community identity. Reconnecting the street grid was important and the decision was made to continue north-south streets as opposed to east-west streets to limit cut through traffic. Initial plans also incorporated curved streets in an effort to integrate the existing Midwest Terrace and also Maplewood Courts, which sit on the site. Likewise, in an effort to increase the amount of existing green space a network of parks were incorporated throughout the site. Also, a green buffer was proposed along the viaduct to redefine the site boundaries. Ideas to create a community identity also focused on building community gardens and integrating public art.

While the plans proposed by Okrent Associates were focused on integration and developing a cohesive master plan, this was difficult to accomplish with the restrictions placed on physical design by the CHA. A planner told me in our interview that the CHA had a culture of “no” to any proposals that were comprehensive or innovative. As evidence he further explained how the CHA did not want Midwest Terrace touched or the land integrated into the Jackson Square proposed plans. Likewise, the existing Maplewood Courts were also off limits, and the CHA did not want the site to include any additional connections to Jackson Square, despite Maplewood Court initially being a part of the redevelopment proposal. Edward explained to me in our interview that there was flexibility to include both Midwest Terrace and Maplewood Courts to develop an integrated site plan, but the CHA did not want to plan for property that was not funded through HOPE VI dollars. Midwest Terrace is senior housing, and Maplewood Courts received operating funds through a Project-Based Section 8 HAP contract. Additionally, the City of Chicago did not support incorporating curved streets because of engineering challenges, as well as Eastlake not wanting to control the network of open spaces, which in turn limited park spaces to a minimum of 2 acres for the City of Chicago to manage. Although Eastlake supported integrating new urbanist concepts into the proposed master plan, the constraints placed on the design team limited their ability to develop a master plan that was cohesive. Overall, the master plan proposals by Okrent Associates to create a cohesive community were ignored and the final plan proposals
focused only on the existing Rockwell Garden parcels. Because the site was not contiguous and proposals focused on integration were not selected, the final master plan proposal lacks strong connections to the surrounding infill development, as well as Midwest Terrace and the Maplewood Courts site.

Building design and types were also an issue for Phase 2 with the LAC preferring single-family housing instead of the larger multi unit or walk-ups that were designed for Phase 1A and 1B. Because of the increased cost of single-family housing compared to multi-family housing, Eastlake disagreed with the LAC, but the CHA agreed to incorporate single-family housing. Consequently, Phase 2 incorporated single-family housing, two and three flats, and duplex units. Additionally, the CHA wanted the design team to move towards a more modern style of housing, and this also provided for the diversity in products across development phases. The smaller housing types in Phase 2 allowed the design team to incorporate sustainable design features as well as move to a more modern style of architecture instead of traditional Chicago housing. Henry also told me in our interview that the design team spent a significant amount of time developing a unit mix that worked for the working group, and integrating rental and for sale buildings by block, as well as integrating a mix of rental and for sale in multi unit buildings. This was done in an effort to ensure that buildings were indistinguishable between rental and for sale buildings, with no significant differences. Overall, the development and design teams were supportive of incorporating new urbanist features, but the City of Chicago and the CHA did not share the same level of support.

Figure 54. Photographs of building types

Source: Photographs by author

**Ongoing Plan Modifications**

In regards to developing both mixed use development, and open spaces there were challenges faced with each of these tasks. Mixed use development was a feature the working group wanted to incorporate, and to help
bring this idea to light, Gilmore Kean facilitated a series of charrettes to better define, and understand the types of retail that residents wanted to see in their community. While, the charrettes were useful tools, according to Megan, the ideas were not grounded in the reality of the location of Jackson Square, and the difficulty to leverage any investment opportunities. Eastlake wanted to attract established tenants to build mixed-use development to support Jackson Square, but there were limited amenities to support any business. Therefore, Eastlake chose to focus on building a purely residential community that lacked any mixed-use development or amenities.

A major part of the initial plans developed for Jackson Square were based on the initial 2001 HOPE VI Revitalization Plan. The initial plans proposed to combine existing open spaces totaling 3.6 acres for recreational use adjacent to Grant Elementary School to create a Campus Park. This new combined area was proposed to be included in the Chicago Park District (CPD) Campus Park Program initiative. The Campus Park Program is a development program funded by the City of Chicago with $50M to develop campus parks that combine neighborhood schools, and its adjoining parkland to transform communities and provide recreational amenities and gathering spaces for communities. The Campus Park Program, proposed at Jackson Square addressed the lack of outdoor and community amenities and built upon the existing Grant Elementary School as an anchor institution. The CHA and Habitat requested this designation, and it was included in CPDs planning for FY 2003 with implementation to happen in FY 2004 (Rockwell Gardens HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, 2002). In addition to combining park spaces, the idea was also to include the concept of using the existing Grant Elementary School as an anchor to build a campus park as a major centerpiece to focus the community around.

However, this idea did not come together in the way that the development and design team and Habitat had hoped. The design team initially prepared plans with the park space adjacent to Grant elementary school, and used Western as a gateway to have management offices, and additional community spaces. Instead, CPS decided to close Grant elementary school and open it up as Phoenix Military Academy, which would now be a high school. According to Megan, CPS made this decision and did not notify or coordinate with anyone from the redevelopment including the CHA. This in turn changed the dynamic of the campus plans, and what the development and design team had hoped to create around an anchor institution. A park for smaller children no longer made sense, therefore the design team had to develop alternatives in later phases to accommodate open space for the residents. Therefore, open space was not integrated into the Phase 1 or 2, and that hurt the development because there was no community space for residents, or the ability to provide spaces to facilitate some form of interaction. Instead, the park space was moved to
the northern part of the site, which will be part of Phase 3 and the developer and CHA coordinated a land swap with the park district to create a park space that will now tie together phases 2 and 3.

In addition to the change with the planned campus park, plans for 1A were altered as well. Land off-site was acquired by Eastlake to jumpstart the development along Madison and Washtenaw for rental, with a plan to do for sale on the rest of the block through land acquisition from the City. However, this never happened and Eastlake was left with 14 new housing units on a vacant lot, on an island, next to a railroad embankment. This was another example Harriet points out, “where none of the things planned, and told people happened”, which was problematic to gain project buy in, when the plans developed continued to fall through (Interviewed on 12.05.2013). Plans in this case fell through due to a lack of project support by the CHA and the City of Chicago to follow through with their prior commitments as outlined in the HOPE VI Revitalization Plan for land acquisitions, as well as the planned campus park.

Figure 55: Photographs of Phoenix Military Academy

In the case of Jackson Square, the aforementioned plan changes were a common theme throughout the planning process. In our interview Harriet told me not only was it difficult to get resident buy in, but,

“We didn’t have buy-in from, even some of our investors, that really were thinking, you know, like “What happened to our plans?” “Well, it got changed.” I think some people got a little ... a bad taste in their mouth, because ... CHA was able to change so much without any ... input from anyone else, and it had a direct impact on what these communities looked like. You know, and sometimes the people who were making those decisions didn’t even ever go out there or talk to us, or say, “We have this problem. Can you help us figure out a solution?” (Interviewed on 12.05.2013)
This made the planning process a difficult task, as there was an inability to find a meeting of the minds. Eastlake felt the project responsibilities lay squarely with them, but it was a challenge to get compromises from the CHA, or coordination across agencies. Considering these circumstances, after years of not having a cohesive planning process, it began to show and there were limitations as to what could be accomplished. In our interview, Harriet acknowledged that it was a disappointment for Eastlake:

“But, we don’t feel like that means that our development failed. I think we feel like we probably got the best result that we could have gotten, with the set of circumstances that we had to work with.” (Interviewed on 12.05.2013)

In our interview, Edward also acknowledged the shortcomings of Eastlake, but made a point to tell me the difference the redevelopment has made:

“Well, I mean it’s been, they haven’t performed as well as others…I mean we’ve had good ones and bad ones and I think the good ones really made the program into a vehicle to really implement a vision. I think that Eastlake more had the opposite and tried to make the program fit their production model in a sense. There have definitely been times when I know that they were really trying to roll up their sleeves and get some things done and… I mean I don’t think that their time has been unmitigated disaster. I think that what’s happened over there is, in large part, a positive. Not just drawing from what was there was really, it wasn’t the biggest development but it was one of the worst. It’s pretty transformative over there. It’s not done and I think that you know their work with somebody else’s gumption to try and keep it rolling would – I think it would have. I think it would work out. I think that it just, the final chapter really isn’t written there.” (Interviewed on 05.07.2014)

Multiple plan changes in the case of Jackson Square, proved to be detrimental to the projects long-term sustainability. At Westhaven Park, an incremental approach to the planning process was successful because decisions were made in the participatory process that were subsequently implemented. In this case, the cyclical process of planning and building worked to solve issues and retool future phases. Compared to Jackson Square, the planning process itself had multiple plan changes to the point that commitment waned in the planning stages. Too many failed plan attempts can also lead to stagnation and an inability to move the project forward without commitment from key actors.

9.4 Final Plan Development: Good Intentions just not Enough

Eastlake opted for a multi-phase development with Phase 1A/B not being a PD, and instead Phase 1A was infill development along Western and Van Buren. Phase 1A/B were small enough phases that a PD was not required, and Eastlake wanted to use Phase 1A/B to jumpstart the development process, however there were challenges to jumpstart Phase 1A/B. According to Edward, there were two issues with the final plan development; one was getting aldermanic support, and second procuring city owned lots to develop a cohesive first phase. There were challenges
to obtain aldermanic support from Robert Fioretti, consequently there were delays over several years because of the surrounding community backlash with not wanting to have too much public housing return to the former Rockwell Gardens site. In addition to lack of support by community residents, there were also necessary zoning changes that slowed down the development, as well as challenges to procure land from the City of Chicago. According to Edward, working with the City of Chicago to procure city-owned lots for development could be challenging because the interests of the City of Chicago varied with holding the lots for other potential development activities as well. He explained to me in our interview the difficulty of obtaining city owned lots:

“The expectation at the time was that there would be multiple developments on both sides of Talman and that would sort of knot things together and make that area as wonderful as Westhaven. But that whole area right around that track was not easy to work in and it also wasn’t easy to get land for some reason. The City had some scattered lots and the City lots are always a little bit loaded. I like, they would hate them but they weren’t sure they wanted to give them to you...Well, you never know when somebody's gonna come and put in some really nice condos or there's a church that wants it. There's a lot of church things. There's a lot of, yeah but I've got a developer who I'm talking to wants to do something nice. Or I don't want your stuff.” (Interviewed on 05.07.2014)

For phases 2, and 3 there was a PD done that was a more broad and general plan, but each phase had a different degree of how detailed the PD was defined. For Phase 2, the PD was developed with streets, lots, unit mix, and building types, therefore there was a cohesive planning framework in place that was followed. For Phase 3, there was a more general and open PD developed that only defined streets, alleys, blocks, and number of units and left the site open to what the future unit mix and housing types might be. Because there were significant changes from Phase 1A/B to Phase 2, the development and design teams did not want to lock in the parcels and building types in case modifications to the site were necessary. In this case, while both phases were done as a PD, Phase 3 was flexible and with a planning framework that could adapt to future project changes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Rental Units</th>
<th>For Sale Units</th>
<th>Total Units</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>Market</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Planning Phase</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Completed</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Planned</strong></td>
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<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Units</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>260</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Habitat Company, 2013
9.5 Construction: Building the Plan - A Balancing Act

Phase 1A construction was comprised of on-site and off-site units at Jackson Square, which started in 2003. Phase 1A included 42 rental units comprised of 14 public housing units, 18 affordable units, and 10 market rate units. Phase 1B was constructed between 2006-2007 and included 92 rental units and 31 for sale units; the rental included 57 public housing units and 35 affordable units. Phase 2 was constructed in 2009-2010 with all rentals including a total of 112 units across 65 public units, 33 affordable units, and 14 market rate rental units.

Figure 56. Jackson Square Master Plan

The construction process for Jackson Square was complicated based on earlier decisions made in the planning and design stages. First, the overarching challenge was coordinating with the CHA to construct the development. The second challenge was balancing the process of value engineering that saved money, with the green design and single family homes that while innovative, were not cost effective. And lastly, there were a number of unexpected construction issues that arose that the development and design team had to deal with. The coordination process in this case was challenging in regards to dealing with the CHA because, Eastlake needed to work with several city agencies to complete the construction process. Eastlake has in-house construction management, so the coordination did not revolve around the development team coordinating with the design team, as much as connecting with the
various city agencies to get work done. For example, the CHA does property management, not development, so those that worked with Eastlake on the construction process did not necessarily have the specific skill set around construction. Further, there were not always the proper contingencies in place for environmental, excavation, and infrastructure costs.

In this case Eastlake acted more as technical advisors in an effort to get the project constructed, and had a difficult time with coordinating these issues that were significant to the bottom line costs of construction. In a sense, Eastlake and the CHA were not partners, and the developer carried the majority of the burden in terms of getting the project constructed, and received little assistance partially due to the lack of practitioners on staff that were experienced in implementing development projects. They may have had a specific expertise, but that was not effective when faced with coordinating a complicated construction process. Also, coordinating the city agencies was a challenge despite numerous meetings and decisions being made. For instance, although CDOT had already agreed to the infrastructure improvements and connecting the streets, there are still numerous streets in the development that are not reconnecting to the existing street grid, or streets that just cut off. What Eastlake learned over time, according to Harriet, was that Jackson Square was simply not “a high priority on the agenda for getting things done.” (Interviewed on 12.05.2013).

Figure 57. Building figure ground of Jackson Square
Figure 58. Block figure ground of Jackson Square
Figure 59. Aerial of Jackson Square

Source: Figure by the author based on data from GLS
Source: Figure by the author based on data from GLS
Source: Photographs by CMAP
The value engineering process struck a balance between cutting costs in some cases, and in others, the construction costs increased because of earlier decisions made. In an effort to manage the cost of construction, the development and design team focused on using a lot of prefabricated elements. In Phase 1 precast concrete panels were primarily used, and in Phase 2 a metal stud system was used with the wall panels fabricated off site and then brought to the site and put in place by a crane. The floor trusses were all prefabricated, which Henry notes, worked out well because Phase 2 construction occurred during winter, and the contractors lost very little time in the construction process because there was so much that was fabricated off site. This allowed the contractors to continue working through inclement weather.

On the other side, with the residents demanding single family housing for Phase 2, this was a significant area where the operational, and construction costs escalated. However, this also offered a unique opportunity for the development and design team to implement innovative sustainability features. Eastlake wanted to keep costs down by doing mid-sized buildings, where you could control access and have on-site management. Instead they were tasked with building 22 individual buildings, where everyone had their own entrance. In this case, building smaller buildings, as well as single-family housing was not cost effective operationally, or from a management standpoint, because now 22 different roofs instead of two or three big ones needed to also be maintained and managed. This process amounted to slower planning, phasing, and construction. Eastlake had to hold on to the land for an extended period, and was losing money at each phase, instead of getting the project built and generating revenue.

Although building single-family housing and smaller buildings was not cost effective, the development and design team used the single-family building typology to their advantage, by being one of the first developments to go through the HUD Enterprise Green Communities program. The buildings in Phase 2 have geothermal heating and cooling, as well as domestic hot water being delivered by the solar panels on the roof. Harriet noted, “that residents loved the geothermal features, and appreciated having lower electric bills, and fully embraced the green initiatives.” (Interviewed on 12.05.2013). The development and design team, through a public-private partnership with the city created a system of permeable alleys and pavement in the larger parking areas with dry wells. This allowed storm water to matriculate into the ground naturally instead of going into the sewer, preventing flooding.

By being on the forefront with sustainability initiatives, the design team could differentiate between phases and create more diversity across the site in terms of aesthetics as well, which fostered the more modern look for Phase 2. This however did not come without some downside in terms of the costs associated with doing green development for 22 individual buildings. As Henry told me:
“That’s a big difference in terms of cost particularly in implementing strategies such as solar and PV, you know things that have very high up front costs for equipment. It’s a very different kinda cost per unit equation.” (Interviewed on 02.07.14)

In this case, the development and design team had increased costs to implement the sustainable features, but there were also the benefit of being at the forefront with sustainability initiatives for mixed-income developments including long-term cost savings in the operation of buildings.

Figure 60. Photographs of Jackson Square single-family

Source: Photographs by author

Other issues that the development and design team had to modify were related to gaining a better understanding after Phase 1A/B of how people lived together, as well as construction quality. For instance Eastlake learned that better soundproofing was required after Phase 1, because they didn't anticipate how much noise a family of four would make above another family of four. In addition to soundproofing, the development team also learned that the building layouts in Phase 1A where there were duplex units, with one unit facing the street, and one unit facing the alley with an egress stair in the middle on the outside of the building, was not an efficient, or desirable building design. Residents preferred to have street views and egress stairs enclosed in the building. For Phase 2 designs were changed to make the lots larger so the duplex units could be larger to accommodate interior stairs. The designs also provided extra green space for the units with rear facing views. Also, Phase 1 had exterior entry stairs in the front for second floor units, which made for an awkward exterior design, so in this case lot widths were increased, as well to accommodate interior stairs for upstairs units. This allowed for more interesting design elements such as bays on the smaller buildings, and canopies off to the front. Additionally, residents complained about shoddy construction and poor design quality in Phase 1, which Eastlake worked to improve in Phase 2 with the aforementioned design changes to the prefabricated materials used.
9.6 **Marketing and Occupancy: An Unexpected Target Market**

Marketing Jackson Square to public housing residents, as well as potential affordable and market rate residents was a lofty challenge for several reasons. Jackson Square was considered a new community, particularly because the majority of the residents opted to not return to the development. There were challenges getting buy in to the idea of mixed-income development, attracting certain tenants, as well as the impacts of the housing market crash. In this case, the planning constraints with the declining housing market conditions and financing, proved to be a barrier that called for a changes that stymied for sale development, and led to a change in the overall unit mix. Additionally, while Eastlake Development and the design team made efforts to incorporate new urbanist designs and sustainability features, they fell short in their ability to get people to believe in the mixed-income concept. Harriet discussed in our interview the difficulty of garnering project buy-in:

“It’s a new community in a place that people aren’t necessarily attracted to, so we got the double edge of the same sword, and I think because we didn’t have a lot of people who understood, or bought into what we were trying to build—not even “not bought in,” believed that it could happen. It made us always feel like we were selling a pipe dream to people. And when you get enough people that feel that way, it doesn’t matter what you try to do.” (Interviewed on 12.05.2013)
Consequently, not being able to get the few remaining residents or the broader community to believe in the project plans to transform Rockwell Gardens into a new mixed-income development made the project challenging to market, even as a new community. In addition to the failed buy in, the community also did not resemble the initial project plans or have the look or feel of a real community that was well planned. Phase 1A was not built out as intended, as well as none of the for sale units being constructed for Phase 2, therefore there are vacant parcels interspersed across the site. Likewise, Phase 3 remains unbuilt, which is where the park was planned. Further, the streets have not been completed and Maplewood Courts is currently under construction. Because a significant part of the community remained unbuilt, Harriet told me in our interview that instead of having a cohesive community, “We just have a lot of people who live in close proximity to each other.” (Interviewed on 12.05.2013).

In terms of attracting residents to Jackson Square, Eastlake was able to fill the public housing units with residents on the CHA waiting lists, or from other developments. Former Rockwell residents, once invited back did not return; they had already established new relationships and communities, and the community they once knew no longer existed. So, while the public housing units, were easily filled, it was not with the residents that had once lived there. While, many former residents did not move back to Jackson Square, this also could have been viewed as a positive, where new residents would be considered equals without turf control issues. In addition to the public housing component, Jackson Square does not have the luxury development or proximity to amenities, as does Roosevelt Square or Westhaven Park. In our interview Edward described to me the challenge of Jackson Square’s location to attract buyers:

“Going across Western is not physically far but it’s like another place. It’s like going across Western, going across Madison and you’re physically up against the expressway now. You’re physically up against the railroad tracks now, and Western is much more a part of the site where neither Western or Damen really came into the play until the early phases at Horner. So I know Eastlake did build a phase of for sale and had pads to do more. They couldn’t sell them. They couldn’t sell what they built and they got beat up a lot for that.” (Interviewed on 05.07.2014)

Because of the difficult site location and obtaining buy in from residents, the marketing was targeted towards building off of nearby development in the community and attracting working class families such as teachers, firefighters, and police officers. Because Jackson Square had a closer income range amongst tenants, Eastlake adjusted their target market and focused on a different model than other mixed-income developments like Westhaven Park and Roosevelt Square that marketed to a wider range of tenants.

The market crash also significantly hurt the for sale components for Jackson Square. While there was initial interest in the development, there was an inability to keep buyers interested because the market was saturated. Once
the housing market collapsed in 2008, Eastlake had to make adjustments such as decreasing for sale unit prices, as well as renting out the for sale units that couldn’t be sold. In our interview, Sarah further expressed to me how detrimental the market decline was:

“I think that the recession and the crash in 2008 just changed everything and so it kind of took everyone out of this age of innocence and was slapped with a new reality that your product isn’t working and it may not work in the future. And so therefore the marketing that’s in place has to be completely changed depending on what redevelopment site it was. And so I think it was really trial and error. I think it was just a matter of you know we learned a very valuable lesson. It was a painful lesson because we lost time, we lost money, we lost potential buyers, potential renters so how do we get them back? And how do we change our marketing which in some cases means what do we want to be here at this site? (Interviewed on 08.05.14)

To deal with the housing market decline, Eastlake had to make a shift in its marketing and occupancy strategies, in which Jackson Square became primarily a lower income rental community with a significant number of public housing units. Out of the 31-market rate for-sale units built, the majority have ended up being rented out. The remaining for sale units planned for Phase 2 were also never built, which changed the dynamic of the community as well. Because there were so many vacant lots and clusters of buildings, there were challenges to developing a cohesive neighborhood. In addition, the change of Grant School from elementary to a high school also impacted the nature of the community. Without, an elementary school, amenities, and an isolated location the quality of life improvements that were anticipated also did not help to attract buyers.

Figure 62. Photographs of Jackson Square for sale vacant lots

Despite the market crash, and inability to sell units there was still the opportunity to continue with the rental phases. However, there was concern from the tenants and homeowners that a rental phase would make it difficult
to sell and re-sell for sale units in the future. Given this dynamic, Jackson Square remains a half built community, because for sale is the only product that the tenants and the surrounding community want to see. The challenge with this decision is that Jackson Square continues to remain on hold because there is currently not a market to sell for sale units. According to Edward, this is not necessarily a unique condition to mixed-income developments, however:

“At most developments, the developers are very proactive with their next phase and pushing and trying to get the project financed and in queue and approved, but Jackson Square and Park Boulevard have been the opposite.” (Interviewed on 05.07.2014)

Despite Eastlake’s commitment to the project, the development team has not been able to push forward with a vehicle to continue progress at Jackson Square. There are currently no plans to move forward with Phase 3, but Eastlake hopes to jumpstart the project by 2016 with a scaled back development with more midrise character across rental and for sale if the housing market improves. There remain 452 units that need to be completed along with another 76 that are under construction for Maplewood Courts. However, the biggest challenge to moving forward with Phase 3 is the change in funding availability. Traditional funding sources with tax credits, IHDA trust fund, and city sources are no longer available in the same capacity as they were previously. Even if Eastlake can plan phase 3, there may not be funding available to build the project.

9.7 Community Building: New Residents, What Community?

The proposed CSS plan in Rockwell Gardens HOPE VI application implemented the on-site Family Works program, but inhibiting planning constraints around financing and building consensus, prevented Eastlake from implementing the broader community building initiatives that were planned. The Family Works program was implemented, but not with the partners that were originally planned. Initially, Gilmore Kean, LLC and the LAC planned to form a community development corporation (CDC) to administer the Family Works program and provide a number of additional services to include career development, employment and education training, and an apprenticeship program through Burling Builders and the United Independent Workers International Union (Rockwell Gardens HOPE VI application, 2001). Eastlake had an on-site service coordinator to provide case management services to residents. However, they were not able to start the CDC, or form partnerships with community based organizations in the neighborhood. Many of the CDCs working in the nearby Westhaven Park community, do not extend their boundaries to the Jackson Square community. Given these circumstances, Eastlake has had to invest its own money to develop services not covered by the CSS program. In addition to challenges forming partnerships with
CDCs to provide services, Jackson Square does not have a community facility for organizations to bring services to the neighborhood, it has been difficult to attract partners and host events or training programs. Also, the partners Eastlake worked with needed funding to cover operational costs, and because additional funding was not available, added services for the community have not been implemented. Instead, Eastlake provides a salary for a social service coordinator to provide case management services, but this is not enough to promote self-sufficiency for public housing residents. There is a need for comprehensive services, and Eastlake hopes in future phases to build a small management office or receive more CSS funding to serve that purpose. In this case, despite Eastlake being committed to implementation, the broader neighborhoods lack of support and community partners, and financing were barriers they were unable to be overcome.

Despite a focus of the CSS Plan and a commitment by the City of Chicago to improve access to education at Jackson Square, similar to both Westhaven Park and Roosevelt Square, those efforts have failed. Efforts to improve access to education have failed due to impeding actors such as the City of Chicago, which do not coordinate with development partners to provide support for improved access to education for Jackson Square residents. For instance, once the Rockwell Gardens buildings were demolished and population decreased, there were changes made to the neighborhood school plans by CPS that shaped Jackson Square by an unanticipated CPS school closure. Initially, Grant Elementary School, which was the local neighborhood school for Rockwell Gardens serving K-8, was enrolled in the City of Chicago into the campus park program, along with the existing and new parks. The park district was to install a new play lot, ball field, two basketball courts, and several other areas for outdoor recreation. However, without any notice or coordination with the CHA, Habitat, or Eastlake, CPS decided to close Grant elementary school in 2005 and reopened the school into Phoenix Military Academy in 2009 serving high school students. This changed the project plans for Jackson Square creating a campus park to anchor the community, continue to serve the primary age population of public housing residents, and provide community spaces for residents. Instead, the high school serves a citywide population with few residents from Jackson Square attending Phoenix Military Academy. The majority of residents attend nearby Crane High School, which is three blocks away. Also, the park and any community space or management offices are slated for phase 3, but there is still no timeframe for completion. Without having these central pieces implemented, there are no areas to facilitate social interaction or promote community building amongst residents. Not having a high performing elementary school nearby or community spaces for the residents to use have significantly hurt the redevelopment efforts.
9.8 Summary

The case of Jackson Square has a range of commitment from local actors from idealists, those that are indifferent, and non-believers. The implementation process is guided by Eastlake, which is driven by its idealism, as well as the idealism of Habitat and the design team. There are also the key actors that are both investment partners and facilitating actors. Both the City of Chicago and the CHA were indifferent to maintaining commitment to the social and physical mixing project goals. And lastly, the LAC played the role of non-believers or cynics. These roles play out differently throughout the implementation process, but in this case commitment does not play a significant role in how project plans are implemented. Unlike Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park, where commitment to plans goals mattered, as well as episodes where commitment wanes in the face of impeding actors and planning constraints – Jackson Square was primarily faced with both inhibiting planning constraints and impeding actors that were barriers to commitment, causing actors to adjust project plans in light of these barriers. Episodes where both impeding actors and inhibiting planning constraints acted as barriers to commitment were in the plan development, participatory process, and final plan development stages, construction, marketing, occupancy, and community building. Episodes where inhibiting planning constraints force actors to change project plans are marketing, occupancy, and community building. In these particular episodes, commitment is less significant in the face of detrimental planning constraints such as financing, market conditions, and consensus. This case also highlights when a significant number of actors are either cynical or indifferent to plan goals, project implementation fails regardless of the efforts of idealists to work to develop project plans that are consonant with plan goals. The idealism held by Eastlake, Habitat, and the design team are not a hindrance to project plans in this case, which is evident by the project changes that occur in an effort to work within the planning constraints present at each episode. The case of Jackson Square shows where a range of actor commitment does exist, but decisions about project plans are borne out of the inhibiting planning constraints. TABLE XII, illustrates these relationships, which I will further explain:
TABLE XIII

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACTOR COMMITMENT AND PLANNING CONSTRAINTS

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<tr>
<th>Reinforcing Planning Constraints</th>
<th>Inhibiting Planning Constraints</th>
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<td>Final Plan Development: Politics</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Public Participatory Process: LAC, CHA, and City of Chicago</td>
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<td>Community Building: CHA and City of Chicago</td>
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**Where Actor Commitment is Maintained, but Planning Constraints and Impeding Actors Influence Project Plans**

In the plan development stage, both financing and consensus were the primary planning constraints that impeded how initial plans were developed. Likewise, the CHA and City of Chicago were impeding actors that also constrained project plans. Despite commitment by both Eastlake and Habitat, who acted as idealists, in this case both a combination of inhibiting planning constraints, and impeding actors were barriers to getting plans off the ground. For instance, Eastlake was largely selected because the development team managed the former Rockwell Gardens and had intimate knowledge of the community. Likewise, as Harriet mentioned, Eastlake was committed to redeveloping Rockwell Gardens and were on board with developing a project that was for-profit, but also had more significance in terms of improving the community through physical and social mixing ideas. However, working to implement these plans was much more difficult than anticipated in part because of the challenging site constraints, the inability to secure the necessary financing, and also the lack of administrative support from the CHA and City of Chicago. Site constraints hindered the project significantly, as did Eastlake’s ability to secure funding to pursue project plans over an extended period of time. Additionally, even though the CHA and City of Chicago had made prior commitments to provide land, build out streets and park spaces, and secure design teams, this failed to happen.

The participatory process at Jackson Square was faced with a number of challenges from both impeding actors, and inhibiting planning constraints. Actors that impeded the process included the LAC, the City of Chicago,
and the CHA. In this case, Eastlake had a difficult time getting both the LAC and the CHA to buy into project plans. An inability to obtain buy-in was largely because the existing community departed, which left the LAC with a significant amount of control, despite not having constituents to represent. The LAC did not believe the plans would actually be fulfilled, due to numerous unfulfilled promises made around the project plans to incorporate mixed-use development, campus park, and community amenities. In addition to contending with the cynical LAC, Eastlake also struggled to get key actors such as the CHA and City of Chicago on board with plan alternatives developed by the design team. There were numerous plan alternatives presented by Okrent Associates that integrated the site with the existing Maplewood Court and Midwest Terrace, as well as a network of open space and street connections. Although, there was support from the working group for these plan alternatives, the CHA and City did not support the development of a comprehensive project. Because of this lack of support by the CHA and City of Chicago to consistently assist the development and design teams to develop a comprehensive master plan for Jackson Square, the project build out is not as cohesive as it could have been.

The final plan development stage also had a combination of inhibiting planning constraints creating barriers to effectively implementing project plans. The key impeding actor in this case was the City of Chicago, and the relevant planning constraint was politics. Eastlake, in an effort to jumpstart the development at Jackson Square took another approach to the PD process and did not plan the first phase as a PD. However, the first phase required land that was planned to be acquired by the City and provided to Eastlake for Jackson Square. However, the City of Chicago did not uphold its commitment to provide the lots needed. As Edward mentioned, this was in large part because the City oftentimes wanted to use the lots for other potential development opportunities. Likewise, Alderman Bob Fioretti would oftentimes hold up the PD process because of community backlash claiming Jackson Square had too much public housing. In this case, because the lots were not acquired, Phase 1 was disconnected and turned out to be infill development. It was not until the later phases 2 and 3, where Okrent Associates was brought in by Eastlake and the design team to develop a separate PD for each phase, with the aim of linking the two phases to the existing Phase 1 development. Not having a clear and defined PD, or planning approach from the beginning of plan development illustrated a partial lack of commitment by Eastlake as to how the physical and income mixing plan goals would be implemented. Although there was commitment to the plan goals by Eastlake and the design team, without a strong plan framework from the beginning left questions about Eastlake’s ability to implement the concepts. Additionally, the politics involved with garnering the support of the City of Chicago and the alderman were challenges that influenced the overall project plans.
The construction stage was influenced by impeding actors, as well as, inhibiting planning constraints. In this case, indifferent actors were equally as detrimental as the housing market decline, which halted project construction. Similar to both Roosevelt Square, and Westhaven Park, the construction stage was led primarily by the development and design teams. However, at Jackson Square, there was also the complication of coordinating with the CHA and City of Chicago, which remained indifferent to the needs of these teams. The development and design teams remained committed to implementing the planned new urbanist features, such as the open spaces, and street connectivity, as well as introducing innovative sustainability features. However, without the same level of commitment from the CHA, the construction stage was difficult to implement due to the challenges of coordinating with the CHA. Coordination was problematic for several reasons, which included a lack of specific skill sets of those at the CHA to ensure contingencies were in place for environmental, excavation, and infrastructure costs. Also, despite coordination with CDOT, there were numerous streets that were not built to reconnect the existing street grid. And lastly, the indifference of the CHA and City of Chicago continued to play out in a similar fashion, where Eastlake acknowledged that Jackson Square because of its relatively lower profile was not a high priority of either agency. Additionally, with the housing market decline in 2008, Eastlake was able to build 31, for sale units in Phase 1, but was unable to build any of the for sale units for Phase 2. This has left a half built development with pads in place for construction of for sale units interspersed throughout the site. Currently, the project has been on hold since 2010 and has an additional 229 for sale units left to build. In this case, the indifference of key development partners hindered the construction process, but the housing market decline forced the development team to place the project on hold indefinitely.

The marketing and occupancy stages at Jackson Square also proved to be difficult because of the lack of buy-in from the existing community, LAC, isolated site location, lack of amenities, and the market decline that impacted Eastlake’s ability to build and sell for sale housing. Likewise, without the planned amenities such as management office, open spaces, and education opportunities, selling for sale housing proved to be a challenge. However, Eastlake was able to easily rent out the public housing units to CHA waitlisted residents. Additionally, with the housing market decline, Eastlake had to change their marketing model to focus on recruiting working class families, as opposed to its intended market of middle and upper class families to sell the units that were built. In an effort to occupy the 31, for sale units built, the majority was rented out. While impeding actors like the LAC acted as non-believers, this was not as detrimental to project plans as the changing housing market conditions. The changing housing market conditions and tightening of the credit markets impacted Eastlake’s ability not only to build, but also to sell any for sale units. Therefore, Jackson Square remains a lower income rental community, as opposed to a community with a range of
incomes across rental and for sale units. In this case, the need to generate revenue in a tight housing market greatly influenced Eastlake’s decision to modify its marketing strategy, which in turn influenced the intended population of Jackson Square.

Similar to Westhaven Park, the community building stage also suffered from a number of planning constraints that inhibit implementation, as well as key impeding actors that caused plans to change. While Eastlake was able to implement the Family Works program and offer case management services, due to financial constraints the development team did not have the ability to fully implement all of the community building services as planned. As in all of the developments, the Family Works program is funded through CSS funds, but Eastlake intended to additionally have Gilmore Kean, LLC in partnership with the LAC start a non-profit organization that did not happen due to financing and resource limitations. While Eastlake was invested in the community building initiatives, the development team did not have the resources to implement services outside of their on-site social service coordinator to administer case management services. In addition to not being able to implement the non-profit arrangement, the education plan for Jackson Square was also compromised by the lack of coordination by City agencies with the development team and working group. This lack of coordination resulted in planning the community around the existing Grant Elementary School, only to find out later that CPS was set to close the school in 2005 and reopen it into the Phoenix Military High School in 2009 that would be a city-wide school. These maneuvers were conducted without any discussion with the development team or the working group, and left the plans in a state of flux with new plans having to be done to include the school changes. In this case there was indifference by the City of Chicago and CHA to work to coordinate with CPS despite Grant Elementary School’s enrollment in the City of Chicago campus park program, which was a central component to the plans developed during the planning and design phase. Also, Eastlake’s efforts to secure slots for Jackson Square residents at nearby selective enrollment schools failed. Although indifference by key facilitating actors caused plans to change, it was the inability to build consensus across these groups of actors that the broader neighborhood amenities were not implemented. In this case, coupled with the financial challenges of Eastlake, to provide additional neighborhood support systems, Jackson Square does not have in place the support system necessary to promote self-sufficiency, or access to education for its residents.

Intermediate Mechanism

In contrast to Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park, the redevelopment of Jackson Square lacked any informal or formal intermediate mechanism to hold actors accountable, which was evident throughout the
implementation process. By not having any way to hold key development partners accountable for their commitments, the redevelopment of Jackson Square suffered in this respect. As previously mentioned, the redevelopment efforts lacked broader support from the existing community, the CHA and City of Chicago, which was evident in the limited participation of these actors in the working group. The low level of participation in the working group reinforced the ease in which prior commitments made in the initial HOPE VI Revitalization Plans were not upheld in large part by the CHA and City of Chicago. In this case, although planning efforts initially focused on building a comprehensive new urbanist project, the multiple plan changes and lack of a cohesive planned development process left Jackson Square only partially developed. Important components of project plans that were not adhered to included promised land off-site, and infrastructure support to build out streets and park spaces, which were not provided by the City of Chicago. Likewise, support for community building initiatives and improved access to education was difficult to coordinate across the CHA and City of Chicago. In addition to changes to the physical plan, the development team also had to modify their marketing approaches in an effort to occupy units that were already built. This in turn changed the plan goals of achieving a mixture of incomes across a broad spectrum of the population, and instead Jackson Square remains a lower income residential community. In contrast to Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park, without either formal or informal intermediate mechanisms in place to hold actors accountable during implementation, project plans in this case were easier to adjust to both impeding actors and inhibiting institutional constraints. Jackson Square highlights the difficulty to maintain commitment by actors to HOPE VI ideals if accountability measures or consequences for lack of action are not in place.
10. Conclusions: Commitment in Implementing Mixed-income Developments

“The constantly shifting package of theories and ideologies handed to practicing planners has little hope of solidifying unless it becomes merged with practice by basing itself on practice.”
(Talen, 1996:79)

This dissertation examines the implementation process across three mixed-income development planning efforts in Chicago that exhibit very different outcomes: Roosevelt Square, Westhaven Park, and Jackson Square. This chapter summarizes my comparative case approach to understanding plan implementation, and how both commitment to plan goals, and planning constraints influence project plans. The first section will provide a summary of my research findings and answer my primary research questions. These questions will address where actors are committed to HOPE VI ideals, and where planning constraints affect the ability of actors to maintain their commitments, or act as barriers to which commitment could not be overcome. The second section will discuss how my research efforts contribute to the plan implementation, and mixed-income development literature. The third section will outline contributions to the policy debates around HOPE VI, and future efforts to reform public housing. The fourth section will explain the broader implications of my research to urban planning practice. And lastly, the fifth section will discuss the limitations of my research, as well as provide suggestions for future research efforts.

10.1.1. Summary of Research Findings

In the planning and implementation process at Roosevelt Square, Westhaven Park, and Jackson Square actors face similar challenges between maintaining their commitment to physical and social mixing goals, making decisions contrary to plan goals in the face of planning constraints and/or impeding actors, or actor commitment wavering. My comparative case study highlights where actors are committed or not, to HOPE VI ideals, and the factors that influence commitment. I will start by answering my first research question and identify the four ways actor commitment plays out across the implementation process. As I discuss the variations in commitment, I will also describe how actors make decisions within their institutional roles. Next, I will answer my second research question, which will address in what stages the implementation constraints affect commitment to HOPE VI ideals as actors made adjustments, as well as, other constraints I discover that influenced commitment.
Research Question 1: How much, and how well do actor planning commitments pursue HOPE VI ideals across all phases of development?

My research findings show that the differences in case outcomes are based less on the new urbanist principles described in the initial HOPE VI plans, and more from differences in actor commitment to HOPE VI ideals at different phases of implementation. There are four different ways that commitment plays out, and within each distinction, there are similarities in the actors present across each case. There are stages where: commitment matters; commitment is constrained by impeding actors; commitment is constrained by planning constraints, or some combination of both; and commitment simply wanes due to impeding actors or inhibiting planning constraints. Moreover, as commitment plays out differently at each stage of development, there are similar roles actors play based on their institutional affiliation. More specifically, in both the Westhaven Park and Roosevelt Square cases, the primary actors are represented by idealists, realists, and those that are indifferent. At Jackson Square, the primary actors are idealists, non-believers, and those that are indifferent. These differences in commitment show how idealists and realists keep plan ideas alive, and those that are indifferent, or non-believers can be detrimental to the implementation process.

In both Roosevelt Square, and Westhaven Park, commitment matters at the project planning + design phase, which is comprised of the plan development, participatory process, and final plan development stages. These stages in particular are critical in the decision making process, as the majority of decisions are made during the working group process, and further solidified in the PD process. Across these stages, at Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park, there are a number of actors present that represent idealist, cynics, realists, and those that are indifferent. At Westhaven Park, the development team of Brinshore Michaels are represented by both the idealism of Michaels, and the cynicism of Brinshore. This combination proves to be complementary, as Brinshore tempers Michaels idealism with a pragmatic focus to redevelopment plans. Additionally, the design team is also committed to the plan goals and represents idealists. Likewise, at Roosevelt Square, Related and the design team are idealists, which, serves the team well in terms of adhering to plan goals as stated in HOPE VI Revitalization Plans. But this idealism also serves as a hindrance in the PD process. More importantly, both Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park has a host of realists such as the LAC, Counsel for Gautreaux, HRC and Counsel for HRC, tenants representatives, Habitat, and community leadership that fought for unit integration not only by block, but by building, equitable distribution of rental and for sale housing across the site, and phasing that limited displacement. Additionally, in both cases, there is a shared commitment to follow the overarching new urbanist principles by the design and development teams. But it is challenging to plan for the comprehensive nature of new urbanist plans that aim to include a mixture
of land uses, and public open spaces. Despite commitment from the development and design teams, it is difficult to implement a comprehensive plan with a mixture of land uses and open spaces based on a lack of support and indifference from the CHA and City of Chicago to follow through with infrastructure improvements, and business development support. Although, every aspect of project plans are not implemented, in this case, the consent decree at Westhaven Park, and the prior CRA lawsuit at Roosevelt Square are also points of leverage that actors use to reinforce commitments made by actors who are indifferent. Because there are a host of realists, as well as an accountability mechanism, actors that are indifferent are not as detrimental to the planning process during the earlier development phases, because the disruption can be mitigated by negotiation, mediation, or court proceedings.

Commitment is constrained by impeding actors particularly at Jackson Square, and to a lesser degree at Westhaven Park. Jackson Square plays out differently than both Roosevelt Square and Westhaven Park in the project planning + design phase. The redevelopment of Jackson Square faced challenges early on in the development process, largely in part because although Eastlake, Okrent Associates, and Piekarz Associates supported the social and physical mixing plan goals, they were unable to overcome the disruption of indifferent actors such as the CHA, the City of Chicago, and the cynical LAC. For instance, the idealism of the development and design teams are not enough to obtain buy-in, or project support from the LAC, CHA, or City of Chicago, and this lack of commitment is evident in the implementation process. There are constant plan changes during the project planning + design phase, which leaves the LAC cynical as to whether the plan ideas agreed upon can be implemented. Also, there are several instances where the lack of coordination between the CHA, the City of Chicago, and the development team, impacts the planning process. Moreover, there are several unforeseen plan changes that includes no longer having Grant Elementary School as a community anchor to plan around, an inability to acquire additional lots from the City of Chicago to develop a cohesive project, or to get CDOT to complete the planned streets. Consequently, there is very little that is planned and implemented as initially conceived. Therefore, in this case, the commitment from the development and design teams are negligible to overcome the indifference, and cynicism of key facilitating actors. It doesn’t matter if initial plans integrated HOPE VI ideals, because of their inability to be implemented without the support of the CHA and City of Chicago. Additionally, Jackson Square, unlike Westhaven Park and Roosevelt Square does not have a mechanism to hold investment partners accountable during the implementation process.

To a lesser degree, Westhaven Park is also impacted by impeding actors, particularly in the community building stage. Brinshore Michaels maintains their commitment to incorporating community building initiatives through their partnership with the NWSCDC. The NWSCDC implements the HVP, as well as the Family Works
program, funded by CSS dollars, and Michaels offers community support around employment training, educational programs, and having a community builder on staff for case management services. Where Brinshore Michaels is less successful, are implementing the broader neighborhood amenities around open space and improved access to education. Both open spaces and access to improved education requires the project support and resources of the CHA and City of Chicago. These efforts are not implemented despite Brinshore Michaels efforts to coordinate with the CHA and the City of Chicago to include improved access to education, or building a new school to support the Westhaven Community. Similarly to Jackson Square, the indifference of the CHA and City of Chicago to coordinate and work towards fulfilling the stated goals in the HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, leaves Westhaven Park without broader neighborhood amenities to support the community.

Commitment is also constrained by inhibiting planning constraints, which act as barriers to implementing plans across all three cases. The sale + management phase is largely influenced by inhibiting planning constraints at both Roosevelt Square and Jackson Square, and to a lesser degree Westhaven Park. Moreover, the marketing and occupancy stages are faced with both financial and housing market constraints that do not necessarily alter commitment, but actors must make changes to their project plans, which do not align with the intended social and physical mixing plan goals. Where these similarities diverge, is at Roosevelt Square, in which the construction stage is influenced by financing and market conditions, and at Jackson Square, where the community building stage is influenced by financing, and consensus among stakeholders.

Where developments faced similar inhibiting planning constraints were in the marketing and occupancy stages, in which despite actor commitment, development teams had to adjust project plans based on the financial constraints of generating revenue, as well as the impact of the declining market conditions on project plans. Development teams used various marketing approaches to attract buyers and the development teams were forced to adjust project plans to sell and occupy units so that revenue could be generated. Related at Roosevelt Square used a marketing approach focused on families, but continued to attract singles. Additionally, Related had difficulty filling affordable for sale units, as well as selling for sale units near the Brooks Homes. In this case, to sell for sale units in close proximity to the Brooks Homes, fourteen lots were sold to SOSCV. Brinshore Michaels at Westhaven Park used a value-based model to attract buyers focused on a good deal or financial investment, because the concept of income mixing was not considered a beneficial marketing strategy. While, this was effective in filling units at Westhaven Park, with a 60% return rate for existing residents, this created a significant gap in incomes, which in turn created tensions among homeowners and renters. Likewise, Eastlake had to adjust it’s marketing strategy from a focus on a
broad spectrum of incomes, to one of working class residents, because of their inability to obtain buy-in from the existing community, an isolated site location, and a lack of community amenities. Moreover, declining housing market conditions also exacerbated the challenges at each development to build and sell units. Each development team had to offer steep discounts on for sale units, and eventually project construction was placed on hold indefinitely.

In addition to the marketing and occupancy stages, actor commitment at Roosevelt Square and Jackson Square were also influenced at the construction and community building stages respectively. At Roosevelt Square, financing and housing market conditions also played an instrumental role in the development teams inability to build out the project. Although, Related, and the design team, were idealists who supported implementing plans equitably across Roosevelt Road, it was not enough to overcome the inability to secure an extension on the Roosevelt Square TIF. While the Roosevelt Square TIF financing slowed the project construction down, the housing market decline in 2007 caused a complete halt to any further construction. Because of the project going on hold, this left only 1.5 phases completed, with clear differences between rental and for sale housing, due to the vacant lots planned for the for sale units. In this case, despite having supporting actors willing to build out the project based on the agreed upon unit mix, phasing, and design goals, the planning constraints acted as barriers that commitment was unable to overcome.

At Jackson Square, the community building stage had to contend with both impeding actors, as well as inhibiting planning constraints. While Eastlake maintained their idealist perspective to implement community-building initiatives, the development team did not have the resources to implement services outside of their on-site social service coordinator, to administer case management services. In addition to not being able to implement the non-profit arrangement, the education plan for Jackson Square was also compromised by the lack of coordination by city agencies, with the development team and working group. In this case there was indifference by the City of Chicago and CHA to work to coordinate with CPS, despite Grant Elementary School’s enrollment in the City of Chicago campus park program, which was a central component to the plans developed during the planning and design phase. Although indifference by key facilitating actors caused plans to change, it was the inability to build consensus across these groups of actors that the broader neighborhood amenities were not implemented.

Commitment wanes when supporting actors shift to impeding actors due to both a combination of inhibiting planning constraints, as well as indifferent actors that impede the planning process. This occurred at Roosevelt Square during the community building stage, where there are planning constraints such as, financing and consensus, that play a role in inhibiting the implementation of plan goals. Moreover, these constraints are less important than actor indifference that serves to wholly impede plan implementation. For instance, Related was able to implement
the Family Works program through its partnership with Heartland Housing, but the remaining community building efforts were not implemented. Related was unsuccessful in implementing its broader community building initiatives that were part of the CSS Plan, which included using 10% of its developer fees as seed funding for a non-profit organization. Likewise, the additional recommendations for additional community building initiatives around employment and education failed to materialize. These broader community-building initiatives were not implemented because they were a low priority for Related, which was focused on housing as opposed to the community building initiatives. In this sense, commitment waned against the challenges of building consensus with the CHA and City of Chicago, as well as opting to use the designated 10% of the developer fee for housing development instead of community building.

Overall, my comparative case study shows projects that are more consonant with plan goals have actors considered idealists, and realists along the way that keep plan ideas alive and maintain an accountability check, while those projects that are less consonant with plan goals have actors represented by, non-believers, and those that are indifferent. Based on these findings, my research shows the range of actor commitment to HOPE VI ideals, and the types of actors necessary to achieve many HOPE VI plan goals. A balance of actors represented by idealists and realists are necessary to overcome the detrimental affect during the implementation process of actors that are non-believers, and those that are indifferent to physical and social mixing goals. Idealists support the social and physical mixing goals and generally work to guide the planning process so plan norms fit plan purposes. However, idealism can also serve as a hindrance to practical judgments, when decisions are no longer led by pragmatism. Without actors that have a strong commitment - project plans diverge from what was intended at strategic points in the implementation process. Likewise, realists also believe in the social and physical mixing goals, yet do not trust other institutional players to adhere to program goals are necessary to hold other actors accountable to their commitments. Both types of actors are required to maintain both commitment and accountability for other actors that may play different institutional roles. Similarly, in each case, those actors that were either indifferent or non-believers disrupted the planning process at ‘critical implementation episodes’ in ways that impeded implementation. Actors that were indifferent were not engaged in the project in meaningful ways, which in turn made implementing plans without their support much more difficult, and in some cases impossible. Likewise, non-believers play a dual role, as some dismiss the program goals and impede the planning process, and in other cases use their cynicism to act pragmatically.
Research Question 2: How do actors adjust their commitment to HOPE VI ideals in response to contextual conditions at each phase?

The inhibiting planning constraints that are the most prevalent across each case are consensus among stakeholders, financing, and market conditions. These planning constraints act as barriers to commitment, in which commitment does not necessarily change, but actors must make decisions about project plans that may not align with HOPE VI ideals. While my comparative case study illustrates that decisions made by actors in the sale + management stage is affected the most by inhibiting planning constraints, there are also five additional factors my research uncovered that also constrain plan implementation; the PD process, site constraints, developer capacity, buy-in, and accountability.

As previously mentioned, the sale + management phase faced the most challenges in terms of planning constraints. The marketing and occupancy stages were influenced at each development, and Roosevelt Square also faced implementation barriers at the construction stage, and Jackson Square at the community building stage. During the marketing and occupancy stages, financing and market conditions were barriers to achieving project plan goals, regardless of actor commitment. At Roosevelt Square, Related continued its commitment to the physical and income mix goals, and aimed to attract residents that would fit into the already existing community. However, the inability to secure the Roosevelt TIF, and declining housing market impacted their ability to build and sell for sale units in Phase II. In the case of Westhaven Park, Brinshore Michaels marketed the project with the focus on a value-based model, and selling a quality product. This strategy, as well as offering steep discounts did allow the development team to fill units, but this strategy came with a price. Some homeowners, particularly those that bought for financial investment purposes, felt they had been swindled into buying into a community that still had a high proportion of public housing residents. The declining housing market also further exacerbated discontentment, which has resulted in tension amongst homeowners and renters, and has impacted the ability to form community across income tenures. Lastly, at Jackson Square because of the existing community leaving, and challenges to occupy and sell units, Eastlake chose to change their marketing model to one that focused on recruiting working class families, as opposed to its intended market of middle and upper class families. This was due in large part to the lack of follow through with the initial plans, isolated site locations, and lack of community buy-in. Moreover, the changing market conditions also impacted the ability to sell any for sale units, and these units were either rented out or remained vacant, therefore Jackson Square remains a lower income rental community.
The marketing stage requires commitment from the development team in terms of how the project is marketed to attract residents. The ideas about physical and social mixing may appeal to a certain type of resident that would be invested in the community ideals, and support the self-sufficiency of low-income residents. Also, shared interests in creating a diverse community, and building a sense of community across different income levels, would serve the purpose to support the plan goals. To do this, a targeted marketing strategy created by the development team and focused on the HOPE VI program goals are necessary. If the development team is responsible for marketing for sale units, they should equally be required to market the project that aligns with the program goals to limit misrepresentation. Or, if projects modify the income gap between public housing residents and market rate tenants, this could also reduce the challenges faced on the ground to build community between homeowners and renters.

At Jackson Square, the community building stage is also where planning constraints, particularly consensus among stakeholders and financing influences Eastlake’s ability to implement the broader neighborhood amenities as outlined in the HOPE VI Revitalization Plan. While Eastlake was invested in the community building initiatives, the development team did not have the resources to implement services, such as the proposed non-profit organization outside of their on-site social service coordinator to administer case management services. In addition to not being able to implement the non-profit arrangement, the education plans for Jackson Square were also compromised despite the development and design teams’ prior commitments from the City of Chicago to enroll the existing Grant Elementary School in the campus park program. Consequently, Jackson Square was impacted by this CPS school closure in its final plans and the community remains without a high performing neighborhood elementary school.

Implementing the community building initiatives set out in the HOPE VI revitalization plans, and being organized in the working group during the participatory process, are as equally important as providing improved housing options. Whether it is providing non-profit organizations open spaces and community anchors, or improved access to education – without comprehensively implementing community building initiatives, mixed-income developments will not be able to promote self-sufficiency for low-income families, or attract middle and upper class families to these redevelopments. Each development team was committed to the bricks and mortar, as well as the community building initiatives. However, community building requires the support of investment partners such as the CHA and City of Chicago to implement. In particular, the education component is central to the success of mixed-income developments, and without this key component there will be limitations as to how successful any redevelopment effort might be.
In addition to the aforementioned planning constraints, my research also uncovered five factors that also constrain actor commitment. In this case, plans were difficult to implement due to the constraints of the PD process, existing site conditions, community buy-in, developer capacity, and accountability. The PD process is significant in terms of how the project plans take shape, and the ability of the development and design teams to implement new urbanism. At Westhaven Park, Brinshore Michaels took a pragmatic approach, and used a phased PD process, which allowed for changes to be made, limited potential risk, and offered more flexibility to changing conditions. In this case, the project has consistently moved forward with its cyclical process of participation, and final plan development for each phase. Roosevelt Square chose to do a single PD, which limited Related's ability to adapt to changing conditions. Although, project plans were well-planned and financially feasible, the project was essentially frozen in place, and now must be modified to adapt to the changing economic climate and new actors twelve years after the initial PD was approved. And lastly, Eastlake opted to do a multi-phased PD at Jackson Square, where initial phases did not have a PD, while later phases included a PD. Without having a comprehensive PD process from the beginning, Jackson Square is not a cohesive or comprehensive project. Moving forward, the PD process must be modified to include architects and planners in the decision making process from the very beginning, as opposed to being developer-led based on the financial feasibility of the project. A phased PD process must also be promoted to leave flexibility in the implementation process, where plans can adapt to changes along the way, which are inevitable.

Existing site conditions also played a significant role in how plans are implemented. Each case had to contend with varying site conditions; Roosevelt Square had the existing Brooks Homes on site; Westhaven Park had the superblock in the middle of the site; and Jackson Square had a clean slate, but no existing community. In each case, the site conditions affected the design and income mix of the community. At Roosevelt Square, because the existing Brooks Homes remained on site, early phases of the development were rental heavy, with the for sale component tacked on to later stages to leverage Related's investment. This in turn has left a site that needs to adapt to the current economic climate. However, more rental could make it that much more difficult to sell for sale units in the future. Likewise, Westhaven Park had to deal with the consent decree, which required residents to remain on site and move directly into their new units, as well as deal with a 100% public housing superblock in the middle of the site. This meant development was much slower, and done in phases on the two bookends of the site to accommodate the existing site conditions. Jackson Square, had the most ideal conditions in terms of a clean slate to work with in regards to development. However, building a new community ironically proved to be even more difficult. There is a give and take when it comes to site conditions. On one hand, the development process may have the potential to move faster
with a clean slate, but there may be no community to plan for. And on the other hand, existing units on site during plan implementation and final build out, can slow the process down as the development and design teams must work around less than ideal site conditions, yet limit resident displacement.

Developer capacity is another constraint that is evident in the planning and implementation process. Westhaven Park was led by Brinshore Michaels, a development team that has completed thousands of units of mixed-income housing across the U.S. This development team also was highly experienced with implementing community building initiatives, which was a nuanced perspective that other development teams were lacking. This allowed Brinshore Michaels and the NWSCDC to excel in their approaches to develop social equity. The ability to deliver both housing and community building at Westhaven Park, distinguished the development from other mixed-income communities in Chicago. While Roosevelt Square also had a development team that was experienced in affordable housing, Related’s project portfolio was based on high-end, large-scale private projects. In this case, Related developed Roosevelt Square similar to private projects. But mixed-income developments have a significant degree of uncertainty. Due to the lack of flexibility in project plans this approach failed to work in Related’s favor and served to inhibit the projects ability to move forward. Likewise, Eastlake also had extensive experience in affordable housing, but had not developed large-scale mixed-income developments like Jackson Square. As noted by Habitat, Eastlake was one of two development teams in Chicago that have been unable to move project plans forward, which in turn has limited the project support received by the CHA and the City of Chicago. Without the experience and financial capacity to sustain a long-term project, the future remains in question as to how Jackson Square will be completed.

Having project buy-in by the LAC and existing community or community leadership also influence actor commitment to implementing plans. At each development there were contentious relationships between the CHA, LAC, existing community, and development partners. In the case of Westhaven Park, due to the history of litigation and mistrust, Brinshore Michaels had to mediate the relationship between public housing residents and the CHA. While Brinshore Michaels was able to assist with bringing the two sides together, public housing residents had more leverage with the consent decree, to ensure their voices were heard. While the LAC had a mutually beneficial relationship with the CHA, in which the LAC supported project plans in exchange for tenant benefits, the community leadership was also invested in the redevelopment of Roosevelt Square. The LAC fought for the rights of public housing residents, while the community leadership worked to ensure the long-term sustainability for the existing Little Italy community. Although these two groups of actors were not always in agreement, both consistently mobilized constituents and supported plan efforts. However, at Jackson Square, Eastlake was unable to mediate the relationship
with the LAC to gain their support in the planning process. Without the buy-in of the LAC, this made the working group process more challenging because the LAC garnered a significant amount of control in the planning process. Because of multiple failed plan efforts around community amenities and comprehensive plans, the LAC did not believe the plans would actually be fulfilled, and withheld their support of project plans. Without the support of the LAC, the working group process was difficult to mediate because oftentimes, Eastlake and the LAC could not come to agreements on plan decisions. These disagreements, along with the myriad of plan changes and implementation of plans, did not coincide with resident expectations and resulted in an unofficial request by the LAC for a new master developer for future phases.

Whether projects have a planning process that enables actors to be held accountable also play a role in the implementation process. As previously mentioned, both formal and informal intermediate mechanisms are necessary to enforce decisions made by actors to align with HOPE VI ideals, as well as the interests of public housing residents. More specifically, both Westhaven Park and Roosevelt Square represent projects that were able to move forward because of actors that were able to hold key investment partners accountable to a higher level of commitment compared to Jackson Square. In the former, based on a prior consent decree in which most decisions were negotiated, and the latter, the threat of a lawsuit and strong LAC leadership, was enough to facilitate a strong relationship between the LAC and CHA. In each case, these relationships work to hold actors accountable to commitments related to tenant selection, employment, unit mix and distribution, developer selection, and design concepts.

Jackson Square, on the other hand represents a case that was without any intermediate mechanism to hold actors accountable, and implementation suffered as a result. In numerous instances key development partners failed to follow through on prior commitments established during the plan development stage around land acquisition, infrastructure improvements, and social service support. Because prior commitments were not upheld, this in turn influenced Eastlake’s capacity to implement project plans for Jackson Square, which remains a partially constructed, low income community. Without an intermediate mechanism in place, despite commitment from Habitat, Counsel for Gautreaux, and Eastlake, key development partners like the CHA and City of Chicago cannot be held accountable to effectively uphold their institutional roles as facilitating actors. Instead, as evident by their limited participation, these actors are indifferent, or cynical towards project plans at Jackson Square. These actors cause implementation to fail at multiple stages during the development process because even though there may be actors that are idealists, it appears to be almost impossible to overcome the disruption to the planning process that indifferent and cynical actors cause.
10.1.2. **Theoretical Contribution**

This section explores the theoretical contributions of my dissertation research findings. My research contributes to the literature on plan implementation and also adds to the existing debates around mixed-income developments. There remains a scant body of literature on plan implementation within the broader planning discipline, and little is known about the effects of plan implementation on land development practices. Even less is known about what factors influence plan implementation, and how they contribute to project plans. Likewise, the bulk of the literature on mixed-income development has focused on the programmatic outcomes on the people, and whether projects have been successful in achieving the desired social benefits. However, the actual process of implementing HOPE VI policy on the ground, and analyzing how much and how well actors integrate plan goals to build mixed-income developments, remains an area that has not been studied in-depth across each development phase. As a result, my research findings fill several gaps in the literature, which highlight two significant factors; the institutional constraints that exist by planning episode, and the range of actor commitment found in the implementation process.

The most prevalent implementation constraints that either influence commitment, or act as barriers to implementing project plans, are consensus among stakeholders and financing for all cases. In the case of Westhaven Park, legal parameters are an additional implementation constraint that contributes to the plan implementation process. For each case, a secondary implementation constraint that shapes the plan implementation process, are the housing market conditions, which influences each case in the marketing, occupancy, and oftentimes, construction stages. Additionally, politics is a secondary implementation constraint that played a role in the case of Roosevelt Square, but did not constrain commitment to plan goals during the implementation process.

My research also illustrates the areas where planning constraints affect commitment, and the stages in the development process where this occurs. More specifically, the earlier phases of development with project planning and design, are moderately influenced by inhibiting planning constraints. However, when the project reaches the sale and management phase, inhibiting planning constraints can overwhelm actors ability to integrate HOPE VI ideals, or act as barriers, in which despite commitment, project plans are altered by actors in other ways than intended. This happens at the marketing, occupancy, and community building stages, which are the most difficult to implement, and for actors to follow through with prior commitments made in earlier phases. This is also, the last phase where revenue is generated, and the final occupancy mix is actually realized. Therefore, development teams have leverage a significant amount of risk to carry the project, and need to fulfill financial obligations, as well as make a profit. It
is at this stage, as a development team member notes, “where business and philosophical goals collide,” Business goals across my three mixed-income projects won in each case. Likewise, because the community building initiatives are not considered as equally important as the goal of building housing, these components are a lower priority as the development team and other investment partners fail to coordinate these initiatives, allocate promised dollars, or provide the resources necessary to implement the planned community building initiatives.

My research offers the most compelling findings for theory based on the institutional roles developed based on in-depth interviews that illustrated the range of actor commitment. By understanding the range of actor commitment, this also highlights the specific context of HOPE VI, and shows clear evidence of the actors needed to implement complex projects. This builds on the existing plan implementation and evaluation literature, by extending the current definitions of commitment, which focuses on the developer and planning agency, and the interrelationships between capacity, knowledge, resources, and political support (Laurian et al, 2004; Dalton & Burby, 1994). Providing a range of actor commitment based on the institutional role played by a diversity of actors fills a gap in the literature around whether commitment to plan issues matter in the implementation process.

Also in the mixed-income literature, while Vale (2002) analyzed implementation, the focus was on adherence to contract timetables and budgets in terms of indicators of success. Likewise, Joseph (2009) also analyzed 10 projects in Chicago to understand developer and service provider experiences in the redevelopment process. Although each author analyzed the implementation process in mixed-income developments, neither offers a comprehensive perspective across all development phases from the perspective of different actors. However, my research uses a pragmatic approach that does not rely on strict correspondence to plan goals, and considers both context and the diversity of different viewpoints found in the planning process (Hoch, 2002). My research shows why HOPE VI projects oftentimes have different outcomes, and while planning constraints influence project plans, commitment is an even stronger driver that dictates the trajectory of the development process.

I discover the importance of how different actors exhibit commitment, and how this plays out in the implementation process over the course of my case study research. Initially, I thought, based on interviews and documents, that commitment would be discovered based on either those actors that were committed, or by those actors who were not committed and simply paid lip service to plan goals. However, what I find is a range of ways that actors manifested their commitment, or lack of commitment to plan goals. For projects to be consonant with plan goals, there are two types of actors that must be present: idealists, and realists. To implement plans there must be actors that are committed, and support the social and physical mixing goals. While this idealism can sometimes
serve as a hindrance to practical judgments, it is a necessary belief system to complete projects based on plan goals from start to finish. Actor commitment can also shift during the implementation process, but this shift mostly happens in the later stages of development where idealism turns to indifference – therefore actors that can remain faithful throughout the latter stages is important. Likewise, realists are also required to keep plan ideas alive, but more importantly to maintain an accountability check, which serves to ensure actors maintain their commitments.

10.1.3. **Policy Contribution**

My research illustrates the challenges of taking a policy with high reaching plan goals and implementing it on the ground. This research also offers a significant contribution to policy, by describing three cases that are located in close proximity to each other that have simultaneous development timeframes, receive similar levels of funding, have overlapping actors, yet had drastically different outcomes. Furthermore, my case accounts illustrate how the plan goals of HOPE VI, particularly, new urbanism are far more difficult to implement on the ground in a consistent manner. As Smith argues, “NU principles can be good rules to plan by, but only if adhered to in all forms of development and in all places” (Smith, 2002). To develop projects, which use new urbanism as a guiding framework, actors involved in plan implementation must be consistent in how these plan goals are used. Without using new urbanism to plan and implement mixed-income developments consistently across projects, there will be variation in plan outcomes, where some goals and outcomes will align, and others will not. The difficulty to consistently implement new urbanism in the context of large-scale public housing redevelopment also raise questions as to whether new urbanism as the design program for public housing, can be implemented.

New urbanist plans need to be implemented with the same level of commitment across all projects to facilitate achieving the assumed benefits of mixed-income communities. To do so will require revisiting the current implementation strategies used by policy makers and incorporating intermediate mechanisms to hold actors accountable, in an effort to maintain the same level of commitment across all stages of development. Based on the new urbanist criteria used in my research, these cases have illustrated the range of implementation, as well as the planning constraints that influence how actors make decisions and judgments. For developers and design teams to implement the new urbanist dimensions focused on diversity, connectivity, defined public spaces, and equitable distribution of services requires a comprehensive plan, as well as an implementation strategy. This implementation strategy to develop a diversity of land uses and housing types, open spaces, and street connectivity takes actor commitment from a range of actors to achieve this. The development and design teams can make plans that meet these criteria. However, to implement plans, city agencies must be on board to recruit commercial businesses, provide the services to develop and
maintain public open spaces, and provide additional land acquisition and infrastructure to create street networks and streetscaping. In each case, city agencies were responsible for these services, but did not always follow through with their commitments. For plans to be implemented, city agencies need to be held accountable to work in concert with public housing authorities to provide the necessary support to development teams so that comprehensive plans can be implemented.

City agencies can be held accountable to provide the necessary support to development teams, to implement new urbanism in the comprehensive manner it was intended by having expanded oversight by HUD or the appointed Receiver, Habitat. Although the primary responsibility lies with the CHA, as the entity that receives and distributes HOPE VI funds – the CHA lacks the capacity to hold the City of Chicago accountable as demonstrated in my case accounts. Since, the HOPE VI policy approach provides cities with more autonomy, there must also be a balance of both autonomy and accountability. To strike this balance and hold city agencies accountable, then this responsibility should lie with HUD, as the primary funder, to oversee the development process, and maintain an accountability check for both the CHA and city agencies. Whether this is tied to the distribution of public funds, or is an additional contract required between the CHA or HUD, a mechanism is necessary to require city agencies to prioritize providing the infrastructure and resources to the development team. Or, given the CHA is in receivership, Habitat can also play this expanded oversight role, in addition to ensuring Gautreaux is upheld.

To meet the new urbanist dimension, focused on equitable distribution of services, or spatial equity, requires an additional layer of accountability for the development team. For example, the development agreement between the CHA and the development team does not include adherence to the community building initiatives outside of the CSS Plan, despite these initiatives being clearly defined in HOPE VI Revitalization Plans that are approved by HUD. Therefore, these additional community building initiatives are not always implemented due to financing constraints, or because developers instead direct money towards housing development. The community building initiatives are as equally important to implement as new housing development, and the projects are not sustainable without also implementing these components consistently across all developments. Particularly the education piece, as noted by researchers, as well as practitioners, mixed-income developments need a strong educational support system to not only attract middle and upper class residents to the development, but also to promote self-sufficiency for low-income families. Linking housing redevelopment and education reform is required for HOPE VI plans to meet the intended plan goals. Additionally, in light of my findings around the influence of CPS school closures on redevelopment efforts, future policies focused on linking housing redevelopment and education reform is required for HOPE VI
plans to meet the intended plan goals. Therefore a policy approach that ties housing and community building within a regulatory framework is necessary, and cannot be an optional component for private developers to adhere to. Having a regulatory framework in place for developments still in the process of planning and constructing in cities like Chicago, could be transformative not only for HOPE VI, but also to reform education systems.

In addition to integrating intermediate mechanisms to hold actors accountable throughout the development process, my research also raises questions about whether new urbanism can in fact be implemented in the context of large-scale public housing redevelopment. While a significant bulk of research on mixed-income developments have assumed the implementation of HOPE VI ideals and study outcomes on residents (Cunningham, 2001; Clark, 2002; Kliet, 2005; Varaday, Raffel, Sweeny, & Denson, 2005; Chaskin & Joseph, 2009, 2011), as demonstrated by the variation in implementation, there is a need to take a step back to better understand whether communities have actually been implemented based on the social and physical mixing plan goals that are assumed to influence individual outcomes. This is an important question in light of my findings, and future research efforts to understand the context in which new urbanism can be implemented consistently should be considered.

I suspect that there are several embedded contextual factors that influence whether and to what degree new urbanism can be implemented, which include the project scale, proximity to affluent communities, and capacity of city agencies. Based on my research findings, and plan implementation literature, the complexity of actors and scale of Roosevelt Square led to a more challenging implementation process. As noted by Laurian et al (2004b) the level of project complexity and number of actors, as well as the scale of the project influences the ability or degree to which plans are implemented. Smaller scale, less comprehensive or only residential projects compared to large-scale multi-use public-private project are exceedingly easier to implement. Also, as demonstrated in the case of Jackson Square, locational factors also influence the market acceptability and broader community buy in. Due to Jackson Square’s location on the near west side of Chicago and lack of proximity to an affluent community as seen with Westhaven Park, or within a stable existing affluent neighborhood as observed with Roosevelt Square, made it more difficult for Eastlake to market and sell Jackson Square as a new urbanist mixed-income community. Lastly, as noted previously, the capacity of city agencies, as well as housing authorities to deliver comprehensive new urbanist communities remains in question.
10.1.4. Urban Planning Practice

Actor commitment to plan goals has also proved to be an essential element to implement mixed-income developments. This research has shown that projects that are more consonant with plan goals have actors considered idealists. Realists keep the plan ideas alive and maintain accountability, while those projects that are less consonant with plan goals have actors represented by, non-believers, and those that are indifferent. The level of actor commitment is a guiding factor in how well plan goals are implemented, and stems from the formation of the working groups. Each case represented a different degree as to how committed and engaged actors were within the working group, and those groups that had a higher level of commitment were more effective in implementing project plans. When there is strong commitment to HOPE VI ideals, and buy-in to plan ideas by key actors, or not, the level of commitment is evident in how plans are implemented.

Other implications for urban planning practice are based on understanding the four stages in which planning constraints affect actor commitment, and act as barriers to project plans. My research findings show this happens at the construction, marketing, occupancy, and community building stages. The construction stage is influenced by financing and market conditions, in which actor commitment is unable to overcome detrimental impacts to project plans. While I thought the value engineering process would be a key stage, which influenced commitment, this stage was not particularly important. The value engineering stage was not as significant as I thought it would be because the majority of decisions were made in the project planning + design phase. Moreover, the responsibility of plan features such as open spaces, mixed-use developments and business opportunities lie with the City of Chicago in terms of providing the resources and project support. By the time the project moves into the construction phase, decisions about building types, materials, streetscaping, open spaces, and phasing have already been determined in the working group process. While, the working group meetings are an ongoing process, there is not significant flexibility for changes at the value engineering stage. Small changes are made such as unit sizes, window types, building materials, or building reconfigurations, but major elements are not eliminated at the value engineering stage. Plans are instead influenced by financing and market conditions during actual construction, in which financial constraints and an inability to build or sell units can halt the entire project indefinitely.

During the marketing and occupancy stages are when actors maintain their commitments, but must adjust their decisions based on financing and market constraints to sell and occupy units to generate revenue. However, in this case there are two ways to improve how the development is marketed and occupied. First, is incorporating how the development will be marketed into the participatory process, where the most stakeholders and community
residents are involved in the process. Building buy-in at an earlier stage and continuing to build upon that buy-in during the marketing stage is necessary to not only bridge community gaps, but also to educate stakeholders and the community on what income mixing is, and what it will look like. Second, in addition to building buy-in, once the project moves into the marketing and occupancy stages, marketing strategies based on building a community with shared values of diversity is essential. Using the program goals to attract like-minded individuals and families is key to facilitating any form of community across low-income and middle class families. Additionally, efforts to reconsider significant income gaps between renters and owners, might also facilitate an easier transition for both parties. Significant differences in income, as well as unit integration within buildings may need to be revisited, in efforts to build community based on diversity.

The community building stage is also where various initiatives are not implemented. My research shows that these efforts fail primarily due to a lack of broader commitment from key investment partners, which in some cases are the development team, however primarily includes the CHA and City of Chicago. Given this dynamic, and the lack of support offered towards community building, there is a need to develop a more inclusive and regulatory framework for not only implementing the CSS Plans, but also implementing the additional community building initiatives around healthcare, education, and creating non-profit organizations. To make this work, just as the working group is the legal governing body that works to develop the plans, there needs to be an intermediate mechanism in place to implement the community building initiatives. There are two regulatory provisions that can assist with achieving consistent implementation of community building initiatives such as a community benefit agreement (CBA) or clawback provisions. A intermediate mechanism that might be beneficial to all parties involved is using a CBA between the development team and the LAC, CDCs, and community leadership. A CBA is a private agreement between the developer and community coalitions that is proactive and allows community groups to directly negotiate with the developer instead of with a city agency. Also, for projects in Chicago still undergoing redevelopment and new negotiation processes, this may also offer an opportunity to restructure the development agreement between the CHA and the developer to include a CBA in the development agreement. By adding another layer of accountability through a CBA, this can serve to hold the development team accountable to implement the promised community building requirements from the initial HOPE VI plans and any new initiatives developed throughout the participatory stage by both community coalitions and the CHA. This will give the development team added incentive to make sure actors are equally as committed to the bricks and mortar as to the community building. In addition to adding a CBA, also, the working group process must include CPS as a voting member moving forward because their involvement is essential
to coordinating housing redevelopment and education reform efforts if there is any hope to provide equitable access to education at these development sites.

In addition to a CBA, a non-performance provision in the development agreement between the CHA, City of Chicago, and the development team can include a clawback provision. In this case, the CHA and City of Chicago can include a non-performance provision in the development agreement, which ties any public funding received to performance benchmarks. For instance, if the development team fails to implement community building initiatives as indicated in the development agreement, a clawback provision would allow for recovery of all or part of subsidy costs if agreed upon performance goals are not met (Weber & Santacroce, 2007). More specifically, when the recipient of public funds fails to meet a benchmark as specified in the development agreement, the clawback provision will be enforced, which entitles the CHA or City of Chicago to repayment of benefits. A clawback provision could be used in a number of ways and tied to CDBG or CSS funds in an effort to enforce the implementation of community building initiatives.

10.1.5. Limitations and Future Research

There are several limitations to my dissertation research, which include that fact that projects are still in process, limited access to actors and documents in specific cases, and the politicized context under which interviews were conducted. The first limitation to my research findings are that Roosevelt Square, Westhaven Park, and Jackson Square are still in the process of being fully built out and completed, therefore the chapter on the final outcomes for these developments remains to be written. Given that these projects are still underway, there are future planning and implementation efforts that are not part of this research. Because future planning efforts may be moving forward, this also creates an opportunity to share my findings in the hope that the next round of HOPE VI planning efforts in Chicago and other cities can glean some understanding into the types of actors and accountability measures required to implement plan goals. The second limitation to my research findings are the limited access in all cases to CHA officials, City of Chicago officials, and specific original documents from the CHA and HUD. Therefore, in this case, I relied on interviews with a multitude of actors that were integral to plan implementation, as well as secondary documents that were made available. Although, there were challenges to obtain interviews with specific actors, this did not impede my understanding of the implementation process, it simply limited having two sets of actors to reflect on the redevelopment process. Also, their unwillingness to offer reflections on three major PFT developments, also is a finding in itself, and presents the perception that city agencies do not want to engage in difficult questions as to why HOPE VI projects in Chicago exhibit different outcomes. And lastly, because the PFT is still in progress
and the CHA remains under scrutiny with its implementation of the PFT, actors were very aware of the politicized environment and small network of actors involved in these projects. Taking this into consideration, the narratives and findings of my research have to be considered within the specific policy context in Chicago that contributes to how open actors can be during interviews.

Based on my research findings, there are several opportunities for future research that will add to the policy literature and urban planning practice. First, building upon my existing cases, there is a need to follow the multiple stages of the implementation process until projects are completed. The challenge with this, is that some projects may or may not be completed, and also the timeframes are unknown. Second, while this research focused on a single city where the institutional constraints were controlled, there is a need to investigate plan implementation in the context of HOPE VI across different cities in order to understand how different institutional contexts matter in the plan implementation process, and where these differences might influence the development of mixed-income communities. Finally, the housing policy turn towards Housing Choice Neighborhoods, which are an extension of the HOPE VI program that applies to all subsidized housing and their surrounding communities, offers another context to study plan implementation. In this case, as a relatively new policy, there is the ability to analyze plan implementation from the very beginning of neighborhood planning projects in real time. Additionally, although Housing Choice Neighborhoods are both policy driven planning, and implementation process that are constrained by policy, this still presents an opportunity to study multiple cases that are relatively concurrent in time. Also, as with the existing HOPE VI research, current research and evaluation of Housing Choice Neighborhoods does not focus on the plan development or implementation process. In closing, many of the lessons learned for urban planning practice within the context of HOPE VI in Chicago, can also be used as a guiding framework for urban neighborhood redevelopment projects seeking to use new urbanism to improve communities.
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