The City Cannot Be Occupied:
Urban Movements and Revolutionary Memory
in Paris, Prague, and Tehran

BY

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THESIS
Submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Chicago, 2013

Chicago, Illinois

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge all the support and help of my committee, the faculty and staff of the UIC Political Science department, and my family and friends. Without their support over the years and their good advice, this dissertation would not have been possible. A very special thank you goes out to Ike Balbus and Norma Moruzzi, who were both with me from the beginning of my graduate career and who have supported me through good times and bad. Finally, thanks to Dennis Judd who gave me the right advice at the right time.

Thanks also to Richard Embray at Four Corners Books, Filip Blažek at Designiq Studio, and the artist Nicky Nodjoumi who all graciously let me use their poster images in my dissertation.
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SUMMARY

This dissertation concerns the role of urban spaces and political memories in revolutionary mobilization. The theoretical framework suggests that movements will use central urban spaces like streets and plazas to connect the contemporary movement with the memory of past political events. Memories of previous revolutionary movements, police violence, and martyrdom, help activate an urban population. Primary urban mobilization on the street, and the use of memory, has the potential to activate ‘secondary’ cultural spaces that can shelter and provide leadership for the movement as it challenges the state. This dissertation argues that movements will be more successful in their political challenge, and more resistant to demobilization, if they are able to organize within a secondary space.

To explore the theory, this dissertation develops three case studies of urban movements: the May 1968 movement in Paris, the Velvet Revolution of 1989 in Prague, and the 2009 Green Movement in Tehran. The student uprising at Parisian universities quickly spilled over into the streets of the Latin Quarter in Paris. While connecting with memories of the 1871 Paris Commune by building barricades in the streets, student protesters also developed a vivid iconography in the form of revolutionary posters made at the Atelier Populare. Ultimately unsuccessful at transforming the state, the May ’68 movement still had a dramatic effect on politics and culture. The Velvet Revolution brought an end to the communist regime in Czechoslovakia by a continual process of urban mobilization in central Prague and by connecting with past memories of martyrdom during Nazi occupation and communist rule. The urban movement allied with the vast theater network of Prague. This secondary space provided a safe haven for the movement to ‘come in off the streets’ and successfully challenge the communist state. The Green Movement of 2009 in Tehran arose as a response to an electoral coup d’état by the incumbent regime. By drawing on Islamic imagery and the memory of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the movement further undermined the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. Unable to organize within a cultural space like the mosques or the bazaar, the movement relied upon rooftop protests and cyberspace after being forced off the streets by police violence. Though these spaces indicate new potentials for organized protest, as of 2009 they were not sufficient to organize a transition in power.

The dissertation concludes by reasserting the theoretical formulations in a synthesis of the collected case study insights. Streets and plazas act as primary locations of protest. These spaces are the location for political memories that give justification and legitimacy to the contemporary movement. Political memories can link an urban movement with significant secondary spaces, like theaters in Prague or mosques during the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Movements that rely on organizing within secondary spaces, like the Velvet Revolution did in Prague, are more durable and more successful at transforming the state than movements that rely on occupying streets and buildings like the May movement did in Paris. Ultimately it is concluded that the city cannot be successfully occupied for a long duration, and that organization within secondary spaces is a more viable protest tactic.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Introduction

The subject of this dissertation is the space and time of revolutionary processes in 1968 Paris, 1989 Prague, and 2009 Tehran. A study of revolutionary movements and processes must be focused on urban sites, since modern revolution is an urban phenomenon. Revolutionary situations occur in cities at moments when state authority is weak; revolutionary movements take advantage of this opportunity to mobilize street protest, and to organize transitions in state power. As revolutionary movements mobilize and organize within urban space, they make use of and transform that space. Additionally, mobilization and organization take place over time; but this is not the only temporal component of urban movements. As they mobilize, movements recall the memory of past struggles and past political events in order to foster mass participation in the movement, and to support the collective claims made by the movement against the state.

Urban, revolutionary movements are coeval with revolutionary situations, and revolutionary situations occur within urban space. Furthermore, there are always specific urban spaces in which a movement coalesces. Primary spaces of mobilization, whether they be plazas, central squares, main boulevards, or monuments, help connect a movement with past political memories that give context and meaning to the contemporary struggle. The meaning of urban space is produced in part by the struggle of social forces like revolutionary movements. The space of movement mobilization is a key object for any study of revolutionary movements, but it cannot be the only space of study. It is also crucial to locate a movement's secondary spaces.
Important urban spaces, like churches and mosques, theaters, artist studios, universities, factories, and the like, can potentially aid in organizing the movement as it confronts the state. The capacity of these secondary spaces to provide relative safety from the state and to provide organizational leadership helps to explain the movement's outcomes. Understanding where a movement develops the primary and secondary capabilities to challenge the state provides insights on that singular revolutionary movement and sheds light on the general trends inherent in all cases of revolutionary movements.

**B. Three Cases: Paris, Prague and Tehran**

This project focuses on the revolutionary processes of three compelling examples of urban, revolutionary movements in Paris, Prague, and Tehran. The tumultuous years of the 1960s culminated in the explosive year 1968—across the globe, urban spaces saw massive protests but none perhaps so well remembered as the student protests of May and June in central Paris. The May '68 movement saw the occupation of the Latin Quarter and the Sorbonne, and led to the largest general strike in French history. This outpouring of discontent has been framed as a largely leftist challenge to the borderline authoritarian French state lead by President Charles DeGaulle. In occupying the streets and universities of central Paris, student protesters drew on anti-authoritarian memories of the 1871 Paris Commune to make their challenge to the French state. Universities like Nanterre and the Sorbonne, as well as occupied buildings in central Paris, provided spaces through which the movement was able to organize. Even though the movement
was unsuccessful in toppling the state, the May '68 movement has gone on to have a large influence on contemporary French politics and culture.

The urban challenge to the Czechoslovakian state in 1989 came as part of the wave of anti-Communist struggles that lead ultimately to the end of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe. In November and December of 1989, the residents of Prague mobilized on the streets of the central city and on the famous Wenceslas square demanding multiparty elections. The Velvet Revolution, as it has come to be known, is generally framed by scholars as a liberal movement in opposition to the authoritarian Communist state. But the dynamic use of past political memories during the 1989 movement, specifically the memory of the 1968 invasion and occupation of Prague by the Warsaw Pact armies, complicate a simplistic 'liberal-versus-communist' framing of the Velvet Revolution. In 1989, the vast theater network across Prague and other Czechoslovakian cities provided the organizational space through which the movement was able to make a successful challenge to the Communist state. Theater space contributed a dramatic sensibility to the Velvet Revolution.

In 2009, Tehran saw the mobilization of the Green Movement in opposition to the electoral coup d'etat of the presidency by the incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Urban street protest was met with a violent crackdown by Iranian security forces, and a movement that was initially focused only on the stolen election expanded to challenge the authority of the Islamic Republic. By drawing on memories of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Green Movement evoked the republican component inherent in the Iranian constitution. This political tradition has been under constant threat by hardline authoritarian elements in Iran. Killed by a sniper during a day
of protest in Tehran, the martyred figure of Neda Agha-Soltan became the symbol of the movement; the image of her death caught on video went viral on the internet. As a precursor to the later Arab Spring, the Green Movement demonstrated new mobilizing techniques possible through cyberspace, as well as the organizational limitations of virtual communication. Even though the memory of Shi’a Islam was actively contested by the movement, the mosque network and the bazaar—the main organizational spaces of the 1979 Iranian Revolution—remained inaccessible to the 2009 Green Movement.

Learning more about the general qualities of urban movements from the diverse political, cultural, and geographic contexts of Paris, Prague, and Tehran, is a central goal of this dissertation. Taken together, these three cases of urban movements offer a chance to generalize across the diverse geographic regions of Western and Eastern Europe. The inclusion of Tehran integrates an example of a non-European revolutionary movement and broadens the generality of insights gained. That we find commonalities across these very different temporal and spatial locations suggests that all urban movements have important similarities. As we will see, general trends among these movements show that contemporary struggles are always framed within a context of past ones, and that urban spaces like plazas and streets, provide the location where past struggles and present ones become mingled in the process of mobilization against the state.

Yet these three movements also demonstrate important differences. Unique characteristics in each movement emphasize a crucial fact: context matters. Different urban, political, and cultural contexts give rise to compelling differences across cases. Even as we expand the knowledge of general conditions of urban revolutionary movements, we can likewise explore
each case as distinct and valuable in its own right. If we hold that urban space provides the location for mobilization and organization, and that space is more than just an abstract background against which things happen, then the selection of Paris in 1968, Prague in 1989, and Tehran in 2009 as cases for this dissertation permits an analysis of the general trends across cases, while still attending to the vital and compelling characteristics unique to each case. Each movement is different since it occurs within a different urban context, but urban space and the modern city have common characteristic processes. In crossing cultural and political contexts, the cities of Paris, Prague, and Tehran provide for incredibly valuable comparisons.

C. **What is an Urban Movement?**

A brief discussion of the literature on social movements will lead us to a better understanding of revolutionary movements. Urban movements, either social or revolutionary, take different forms depending on different contexts. Unlike revolutionary movements that seek to replace or dismantle the state, social movements are reform-oriented movements. Scholars of social movements have searched for general and particular mechanisms to explain the process of movement mobilization. By incorporating three perspectives (political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framing) scholars in the field called 'contentious politics' have attempted to build a general theory of movements (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). Movements take advantage of political opportunities to mobilize against the state. Political opportunities can take the form of changes to public policy, elections, or other dramatic changes in the condition of urban life. Understanding the structures of opportunity, the potential political opposition or
support for a movement, is a fruitful way to comprehend the strategic choices and historical outcomes of a particular movement (Tarrow 1996; 1998). Likewise, exploring the resources available to a movement can indicate the likelihood of success or failure of a given enterprise (Kriesi 1996). In addition, as movements mobilize and engage with the state or other social actors, they frame issues or events from distinct cultural perspectives (Snow and Benford 1986;1988).

In the latest version of their work on contentious politics, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2009) suggest that certain types of contentious action dovetail with certain types of regimes. Thus instead of viewing a movement only in terms of its mobilizing, or its cultural frames, it is best to explore the movement as a whole as it develops and engages with the state. Moreover, describing the movement as it relates to the state in which it operates builds an explanatory context for the movement itself. The value of contentious politics to this dissertation project is that it seeks to account for the form of the relationship between the movement and the state. At moments of change, the alternatives posed by a movement offer key insights into the nature of that particular movement and anti-systemic movements in general.

While it provides a number of compelling studies on social movements, it is unclear if the literature on contentious politics has a good understanding of the specifically temporal and spatial processes associated with movements. Studies of social movements usually mention the country-location of a movement, but very little thought has been given to the particular spatial context of contentious politics. William Sewell notes that most studies of movements:

bring in spatial considerations only episodically, when they seem important either for adequate descriptions of contentious political events or for explaining why particular
events occurred or unfolded as they did. With rare exceptions, the literature has treated space as an assumed and unproblematic background, not as a constituent aspect of contentious politics that must be conceptualized explicitly and probed systematically” (2001, 52).

Sewell emphasizes that spatial factors such as the urban, built environment, life routines, and the cultural meaning of places play important roles in movement activity. Moreover, most studies of contentious politics deal only with social movements, not revolutionary ones. Clearly, more research needs to be undertaken; this dissertation seeks to more fully explore the phenomenon of urban movements, and their spatial and temporal processes.

D. **What is the difference between Social and Revolutionary Movements?**

As suggested above, the best way of viewing a movement is in terms of its processes. Jack Goldstone argues that social movements and revolutionary movements may begin with similar processes but end up changing and diverging over time. While a revolutionary movement “may begin as a movement to achieve certain policy or attitudinal goals, it evolves into a collaborative effort linking diverse groups with policy goals into a movement that aims to overthrow the state. It evolves in that direction precisely because the state adopts a repressive stance of resolute resistance” (1998, 128). Revolutionary movements and social movements are derived from similar processes, most notably a desire to see social and political change. Yet through the particular context of the state-movement interaction each type develops different strategies to promulgate social change. While social movements are able to work within the

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1 This is in contrast to approaches such as Skocpol’s (1979) that suggest that revolutions are wholly distinct rom social movements, or to Smelser’s (1962) suggestion that revolutions are just a more severe form of social protest. Neither one of these diametrically opposite positions on revolution is nuanced enough to capture the distinct yet inherently comparable nature of social and revolutionary movements.
system, revolutionary movements develop when confronted with resolute, often violent, state power. A focus on processes develops a linked chain of important events and mechanisms of mobilization, and it perceives the important changes at work during a movement's development. A focus on processes identifies the moments and locations that drive the expansion or contraction of a movement, building an analytical chain of interrelated actions, reactions, and responses.

The spatial and temporal processes of revolutionary movements are tied to the existence of revolutionary situations. Charles Tilly's work on revolutionary situations presents perhaps the clearest bridge between the study of movements and the study of revolutionary processes, and his theory permits us to take into account more than just successful revolutionary cases. Revolutionary situations occur when one or more political factions vie for control of the state, when these factions are supported by large bodies of committed followers, and when the state is unable or unwilling to use force against them (Tilly 1994, 10-11). By looking at the mechanisms that develop a revolutionary situation, Tilly breaks down a complex event like a revolution into component parts, aiding in developing an analysis of what is a contingent process, rather than a foregone conclusion.

As a complement to their wide range, all revolutionary situations share a single unifying characteristic: dual power. Tilly attributes his insights on the importance of dual power to Trotsky, who suggested that dual power “arises where the hostile classes are already each relying upon essentially incompatible governmental organizations—the one outlived, the other in the process of formation” (1932, 207). Trotsky developed his understanding of dual power in terms of class struggle and the Bolshevik party's challenge to the Tzarist and republican elements of the
Russian state; when we say dual power, it is critical to understand that all, or even most revolutionary movements do not develop along the lines of the Russian Revolution of 1917. Rather, the key insight to be gleaned from Tilly and Trotsky's focus on dual power is a spatial one; dual power develops a challenge to the state because it is grounded in formal organizations, located in particular spaces that have the resources and leadership necessary to formulate a serious and sustained challenge to state power.

E. **Urban Space and Revolutionary Movements**

Urban space has a close association with movements, because “people always need a material basis on which to organize their autonomy against...institutional power” (Castells 1983, 70). At least since the publication of Henri Lefebvre's books *The Right to the City* (1996) and *The Urban Revolution* (2003) in the late 1960s, scholars have begun to consider the crucial role urban space plays in the construction of all aspects of modern life and politics. Lefebvre viewed social space as a dialectical process created by the intersection of conceived urban architecture and legal structures, and the everyday lives of people inhabiting the city (1991). Unlike scholarship which considers urban space only as a backdrop or abstract grid on which social processes take place, scholars of space like Lefebvre, Edward Soja (1989), and David Harvey see space as the dynamic locations out of which the modern world springs. Harvey adds a second dimension to our understanding of urban space by identifying three levels at which space operates: the absolute space of the state, the relative space at which social forces engage one another, and the relational space from which people and groups approach the world around them.
Together, Harvey and Lefebvre show that urban space is a dynamic set of processes that can never be completely dominated by the state.

Streets and plazas provide the primary space through which mobilization against the state takes place, and it is through these spaces that a movement is able to connect with the larger population and activate salient collective memories embedded within the urban milieu (Liggett 1995; Huyssen 2003). Urban space is a repository for the collective memories of a culture (Boyer 1996; Srinivas 2001). In evoking these memories, a movement can build a justification for mobilization and the challenging of state policy, or the state itself. Hannah Arendt argues that the memory of past political struggles gives voice to a new generation seeking to establish freedom, and that memories of prior political events give inspiration to those revolutionaries seeking to create a new state (1965). Memory is central to revolutionary movements, not because a movement seeks to delude itself about its own activity, but rather because the struggles of the past often form the basis for making collective claims against the state. Past abuses of power, a lost political tradition, or dead martyrs: memories like these drive the human quest for freedom, and often make the injustice of the state palpable for everyday citizens. Additionally, Walter Benjamin suggests that when a movement calls upon political memory in the hopes of liberating society from the abuses of the state, it also has a potential to partially redeem the injustices of the past (1968).

Movements are not just an aggregation of the adherents who participate in protest actions or the like; the process of mobilization builds a movement's own relational experience, one visible through the iconographic expressions of the movement. People protesting together for
change on the streets cultivate a sense of themselves as a group, as a Movement. In other words, it develops a relational sense of itself. Harvey suggests that it is only through attending to relational space that we can access “the political role of collective memories in urban processes” (2009, 140). Relational spacetime is important to understanding the nature of a revolutionary movement, since it is through relational space that we can access salient political memories, a hitherto understudied temporal component of revolutionary movements.

F. What is the Spatial Practice of a Movement?

Every movement has its own spatial practice: David Harvey points out that it “takes control of some place to command space in the first instance...any struggle to reconstitute power relations is a struggle to reorganize their spatial bases” (1990, 236-8). Struggles that seek to transform the state must necessarily have spaces from which to organize, mobilize, and contest state space. A movement must become formally organized in order to resist state-sanctioned violence and continue challenging the state. Lefebvre argues that the productive process going on inside and throughout social space can be directed towards the revolutionary goal of radical break with the state—that in fact, what he calls 'heterotopian space' will be the central site out of which revolutionary organization will spring (2003). Secondary spaces like civic organizations, public clubs, religious institutions, universities, art collectives, and factories all contain the potential to act as sites of organization. These are the spatially grounded locations where urban mobilization can literally 'come in off the streets' to find protection from state repression as well as find organized, transitional leadership.
Space is a dynamic, changing, and produced sphere of social and institutional engagement (Zukin 1991). An attention to spatial practice provides a valuable theoretical framework for movement research and it also helps the researcher apply the hermeneutic method. By exploring its conceived and lived spaces, the researcher better understands the spatial practice of a movement as it engages with the state. In doing so, one then develops a better understanding of both spatial theory and the movement's practice as a whole. Thus, understanding spatial practice can be a form of hermeneutics, a movement between specific component parts, to the larger whole, and back (Davison 1989; Gadamer 2004). Larry Bennett's work in the book *The Third City* follows a similar methodology: Bennett draws on both the 'birds-eye-view' perspective of the Lewis Mumford (1986) and the 'street-level' approach of Jane Jacobs (1961) to capture the essence of Chicago. For Bennett, either of these approaches alone misses much of the rich context and general insights to be gleaned from a case (2010). Methodologically, hermeneutics provides a way to grasp the particulars of a movement's processes within urban space, while maintaining a perspective on the movement and city-space as a whole. To do so, one must take revolutionary conceived spaces and lived spaces seriously, and understand how the two intertwine to produce the overall spatial practice of the movement.

**G. Plan for the Dissertation**

Chapter One builds the theoretical framework that will be used to explore the three case chapters. Drawing on Lefebvre, Harvey, Arendt, and Benjamin, I synthesize a new spatial theory on revolutionary movements that suggests how movements use primary urban spaces and salient
political memories to foster mobilization. Furthermore, this theory argues that successful movements will be the ones that organize within a secondary social or cultural institution. The following chapters of this dissertation describe in detail the spatial practice of three urban movements. Chapter Two deals with the 1968 student-led movement in Paris; Chapter Three explores the 1989 'Velvet Revolution' movement in Prague; Chapter Four relates the details of the 2009 'Green Movement' in Tehran. The final chapter uses data gleaned from my three empirical chapters to synthesize my observations and re-examine my theory as outlined in chapter one. By fleshing out my theoretical framework with the insights of my chapters, I will illuminate how successful movements seek to organize within secondary spaces rather than only to occupy urban space.
II. THEORIZING THE TIME AND SPACE OF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS

A. Introduction

Revolutionary movements spring from authoritarian responses to mobilization, and revolutionary situations are generated by spatial and temporal processes at work in urban mobilization. The first section of this chapter details the relationship between urban space and revolutionary movements. Henri Lefebvre builds a rich theory of space as a dialectical engagement between conceived, architectural-legal space and lived space that shows urban space to be more than a backdrop for revolutionary action. Section two develops a temporal understanding of revolutionary movements through the work of Walter Benjamin and Hannah Arendt. Arendt sees revolutions as large-scale attempts at repairing the lost authority of the state, while Benjamin sees them as large-scale attempts to redeem the sacrifices of past generations. In both theories, political memories frame the fundamental argument a revolutionary movement makes against a state, an argument visible through the iconography of the movement itself.

In section three, I use the work of David Harvey to draw together space and time with his notion of the absolute space of the state and the relational and relative spaces of the movement, providing a synthesis of the work of Lefebvre, Arendt, and Benjamin. When grasped together, spatial practices and political memory illuminate the utopia of a movement. Section four explores this utopia of revolutionary movements, pointing out that utopia tends to be a powerful force, but too unfocused to be fully enacted. Instead, secondary spatial networks are seen to be
heterotopian, a more grounded and pragmatic type of utopia theorized by Michel Foucault and Henri Lefebvre. Based on these intellectual resources and theoretical insights, the final section of the chapter outlines a new theory of revolutionary mobilization and organization through primary and secondary spatial networks. In order to be successful at transforming the state, a movement must be able to link primary urban mobilization on the streets with an organized secondary spatial network. Even though a revolutionary movement may not be successful at enacting state transformation, its utopia may still have a dynamic influence on social practice; it may generate new and vital political memories to inspire future revolutionary action.

B. How Does Urban Space Influence Mobilization?

In order to better understand the space of revolutionary movements, we must explore how a movement engages with and through its space. Other studies outside of the contentious politics field have been active in searching out spatial bases of movements. The work of James Scott on what he terms 'everyday forms of resistance' shows that there are always local spaces within a community for the organization of resistance to political power (Scott 1985). Furthermore, Scott's research on the region of Zomia in Southeast Asia suggests that these spaces of resistance are not limited to villages or homes, that they can be geographically vast in scope as well (Scott 2009). While this study is particularly interested in urban movements, Scott's work demonstrates a richness of explanation that is revealed when we seriously consider social space.

Social space is one of those concepts that is so ubiquitous, so integrated into daily practice, that it tends to disappear against the backdrop of modern life. A concerted effort to
study space attempts to pull the backdrop forward, and recognize the points at which space and spatial processes influence the course of political change. In their book *Spatial Practices*, Helen Liggett and David Perry suggest that theory “comes from some place, and it is the responsibility of analysis to return it there” (1995, 2). This evocative statement crystallizes the spatial turn in social theory, and urges us to do the same when we move past theory into the realm of practice. When we study a subject like revolutionary movements we first must recognize that it *comes from some place*, and good analysis will return to that place to aid in explanation. This means a commitment to studying the particular spatial processes and practices that contain valuable insights on the working of a phenomenon like revolutionary activity.

Some scholars have called for the reappraisal of social space as necessary to social scientific research. The fundamental insight of this scholarship is that space is not just an abstract, neutral, or empty background to social life. As Liggett and Perry suggest, following Michel Foucault (1977; 2009), space it is not an empty container or an abstract grid to be filled with human activity, but rather a dynamic and changing set of processes that influence the development of human life and society (1995, 3). While spatial scholars may disagree on the details of spatial practice, they consistently demonstrate that social and political life is embedded in a spatial terrain worthy of analysis, fruitful in results. Building on this insight, Edward Soja argues that two general cognitive frames exist in modern academic inquiry: temporal ones and spatial ones. While both of these perspectives are useful in studying the modern world, temporal frames have been preferred to spatial ones (Soja 1989, 14-15). Soja's analysis identifies an
important insight: time and space are inextricably linked, and that in studying one, we must also attend to the other.

B.1 Henri Lefebvre's Conception of Space

It is Henri Lefebre (1991) who developed the most widely recognized and respected theory of space. In his seminal text, *The Production of Space*, he identifies two central forms of spatial awareness that work together to 'produce' social space. The first is 'conceived space,' the space of representations. Conceived space is the collectively held physical and social architecture most often deployed by society to give order to human communities. Thus, conceived spaces are the buildings of a city, the rational bureaucratic plans of resource allocation, and the commonly agreed upon system of laws and habits of that society. In Lefebvre's estimation, capitalism is the prime mover of contemporary conceived space. The second spatial form is 'lived space,' the representations of space held by individuals and groups in a society. Lived space is the disposition of a particular mind or group mindset; it is the mental architecture with which people approach the world. Lefebvre sees capitalism at work in lived space as well. These two spatial perspectives are constantly engaging one another in the course of everyday human events, dialectically producing a third space of 'spatial practice,' or the intersection of urbanity and daily life² (Lefebvre 1991, 38-39).

Spatial practice should be made explicit if we are to make it an object of scientific inquiry. Even though we can develop a theoretical framework or a thought experiment that

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² This is not unlike Bourdieu's theory of the Habitus in terms of how identity and social structures work together to produce lived experience. See Bourdieu, *Distinction* (1984).
isolates conceived space from lived space for the purposes of analysis, these spaces are always engaged with one another and are thus inseparably linked through their creation of spatial practice. It is through the naturally occurring synthesis of these two spaces that the processes of spatial practice becomes visible on the streets or in daily life, as well as in those moments of extreme political activity like a revolutionary movement. Thus in searching out revolutionary space, it would be more accurate to say that we are searching out revolutionary spatial practice, those locations, populations, and processes that make a movement successful (or not), distinct (yet comparable), and compelling.

Space is a continually produced phenomenon. It is a dynamic, changing, and produced sphere of social and institutional engagement. By exploring its conceived and lived spaces, the researcher better understands the spatial practice of a movement as it engages with the state. In doing so, one then develops a better understanding of both spatial theory and the movement's practice as a whole. Attending to the spatial hermeneutics of a case provides a way to grasp a movement's processes at work within urban space, while maintaining a perspective on the movement as a whole. To be clear, every movement has its own spatial practice: Revolutionary struggles that seek to transform the state must have spaces from which to organize, mobilize, and contest state space. Since every revolutionary movement has its own particular space (or spaces) out of which it operates, then an exploration of these spaces of movement mobilization and organization is critical to the comprehension of the movement itself. A spatial analysis provides insights and explanations that no other type of analysis can provide.

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3 See Manuel Castells, *The City and the Grassroots*, 70-71.
C. Political Memory and Revolutionary Movements

The role of political memory in mobilization is also an understudied topic. The literature on contentious politics has done some exploration into the role of temporality of movements. Where “temporal logics or images have been invoked in the study of political contention, they have tended to conform to one of two analytical templates: long term processes or protest cycles” (McAdam and Sewell 2001, 90). Some studies of social movements have explored the ‘when’ of movements, but these studies have been limited to cycles of protest, the ebb and flow of movement activity, or to understanding how movements affect change over the long term. McAdam and Sewell identify two other important temporal frames from which we can better understand movements: transformative events, and cultural epochs. A transformative event, like the storming of the Bastille in 1789, has the potential to radically change the scope or direction of a movement.

At the other end of a temporal spectrum, McAdam and Sewell point to vast stretches of epochal time as influencing movements as well. Specific time periods, like the modern era, have certain values or beliefs that undergird movement action, creating master templates that give meaning or shape to the movement. Articulating these temporal frames does help in locating the ‘when’ of a movement, but this form of temporal analysis does not yet account for the role political memory plays in the development of a particular revolutionary movement. The literature on contentious politics alone cannot provide adequate explanation if we take seriously the notion of political memory as an important factor in revolutionary mobilization. While McAdam and
Sewell are right to emphasize cyclical patterns in social and revolutionary movements, it is not clear from their work how revolutionary movements experience the time of political memory.

C.1 The Arendtian Notion of Revolution

In her book *On Revolution*, Hannah Arendt provides a clear account of how political memory and tradition drive revolutionary activities, and in doing so, builds a coherent and compelling temporal theory of revolution. For Arendt, revolutions are the quintessential modern phenomenon. More so than war, which exists across ages, revolution has captured the imagination and fueled the fears of states across the globe since at least the two great revolutions of the 18th century. Modern revolution is “inextricably bound up with the notion that the course of history suddenly begins anew” (Arendt 2006, 18). Since the time of Edmund Burke, revolutions have been seen as a radical break from the past, or positively as Arendt puts it as “the experience of a new beginning” (2006, 19). Temporality forms the core of the revolutionary project. Unlike movements that seek incremental or moderate change in a government, revolutionary activity seeks an entirely new beginning. The utopian dream that history can begin again under the aegis of peace and freedom forms the temporal heart of the revolutionary effort.

Paradoxically, Arendt suggests that while revolutions claim to break with history, they do so in order to reinvigorate particular political traditions. She understood that while revolution seems like a radical break, it is in fact an attempt to create a new legitimate foundation for

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4 This stands in distinction to Benjamin's theory which suggests revolutions are more so attempts to redeem the past than attempts to repair past tradition. Though they focus on slightly different temporal aspects of tradition in revolution, these two theories are not incompatible. Revolutionary movements can and do seek both redemption and reparation in the course of urban mobilization.
politics. In fact, “the revolutions of the modern age appear like gigantic attempts to repair...foundations, to renew the broken thread of [political] authority, and to restore, through founding new political bodies, what for so many centuries had endowed the affairs of men with some measure of dignity and greatness” (1954, 140). What she means here is that the early modern revolutions in America and France sought to repair the broken thread of Roman and Christian authority in the West. Likewise, more contemporary revolutions seek out a similar reconnection with legitimate political authority. Arendt does not suggest that there is a return to these forms of authority during revolution; rather, new bodies are founded to replace or bridge over the broken gap in state authority. Revolution is thus both a popular break with a regime and with history, as well as a renewal of remembered, legitimate state authority.

The theory of temporal break and reconnection that forms the core of Arendt's theory urges us to ponder why a revolution takes place at all. As suggested above, this question concerns the failing authority of the state. The basis for political obedience is authority, which is neither coercion nor persuasion: “its hallmark is unquestioning recognition by those who are asked to obey” (Arendt 1970, 45). A political system with authority should not need to resort to violence to gain obedience; a political system that relies upon violence demonstrates the absence or waning of authority. Political authority always rests on a prior foundation, and it is this foundation that serves as its political memory and vital tradition. The spirit surrounding the past act of foundation empowers the authority of a political structure like the state. As a state deploys violence against its own people, the authority of the state suffers, eventually eroding to nothing. Arendt suggests that at times when a state lacks authority, revolutionary movements can arise,
seeking to liberate the people by dismantling the authority-devoid state, while simultaneously desiring the reestablishment of authority based on a new foundation (1958).

For Arendt, revolution is an attempt to restore tradition and authority to a polity through the tearing down of authority-bankrupt state structures. Yet this radical break and repair does not, and cannot happen all at once. Arendt is clear: revolution is divided into two related, simultaneous, and equally important processes: Liberation and Foundation. Liberation is the process of dismantling an old regime through the application of violence, while foundation is the collective act of establishing freedom and a new government (Arendt 1965, 140-141). What some perceive as a single revolution, Arendt correctly identifies as two processes working concurrently. Both processes draw on salient political memories in order to be successful.

Political memory justifies the tearing down of illegitimate state structures. The memory of past political struggles gives voice and political precedent to a new generation seeking to establish freedom. Memories of prior political events and structures give inspiration to those revolutionaries seeking to create a new state. Thus a revolution cannot create its new order out of whole cloth, for it must appeal to tradition in order to be successful. In cases of revolutionary movements, one must gauge the authority of the old regime and explore how that authority eroded. One can then comprehend how the utopian revolutionary movement, focused on the future but grounded in the past and present, activated traditions in order to break with history in order to establish a new political authority.
C.2 Arendt's Notion in Contrast with Marx

Arendt's theory of revolution stands in rather stark contrast to Karl Marx's oft-remembered remarks on the use of political memory in revolutionary action. Marx differentiates between revolutionary movements that draw successfully on tradition and memory, like the English who drew on biblical history or the French of 1790 who called on ancient Rome, and those of 1848 that pathetically rehash outdated revolutionary struggles. He wrote that the “awakening of the dead in those [English and French] revolutions therefore served the purpose of glorifying the new struggles, not of parodying the old; of magnifying the given tasks in imagination, not of taking flight from their solution in reality; of finding once more the spirit of revolution, not of making its ghost walk again” (Marx 1978, 596). Thus we can see that, to a limited extent, Marx valorizes the use of memory in some past struggles.

The Revolutions of 1848 saw an explosion of urban protest in Paris and most of the other capital cities of Europe. Of these events, Marx wrote that the crisis and anxiety of the revolutionary process caused people to “conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle slogans and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honored disguise and this borrowed language” (1978, 595). The danger of such a historical evocation in the name of revolution is that the content of revolution, the revolutionary spirit, can be lost in a play-acting of the past.

Marx writes in The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, that the “tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living” and that socialist revolution “cannot begin with itself, before it has stripped off all superstition in regard to the past” (Marx
1978, 595-597). Marx believed that tradition and the experience of past generations should be forgotten and left behind in order to make socialist revolution possible. But to rest here would do injustice to a complex argument. It is not simply that Marx believes that the use of political memory is wrongheaded, but rather that the vital content of revolution may be lost in the trappings of an old world. This is exactly what he believes happened in the heady rush of revolution in 1848.

Thus Marx creates three categories of revolutionary memory: those revolutionary movements that make good use of past memory, those that only repeat without innovating, and socialist movements that Marx believes will completely eschew tradition and memory\(^5\). We need not adhere to Marx's own logic. There are many types of revolutionary movements beyond socialist ones, and Marx privileges socialist revolutions above other types. What Marx does is draw our attention to the critical role of political memory in revolutionary activity—the words, actions, and imagery of the past often clothe the struggles of the present. Memory is central to revolutionary movements, not because a movement has the potential to delude itself about its own activity, but rather because the struggles of the past, and the memory of important political events often form the basis, the very reason for making collective claims against the state. Past abuses of power, a lost political tradition, or dead martyrs: memories like these drive the human quest for freedom, and often make the injustice of the state palpable.

\(^5\) Marx boldly states that “the [socialist] revolution of the nineteenth century must let the dead bury their dead” (1978, 597).
C.3 Benjamin's Revolution for Past Generations

Liberation demands not only the liberation of the present, but also of the past. The corollary to saying that political memories support contemporary movements is that in using political memory, contemporary movements have the chance to redeem the injustices of the past. Walter Benjamin expounds this redemptive understanding of political memory in his *Theses on the Philosophy of History*. According to Benjamin, the notion of happiness is bound up with the notion of redemption: “There is a secret agreement between past generations and the present one. Our coming was expected on earth. Like every generation that preceded us, we are endowed with a weak Messianic power, a power to which the past has claim” (Benjamin 1968, 254 emphasis in original). When a revolutionary movement calls upon political memory in the hopes of liberating society from the abuses of the state, it also has a potential to redeem the injustices of the past. A weak Messianic power means that a movement can be a salvation, a redemption of the sacrifices made by past generations that in turn have made the contemporary movement possible. From Benjamin's perspective, the use of political memory in contemporary struggles prevents our ancestors from dying twice by allowing them to live again in the memory and actions of a movement.

Benjamin suggests that it is the task of a revolutionary movement to “wrest away tradition from a conformism that is about to overpower it” (Benjamin 1968, 255). Benjamin’s distinction between tradition on one hand and conformism on the other is valuable: All too often a discussion of tradition is sidetracked by confusing it with a narrow-minded conformism. By disambiguating the two, Benjamin theorizes a movement of liberation that can embrace those
traditional values which demand freedom. Or in other words, emancipatory traditions can form the basis of a movement and permit it to position itself in space and time. Through political memories, a movement can recognize the potential for liberation in the present moment, even as it acknowledges and redeems the struggles of the past.

Realizing the struggles of the past is always problematic because it means the movement must break out of what Harvey would call an 'absolute' conception of time. A movement must know where it is in terms of the past and the future, but it must also explode these abstract concepts in order to collapse the past and future into the present. Revolution is possible when time becomes a 'monad', a mathematical-philosophical concept Benjamin draws from Leibnitz. Monadic time is Jetztzeit, the time of now\(^6\). “History is the subject of a structure whose site is not homogenous, empty time, but time filled by the presence of the now [Jetztzeit]. Thus, to Robespierre ancient Rome was a past charged with the time of the now which he blasted out of the continuum of history” (Benjamin 1968, 261). For Benjamin, the French revolutionaries of 1789 used a critical moment in history to ground their appeal to higher ideals, like freedom and equality. By blasting the republican traditions of ancient Rome into the present, Robespierre and other revolutionary leaders were able to couch their utopian visions of a new future in the recognized and legitimate clothes of the past.

\(^6\) The notion of Jetztzeit and revolutionary realization is closely tied to his concept of the dialectical image. This second concept is discussed in detail in chapter two.
D. **Synthesizing Space and Time**

Lefebvre's spatial practice develops a method for exploring the space of a revolution by analyzing its conceived and lived components, but this method does not fully contextualize a revolutionary movement as it relates to political memory. Arendt and Benjamin position a revolutionary movement in terms of political memory, but lack a strong focus on urban space as a location for the movement. These theories give us purchase when synthesized through David Harvey's theory of space and time. Harvey helps build the contextual relationship of a movement by addressing spaces and temporalities of revolutionary activity.

Harvey embraces Lefebvre's notion of spatial practice as described above, but expands upon it by developing a second ‘dimension’ as its complement, a dimension that specifically deals with the relationship between space and time. Harvey includes a temporal component as part-and-parcel of his spatial categories. Unlike Lefebvre's theory, where time is incidentally subordinated to space, Harvey consciously integrates the linked concepts of time and space. Harvey's understanding of space and time is tripartite. For him, space can conceived of in three layers: Absolute, Relative and Relational. In the absolute, space and time are fixed and bounded, universal and immovable. Absolute space is the space of Euclidean geometry, private property, and city plans; it is the space of state order as well as individual identity. Correspondingly, absolute time is a fixed chronology that extends from the past, through out present, and into the future. “Location in absolute space and time is, therefore, the means to identify the individuality and uniqueness of persons, things, and processes” (Harvey 2009, 134). Absolute space helps
differentiate spaces, but if we confine our conception of time and space to the absolute, we stay oblivious to the spatial-temporal processes at work in both the relative and relational dimensions.

Relative space is “preeminently the space of process and motion. Space cannot here be separated from time...This mandates an important shift of language from absolute space and absolute time to the hyphenated concept of relative space-time” (Harvey 2009, 135 emphasis in original). Relative spatial frames can have multiple relative temporal frames. Consider that a person has two very different conceptions of time if traveling between New York and Chicago by foot, or by plane. Since space-time is the domain of processes, it is through relative space-time that we are able to build an account of mobilization. An analysis of revolutionary space-time focuses on the relative position of a movement vis-a-vis other social forces, most notably the state. We can identify the processes that begin mobilization, as well as the spatial conditions in which a movement must engage the state. Thus by paying attention to a movement's relative position as it develops, we gain a more complete conception of movement space over time.

Movements do develop over time; at one point in space-time a movement does not exist, at another it is in it infancy, while at another it develops dual power and challenges the state. This simple conceptualization of a movement's space-time compels us towards Harvey's third, 'relational' dimension. Over time, a movement develops its own ontology as unique and distinct from other relatively positioned social forces. In the course of its mobilization, people protesting together for change on the streets cultivate a sense of themselves as a group, as a Movement. In other words, it develops a relational sense of itself. In its own relational space, a movement does not 'exist' in space-time; a movement generates its own space and time. “Space and time are
internalized within matter and process...It is impossible to disentangle space from time. They fuse into spacetime (the hyphen disappears). Memories and dreams are the stuff of such a fusion” (Harvey 2009, 137). From the relational perspective, spacetime becomes a unique and sublime experience for the movement participants. Where does the spacetime of a movement, its hopes, memories, and aspirations, reside? A movement's iconography relates vivid memories, thoughts and beliefs. It is through a movement's iconography that we can better comprehend the relational spacetime of a movement.

D.1 Spacetime and Revolutionary Practice

Though it may be difficult to measure, relational spacetime is critical to comprehending a revolutionary movement. Such movements are not just an aggregation of the adherents who participate in protest actions or the like; the process of mobilization builds a movement's own relational experience, one visible through the iconographic expressions of the movement, particularly through revolutionary posters and protest images. Helen Liggett suggests that images in an urban context, like billboards or revolutionary posters, demonstrate a “memory of a time and place, a fulfilling way of life and also a dream for the future” (1995, 252). Exploring the relational spacetime of a movement gives us access into the inner worlds of a movement. Harvey suggests that it is only through attending to relative space that we can access “the political role of collective memories in urban processes” (2009, 140). Political memories motivate revolutionary mobilization and organization, and it is through relational space that we can access these salient political memories, a hitherto understudied temporal component of revolutionary movements.
A compelling example of a synthesis of political memory and social space comes from Greta Uehling's study of the Crimean Tatar movement. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Tatar people mobilized using the memory of their historical connection to particular locations to reclaim land confiscated during the Communist era. The Tatar return to Crimea indicates the power space and historical narrative has in collective action. According to Uehling, the younger Tatar generations knew stories of deportation 'better' than those who lived through the events (2000, 264). For the Tatar, the deportation has become more than memory; it has become political memory, a form of collective belief that permeates the tales and thoughts of the Tatar people. In this case, political memory of home and homeland has become so powerful that some in the Tatar movement have immolated themselves in protest against the state. These memories have become a deep structure of culture (Johnston and Klandermans 1996, 19), a force that shapes and produces a people willing to die in order to have a chance at reclaiming their remembered homeland.

Another compelling fusion of theories on space and time in urban movements comes from Octavio Paz's work on Mexican political memory in Mexico City. Paz builds a poetic argument connecting the political memory of the Aztec and colonial periods with contemporary, violent repression of student protesters in 1968. He writes that, “although the Conquest destroyed the indigenous world and built another and different one on its remains, there is an invisible thread of community between the ancient society and the new Spanish order: the thread of domination” (Paz 1985, 298). A dark parallel to Arendt's notion of tradition and authority, Paz sees an unbroken shadow tradition leading from the ancient to the colonial era, and into the
contemporary period. For Paz, massacres of student protesters in the central plaza of Mexico City in 1968 are a continuation of a remembered political tradition of bloody and public sacrifice from the Aztec era. Urban space in Mexico City, specifically the Zocalo market built on top of the central Aztec plaza, provides a spatial continuity between past memories of public sacrifice, and the contemporary deployment of violence against protesters.

D.2 Political Memory Within Urban Space

The work done by Harvey and others to connect issues of space with issues of time resonates with Uehling's and Paz's powerful examples of how space and memories cannot easily be disentangled. Recognizing this critical relationship between space and memory gives credence to the claim of Miwon Kwon, who writes that the “efforts to retrieve lost differences, or curtail their waning, become heavily invested in reconnecting to uniqueness of place—or more precisely, in establishing authenticity of meaning, memory, histories and identities as a differential function of places” (2004 157 emphasis in original). For groups mobilizing at different times, space will have differential functions—while for some a street or a plaza may be a means to get from one place to another, for others it may be the heart of a revolutionary movement. Urban spaces connect directly to political memories, and movements use urban space as a way to access those political memories and traditions that give credence to the movement's collective claims on the state.

In discussing political memory, we must always return to the spaces that make political memories come alive again for a new generation. As Andreas Huysen suggests, urban space,
“replete with monuments and museums, palaces, public spaces, and government buildings—represented the material traces of the historical past in the present” (Huyssen 2003, 1). Even if traditions are invented, or if political memories are embellished over time, they still give shape to urban space and social practice. The space of revolutionary action is no exception to this rule. The memories and traditions that a movement draws upon, particularly a revolutionary movement that seeks to dismantle or supplant the state, will be ones that contest the memory that actively supports the state. Revolutionary movements draw upon political memories outside of everyday memory in an attempt to reactivate or repair traditions that have been displaced by the vicissitudes of time, space, and the state. Beyond state-sanctioned collective memories and outside the normal memories of everyday life, revolutionary political memories are always utopian.

The utopian dimension of revolutionary action further differentiate these types of movements from social movements. Revolutionary movements call on vital political memories through urban space; utopian memories are always already imbedded in urban space and social practice, waiting to be called on by a mobilizing revolutionary movement. The “urban imaginary in its temporal reach may well put different things in one place: memories of what there was before, imagined alternatives to what is there. The strong markers of present space merge in the imaginary with traces of the past, erasures, losses, and heterotopias” (Huyseen 2003, 7). Urban space is a palimpsest of political memories, a jumble of cold architecture and living community. Some of these political memories may be close to the surface, others may be buried deep. Urban
space can yield utopian, revolutionary potential; spaces like streets, plazas, buildings, and homes have the potential to become spaces of resistance.

E. **Revolutionary Movements as Utopian Movements**

Revolutionary movements work to activate the utopias connected with political memory and imbedded in urban space. But what is utopia? Drawn from the Greek, utopia literally means 'no-place'. Thus we are confronted with a paradox—how can no-space be a space at all? Of course when Sir Thomas More created the concept, Utopia was an actual place, a new Atlantis located somewhere off the charts of the known world. Even if it is only a metaphor, an attempt must be made to locate what might otherwise be thought of as an imaginary space.

E.1 **The Temporality of Utopia**

The first noticeable characteristic of utopia is not its spatial quality, but rather its temporal complexity. Fredrick Jameson writes that utopia “forces us precisely to concentrate on the [revolutionary] break itself: a mediation on the impossible or the unrealizable in its own right.' (Jameson 2005, cited in Noble 2009, 15). This insight is implicit in Arendt's own work; revolutionary movements seek to manifest a new future political program, by radically breaking with the present. This is the time of utopia.

This insight on the temporally utopian focus of revolutionary movements is echoed by Jay Winter. He writes that utopia is first:

[A] narrative about discontinuity. It is a story through which men and women imagine a radical act of disjunction, enabling people, acting freely and in concert
with others, to realize the creative potential imprisoned by the way we live now. But secondly, since the narrative is written by men and women rooted in contemporary conditions and language, it inevitably shows where they are, even as it describes where they want to be (Winter 2006, 3).

Utopian movements articulate a worldview that suggests misery and injustice can be eradicated by a change in regime. But even as utopia is future-thinking it develops this discourse based on the language, theories, and concepts of the urban here-and-now. Winter's discussion breaks apart utopia into two potentially contradictory halves, one sighted upon a new and potentially radical future, and another grounded in the real lives and past political conditions of the society in question.

It is crucial to understand the temporal blending utopia engenders; the revolutionary desire for something completely new is a radical break from the past, even while there is the problematic continuity of language and thought, between past and future, during revolutionary movements. As Winter suggests, “Envisioning the future is frequently a way of trying to break with the past while unwittingly revealing the hold of the present on the way we think and live” (2006, 7). Winter's conceptualization maps onto Arendtian thinking about revolutionary movements: such a movement seeks a radical break from the present by drawing on past traditions to articulate a better future. It speaks the language of the future, but this language bears an uncanny resemblance to the language of the present, even as it evokes the traditions of the past.

Utopia encapsulates the temporal complexity of a revolutionary movement. Revolutionary movements fill the temporal spectrum: from thinking the future, to acting in the present, to remembering past struggles, and on to making a radical break from the present and
the past. And if we take Walter Benjamin seriously, then the radical break from the present and
the past also has the function of redeeming the past, as well as crafting a new future in the
present. Spanning the temporal gulf, utopia sits at the crossroads of a number of different
temporal and spatial frames necessary to comprehend as we move to theorize the space of utopia.

E.2 Utopia and Heterotopia

The time of utopia is certainly fraught with paradox, but not incomprehensible; the space
of utopia is similarly complex. Recall that Huyssen described urban space, the most general
spatiality of revolutionary movements, as heterotopic. This useful concept was first articulated
by Michel Foucault in his book The Order of Things (1973) and in a lecture published as the
short essay Other Spaces. Sumarizing Foucault's position on utopia and heterotopia provides a
perfect entry point to discuss the spatial aspects of these complex concepts. Foucault claimed
that utopia is not a really useful concept. Instead he preferred his own term, heterotopia. For
Foucault, utopias “are sites with no real place. They are sites that are a direct or inverted analogy
of the real space of society. They present society itself in a perfected form, or else society turned
upside down, but in any case these utopias are fundamentally unreal spaces” (Foucault 2009, 62).
According to Foucault, utopia's lack of spatial presence disrupts the transmission of ideas from
the utopian 'site' to the world of here-and-now. Thus for Foucault, utopia is not useful as a
location of change or resistance because of its fundamental disjunction with reality.

Instead, Foucault identifies spaces similar to utopian space, out of which spring the
potential for radical change and resistance. Foucault writes that there “are also, probably in every
culture, in every civilization, real places—places that do exist and that are formed in the very founding of society—which are something like counter-sites, a kind of *effectively enacted utopia* in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested and inverted” (Foucault 2009, 62-63 my emphasis). Heterotopias are effectively enacted utopias; Foucault identifies the inherent potential of concrete, real-world spaces to generate radical thought and action purely as an outcome of the practice within that particular space. “Heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible” (Foucault 2009, 65). As heterotopias, the theater that can transport the viewer from one location to another with a simple change of scene, and the arboretum is an allegory for the larger botanical diversity of the entire world. Heterotopias have the inherent potential to manifest a variety of sensations in a real, concrete space. For Foucault, it is through the internal diversity of heterotopia that its potential as a space of resistance is activated.

Just as utopia has temporal aspects, so to does heterotopia. “Heterotopias are most often linked to slices in time—which is to say that they open onto what might be termed, for the sake of symmetry, heterochronies. The heterotopia begins to function at full capacity when men arrive at a sort of absolute break with their traditional time” (Foucault 2009, 65-66). Foucault urges us to consider how the cemetery can signify both the merging of death as temporal-terminal limit and eternity, thus complicating a singular and chronological notion of time. Foucault's heterotopia (like utopia) seeks a radical break with time, blending the past with the present and the future while being grounded spatially in the here-and-now.
Ironically, the problem with Foucault's heterotopia is its tragic separation from the world around. Foucault presents a heterotopian space like the theater or the cemetery as fractured from 'normal' space and time. His notion of heterotopia does not fully acknowledging the contingent play of forces at work between the heterotopia and the rest of social space. In essence, Foucault does not comprehend the critical lesson one can learn from Lefebvre's work; social space, whether utopian, heterotopian, or the space of everyday life, is always in-process—space is always produced by the interplay of human relations and architectonic forces at work therein, and within the larger urban milieu. Foucault's heterotopia is too absolute in its disconnection with the rest of social space, and this absolute disconnection limits its potential as a site of revolutionary space.

In Harvey's terms, Foucault posits a too-absolute notion of heterotopian space. Instead of seeing the radical potential for an engagement between heterotopian space and 'normal' space, Foucault's heterotopia is presented in absolute heteronomy to the normal world. Thus Harvey remarks that “what appears at first sight as so open by virtue of its multiplicity suddenly appears as banal: an eclectic mess of heterogenous and different absolute spaces within which anything 'different'—however defined—might go on” (2009, 160). Instead of actually identifying the potential for heterotopia to become a site of resistance (revolutionary or otherwise), Foucault posits heterotopias as a form of escape from the 'normal' world—in fact his quintessential heterotopia is that of the ship, a vessel that can literally depart from the normal world to make its own way, separate and absolute from the world which it departed. Lefebvre's use of heterotopia from the book *The Urban Revolution*, carries more theoretical weight. A Lefebvrian heterotopia
explores the potential for liberation that rests in any (and every) heterotopian space: The productive process going on inside and throughout social space can be directed towards the revolutionary goal of radical break with the state—in fact heterotopian space will be the central site out of which revolutionary organization will spring. Unlike utopias which are located in the no-place of imagination, heterotopias have the spatially grounded potential to transform utopian revolutionary thinking into organized revolutionary action.

<table>
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<th>Table 1.1</th>
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<td>Absolute Definition</td>
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Figure 1.1 lays out four different utopian potentials based on whether or not the space in question is concrete or abstract, and whether we define space as absolute or relative. As the table indicates, the relationship between utopia and heterotopia depends on how we understand space: Absolute notions of space provide a utopia and heterotopia lacking in theoretical weight and limited in their potential to aid in understanding revolutionary movements. Alternatively, relative notions provide a process-oriented understanding of revolutionary space grounded in spatial practice. With a process-oriented definition, one need not consider utopia in strict opposition to heterotopia, that heterotopia is 'good' while utopia is a concept with little utility. In fact, heterotopian space needs utopian memory to become a space of resistance—imaginative and temporally transcendent memory is the force that mobilizes revolutionary action. The key is that as memories are activated within urban space, utopian thought becomes grounded and engaged.
within revolutionary spatial practice. When it does this, abstract utopia is transformed into political memory. It is the utopian memory of liberation which brings protesters into the street and that initiates the process of mobilization. But utopian mobilization alone cannot manifest a revolutionary transformation of society. Heterotopias are the spatially grounded, process-oriented locations where utopian thinking can literally 'come in off the streets'. Only through a heterotopian space can a revolutionary movement find the necessary spatial practice to organize a sustained challenge to the state. Memory and heterotopias work hand in hand to drive revolutionary mobilization, and revolutionary organization.

F. **A Spatial-Temporal Theory of Revolutionary Movements**

Revolutionary movements are always opposition movements. In most situations, an authoritarian state will prevent the mobilization of opposition, either by deploying violence against the population, or closing off popular access to public space. Often a change in the political opportunity structure provides the necessary opening for the mobilization of opposition. This change in the opportunity structure takes various forms in various cases, either international (like a change in international political dynamics, loss in an international war, etc) or domestic (top-down democratization, massive natural disasters, etc). Structural changes can provide the necessary modification to the opportunity structure—but revolutionary action is often initiated by a triggering event as well. Dramatic events, particularly the loss or sacrifice of life during an early demonstration can provide the necessary thaw in domestic politics to begin a process of mass mobilization. Fundamentally reactive to a state situation, revolutionary action is concerned
with liberating a population from conditions of repression. By seeking the overthrow of the state, movements of liberation mobilize within urban space, in opposition to the state.

F.1 Primary Space on the Streets

The primary space of a revolutionary movement is the space of mobilization. Movements arise opportunistically during those moment of potential change, drawing together various resources—most centrally the actual human beings necessary to form protest marches or to occupy government buildings. Spatially grounded and culturally significant associations provide the earliest cohort for a revolutionary cause. As the situation develops, revolutionary protest spills out from these spaces and into the street, the main space of mobilization. Even with a dramatic change in the opportunity structure, and the stirrings of domestic opposition, there is no guarantee that this mobilization will aim at revolution. As mobilization begins on the streets and in the universities, authoritarian states crack down on the protest, pushing the movement into radical opposition, and revolutionary thinking. As suggested above, such a crackdown may create martyrs out of those protesters tragically killed or beaten. The spiral of mobilization and state response can create a feedback loop—the actions of the mobilizers on the streets provoking a violent regime response, the violent response provoking further mobilization. The revolutionary space par-excellence during the mobilization period is certainly the street. Public

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7 In many cases, the initial resources and human participants can be traced back to the university. Students and their allies, can provide the committed participants necessary to generate a revolutionary situation. Well educated, usually ideological, and often independent economically, students are perfectly positioned to play a central role during some cases of revolutionary mobilization.
spaces like plazas, boulevards or monuments become the primary, active site of contestation between the movement and the state.

F.2 Memory and Revolutionary Mobilization

Political memory inspires the processes of mobilization at work on the street. The influence of political memory on revolutionary processes is twofold: first is the desire on the part of the movement participants to repair the broken traditions of the state—to dismantle the existing regime and restore authority to a bankrupt state. Political memory of eras past, when honest and authoritative governments ruled, provide a strong justification of mobilization. The reverse of this coin is the desire on the part of revolutionaries to make good on the claims of past generations, to redeem the sacrifices made by those who had resisted the corruption and violence of the state in the past. The memory of political action taken by individuals in resistance to the state and past struggles can provide the necessary inspiration for mass participation in the movement.

Political memories draw an urban population into the struggle of the moment against the state. Because of their salient themes and vivid imagery, movement iconography (most notably posters and graffiti) inform viewers of the remembered past, and the current claims the movement makes against the state. Posters make a visual-rhetorical argument, calling on the viewer to identify with both past and current struggles by connecting the current struggle with those of the past. Visually simple, often ironic or humorous, revolutionary posters have the potential to transform passersby into activists, or at least to urge a reconsideration of the
contemporary struggle in terms of the past for those urban dwellers less willing to become active revolutionaries. At the same time, revolutionary posters promote the utopian sentiment at work during mobilization. Posters incite the utopia of the movement by identifying a redemptive past and a future that is attainable through revolutionary action. In making visible those political memories that give justification and inspiration for the contemporary struggle, revolutionary posters provide a space through which we can assess the utopia of mobilization.

F.3 Primary Utopias and Secondary Heterotopias

We can identify the aspirations of a nascent revolutionary movement through its engagement with urban terrain. Revolutionary mobilization moves political memories and the hope for the future from the imaginary 'no-place' of utopia, to a tenuous and evanescent site in urban space. Through the thoughts and actions of the revolutionaries, utopia begins to influence the direction of the movement during the period of mobilization. Movement participation may attempt to manifest utopia, but the very nature of utopia prevents such an occurrence. Rather, utopia works through urban public space, through the actions of the revolutionaries, to produce changes in social practice. Though it may not manifest in full, utopian revolutionary action seeks to transform spaces in which the movement holds sway and beyond, to other sectors of society.

If the primary space of mobilization demonstrates utopian qualities, then the secondary space can be understood as heterotopian. Mobilization on the streets demonstrates the boundless and unstructured utopian aspirations of the movement, while action in and through a secondary spatial network demonstrates a more grounded, specific heterotopia. As it engages through a
secondary space, the movement activates the inherent heterotopian potential of that space and puts it to work for the movement. The quality of a secondary space is not taken over by the movement, nor is the movement completely dominated by the character of a secondary space. The processes of linking the primary and secondary spaces of a revolutionary movement is a dialectical one. The utopia of the streets certainly influence the heterotopia of the secondary network, and likewise, the organized focus of the secondary space makes concrete sense of utopia. Out of this dialectic comes the movement itself, its absolute representation.

F.4 Organized Secondary Spaces

A revolutionary struggle cannot exist perpetually on the streets; a secondary space is needed to provide the organizational basis for the sustained revolutionary challenge to the state. Mobilization occurs on the streets, but it is through a secondary (usually cultural) network that a revolutionary movement can engage with state actors, and begin building the necessary organizational resources to transform or replace the state. A movement must 'come in off the street' and locate itself in and thorough an already existing cultural or social institution in order to effect change. Moreover, a structured network simultaneously consolidates, legitimates, and spreads the demands of the urban movement. As a spatial basis of organization, a secondary network grounds movement goals and makes a direct challenge to the state possible.

The secondary spatial network also imparts to the movement some of its own character. As urban mobilization becomes more closely tied to a formal organization, this secondary space increasingly shapes the form and content of the revolutionary movement. As processes of
mobilization shift and are incorporated into spaces of organization, one can identify a shift of movement emphasis from urban struggle to state transformation. This does not mean that urban mobilization ends, and a process of organization begins. Rather processes of mobilization continue to put pressure on the faltering state, while more formal processes of organization attempt to articulate a transition between the old regime and the new. In order to be successful, a revolutionary movement must build a base of mobilization in urban public space, and must integrate that mobilization into a secondary spatial network to transform the powerful yet diffuse force of mobilization into an organized challenge to the state. Revolutionary movements that cannot, or do not develop a linkage between the primary space and a secondary space have little chance of effecting state transformation.

F.5 Revolutionary Outcomes?

When comprehending the varied outcomes of a revolutionary movement, we recognize whether or not the moment was successful in overthrowing the state. Does the old regime fall; is it replaced by the revolutionary movement? Is state space transformed by the actions of the movement? These questions are relatively easy to answer. Less obvious perhaps are the political memories generated by the movement itself. While all such movements draw on political memories to make collective claims on the state, in some 'successful' cases there comes a time when mobilization ebbs, and secondary spatial organization takes up the functions of the state. As the years pass, what content does a past revolutionary movement provide in the way of a political memory itself? Who calls on the memories generated by a revolutionary movement?
The utopian and heterotopian content of a movement will in part determine the shape of future political memory. At the very least, the memory of a movement can provide utopian inspiration to future resistance struggles or liberation movements. Thus a movement unsuccessful at transforming the state may generate a utopia so significant that it provides the central organizing principles of many movements elsewhere in the world. Alternatively, a successful movement might generate an incredibly salient political memory for one people, that is largely irrelevant to an international or global population. These less tangible revolutionary outcomes are inscribed into social practice.

As they mobilize, revolutionary movements draw on political memory and create political memory; they are embedded in social space and transform social space. Movements activate primary and secondary spaces during the course of urban action. Utopia provides the imaginary of mobilization but is too intangible to provide the organizing principles of a movement. Secondary spatial networks provide the grounded specific heterotopian decision-making that has the potential to facilitate a revolutionary transformation of the state.
III: THE MOVEMENT OF MAY 1968, PARIS

All morning long, anger pervades the city. This crowd has finally decided to take fate into its own hands. Around 11 a.m., the first barricades appear. The road that leads from painful docility to insurrection had finally been run. From this moment on, there will only be combatants.

-J. P. Sartre

A. Introduction

The barricades described by Jean-Paul Sartre are not the barricades of '68; they are those of the resistance fighters in Paris during the last days of the Nazi occupation. This chapter explores the dynamic connections among the events, theoretical expressions, and the iconography of the May '68 revolutionary movement, on the one hand, and the political memories of resistance embedded in the urban terrain and spatial representations of Paris on the other. While many scholars deny the action of May 1968 in France the status of 'revolution', these events most certainly qualify as a full-fledged revolutionary movement. In his interview of the student leader Daniel Cohen-Bendit, printed in Le Nouvel Observateur on 20 May 1968, Sartre was quick to point that the “situation is a revolutionary one” (Bourges 1968, 74). By mid-May of '68, most economic sectors of French society were participating in a general strike, and the streets of central Paris and many provincial cities like Nantes and Strasbourg were filled with protesters. In Paris, university student revolutionaries clashed with police, building barricades made of paving stones, debris, and burned cars.

The barricades built in Paris by the student protesters challenged the everyday use of urban space. By drawing on diverse political memories, particularly the long-remembered
history of the Paris Commune and the French democratic tradition, the movement transformed the social practice of the city from one of everyday life into a revolutionary situation. When added to the urban *bricolage* by being pasted to the walls and barricades, revolutionary posters informed viewers of the ironic tactics and democratic commitment of the movement. Produced by the Atelier Populaire print collective, these posters provide a window into the tactics, beliefs, and memories of the revolutionary movement. The posters illuminate the situationist tactic of ironic reversal deployed by the movement over the course of 1968, and the practices of the print studio itself demonstrate the movement's democratic commitment. This chapter argues that mobilization in the primary space of the street was unable to successfully organize through a secondary space, and therefore was unable to successfully transform the French state. This was due in part to the movement's inability to form an equal partnership with striking factory workers, but also because the movement was unable to overcome its own prejudices against the open and equal participation of women and homosexuals in movement action. Ultimately, the memory of May '68 provides an active, vital, and contested memory that continues to influence contemporary social and revolutionary movements.

Section one of this chapter familiarizes the reader with the primary spaces of student mobilization at the University of Nanterre and the Sorbonne. It focuses on the particular spatial relationships at work in the early days of the revolutionary movement, demonstrating how spatial closures and ruptures in university social practice actually increase the spatial scope of the revolutionary movement. Section two develops an analysis of the barricades built during the 'Night of the Barricades' on May 10th and 11th, connecting this action back to the vital political
memory of the Paris Commune of 1871. It is the activation of this political memory in the primary revolutionary space of the street, which scales the movement up from a localized but internationally focused\textsuperscript{8} student protest to a full-fledged revolutionary movement. Sections three develops an analysis of the iconography of the movement in the spatial practice of the \textit{Atelier Populaire}. It introduces the \textit{Atelier Populaire} and its revolutionary posters, focusing on the centrality of the Latin Quarter and the Rue du Dragon in order to demonstrate the spatially grounded exchange between print art commodities and the revolutionary poster. The chapter concludes by assessing the inability of the May '68 movement to develop a secondary space of revolutionary organization, and ties together the values of the movement with its silences on the role of women and homosexuals. Finally, the conclusion gestures to the success of the May '68 movement in influencing both leftist and capitalist ideologies in the contemporary era.

B. \textbf{University Problems}

In order to interpret the revolutionary events of 1968, it is helpful to step back and look at the preceding years. With hindsight, one can identify a number of key moments in the buildup to the explosive events that took place in May of 1968: In the spring of 1967, students all across France participated in the 'Bedroom Revolt,' demanding that male and female students be allowed access to each others dormitories. By November 17\textsuperscript{th}, sociologists at the University of Nanterre just outside Paris went on strike against the proposed 'Fouchet' reforms, demanding a

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{8} Protest against war in Vietnam, with its deep connections to French colonialism provide the most striking and visible element of internationalism at work in the Mai '68 revolutionary movement. See Gurinder K Bhambra and Ipek Demir, 1968 in Retrospect: History, Theory, Alterity (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
\end{footnote}
reorganization of the curriculum, and a complete overhaul of the French university system.⁹ On St. Valentine's day in 1968, the students of Nanterre again protested the lack of personal and sexual freedom of access to each others' single-sex dormitories. Early March saw an increase in student protest and radical agitation on the Nanterre campus, as well as most other campuses around France, and by the 22nd of March, 1968, a fully formed organization began to demand changes, not just to the university system (though this was the central target of the organization) but also to the French state and economic system. These university-level struggles saw the genesis of a movement, a movement that would develop beyond purely university concerns. While the May '68 revolutionary movement was not solely determined by students, it was the students who developed the revolutionary situation and helped to spread protest and strike actions to the other sectors of France.

By 1968, the space of the French university was under serious strain. Postwar requirements for French youth to get into university were quite straightforward: they need only pass the *baccalaureat* in the final year of their secondary school education. “This extreme liberality, coupled with the postwar demographic boom, caused a staggering inflation in student numbers; in 1946—123,000; in 1961—202,000; in 1968—514,000” (Seale and McConville 1968, 22). Swollen university numbers meant system-wide strains on university resources, specifically brick and mortar locations to hold lecture class. By 1960, in order to combat this problem the French government began building new universities at an astounding rate: three new

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⁹ The 'Fouchet' reforms created two distinct channels of University instruction, one called a License (essentially a practical teaching or professional degree) and the other a Master’s (a higher echelon degree). This transformation upset conservative elements, and did not provide for the needs of the bureaucracy. See Alain Schnapp and Pierre Vidal-Naquet. *The French Student Uprising November 1967-June 1968: An Analytic Record* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 15-16 and Chapter 8.
faculties in Paris and seven more in major cities across France, and commenced the hiring of 19,000 more university teachers (Brown 1974, 130). But as is often the case with new construction, the demand for space in lecture halls and access to other university resources soon outstripped the supply. Student agitation for a complete overhaul of the French education system became a common occurrence in the latter half of the decade.

Nowhere was this student agitation more visible, or historically important, than at the University of Nanterre, just outside of central Paris. Located out past the cultural monuments and historical districts of the capital, beyond *La Defense* and the western part of the city, Nanterre sits at a periphery of Paris and the University of Paris, in more ways than one. Described by Henri Lefebvre, then a member of the faculty at Nanterre, as “a desolate and strange landscape...a place of damnation”, Nanterre was envisioned as a modernist campus (Lefebvre 1969, 104). With its wide open quads between tall cement buildings, Nanterre was built in rigid angular style with little regard to more traditional university aesthetics and, as Figure 3.1 demonstrates, with much regard to utilitarian function. This new campus was built to house the *Faculté des Lettres* of the University of Paris, including the left-leaning faculty of sociology of which Lefebvre was a member. Yet, political organization, meetings, and poster-hanging were forbidden by the administration.
Nanterre was a strange project, obviously out of line with historical French intellectual sensibility, while at the same time Nanterre demonstrates the imposition of an authoritarian high-modernist utopia in the manner of Le Corbusier. This type of architectural project built a university campus that adequately fulfilled the conceived-spatial needs of an abstract university population, without taking into consideration the needs of actual lived space: community, comfort, and a sense of home. Without regard to the needs of the population who would inhabit it, Nanterre was blocky, rigid, and concrete. Yet like the overcrowded Sorbonne in central Paris, “[the problem of overcrowding] would quickly recur in the outpost. It opened in 1964 for 2,000 students; there were 12,000 in 1968” (Atack 1999, 29). And as the great French revolutionary

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and orator Mirabeau once said, “Men are like apples; when piled together they rot” (Schnapp and Vidal-Naquet 1968, 494).

The rot at Nanterre was not really a rot of human bodies; it was rather a rot of culture, or more precisely, a rot due to the lack of culture. “Everybody now also proclaims that it was double folly to build such a ghetto and fill it with students without providing the social and cultural amenities that would make up for the isolation. The library was still unfinished; there was no scope for any social life” (Singer 1970, 60). Located so far from the center of Paris, from the culture, sophistication, and connections of the Sorbonne's Latin Quarter home, Nanterre provided little cultural outlet for student activities and student lives. An abstracted, neutral individual student as envisioned by the modernist architects, might be able to make the best of a bad situation at Nanterre, but the affluent and urbane student body of 1968 was nothing close to such an abstraction. The stunted social practice at Nanterre could not provide for the living needs of the student body.

In general, these young men and women were the sons and daughters of the middle class, a population who had experience with the cultural artifacts, history, and collective memory of Paris, as well as the contemporary culture and fashion of the day (Seale and McConville 1968, 26-7). These class-based identities clashed with the angular architecture and isolated space of Nanterre. Moreover, Lefebvre suggests that the tension between banal architecture, the poverty of the surrounding immigrant bidonville, and the “utopian and mythical richness of officially proposed culture and officially dispensed specialized knowledge” made Nanterre the explosive and revolutionary epicenter for the May ’68 revolution (Lefebvre 1969, 106). The spatial practice
of Nanterre, this “bold experiment, a break from the French past” contained enough contradiction and critical mass of population necessary to launch a revolutionary movement (Seale and McConville 1968, 25).

If we were to point to a single day which might be considered the true beginning of the May revolutionary moment, it would not be a day in May, but rather the 22nd of March, 1968. In response to an administration crackdown on the Nanterre campus, and in solidarity with five youths arrested for the bombing of the Chase Manhattan, Bank of America, and Transworld Airline buildings in downtown Paris, over five hundred students moved into occupy a faculty building on the Nanterre campus (Seale and McConville 1968, 19; Feenberg and Freedman 2001, 7). Oftentimes May '68 is depicted as pure festival, or as a moment of youthful enthusiasm. While these things are true in part, one must also recognize the violence inherent in any revolutionary situation, violence perpetrated by both the state and the revolutionaries. Here we see the important role of violence, in the case of targeted bombings that touched off the occupation of Nanterre.

B.1 Student 'Enragés'

That night of occupation saw the birth of the March 22 Movement, lead by student *enragés*, a name drawn from the collective memory of France. Historically, the *enragés* were a body of popular revolutionary 'sans-coulottes' from the French Revolution who comprised the most violent faction in 18th century revolutionary politics11. Drawing on this collective memory

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positioned the March 22 Movement (M22M) squarely in the tradition of French radical protest and revolutionary action. The face and spokesman of this new movement was Daniel Cohen-Bendit, or 'Danny le Rouge' as he was described by the media and friends alike. Charismatic and outspoken critic of the state and university system, he exemplified so many engaged student leaders, deploying wit, improvisation, and an anarchist disregard for order and status. The M22M was born at the end of March, and began organizing the forces of Nanterre that would bring the French system into general strike and paralyze the French state.

April was a month of almost continual engagement between the Nanterre enragés and the administration. By May 2\textsuperscript{nd}, M22M had brought the situation at Nanterre to a head: the students seized the loudspeaker system from Dean Pierre Grapin's office, and prevented classes from being held by occupying the lecture halls. “Dean Grapin called the minister of Education, Alan Peyrefitte, to request permission to close the university for the second time in a month—this time indefinitely” (Feenberg and Freedman 2001, 10). Only one day later, on the 3\textsuperscript{rd} of May, a substantial portion of the Nanterre movement relocated to the Sorbonne. Cohen-Bendit and a number of other student spokespersons were in Paris to answer before a disciplinary board; they rallied the crowd, and a festival of protest filled the historic courtyard of the Sorbonne. Ostensibly to protect the student from the l'Occident, a fascist student group, police began to gather outside the court. There existed a particular tradition surrounding the Sorbonne: historically, the University of Paris has been considered inviolable territory, a safe haven of thought and speech outside police intervention and censorship. May 3\textsuperscript{rd} saw the dismantling of
this tradition as security forces moved into the courtyard to detain students voluntarily leaving on
the order of the police.

With the closure of Nanterre, we can see an almost immediate, explosive expansion of the
scope of revolutionary conflict. In shutting the space, closing off student access to the campus,
the administration (backed by the French state) gave the *enragés* a dynamic spatial opening.
With the cultural and urban periphery closed to the movement, Cohen-Bendit and the M22M
relocated from Nanterre to the Sorbonne in the heart of Paris. Of course the goal of the university
closure was to silence protest action and deny the movement a spatial basis of organization.
Instead, the opposite occurred and the movement was amplified. With one dramatic action on the
part of the state, dissatisfaction and revolt located on the periphery Paris, moved to the center of
the city. The spatial closure of the university directly influenced the vast expansion of
revolutionary space and revolutionary action.

In a period of two days, from May 2\textsuperscript{nd} to the 3\textsuperscript{rd}, we see the university administration and
police arms of the state both closing and then penetrating university space. The closure of
Nanterre had the unintended effect of concentrating the nascent revolution in the center of Paris
at the Sorbonne. The spatial penetration of the Sorbonne likewise had the unintended
consequence of rupturing the spatial barrier of the university that held the movement as a purely
student, or university targeted movement. It is as if the destruction of the sacred tradition of
inviolability at the Sorbonne sheared away the purely institutional constraints of the university
revolt, transforming it in one dynamic flash into a true revolutionary movement.
Furious at the police intervention, a ragged street battle broke out between a student body galvanized by the hand of the state; the battleground was not the Sorbonne, but its surrounding streets. “Commuters emerging unawares on to the battlefield from underground stations, were felled. Pavement cafes were stormed and tables overturned. Simple passers-by were rounded up ferociously and trundled into police vans” (Seale and McConville 1968, 70). The penetration of the Sorbonne transfigured a localized student movement in two important ways: the May 3rd clashes with police drew in the surrounding population of the Latin Quarter, and the first of many unions, the SNESup teacher's union, called for a strike. Within twenty-four hours, what had been a spatially localized university protest was quickly developing into a national revolutionary movement by incorporating other sectors of French society, and gaining solid ground for a challenge to the French state. “Sometime during the fighting Rector Roche ordered the Sorbonne closed for the first time in history...and it has a long history going back to the Middle Ages” (Feenberg and Freedman 2001, 13). Ordering the Sorbonne closed? This futile move, and its lack of effect on the now revolutionary movement demonstrates that the violation of the Sorbonne space made the mobilization of the movement impossible to prevent. The revolutionary cat was out of the university bag, and no number of administration decision making could prevent the dynamic transformation of the revolutionary movement.

The spatial practice of the movement had changed—Rector Roche had no claim on the revolutionary movement once it began to scale up from the university to the national level. To say that the movement scaled up, or that the spatial practice of the movement changed is not to say that the movement was instantaneously at its summit. Over the course of early May, students
marched in the street, engaged with Paris residents, and generally agitated against the State. More and more unions called for strikes, but it was not until the night of May 10th, the Night of the Barricades, that we can see the May ’68 movement coalesce into a full-fledged nationwide revolutionary movement.

Failed negotiations and mounting tensions came to a head on the night of 10-11 May, the night of the Barricades. When the government again refused to free the imprisoned students, a crowd of 15,000 turned the narrow streets of the Latin Quarter into a fortified maze with barricades fashioned from cars, street signs, stones, and mattresses. The police moved in. Feeding the drama, the events were carried live on the radio. The serious fighting started at 2:00am and ended at dawn: 367 wounded; 460 arrested; 188 cars overturned or burned” (Bourg2007, 20).

For the May ’68 revolutionaries, barricades made partly from the cobblestones of the Latin Quarter's streets meant protection from police baton-charges. But the barricades built in the Latin Quarter signaled more than just control over urban space; they evoked the long revolutionary tradition embedded within the urban space of Paris. Both utility and collective memory drove the movement to throw up barricades, and while the police could dismantle the physical structure, the symbolic strike brought home to radio listeners, and a sympathetic Parisian population an unequivocal fact: Paris, the heart of French culture and seat of governmental control, was in the grip of a revolutionary situation.

C. The Memory of ’71: The Commune

Student protesters in the Latin Quarter on the night of the barricades built walls out of cobblestones, benches, trashcans, furniture and even the trees lining the boulevards. For the student-revolutionaries, barricades provided a layer of protection between their bodies and the
police batons. While we may all have an image in our minds of what a barricade is, it is useful to consider the physical structure itself. In its most basic form, the barricade is a bricolage of objects placed in such a manner as to impede movement. Alternatively one might barricade a door with furniture from a room (like in some film noir before a shoot-out with the police) but for our purpose one should think of barricades as they existed on the streets of Paris. Urban barricades are meant to block access to a city by piling up objects in an attempt to prevent the police or the army from moving into a city or certain parts of the city. At the very least, the barricade exists to slow down security forces as they challenge an urban insurrection. Even as they were barriers and sources of cobblestones to throw at the security forces, an equally important function of the barricades was the symbolic strike they made at the French state.

By erecting barricades, the barricade-builders placed themselves squarely inside, and perhaps as the culmination of the grand French revolutionary tradition. “The barricading of Paris during the night of May 10-11 was a historical allusion to the barricades of the Paris Commune of 1871 and the liberation of Paris from German occupation in 1944. Erected by high school and university students, the barricades evoked memories of those earlier examples without merely imitating them; they were expressive rather than instrumental in nature” (Glicher-Hotley 2008, 115). For the student-revolutionaries of ‘68, barricades expressed a connection with two important, yet incredibly different strains of political memory: the Paris Commune, and the resistance to the Nazis during the occupation. Beyond a simple allusion to actual historical barricades, the use of barricades draws forth an entire history of the revolutionary commune from its birth in the Paris around 1790, to the June Days of 1830 and 1848, to its 19th century
culmination with the Communards of Paris in 1871. By '68, the value of the barricade was not only, or even largely, its physical role as a barrier. The image of a barricade built in the streets of Paris is a spatial activation of one of the most potent political memories in the French tradition—democratic insurrection.

Even before the movement of 1871, a number of important movements for urban autonomy called themselves the Paris Commune, the term deriving originally from the communal forms of organization established during the middle ages. During the French Revolution the new city government of Paris, formed in 1790, called itself the Commune, using its popular power to influence the course of the revolution, including during the arrest and trial of King Louis XVI, and the Jacobin Terror. The Communards of 1871 consciously evoked this political memory during their resistance to first the Prussian Army and then the army of Versailles\(^{12}\). At its most basic level, the Paris Commune represents historical attempts at Parisian self-governance, in the face of national or international opposition. The spatial dynamic at work in the memory of the Commune is one of urban poverty in opposition to bourgeois and monarchical interests: for the long history of the Commune, it has always represented those Parisian voices least represented by either a newly founded National Assembly in 1790, or the elite-favoring Empire of Napoleon III.

The Paris Commune of 1871 never became a national or international movement—it was first and foremost an attempt at urban self-government in Paris, between March and May of

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1871. After the defeat of Napoleon III and the second French Empire in the Franco-Prussian War, the French Third Republic was established at Versailles, outside of Paris. In the chaos and aftermath of the war, including a long winter siege of Paris by the Prussians, Parisians were uncertain of the future government. Large groups of workers, shop-keepers and regular Parisian citizens had formed autonomous democratic bodies from among all of Paris' Quartiers and Arrondissements. It was a government separate from the bourgeois government of Prime Minister Thiers in Versailles. For many months Paris had lived under siege from the Prussian army, and in those bleak winter days the city developed its own, new, democratic mode of governance—one that transcended the political as government merged politics with everyday life. “The insurgents' brief mastery over their own history is perceptible, in other words, not so much on the level of governmental politics as on the level of their daily life: in concrete problems of work, leisure, housing, sexuality, and family and neighborhood relations” (Ross 1988, 33). In order to protect their nascent democracy, and new-found spatial practice, the Communards built barricades all across Paris, from the Arc de Triomphe to the hill of Montmartre, both of which housed artillery to support the men and women who patrolled the barricades.

But protect themselves from whom? Not the Prussians, who after the spring armistice had withdrawn their siege. Rather, it was the Versailles troops—the regular army divisions that moved in to confront and eventually eradicate the Communards. In violent street battles between the army and the people of Paris, it became clear that Paris couldn't hold out against the Versailles government. The National Guard force, formed by the Communards, set a wide-
ranging fire that saw the destruction of many historic buildings including the *Hotel de Ville*, almost a 'scorched earth' tactic that denied the bourgeois government many cultural monuments in central Paris. Over the course of a bloody week, *la Semaine Sanglante*, the commune was defeated; estimates suggest that over 20,000 men, women, and children were executed by the army—hundreds were shot in Montmartre, in the cemetery *Pere Lachaise* at a spot which came to be known as the *Mur de Federes*, and thousands more were shot under the *Pont Neuf* on the Île de la Cité, just steps from the Notre Dame Cathedral (Ross 2011). Harvey notes that the Basilica of Sacre Coeur in Montmartre, visible from almost everywhere in the city, was built by the victorious national government to to forever mark the urban terrain with a potent symbol of the defeat of the Commune (Harvey 1999).

The Commune took place in a very modern Paris that had already undergone profound spatial transformation. During the height of the Second Empire, Napoleon III assigned Baron Haussmann to provide a visionary restructuring of the urban space of Paris, along 'natural' and geometric plans. The Haussmannization of Paris, as it became known, involved the widening of main streets, and the wholesale construction of new streets to provide the famous boulevards which we identify as quintessentially Parisian.

The process of urban transformation [Haussmann] had set in motion had assured such momentum that they were almost impossible to stop...[The] overall conception was so well accepted that Paris developed largely along the lines Haussmann defined for the next thirty years or more. By then, a new scale of action and thinking had also been defined that was difficult to reverse...[it] amounted to the production and engineering of a whole Quarter of the city given over to a single function. The effect was to produce a whole new city texture (Harvey 1999, 100-101).
Not only boulevards, but also the implementation of a city-wide sewer system and water supply, gas-lit streets, and the movement of whole populations from one district or quarter to another: Haussmannization radically transformed the social practice of the city. Poor and working class populations were moved from the center of the city to its suburban periphery, while the center was made comfortable for the bourgeoisie and the flow of capital, with wide well lit boulevards and newly constructed and manageable market centers like the famous Les Halles, built of glass and steel.

As might be apparent, Haussmannization had serious consequences for the displaced working class, and workers movements of the post-Haussmann era. In discussing Prime Minister Thiers and the destruction of the Commune, Francois Furet notes the influence Haussmannization had on the Commune's chances for revolutionary success: “[Prime Minister Thiers] had the advantage of a Paris transformed by Haussmann, where the quarters which lent themselves to barricades had disappeared” (Furet 1995, 505). The 'Semaine Sanglante' or bloody week of 21 May was made easier by the network of easily traversable boulevards which interpenetrated the city's quarters and made barricades difficult (though not impossible) to defend. The warren of naturally developed streets and narrow passages of old Paris had been illuminated and eliminated. The urban, conceived space had been transformed from one of darkness and protection for the revolutionary movements of 1848 and earlier, to one of light, danger, and ultimately death for the Communards of 1871.
C.1 Barricades as Social Practice

Kristin Ross notes that the construction of barricades was quick but organized, as defenses were needed for the newly communal city. In the creation of a barricade “monumental ideals of formal perfection, duration, immortality, quality of material and integrity of design are replaced by a special kind of *bricolage*—the wrenching of everyday objects from their habitual context to be used in a radically different way” (Ross 1988, 36). This *bricolage* of urban artifacts was not intended to provide shelter for the guerillas. No medieval castle to protect a village during an enemy raid, these barricades were meant to slow down the invader, to demobilize the attacker while the defender was free to roam the city, attacking the army wherever possible. Barricades, a *bricolage* constructed from the debris of urban life, became the symbol of urban insurrection—a physical barrier to movement for those who transgress the boundaries of the city. Yet at the same time the barricade is also a metaphor for the political identity of the defender, the Communard. Both the barricade and the revolutionary are displaced from their everyday life; like household objects used to build up a physical wall, the Communard is so positioned that the everyday life of a city inserts itself into the realm of the political. Simultaneously political thought and action descends into newly formed everyday activities. This is the salience of the barricade: When built it signifies a transformation (or an attempt at transformation) taking place at the level of social practice.

If social practice in city is a given combination of conceived spaces (urban architectures and the management of public and private spaces) and lived spaces (the lives, thoughts, and representations of the people inhabiting those spaces) then bricolage stands as the fundamental
reordering of those productive patterns. In a historical moment like the Paris Commune or Paris during the revolutionary movement in May ’68, we see the transformation of a city street from a route which takes people from one place to another, into a blocked location that denies human movement. This is a radical change to modern urban conceived space and the social practice which depends upon it. Moreover, this purposeful blockage simultaneously transforms lived space as well—the barricade must be built and guarded from those social forces seeking to restore social practice to its pre-barricade norm. Even for the casual bystander coming up from the underground station the barricade has a transformative effect. The barricade prevents that bystander from shopping, dining, or getting home; it might even radicalize them into support for the barricade builders and the situation in the streets. To be clear, the barricade creates a hard point of social practice, a barrier to the flow of the urban population. But this barrier is a bricolage as well; it is not a unitary field which blocks spatial flow, but rather a piling up of objects (a trash-can, a burned car, a chopped tree, and paving stones) each one individually ripped from its role in everyday spatial practice and inserted into the radical pile. Each one of these objects could trigger cognitive dissonance in the viewer, a monadic shock in Benjamin's terms, drawing the viewer into the new social practice of the barricade and out of the social practice of everyday life. Even if he or she does not join the movement, the each and every viewer of the barricade experiences the transformation of social practice.

Ross believes that this transformation of social practice was the most significant accomplishment of the ’71 Commune. She points to the development of collective identity in Paris, particularly at the level of the Quartier or Arrondissement during the winter siege by the
Prussians. As the commune developed in early 1871, workers moved to re-occupy the center vacated by a bourgeoisie who fled the city in advance of the foreign army. The sense of autonomy and communication fostered during the siege transformed into self-governance at the level of the city:

The breakdown of spatial hierarchy in the Commune, one aspect of which was the establishment of places of political deliberation and decision making that were no longer secret but open and accessible, brought about a breakdown in temporal divisions as well. The publicity of political life, the immediate publication of all of the Commune's decisions, and proclamations, largely in the form of *affiches* [posters], resulted in a 'spontaneous' temporality whereby citizens were no longer informed of their history after the fact but were actually occupying the moment of its realization. If the city and its streets were in fact reappropriated by the Communards, this undoubtedly entailed a Communard reinvention of urban rhythms: white nights and 'revolutionary days' that are not simply certain days marked off on a calendar, but are rather the introduction to and immersion in a new temporal movement (Ross 1988, 42).

Occupying the city transformed not only the mode of politics, but also the everyday lives of those involved in occupying and defending the city. Printing posters with news bulletins on the approaching army or by depicting recent decisions of the Commune kept the Communards apprised of the new social practice at work in Paris. Acting and working in the Commune's business immersed people's lives in the physical-revolutionary tasks of working, managing the city, and of course building barricades. Parisians were filled with the visual and temporal reminders of the dynamic and changing experience of the Commune itself, of making history. We can mark the revolutionary movement of the Commune as the imbrication of everyday life onto politics, and the submersion of politics into everyday life, so that they collapse into one singular temporal-spatial frame. Thus as French political memory, the Commune signifies a moment and a place that demonstrates the radical transformation of social practice. It is the emergence of an
entirely new mode of life based not on bourgeois economic hierarchy, but rather on collective lived experience in an urban environment.

It is Marx, in his pamphlet *The Civil War in France* who clearly articulates the difference between the practice of the Commune and the old order. What attracts Marx to the Commune is not only the role it played, or did not play in a continuum of communist revolution, but rather the practical ways that the Communards dismantled state power and reconstituted power in a non-hierarchical manner. “The Commune was formed of the municipal councilors, chosen by universal suffrage in the various wards of the town, responsible and revocable at short terms...[it] was to be a working, not a parliamentary, body executive and legislative at the same time” (Marx 2008, 841). It is vital to note the dual nature of Marx's use of the term 'working'. The Commune was a worker's government, in the sense of it being led in part by the working class, but the Commune was also a ‘working' body in the sense of production itself, an insight corroborated by Castells’ (1983) research on the Commune. The Commune produced a new form of political authority, based not on hierarchical control, but rather on popular participation. Both Arendt and Hardt point out the rare form of power constituted by the Commune, one that relied on “active participation, local autonomy, and a pyramid of delegation...as an antidote to the dominant, undemocratic form of parliamentary representation” (Hardt 2007, xvii-xix; Arendt 1960). The Commune worked to produce this pyramid of power and authority, a pyramid (unlike hierarchy which spreads authority from the top down) that creates a nexus of power through interlocking delegations and reciprocal relationships: the power and authority of the Commune emanated from the bottom to the top.
In organizing themselves, the Communards dismantled traditional norms of representative government. They demonstrated, even if only for a few months, that a population can govern itself without the need for formal, professional political representatives. This truth had dangerous implications for Prime Minister Thiers and the Third Republic; the existence of the Commune threatened the bourgeois government and the bourgeois state by proving its very superfluousness. In a similar vein, the ’68 revolutionaries challenged bourgeois hierarchy at the university as well as state level. In reactivating this tradition, by building barricades and by posting *affiches* with slogans and images, the ’68 revolutionaries attempted again to re-order social space along non-hierarchical, non-bourgeois lines, attempting to do again what was done in 1871. To say that ’68 is an attempt to change social space, and that to do so these revolutionaries drew on traditions from French political memory (specifically the memory of ’71) is not to say that ’68 is a repeat of ’71\(^{13}\). The relationship between these two provocative events is too complex for such reductions to ring true. We can, and should, read the course of ’68 as an attempt at self-governance, and an attempt to liberate everyday live and social practice from the Gaullist state. Like the threat posed by the Commune, the May ’68 movement posed an existential threat to de Gaulle's government and the Fifth Republic.

### C.2 France ’68: From Student Protest to General Strike

After the Night of the Barricades, the challenge to the French state began in earnest. The urban student insurrection quickly spread to the factory. By the middle of May, factories from Nantes to Marseille were on strike, including the huge Renault Billancourt factory outside Paris.

\(^{13}\) For more on the memory of 71 for French movements generally, see Castells, 26.
May 13th saw a march of 800,000 students, workers, and Parisians. “The timing of the events makes it clear that the sitdown [strikes] in themselves were not so much the creation of, as the response to an existing political crisis...the May-June sitdown strikes were the largest mobilization of workers in French history” (Shortner and Tilly 1978, 140 emphasis in original). Student protesters did not create factory strikes, but the strikes were a formal response to the Gaullist regime. Furthermore, Shortner and Tilly point out the similarity between the General Strike of ’68, and that of 1936, where local unions rather than national labor organizations, played the key role in deciding to strike, and who then focused the radical energy of the striking workers. The general strike was a response to the crisis created by student insurrection, so that by the third week of May, the whole of France was paralyzed—wildcat-striking workers demanding control over the factory and their working conditions, students demanding an overhaul of the university system, the enragés calling for the end of the de Gaulle presidency, and radical communist splinter groups, or gropuscules, agitating for the end to the capitalist economy. The rapidity of the onset of general strike after the Night of the Barricades attests to the potency of the memory of ’71.

Setting aside the highly problematic role of women for a moment, it is clear that massive participation by workers and their unions means we cannot reduce the movement to a purely student revolt, isolated from the other sectors of French society. Many histories have sought to diminish the revolutionary movement by pointedly not using the term revolution, using monikers like 'the events of May' or the '68 student uprising’. But May-June in 1968 did see a revolutionary moment: it saw workers reject the Grinelle Accords which offered substantial increases in
striking worker's pay and conditions. It saw fire and violence in Paris and many other urban centers. Barricades in the streets transformed the center of Paris from a shopping and tourist mecca into a battlefield between police and urban protesters. This activity in the heart of Paris stopped the flow of everyday life under de Gaulle's Fifth Republic, and replaced it with a revolutionary situation. By seizing the streets and the factories, student revolutionaries and industrial workers paralyzed the capital and the economy. This temporal-spatial break demonstrated the fragility of the Fifth Republic. There was such a level of perceived weakness and lack of authority that by the 30th of May Francios Mitterand's socialist-communist coalition [in the National Assembly] proposed something akin to a coup to replace de Gaulle as president.\footnote{See Seale and McConville.}

D. Memory and Spatial Practice in the Iconography of '68

A revolutionary situation existed in France 1968—and a revolutionary movement took advantage of the situation but was not able (or willing) to overthrow the state. We have explored the role political memory of the Paris Commune played in giving context and meaning to the movement, particularity with the barricades on May 10-11. Yet the posters created by the Atelier Populaire during May and June tell a more varied story of French revolutionary tradition and political memory than can be explained by the memory of '71 alone. The social practice demonstrated by the Atelier puts into practice many of the utopian principles and radical revolutionary tactics of the May '68 movement. The posters created, first by art students joined
later by revolutionary volunteers, during the middle of May until the middle of June are visual examples of the political memories and principles that drove the movement.

On the 15th of May, students of the École des Beaux-Arts and the École Nationale Supérieure des Arts Décoratifs, or Arts-Deco as it is often called, occupied their campuses. Influenced by the outbreak of earlier protest at Nanterre University and the Sorbonne, these art students participated in the growing revolutionary movement by occupying their schools and producing revolutionary posters. They called themselves the Atelier Populaire. The practices and posters developed at the Atelier are a window into the movement itself, its processes and its imagination; while the manifestations of May are now over forty years past, we can still access a deep wellspring of revolutionary practice through the vividly remembered and reproduced, and often ironic posters produced by the Atelier Populaire.

Any revolutionary movement may end ironically with a combination of circumstances opposite of what is expected or hoped for. But perhaps no other such movement courted irony (as a method of humorous or sarcastic expression in which the intended meaning of the words used is the direct opposite of their usual sense) like the student revolutionaries of the Latin Quarter and their artistic allies at the Atelier Populaire during May and June of 1968. With slogans chanted on the street and posters plastered on walls, the May movement dripped with ironic reversal: It is forbidden to forbid; soyez realiste, demandez l'impossible. But irony was only one of the styles used in the Atelier posters; other posters are what Walter Benjamin would call 'dialectical images', revolutionary images that seek to collapse the temporal distance between past and contemporary struggles in order to redeem past sacrifices in the name of democracy and

15 These two definitions of irony are drawn in large part from Webster's Dictionary.
freedom. Produced through a unique spatial practice at the Atelier Populaire, ironic and dialectical posters demonstrate both the tactical style and the democratic commitment of the revolutionary movement.

*Figure 3.2: Ironic Image*  
*Figure 3.3: Dialectical Image*

Almost every revolutionary movement has a corresponding artistic component in the form of revolutionary posters (Schnapp 2005). Many of the posters produced during the ’68 revolutionary movement can be understood in terms of the two related categories proposed above. The first category of posters deploys ironic interruption to challenge the Gaullist state and French society. These images often depict the police and president as oppressors, or, like Figure 3.2, they challenge salient concepts like political reform in order to interrupt the status quo. Concepts of reform are usually considered to be progressive, or at worst benign; Posters like Figure 3.2 take the concept and portray it in an alternative, contradictory light. Through ironic

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16 This is the typology dealt with in this chapter, not the only typology possible. The Atelier posters are of a wide variety, and arguments can be made for other categorizations.
reversal, the unintended consequences of that 'normal' concept become visible; instead of progress, reform is revealed as a social anesthetic.

The second category dealt with in this chapter is the dialectical image, revolutionary posters that collapse the temporal distance between contemporary and past struggles. Dialectical images like Figure 3.3, evoke memories of the need for resistance and the reality of oppression by suggesting the similarity between historical moments or movements, and the May '68 movement. Consider how Figure 3.3 juxtaposes the position of Daniel Cohn-Bendit\(^{17}\) with the historical position of the Jewish population and the German state during World War II. Dialectical posters evoke the political memory of resistance, and present the movement outside homogenous, linear time, demonstrating both a revolutionary interruption of contemporary political order as well as the movement's democratic commitment to past struggles.

The tactic of interruption and the movement's democratic commitment were produced in part by the social and spatial practices out of which the movement arose. Revolutionary movements are shaped by the political memories they draw on to challenge to the state, as well as the urban spaces in which they mobilize; the May '68 movement in Paris is no exception. Locating such a movement then, finding where in time and space a revolutionary movement takes place, is of critical importance. By following the tactics and commitments of the movement through the posters of May '68, as well as its spatial practice, one can better grasp how the practices of urban space and political memory shape revolutionary movements. Ultimately unsuccessful in overthrowing the state, the May '68 movement in Paris demonstrated the

\(^{17}\) Cohn-Bendit was an iconic student figure in the '68 movement, and a French-German Jew. He was harassed by the police and eventually prohibited from reentering France after a trip to Germany, an abuse of state authority that prompted the making of this poster.
potential of revolutionary action to transform social space while generating a vital political precedent for future movements.

Figure 3.4: Usines, Universites Union

D.1 The Story of the Rue du Dragon

The very first poster created by art students at the École des Beaux-Arts was a simple lithograph, Figure 3.4, Usines University, Union. The poster was the first tangible image that proclaimed the goals of the 1968 student movement—quite simply, the joining together of the workers' movement and the student movement. This union was proclaimed not as one leading the other; there was little talk of a student-intellectual vanguard. If anything, the discussion was of a worker's vanguard leading the students, but in essence what the students sought was a movement of equality: joint participation in the attempt to liberate society from the oppressive forces of the state and capitalism.\(^\text{18}\).

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\(^{18}\) See Herve Bourges, *The French Student Revolt: The Leaders Speak* (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1968) and
This poster was likely printed on quality paper from the university stores, with quality purple lithographic ink, while later posters relied upon the end rolls of newsprint donated from sympathetic newspapers and cheap ink gathered from whatever source was available around Paris (Tempest 2007). It still looks quite impressive—purple text on a white background, a brilliant and easy to comprehend proclamation. But what was to be done with the poster once it had been made? One was certainly hung on the wall of the studio to inspire the thinking and future designs of the workshop, but that left roughly fifty printed posters to distribute. It is at this moment when we begin to see the importance of the print, and its centrality to the movement itself. A decision was made to take the posters just a few blocks south of the University, to the rue du Dragon, the street which to this day houses art galleries that specialize in quality prints. Perhaps the decision was to sell the posters, or to donate them for a return of services to the students, perhaps in food or printmaking resources. Regardless of the reason, in bringing the posters to the rue du Dragon, the students of the École des Beaux-Arts followed the conventional channels of artistic production and allowed artistic distribution to take its course.

In what might be considered a simplified model of artistic distribution, the artist creates a work of art and then turns that object, be it a painting, a sculpture, or a lithograph, over to the gallery which then markets it to potential connoisseurs by displaying the work in catalogs or in gallery windows. It seems apparent that our artist-student was thinking in this mode—create a 'revolutionary' poster, take it to a sympathetic gallery to be hung, shown and admired, potentially to be purchased, and with that cash return to the studio to furnish more paper and ink for the

creation of more posters. Thus the cycle would continue, incorporating this new poster style into the world of the artifact-as-art. Evidence of this cycle is built into the urban space of the rue du Dragon. Although only one block long, it has numerous print galleries and is home to both an art school, the Ecole Superior d'Arts Graphique et Architecture Interieur, and a business school, the Ecole Superior de Commerce. With these two schools facing one another on the street, rue du Dragon is caught comfortably between art and commerce, and if one concentrates, one can even detect the cycle of exchange, art object to commodity and back, flowing between the buildings and into the street.

Interestingly enough, either of these schools, or one of the many print galleries on the street, could have been the reason why students of Beaux-Arts chose the rue du Dragon as their destination on May 14th. Wanting to sell art by using business or artistic connections most likely motivated the connection between Beaux-Arts and the rue du Dragon, for the street truly sits at the nexus of print art and commerce. But this depiction of the street scarcely satisfies the events of May 15th, for May 15th cannot be contained by a cycle of exchange—it is precisely May 15th that breaks out of this cycle of exchange. Something happened on the way to the rue du Dragon.

Students of the Beaux-Arts, rightfully happy with their work in producing Usines, Universities, Union, headed down the rue Napoleon, a few short paces to the boulevard St. Germain. But that day a special reality existed out on the boulevard, a new social practice that literally cut across the cycle of artistic production and commodity exchange: the revolutionary movement. On May 15th, the streets were filled with students, workers, immigrants, the unemployed, people who built barricades, and who fought with the police. Just to cross a few
hundred meters from Beaux-Arts to the rue du Dragon, these prints had to traverse the revolutionary barricade itself. In fact, as the art students traversed the distance between the University and the rue du Dragon the posters were taken by the movement, and in a moments time they were plastered to the wall and distributed to others who would plaster them at other places in the city. It is as if the heat of revolutionary action ruptured the bonds between the print and its role as art-object, transforming it into a revolutionary poster. Once transformed it had no right to exist on the wall of a gallery, its place could only be public, the public space of the street containing the revolutionary movement itself. This is a clear example of revolutionary interruption—interruption meaning more than just a strike, but the short-circuit of everyday life, the interruption of a continual cycle of production and consumption. The prints were revolutionized by transforming their purpose from art objects to be bought, sold, and appreciated aesthetically into a political poster with a revolutionary end.

By not entering the gallery for sale, the object is denied its function as an aesthetic artifact and achieves the function of educating a whole revolutionary public by its placement on the walls of Paris. What is a revolutionary poster? Only a poster made with an intent to incite revolutionary thoughts, challenging the status quo by being placed in public space for the entire community to see. Such a poster reflecting the revolutionary intent of a movement, placed in a space visible by a community can transform the social practice of daily life into revolutionary practice. To be clear, the print created by the students of the Beaux-Arts was very interesting, but it does not become a revolutionary poster until it is ripped from its normal cycle of artistic commodity, and universalized on the street. There the poster becomes part of the *bricolage,* a
revolutionary image in a kaleidoscope of newly displaced images each one doing its own work to transform the social practice of the street from one of everyday life into the social practice of a revolutionary situation (Ross 1988). Individually viewed, these posters may not transform each individual viewer; but in 1968, their place as part of the revolutionary bricolage formed a wall of images that informed, educated, and helped direct the movement.

D.2 Revolutionary Technique: Silk-screening

One can imagine young artists returning to Beaux-Arts on the 15th, not as students but as revolutionaries seeking to produce more posters, desiring to explore the goals of the movement in ink. But with the lithographic form? It was clear to the artists that the lithograph as a medium was unable to support the needs of the movement19. It is at this moment that art production in France is 'revolutionized' by the introduction of seriographic techniques. French artists Guy de Rougement and Eric Seydoux had worked with serography in New York, a form of stenciled printing commonly called silk-screening, and were able to teach the collective body of artists how to produce hundreds of prints from a single image (Vermès2011, 9-10). In the 1960s, Silk-screening was common in the United States in both industrial and artistic print production, including the famous works of Andy Warhol and Roy Lichtenstein, but almost unheard of in Parisian print studios20.

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19 The process of lithographic printing involves greasing a portion of a stone or metal block, which when ink is applied, creates a positive image, while the negative portions are wetted with water to repel the ink. Each print must be carefully prepared, increasing the time and effort put into each individual print. See Mathilda V. Schwalbach and James A. Schwalbach, Silk-screen Printing for Artists and Craftsmen (New York, NY: Dover Publications, 1970).

20 See Schwalbach and Schwalbach; Tempest; and Tansey and Kleiner.
Unlike lithography, silk-screen printing uses a form of stencil to create a positive image. To create a positive image, a silk or nylon screen stretched across a wooden frame is prepared with gum resin or other impermeable substance, and ink is spread over the entire screen. The negative image gum resin prevents the ink from reaching the paper below, and the artist is left with the positive inked image. “The extreme versatility of the medium has opened completely new possibilities for design and expression...and the inexpensiveness of the equipment needed for small printing has also encouraged experimentation in design” (Schwalbach and Schwalbach, 1970 14). With this new medium, the revolution had found the means to produce powerful revolutionary posters, and in doing so the movement transformed the world of French artistic production, spreading an acceptance of serigraphy as a valid, and incredibly versatile technique throughout the French artistic community. It is at this moment we can see the birth of the *Atelier Populare* as a revolutionary entity, and serigraphy as a revolutionary tactic in France. Perfectly positioned to contribute to the revolutionary movement, the *Atelier Populare* transformed printmaking in France almost literally over night. The days after May 15th saw the birth of a true *Atelier Populare*, as a space and a practice, by incorporating existing artists, volunteers, and art students into a body able to produce many different revolutionary posters.

Not unlike the posters that they created, the *Atelier Populare* attempted to represent its revolutionary ideals in its own internal organization. Students, workers, local artists, volunteers, and amateurs came together at Beaux-Arts and Deco to create revolutionary posters, posters made to inspire and inform revolution. But how was the Atelier to decide which posters would be

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made, what revolutionary content to inscribe with ink on paper? “All the militants—workers, students, artists, etc.—from the Atelier Populaire meet daily in a General Assembly. The work of this assembly is not merely to choose between the designs and slogans suggested for posters, but also to discuss all current political problems. It is mainly during the course of these debates that the political policy of the Atelier Populaire is developed and defined” (Atelier Populaire 1969). These revolutionary councils used a form of democratic procedure to process and decide on content for the posters. Meeting often in the courtyards at the Beaux-Arts and Deco, or alternatively in large work-spaces, the group of artists assembled that day debated and deliberated on each of the 350 or so posters that were created between May 15th and mid-June. The Atelier Populaire embraced democratic participation and explored their 'policy' by engaging with one another on a level of equal debate. Those for or against a poster could share, argue and prohibit certain posters from being made.

Since decisions to produce posters were made by majority vote, “The direct democracy of the assembly made the poster output politically inconsistent...Votes depended entirely on the chance composition of the assembly on a given day...'certain posters were passed at certain times because there were more pro-Chinese and fewer Trotskyites, or the other way around...” (Tempest 2007, 10). This type of deliberative decision making was entirely determined by the atelier space—not so much the shape of the buildings architecture, what Henri Lefebvre called the 'conceived' space, but rather the unique social practice that existed each and every day at the Atelier. The assembled body completed the social practice of revolutionary printmaking

differently each day. Different days may have had different practices, depending upon who or what groups were making the prints that day. Like democratic practice itself, the coherence of expression in the posters is only an illusion. The movement and its posters are a reflection of the democratic practice at work on a given day. Those who participated in the day's action—whether by building a barricade or inking a poster, worked to create the meaning and express the content of the movement.

The spatial practice of the Ateliter Populaire presents us with two key insights: The first is the connection between revolutionary posters and revolutionary interruption. While on the 15th of May, art students may not have intended to have their action interrupted, the movement on the streets of Paris intersected the everyday cycle of artistic production and consumption, transforming future poster production. The fundamental act of revolutionary interruption translates into many of the revolutionary posters themselves; ironic interruption became a major theme demonstrated in poster content after May 15th. Likewise, the Atelier General Assembly transmitted its commitment to utopian democratic practice into many of the posters produced. The following sections develop these themes in detail, first through Benjamin's theory of the dialectical image, and then through an exploration of the posters themselves.

D.3 Walter Benjamin and The Dialectical Image

A serious problem for revolutionaries has always been how to motivate the people, how to convince or change consciousness on such a level that revolution becomes a reality. Unless one is willing to wait for a historical determinism to take its course (exactly the fatal flaw Rosa
Luxemburg rails against in her essay on the General Strike) then some manner of (Leninist) organization or other force is needed to drive the revolutionary effort. Walter Benjamin avoids the thorny problem of formal organization, by concentrating on the power of historical, political memory to “jolt the dreaming collective into a political awakening” (Buck-Morss 1991, 219). The goal of activating history is to blast the present out of history's forward motion through time, to “blast free history from its continuum” (Buck-Morss 1991, 219). For Benjamin, revolutionaries must recognize that history is driven by the largely silent laborers who make the lives of the great a possibility. When we consider the temporal power of dialectical images, it is always the temporal power of one movement embracing the struggles of the other across time.

For Benjamin, liberation demands not only the liberation of the present, but also of the past. History can be activated for a revolutionary purpose, but revolutionary history is not the history of great men, wars, or cultural achievements. Rather, “these cultural treasures...owe their existence not only to great minds and talents, who have created them, but also to the anonymous toil of their contemporaries” (Benjamin 1968, 256). Saying that contemporary movements use political memories necessitates the corollary that in using political memory, contemporary movements have the chance to redeem the movements and injustices of the past through their own liberation. Walter Benjamin expounds this reflexive understanding of political memory in his *Theses on the Philosophy of History*. According to Benjamin, our happiness is bound up with the notion of redemption: “There is a secret agreement between past generations and the present one. Our coming was expected on earth. Like every generation that preceded us, we are endowed

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23 For more on this, see Isaac Balbus, Mourning and Modernity: Essays in the Psychoanalysis of Contemporary Society, (New, York NY: Other Press, 2005), 71.
with a weak Messianic power, a power to which the past has claim” (Benjamin 1968, 254 emphasis in original). When a revolutionary movement calls upon political memory in the hopes of liberating society from the abuses of the state, it also has a potential to redeem the injustices of the past. A weak Messianic power means that the liberation of the past becomes possible through the liberation of the present.

Dialectical images are the means by which a revolutionary movement can draw on past struggles. Benjamin's “visual logic” argues that revolutionary action be built up through images, “according to the cognitive principles of the montage24” (Buck-Morss 1991, 218). The job of the revolutionary, the one who positions dialectical images, is to locate those historical moments laden with dialectical tension and exploit that tension for the ends of revolution. A viewer of a revolutionary image will recognize a “configuration pregnant with tensions, [and this recognition] gives that configuration a shock by which it crystallizes into a monad” (Benjamin 1968, 262-3). It is seeing the monad, a singularity of historical realization, that catapults the viewer into a revolutionary consciousness—the monad is a singularity where historical time collapses and becomes one with the present. The rupture of history as a linear path is the revolutionary act which “cuts across history's secular continuum and blasts humanity out of it, a 'leap under the open skies of history’” (Buck-Morss 1991, 242-3). Of course, there is a huge difference between a viewable montage and all of humanity being liberated through revolutionary consciousness.

24 Montage, a pastiche of images, differs slightly from bricolage, a pastiche of objects. As we are concerned with the spaces of revolutionary memory, bricolage is potentially a more useful and grounded concept here.
Dialectical images are both temporally disruptive and expressive of a liberatory, democratic commitment. They seek to generate a revolutionary consciousness by collapsing the viewer's temporal perspective. Through the image, past struggles crash into present ones, jarring the viewer into a time beyond the homogeneous time of everyday life. History becomes a living force in the present. Dialectical images do not evoke just any time, but a specific, moment or movement in the past. Be it the failure of a movement to achieve the liberation of a people, the massacre of a movement at the hands of an abusive state, or simply the sacrifice made by a historically oppressed population, the dialectical image is committed to addressing the injustices of the past. It is committed to redeeming past acts of resistance and creating a democratic solidarity between the past and the present.

D.4  Situationist Tactics and Utopian Images

*Figure 3.5: La Chienlit*
While mocking or deriding the opposition is a normal tactic of social movements, Situationist techniques developed in the 1950s and 60s demonstrated this tactic in the extreme (McDunnogh 2007). By 1966, students at the University of Strasbourg in eastern France began working with the Situationist International to produce ironic works of art and writing, including the influential tract *On the Poverty of Student Life* (Dark Star 2001, 9). According to Guy Debord, the leading theorist of the Situationist International, ironic acts of diversion have the potential to “upset and overthrow the entire existing order” revealing the society as hollow, thus creating the demand for historical advancement and true communal society (Debord 1983, paragraph 209). The posters and slogans of May, 1968, offer many examples of ironic, Situationist tactics, but perhaps none is as memorable or noteworthy as Figure 3.5. At the outbreak of the May movement and the violence at the first days of street clashes between the police and student protesters, President de Gaulle noted publicly his disapproval of this growing movement, calling the students “la Chienlit”, a uniquely French expression. Though there is some discussion about its best idiomatic translation, it was a clear insult directed at the movement; de Gaulle was chastising the movement, describing them as wild creatures that shit where they sleep.

From the perspective of the student-protesters and sloganeers at the Atelier Populare who produced Figure 3.5, it was the university (and society at large) that was *la Chienlit* and the protesters were only calling out in protest over the massively overcrowded conditions at the university. One student artist commented, “[de Gaulle] meant ‘its shit, its disorder,’ and it was

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25 Mavis Gallant notes how insulted average Parisian citizens were at de Gaulle’s comment. This crude statement did much to undermine popular urban support for de Gaulle in the second and third weeks of May. Mavis Gallant, Paris Notebooks: Essays and Reviews (New York, NY: Random House, 1986).
very insulting...well, when he said that we had an immediate answer for him”” (Tempest 2007, 12). The poster interrupts de Gaulle's words of condemnation, transforming them into an ironic attack on the state itself: The image of de Gaulle's with arms outstretched in apparent hysteria with the caption “la Chienlit, c'est lui.” The rhyming script embraces de Gaulle's condemnation, considers (from the perspective of the student) what 'really is' la Chienlit, before flinging it back at the source, the French state and its president. Normally, one refers to political figures like a president with respect, if not admiration. This poster interrupts this normal interpretation of presidential speech, driving the viewer to reconsider the position of the movement vis-a-vis the state.

Furthermore, the rhyme evokes another (in)famous French leader, Louis XIV who famously said 'l'etat, c'est moi', tying de Gaulle to this deep authoritarian memory. Recalling this memory, Figure 3.6 depicts de Gaulle with a 'matraque' baton held high, accompanied by the text “l'etat c'est moi”. This poster ironically positions de Gaulle as a king, and it borders on the dialectical since it collapses the temporal distance between de Gaulle's state and the absolutist state of the 18th century. As we saw, dialectical images seek to promote an identification between the viewer and those past generations who resisted abuse of power. Figure 3.6 evokes political memory, placing the viewer into the perspective of all those countless people who have been subject to absolute authority, particularly the absolute authority of the French state. The ironic reversal (and potentially dialectical content) of this image interrupts the everyday understanding of a political or historical concept, inverting and negating its normal meaning, inserting an
alternative understanding in its stead. Thus instead of 'l'etat c'est moi' being a phrase out of a history book, its relevance is blasted into the present by an act of dialectical irony.

*Figure 3.6: L'État c'est moi*  

*Figure 3.7: L'État c'est chacun de nous*

Dialectical images may have ironic content, but more often they present the democratic commitment of a movement instead. Consider how Image 2.7 performs similar dialectical work to Image 2.6. We see the same memory called upon, the memory of absolute political authority in the phrase “L'État c'est...”. But unlike Image 2.6 which completes the phrase as viewer would might normally expect, with an ironic juxtaposition of the image of de Gaulle, Image 2.7 inserts a new, democratic subject in the place of irony. The democratic commitment of Image 2.7 is palpable, it creates a visual frame where the dark black line embraces the white space of the poster forming a unified field, drawing the viewer into a sympathetic union with the figure in the foreground. Dialectically, the poster breaks down temporal barriers between the struggles of the present against unjust authority, and past struggles against absolutism. Just as revolutionary interruption transformed an artistic work into a revolutionary poster, the posters of May '68 interrupt the cycle of everyday understanding, forcing a reconsideration of the revolutionary
situation. Well-constructed posters have the potential to link democratic and historical practice with real contemporary situations, creating a true dialectical image.

E. **Conclusion: The Memory of May '68**

Memories are inextricably linked with urban social practice. The space of the Atelier Populaire, and these political memories of resistance gave shape to the May movement. When we regard the use of political memory in the posters created by the Atelier Popularie, it is rewarding to consider the ways in which recalled memories used the movement, as well as the other way around. Through the month of May, revolutionary posters recalled the resistance to abuses of state power, or ironically interrupted state practice. These posters made the democratic commitment of the movement visible and permanent. It was a democratic commitment not only to the contemporary period, but also a commitment to the redemption of past struggles in danger of being forgotten. Once again, the memory of past resistance struggles had a chance to rest at the heart of French political practice. Even though it was unable to transform the state, this rearticulation of democratic resistance established its own, new political memory, one that continues to provide resources to contemporary revolutionary movements.

E.1 **Usines Université Union?**

Before addressing the establishment of a new political memory, it is useful to touch briefly on the movement's inability to transform the structure of the state itself. Recall the very first poster created by the Atelier Populaire, *Usines Université Union*. This poster proclaimed the
most basic desire of the movement—to establish a working relationship between the student revolutionaries occupying the Latin Quarter, and the striking workers in suburban and provincial factories. While it had a strong primary space of mobilization on the streets of the Latin Quarter, the urban street movement was unable to establish a secondary space of movement organization in the factories. Though they struck in sympathy with the urban protesters, factories were never opened up for the integration of the student movement and the worker movement. They remained allied, though separates spaces. For this failure there are many reasons; some may feel inclined to blame the ossified structures of the major French unions and the Communist Party, while others may point the finger at the ideological fractionalization and impertinence of the students, or the distrust of the working-class for the middle-class students. This constellation of powers and these divergent goals prevented the integration of worker struggles for social respect and economic benefit with the student revolutionaries’ desire for a utopian transformation of the state and society. Thus, the new political memory cannot and does not present itself as a unionist memory. It is rather a memory of democratic participation.

While the democratic mobilization of the May movement was short-lived, the movement succeeded in establishing a precedent for democratic speech and participation. By the 30th of May, Charles de Gaulle returned from Germany with military backing, and presented himself to a city exhausted by strikes and uncertainty. His coup de théâtre brought hundreds of thousands of previously silent Parisians onto the streets, sounding the death-knell of a revolutionary movement already on the wane (Kenward 2006). It would be another two weeks before the

streets of the Latin Quarter and its occupied buildings like the Sorbonne and the École des Beaux-Arts were finally cleared, and a month before the end of the factory strikes around the city and the provinces. The movement had failed to transform the state. Even so, revolutionary action transformed cultural and social relations. Michel De Certeau points out that in May “speech was taken the way, in 1789, the Bastille was taken...Thus is affirmed a wild, irrepresible, new right, a right that has become identical with the right of being a human...'everybody here has the right to speak’” (1997, 11). Democratic speech, and democratic participation was the order of the day during the movement's occupation of the Latin Quarter. Once unleashed, this valorization of democratic participation revitalized French political practice.

E.2 The Failures of Mai

Yet there are serious problems concerning the form of democratic participation during the May movement. The most glaring of these is the lack of speech on the part of women and homosexuals. One of the most potent political memories in the French tradition is made visual in Delacroix's Liberty Leading the People. “A full-blown allegory for revolution itself”, the painting depicts a female figure, breast bare, representing France and holding the Tricolour (Tansy and Kleiner 1996, 946). She is rising over the barricades, followed by male revolutionaries. This painting, created in 1830, is not too far off the mark as a representation of the later Paris Commune. Women ‘manned’ the barricades; they formed part of the leadership of the Commune and died in the streets beside men; and they were executed beside men in the

27 For more on the futures and memories of ’68, see Julian Bourg, From Revolution to Ethics: May 1968 and Contemporary French Thought (Ithaca, NY: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007); Ross, May ’68 and its Afterlives.
Commune's horrible aftermath\textsuperscript{28}. Yet in activating the memory of '71, none of this revolutionary gender equality was transferred to the May '68 revolution. While women did participate in street battles with the police, very few women were in leadership positions in the student organizations, no women were in leadership positions at the Atelier Populaire that produced the posters of May '68, and women were shouted down from speaking at the Odéon theater, the preeminent site for 'democratic' discussion. Though they appealed to the Commune, these student revolutionaries were unable to tap into one of the most potent strains revolution tied to the memory of '71—sexual equality in the service of democracy. We should be careful not to essentialize or universalize the role of women in 1871, or ignore the role of women in 1968, but the historical record is clear—women played a central and dynamic role in the Paris Commune, while bourgeois and male chauvinist dynamics limited the role of women in 1968. This silence, the silence of female participation had serious implications for the success of May '68, and for May '68 as a political memory itself.

At those bastions of democratic speech like the Sorbonne or the Odeon Theater, revolutionary speech was generally reserved for males. While women were certainly involved in the May revolutionary effort, from fighting with the police on the barricades, and occupying the Sorbonne and Odéon, too often women revolutionaries were relegated to those traditional patriarchal roles of cook, cleaner, care-provider, and sexual object (Duchen 1994). Only two revolutionary posters from May '68 depict a female figure, and both of these posters were made in the provincial centers of Montpelier and Toulouse, not the Paris Ateliers. These two posters

\textsuperscript{28} See Martin P. Johnson, The Paradise of Association: Political Culture and Popular Organizations in the Paris Commune of 1871 (Ann Arbor, MS: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Kristin Ross, The Emergence of Social Space; Castells.
could not be more divergent. The first shows a woman throwing a paving stone, with the text “La beauté est dans la rue”, while the second is a stylized image of a naked woman, with the word “Mai” in place of her crotch. One a utopian image and one an objectification of a woman, together these two posters demonstrate both the vast potential and the vast problematical nature of the May '68 Movement. For a movement that was so skilled in the use of irony, that could flip the words of a president and the meaning of an entire urban architecture, it is deeply ironic that they were unable to overturn their own internal representation of the role of women in revolution.

Furthermore, the democracy of speech did not extend to homosexual students during the occupation of the Sorbonne. For those at the Sorbonne, homosexuality was not a political issue on par with university reform, anti-capitalism, or free love, and other revolutionaries were generally dismissive or hostile to the homosexual members of the movement29. Guy Hocquenghem, the face of France's Gay movement during the 1970s and 80s wrote that displaying homosexuality in '68 “risked 'discrediting' the movement; at the very moment that we thought we had reached the heights of liberation of all possibilities, there were still aspects of our lives that were not allowed to display” (Sibalis 2009, 241). It is ironic that in order to protect the new-found freedom of occupied spaces, gay members of the movement had to remain silent about their sexuality.

If the uniqueness of humanity is the ability to speak and engage politically, then May ’68 is perhaps the most purely political event in recent history. Yet if the global revolutionary movements of 1968 were concerned with utopian speech, we must point critically to the accompanying silences within this outpouring of speech. The silences of May prevent an unadulterated memory of the ’68 revolution, but at the same time these subjects of silence turn out to be the locations of greatest strengths in the post ’68 era. After the movement cooled, social space was then open for new growth, and it was precisely those points of silences in May, places like the lives of women and homosexuals, that thrived in the newly cleared field of the 1970s. The successes of the new social movements of the 70s and 80s attest to the influence of utopian speech and the memory of 1968 on the course of future social and revolutionary movements. While French students and workers formed the revolutionary core of the ’68 movement in Paris, the movement empowered women and gays to mobilize for themselves in the coming years.

It is not only social movements that call on the memory of May ’68. Nancy Frasier points out that many student participants in ’68 went on to play an active role in the neo-liberal expansion of the 1970s and 1980s (Frasier 2009). She notes that over time, May students became owners of capital and corporate managers, reorganizing firms from a top-down hierarchical model, into ones that embraced quasi-May values like group participation and the dynamic use of the image in advertising. This combination of the movement's artistic freedom of expression with capital accumulation further complicates the memory of May ’68. For some, the memory of May has been embraced as a precedent for current direct action, while for others it inspired an invigoration of capitalist marketing practices. Thus we must point critically to the exploitative
dangers of advertising and contemporary capitalism, and to the successes of the new social movements of the 70s; what should be readily apparent is the centrality of May ’68 for the development of all sorts of political practice in the contemporary era, from the most radical anti-capitalist protest to the most everyday forms of corporate marketing.

The potent utopian influence of May ’68 transcended national boundaries. This study of the May ’68 revolutionary movement is centered in the urban context of Paris. But this movement was part and parcel of an international revolutionary movement (Bhambra and Demir 2009). In demonstrating the power of democratic speech and popular urban mobilization to transform society, and potentially transform the state, the May ’68 movement established a new and potent political memory. From the struggles of women and gays during the 70s and 80s, to the interconnected anti-globalization protests of the 1990s and the contemporary Occupy movements in the United States, and on to the recent Arab Spring revolutions, we can point to the influence of the volatile year 1968 as a central antecedent political memory for current revolutionary struggles. By rearticulating themes of popular speech, democratic participation, and urban social protest, May ’68 revolutionaries established a precedent, a political memory that has influenced many contemporary revolutionary movements, and continues to stoke the fires of radical democracy in France and around the world. While utopia may have no clear location in space and time, the utopian vision of the May revolutionaries continues to influence the actually-existing struggles of the contemporary world.
IV: THE VELVET REVOLUTION OF 1989, PRAGUE

[The] position of the theater in the forefront of the revolution, and its role in the events, had a crucial influence on the revolution's whole character...We prepared all demonstrations as great theater performances. If we needed to come to quick agreement, we used theater jargon. We treated the tribune for the great demonstrations on the Letna parade ground as a stage. We sketched out the staging, worked out a scenario, used dramaturgical sense to decide which political speech should follow which, when a representative of the workers should appear, when a well-known actor should speak, when a song would be sung. We divided the responsibilities just as in the theater. We had stage managers, quick conferences of the team responsible for dramaturgy and direction. Although Havel was the protagonist, he also supervised the direction. All of us poured into these events all the experience we could muster. And all our feeling for the dramatic moment. And yet—time and time again these great demonstrations were also great improvisations. And, though they had theatrical aspects, they were not theater performances. Theater is acting about life, imitating life—in these demonstrations we were acting for our life, as part of life itself, life burning with a fierce flame.

~Petr Oslzly

A. Introduction

Petr Oslzly was a participant during the Velvet Revolution, dramatist, and a member of the Civic Forum, the political organization that organized the peaceful transition from Communism to democracy in 1989. The Civic Forum came into being through the theater network of Prague, and was spatially located within Prague's theaters, most notably the Magic Lantern Theater in the heart of the city. Theatrical space provided the secondary space necessary to organize a transition, and as Oslzly indicates this formal organization within theatrical space also imparted a sense of the dramatic to the revolution itself. The dissident revolutionaries of the Civic Forum used theatrical language and theatrical casting to organize mass protests, even if as Oslzly suggests those protests were not themselves theatrical performances. If revolutions are dramatic in general, then the Velvet Revolution had a conscious understanding of its own
dramatic nature. As Oslzly indicates, the Civic Forum had a self-reflexive understanding of the drama of revolution in general, and comprehended the powerful effect of staging, casting, and timing as crucial components to political action.

The Velvet Revolution of 1989 in Czechoslovakia has given its name to a whole new category of revolutions, ones that orchestrate a largely peaceful transition from an oppressive regime to a democratic one. The Velvet Revolution was both fast, and peaceful, taking place between November and January of 1989-90. Like the election of Solidarity to the Polish Parliament and the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Velvet Revolution was part of the larger Central and Eastern European transition to democracy that took place at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s. This chapter explores the how urban mobilization in Prague, coupled with powerful political memories, influenced the trajectory and scope of the Velvet Revolution. Urban mobilization in November and December united the population of Prague behind a transitional organization, the Civic Forum, led by professional dissidents like Valclav Havel who for years had practiced and prepared for their moment on the world stage. In 1989, in Prague, theaters and their related dissident playwrights and actors were perfectly positioned to contribute their organization skills to stage a peaceful transition from Communism to multiparty democracy.

Section one explores the policy opening through which urban mobilization began. The Soviet policies of Peristroika and Glasnost eased the international conditions for Central Europe, and activists targeted Czechoslovakian social policies that damaged the environment. Mobilization on Prague's Wensceslas Square grew in intensity throughout 1988, and protest there recalled a number of different and well-remembered political events. Section two explores in
detail the student protest in November of 1989 that touched off the Velvet Revolution, focusing on how violence and popular memories of student martyrdom lead ultimately to the movement reclaiming the right to the city. Section three details the Manes Gallery's role in producing posters for the Velvet Revolution, and explores two potent political memories important to the movement. Memory of the Warsaw Pact invasion that ended the Prague Spring of 1968 and the suicide of the student Jan Palach both figure prominently in the posters of 1989, as well as dissident memory. Part four explores the moral theory of the hidden sphere and parallel structure as articulated by Valclav Havel, the dissident leader of the Velvet Revolution and future president of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic. Dissident relationships and networks, like Charter 77, created during the 1970s and 1980s became crucial during the organization of the Civic Forum in 1989. Section five details how the theater network provided the secondary space for the revolutionary movement, and how the Civic Forum was largely a creation of already existing dissident networks centered in theater space.

This chapter concludes by exploring the creation of a new system after the Velvet Revolution. Though the 1989 revolution was largely peaceful, Czechoslovakia split into two countries only a few years after the event. We should celebrate the peaceful transitions, both in 1989 and 1992, but we must also critically assess both the role of (or lack thereof) women in the Velvet Revolution and post-revolutionary Czechoslovakian society, as well as the rampant consumerism that currently grips the Czech Republic and the city of Prague. While the Velvet Revolution was successful in organizing a peaceful transition, all is not roses in the post-revolutionary state. In valuing the peaceful transition, we must also attend to the failures of the
revolution to ensure sexual equality and freedom for women, and its proclivity to value capitalist economic expansion at all costs.

B. **Policy Openings and Early Mobilization**

Many of the best accounts of late 20th century Czechoslovakia and the Velvet Revolution focus on the importance of international policy conditions in shaping the Central European transition to democracy in 1989. Yet a close analysis of Czechoslovakian events indicates the importance of environmental activism and popular political memories in the period leading up to the mobilization of the Velvet Revolution

B.1 **Perestroika and Glasnost**

The historian Timothy Garton Ash, a participant observer during 1989 in East-Germany, Poland, Hungary, and most importantly for our purposes Czechoslovakia, noted that the “European revolution of 1989 was, from the outset, an international event—and by international I mean not just the diplomatic relations between states but also the interactions of both states and societies across borders” (Garton Ash 2010, 61). There is no doubt that the Soviet policies enacted by Gorbachev, most centrally *Perestroika* and *Glasnost*, as well as the unwillingness of the Soviet government to deploy the Red Army to repress social protest in 1989, placed Central European regimes like that of President Husák in Czechoslovakia into a position of isolation. This position of isolation provided an opening for the mobilization of direct political opposition to Communist one-party rule (Sarotte 2009).
Yet this general easing of international conditions cannot explain the unique forms of mobilization and the distinctly Czechoslovakian chain of events which came to pass in 1989. Czechoslovakia provides a very distinct type of revolutionary movement than the more 'traditional' labor union resistance in Poland, or the bloody coup that took place in Romania. Nor did Czechoslovakia immediately experience the political disintegration associated with the failure of Communism in Yugoslavia. The Velvet Revolution is unique among the revolutions of 1989 in that it was extremely rapid, mobilization and organization taking place between November 1989 and January 1990, and that except for one remarkable moment it was extremely peaceful. Under similar conditions of international policy, the countries of Central Europe generated very different types of revolutionary movements. Thus, we must take internationalism as a baseline from which to add more sources of explanation, explanations particular to the Czechoslovakian case, while at the same time recognizing that these particular events may have resonances and parallels in a wider Central European context.

B.2 Environmental Activism

One such resonance was the role of environmentalism and the environmental social movements as a force which worked to organize non-confrontational resistance to the Communist state. Due to the Communist regime's intolerance of opposition, many of the earliest issues around which the Czechoslovakian population organized were issues like environmentalism, ones that could be considered more 'social', rather than directly governmental issues like political representation or party politics. The degradation of the natural environment
became a way for a Czechoslovak opposition to challenge state policy without directly challenging the state (Sarre and Jehlička 2007). The Communist government policy of supporting heavy industry, coal production and its use, had terrible environmental consequences. Czechoslovakia suffered from the worst air pollution in Europe due to the burning of state-subsidized brown coal, had water courses so polluted that they could not support aquatic life, and saw the illegal dumping of toxic waste; these conditions damaged the quality of life for millions of Czechoslovaks (Tucker 2000, 151; Whipple 1991, 46). As the 1980s developed, so too did a social opposition to environmental degradation, including the foundation of the environmental group 'Brontosaurus' in Czechoslovakia by 1988 (Wheaton and Kavan 1992, 29).

Figure 4.1: So Vegetables Won't Be Poisonous

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In both Hungary and Czechoslovakia, this environmental practice before 1989 is exemplified by the opposition to the Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Dam, slated to be built on the border between modern-day Slovakia and northern Hungary. The struggle against the Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Dam, and the growth of the environmental movement took place at the end of the 1970s and continued into the 1980s (Romsics 2007; Tökés1996). This particular environmental struggle and the environmental movement more generally indicates the larger strategy of dissident opposition to the communist state. These early environmental organizations tended to challenge the state indirectly; it was not until 1988 that one can observe the mobilization of an active popular revolt against Czechoslovak state policy. Consider Image 3.1, *So Vegetables Won't Be Poisonous*. This environmentally themed poster was printed at the Mánes gallery during the Velvet Revolution. Designed by Stanslav Holý, it shows the salience of environmental issues during the Velvet Revolution, even when more overtly political issues were being widely discussed. Moreover, the poster works to connect public concern for the environment and healthy living, with political support for the Civic Form, the central opposition organization during the velvet revolutionary movement.

**B.3 Early Mobilization in Wenceslas Square**

Wenceslas Square sits at the center of Prague's 'New Town', a long and narrow strip of public space surrounded by tall office buildings and shops, accessed by many main streets including Narodni Trida, the National Avenue which leads out of the square towards the Vlatva River. Built by the Bohemian King Charles IV in the middle of the 14th century, the Horse
Market, which in time would be renamed Wenceslas after the almost mythical Bohemian king and saint, was a centerpiece of Charles' 'New Town' of Prague. From the 14th century onward, Wenceslas Square has acted as an important urban space with multiple functions and forms—first as a livestock (horse) market during the Middle Ages, to a site for public speeches and gatherings as well as a market during the modern period, and most recently in the post-communist period as a tourist and shopping center (Kukral 1997, 153-6). Wenceslas Square also acts as Prague's major transport hub. It is the location for two of Prague's three major metro stations, as well as being a transit point for many of the above ground trolley lines that crisscross the city, and to vehicular and foot traffic. “Since the Revolution of 1848, Wenceslas Square has been the epicenter of human action during Prague revolutions, a stage, where power, politics, and human spirit all come together to form a dramatic open-air theater of spatial and humanistic expression” (Kukral 1997, 167). The heart of the city, a nexus of transport, and the location for many of the most memorable public events in Czechoslovak history, Wenceslas Square presents itself as the quintessential conceived space of the Velvet Revolution.

In August of 1968, roughly twenty years before the Velvet Revolution, Prague and the rest of Czechoslovakia was invaded by the armies of the Warsaw Pact, effectively ending the reform-Communist movement commonly known as 'Prague Spring'. Invoking the memory of this tragic event on its 20th anniversary, approximately 10,000 people met in Wenceslas Square and staged a demonstration. The crowd heard speeches from the top of the square, in front of the National Museum and the large statue of St. Wenceslas for whom the square is named. “[Two] leading members of the Independent Peace Association (IPA), read out a petition denouncing the
invasion as a crime and demanding its public reassessment. Democratic elections, the abolition of censorship and the rehabilitation of the victims of political persecutions figured among the other demands” (Wheaton and Kavan 1992, 26). These demands were some of the first to actively challenge Communist state power, rather than to target social policies. Over the course of the fall of 1988 and into 1989, one can identify a shift in strategy, from critiquing social policy to challenging the right of the Communist party to dominate public space. Attending to urban space, specifically Wenceslas Square, helps us identify the shift in popular goals, from reforming Communism to revolutionizing the whole state structure.

While it took place in Wenceslas Square as well, the protest of 28 October 1988 was motivated by a different political memory than the August memorial of Prague Spring. The first Czechoslovak republic was founded on 28 October 1918, after the turmoil of World War I and the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Meeting again in Wenceslas Square, seventy years after the founding of the first republic, about 5,000 protesters invoked the memory of their former democratic republic, and the memory of Tomáš Masaryk, the first president of independent Czechoslovakia. In chanting 'Freedom! Freedom' and 'Masaryk' as a part of their protest, the opposition questioned Czechoslovak national identity and evoked the memory of democracy and national independence (Wheaton and Kavan 1997, 26). In contrast to the stagnant Communist regime with its Soviet associations, recalling the first independent republic evoked nostalgic elements, the desire to return to those days of successful parliamentary, multiparty democracy. This potent political memory, acted out in Wenceslas Square on the first officially sanctioned Founding of the Republic Day, draws attention to the importance of 20th century
The 10 December 1988 protest signaled another vital 20th century political memory. The 50th anniversary of the International Declaration of Human Rights saw a gathering of about 5,000 protesters in Prague's Wenceslas Square. Attention to the issue of human rights formed an important core of political resistance to the Communist regime since the failure of Prague Spring to introduce humanitarian reforms. From the '2000 Words' manifesto after Prague Spring, to the formation of Charter 77 in the 1970s, Czech dissidents developed a consistent strategy of challenging state policy by pointing out its inadequate respect for human rights. It was this group of dissidents who would go on to form the core membership in the 1989 Civic Forum, the formal oppositional organization of the revolutionary movement (Bradley 1991). Spaces of dissent are perhaps the most unique contribution the Velvet Revolution and Czechoslovakian mobilization made to the study of regimes and revolutions, and will be explored in great detail in section five.

In January of 1969, a young student named Jan Palach immolated himself in Wenceslas Square behind the statue of St. Wenceslas and in full public view, as an act of civil disobedience to protest the Warsaw Pact invasion. The first month of 1989 saw the mobilization of protest in Prague, around the memory of Palach's suicide. During 'Palach Week' in early January 1989, Prague citizens used the memory of his sacrifice to demand changes to the political climate of

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30 The country of Czechoslovakia had a divisive history and experienced a long-running conflict between the Czech and Slovak portions of the country. During Nazi occupation, Czechoslovakia was divided into an independent Slovakia run by Nazi sympathizers while the Bohemian crown lands (that comprise most of modern-day Czech Republic) were absorbed into the Nazi Reich itself. Later during Prague Spring, Czechoslovakia morphed into a the federated state of Czecho-Slovakia; interestingly enough this was one of the only reforms made during Prague Spring that lasted past the Warsaw Pact invasion. Ultimately, the country split peacefully into the current Czech and Slovak Republics in 1992. See Heimann 2009.
Czechoslovakia. Václav Havel, playwright, essayist, and one of the first three representatives of the Charter 77 organization (a dissident role that had landed him in prison) laid a wreath at the location of Palach’s suicide; the regime responded by again arresting Havel, as well as many other dissidents. It wasn't until late October and early November 1989 that we see more large-scale protests in Prague, though the students of Charles University in central Prague continued their internal mobilization through the summer (Wheaton and Kavan 1997). These early protests demonstrate many of the key political memories surrounding the velvet revolutionary movement: Prague Spring and Jan Palach, the first republic and the Czechoslovakian democratic tradition, and the dissident struggle for human rights. In addition, through these events one can immediately identify Wenceslas Square as the quintessential urban space for revolutionary mobilization in Prague.

C. The November Mobilization

Over the course of late November until early December, popular protest in Prague worked to reclaim the space of the city. Organized marches back and forth between Old Town Square and Wenceslas Square re-inscribed the urban space of the city with public spatial significance. Other than notable exceptional times, like the Prague Spring of 1968, or in the short years between Nazi Liberation and the Communist coup in '47, public space had been occupied by the state and denied to the inhabitants of Prague. It was a university student protest that brought to a head many of the anti-regime tensions percolating within Czechoslovakian society.
This November protest began the process of revolutionary mobilization that claimed the right to the city.

C.1 Triggering Event: The Memory of Jan Opletal

The student protest on 17 November was the catalyst for a series of protest marches that reclaimed urban space for the public use of its inhabitants; on the same day fifty years before, a Czech student named Jan Opletal had been killed while protesting the Nazi occupation of Prague. The memory of Jan Opletal was significant in touching off this revolutionary urban reconquest. Opletal was a student at Charles University during the late 1930s. He was killed by the police during a student protest against Nazi occupation on International Student Day in 1939, and quickly became a major figure of Czech student resistance to police repression in the memory of the country. Drawing on this memory of resistance, using it to shape and guide their mobilization, student activists in 1989 planned the November 17th protest that would become the first in a series of urban protests against the regime. The politically active memory of Jan Opletal's death formed the basis around which the organizers planned the activities of 17 November 1989.

On the 17th of November there was to be a student march and rally in memory of Opletal in Vysehrad, on the east bank of the river and south of downtown Prague. This limited protest

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31 It is significant that the protest was organized by the Communist Youth Union. Only the children of the well connected, or party members were eligible to attend the best universities including Charles University. Having a child attend university was a benefit of the influential, so when it is apparent that it was a student protest that began the Velvet Revolution on the 17th of November, we should remember that these youth were not a bunch of misfits or dissidents. Rather they were in large part the sons and daughters of the party elite. Moreover the organization which mobilized the protest was a communist one. See Simecka 1984.
action had been authorized by the Communist regime; the regime's acceptance of the student march suggests a perceived innocuousness of the planned protest. The regime had seen most of East-Central Europe begin the transition to democracy, and therefore was willing to concede this limited march and rally to the students perhaps in an attempt to avoid larger-scale changes to the government. The students had a permit to march in Vysehrad, but not one to march near Wenceslas Square or Opletal street which had been their intended destination. As the march, numbering around fifteen thousand protesters, neared its conclusion many student activists argued and chanted that the protest march should continue on to Wenceslas square.

A large portion of the marchers broke away from the now-dispersing body, and began making its way towards the center of Prague. Traveling along the river, the protest march picked up supporters from the popular Slavia cafe, and the many theaters lining the route, including the National Theater at the turn onto Narodni Trida which leads directly to Wenceslas square (Bradely 1992, 66-7). Marching along the river, student protesters transgressed the political and geographic boundaries of their legal mandate. Breaking out of the authorized channels of protest, these students began the revolutionary process of reclaiming the urban space of Prague. This unscheduled and illegal protest march began the Velvet Revolution.

C.2 The 'Massacre' on Narodni Trida

The students marched across the Vlatva river, moving north along the river, drawing in bystanders from the nearby restaurants and theaters. By the time the transgressing protesters reached the National Theater on Narodni Trida, the group had swelled to a large number, most
likely around five thousand (Bradley 1992; Heimann 2009). Marching up Narodni the protesters were drawing closer and closer to the heard of revolutionary Prague—Wensceslas square. Before reaching their destination, the student protesters were confronted with a cordon of riot police. Prevented from reaching Wensceslas Square, the protesters soon realized that the police had cut off the side routes and blocked the route back towards the National Theater. Boxed in from all sides, the ensuing melee was the most violent action to take place during the Velvet Revolution. Riot police controlled the exits points off the street, preventing escape except through a line of baton wielding Red Berets who used those implements against the protesters as they attempted to flee what had become a bear-trap on the national street of Prague. The police permitted the trapped students to file through a narrow arcade, roughly halfway between Wensceslas square and the river, a space that became the site of the most brutal violence of the day (Kukral 1997, 55).

The afternoon of 17 November came to be known as a 'massacre', even though ultimately no lives were lost. Soon after students returned to their dorms to nurse bruises and collect their wits, a rumor began to circulate through the university population, and later though the population of Prague. Word had it that a student protester by the name of Martin Smid had been killed in the melee. It is unclear if the rumor was started intentionally or not, but what cannot be denied is the symbolic significance of a student being killed by the police on International Student Day, during a march in memory of Jan Opletal who had died of the same cause on that day, fifty years before. The ultimately untrue rumor that Martin Smid had been killed sent a shock wave though Prague. It spread through the student body and to the sympathetic theaters of
Prague. It traveled even into the homes of the Communist elite whose sons and daughters had participated in the protest—whose sons and daughters had run the risk, like the symbolic figure of the 'deceased' Martin Smid or Jan Opletal, of being slain at the hands of the police.

### C.3 The 'Death' of Martin Smid

As suggested by Della Porta (1996), the use of police violence against protesters has the potential to crush the collective will of the activists and protesters to participate in future actions. Yet there is also the potential for the use of police violence against protesters to scale-up future protest action; the collective experience of violence can unite a group as well as make it afraid to mobilize further. It is clear that the use of violence against the student protesters on 17 November had the effect of galvanizing popular support behind the nascent revolutionary movement. Instead of violence destroying its power to organize, the nascent movement was infused with the symbolic political memory of student martyrdom. The memory of Jan Opletal, transfigured into the body of the supposedly deceased Martin Smid equated the contemporary movement against Communism with the mid-century urban resistance against Nazi occupation of Czech lands, casting the Communist state in the symbolic role of Nazi oppressor. Even though Martin Smid was discovered very much alive a day or so after 17 November, this potent political memory was already unleashed. It transformed a relatively specific student memorial march into the first action of a quickly mobilizing revolutionary movement.

As a political memory, it did not matter that Martin Smid was actually alive, or that he was later suspected to be an informer for the Communist secret police, because his 'death'
became the symbolic bridge between Prague under occupation in 1939 and the Communist regime of 1989. By the next day, 18 November, bouquets of flowers and handmade posters were placed in Wenceslas square to commemorate the events of the previous night. “On the east side of the [statue of St. Wenceslas] was [a] 2 by 3 foot hand drawn poster affixed with brown strips of masking tape that simply stated the dates of: '17.11.1939' and '17.11.1989' separated by the Czechoslovak symbol of three wide vertical white, blue, and red stripes” (Kukral 1997, 60). The student 'massacre' collapsed the temporal distance between these two volatile times, further eroding the authority of the Communist state by equating it with Nazi oppression.

C.4 Mobilization Through Memory

Figure 4.2: It happened on Narodni Trida
After the police crackdown, the state response to the 17 November protest was disorganized. The government of Prime Minister Adamec made no hasty move; the government was aware of the lack of Soviet support for police action against the protesters and the multiple precedents for domestic change from Hungary to Poland, and most recently in East Germany (Bradley 1992). It spent most of its energy denying Smid’s death and then presenting the living Martin Smid as proof, both of which were seen as attempts to draw attention away from the brutality of 17 November. The symbolic Smid had done his work, and no living Smid or government back-pedaling could compete with the already unleashed political memory of student resistance. On the evening of the 17th, the government issued a brief statement, arguing that the protesters wanted “destabilization, violence and the destruction of social life. Because of this, the forces of order were obliged to take necessary measures to restore peace and order” (Bradley 1992, 70). This anti-disorder argument fell in line with Normalization policy. Since Prague Spring, Czechoslovak policy was committed to labeling dissident voices, in 1969 as in 1989, as sowers of discord and as 'anti-social' elements' (Bren 2010). This official depiction of the 'massacre' had more traction in the rural areas of the country, but the facts of the police crackdown spread by word of mouth around Prague.

Figure 4.2, *It happened on Narodni Trida*, was one of the earliest posters created at the Mánes Gallery. Designed by Milan Kincl from a photo taken by Aleš Lamr, this poster shows the immediate importance of the 17 November 'massacre' to the growing revolutionary movement. Flowers are piled high, along with Czechoslovakian national flags, atop the place where student blood flowed on 17 November. Within hours of its occurrence, this site on Narodni Trida became
a focal point for the spatial practice of the revolutionary movement. This conceived space, the short arcade halfway along Narodni Trida from Wenceslas square towards the Vlatva river, took on new meaning in the lives of the protesters, and the lives of the people of Prague who connected the location with police violence. This arcade was transformed from an everyday urban space, very much like other spots in the city, into a location of resistance to police violence and Communist one-party rule. It became a spatial rallying point for the growing revolutionary movement. Kukral, an American participant observer in 1989, describes this newly transformed space on the day after the student 'massacre':

I arrived at the arches of the arcade...A small black cloth with the name of Jan Opletal in white letters hung over the entrance to the arcade. A few hand written and typed notices of testimonials from students were fastened to the walls...A large white cross was painted on the interior wall of the arcade in the exact spot where I saw collapsed students [the day before]. A Czechoslovak flag and thousands of candles and flowers covered the ground...[it was a space] which was quickly becoming a shrine to the mysterious student martyr Martin Smid...Some dedicated individuals told me that they were remaining under the arcade to spread the truth about what happened here. They said it was critical for them to tell people about the 'massacre' (Kukral 1997, 61).

The arcade became the first urban space in Prague beyond Wenceslas square to hold relevance for the nascent revolutionary movement. By 18 November, we can see that the space held symbols of important political memories that would carry the movement to victory only a few days later: student martyrdom, the cross, and the national flag. This space, so close to Wenceslas square, became the rallying point from which mass mobilization began.
C.5 Mass Mobilization as Right to the City

As suggested in the section on the history of Wenceslas square, the streets and plazas of downtown Prague were the locus of popular action against the Communist regime. Consider that on 17 November the illegal destination of student march was not the president's residence or even Castle Hill. It was the long used and recognized center of Prague's demonstrative heart—Wenceslas square. By mobilizing in and through Wenceslas square, the revolutionary movement activated spatially located and historically potent political memories. As the movement gained strength over the last days of November and the first days of December, the rallies and marches in central Prague grew in number and frequency. These marches were tied into the historical structure of the city by virtue of their location. Tracking between Wenceslas Square and Old Town square, these repetitious and moving protests performed a territorial reconquest of urban public space. The Communist regime denied the population access to public space, and the marches of the revolutionary movement reclaimed that space by asserting the right of the people to participate in collective, urban, and political life. Bradley gives a clear description of these repeated marches through central Prague:

Over the next few days people continued to protest in the streets, especially after 2 p.m., after work. Around 4 p.m. several thousand people would go from Wenceslas square to Narodni Trida and then to the bridges, where they would once again be faced by all of police. The crowd would then divide up into separate marches, and go off chanting slogans in various parts of the centre, converging on the Old Town Square to disperse after a final resounding cheer following the singing of the national anthem. Each day the crowd would go home quite peacefully after making a pledge: 'Tomorrow again at 4 p.m. at Wenceslas Square (1992, 81-82).

The temporal and spatial repetition of the protest worked to re-inscribe public life onto urban space. Meeting each day in Wenceslas Square, hearing speeches by members of the Civic
Forum, and then marching in a number of different routes through Prague's downtown to converge in Old Town Square, the revolutionary movement asserted its right to the city.

D. **Poster Production and Political Memory**

The relative inaction of the government, combined with the political memories demonstrated in the arcade on Narodni Trida permitted the dissident movement to take advantage of the moment. As of Saturday the 18th, the Communist government had lost the initiative—action was now in the hands of a diverse community of students, artists and dissident intellectuals centered at Charles University, at the Manes Gallery, and in the many theaters of downtown Prague. While the streets of Prague were quiet on 18 November in terms of mass demonstrations, students, artists and dissidents were at work organizing the movement that what would quickly become the Velvet Revolution.

D.1 **The Mánes Gallery**

Not far south of the Charles Bridge, on the east side of the Vlatva river in central Prague sits the Mánes Gallery. Located just west of Wenceslas Square and south of the Magic Lantern Theater that housed the National Civic Forum32, Mánes Gallery was the center for print production during the '89 movement. Spanning the distance between Prague's 'New Town' and a nearby island, with water flowing underneath, the Gallery (Image 3.3) was among the most important spaces involved in the Velvet Revolution. Though it is commonly recognized more for

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32 The Civic Form became the central movement organization during November and December of '89. Led by Valclav Havel, it formed the heart of the transitional government. See section 6 below.
its eye-catching architectural composition (since the main white, three-floor building is juxtaposed to the 14th century water tower that shares the same location along the scenic river walk in the central tourist district of Prague's 'New Town') the Mánes Gallery should be better remembered for its involvement in the Velvet Revolution. In '89, Mánes was home to a set of private print studios, closely affiliated with the art and design programs at Charles University, and sympathetic to the political actions at the heart of the '89 movement.

Figure 4.3 Mánes Gallery (Photo by Author)

As with every revolutionary challenge to a state that controls the dominant sources of media and communication, the '89 movement faced the problem of informing the population of

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33 Built in 1930 in a modern, functionalist style, the Mánes Gallery saw the end of the Czechoslovak first republic, the Nazi occupation, the short lived second republic, and the whole Communist era from beginning to end. Its stark white exterior, and rigid boxy style seems to reference the austerity of the Communist era, while simultaneously evoking the long history of Czech Cubism. It would not be too far off the mark to place the Mánes Gallery, with its signature green on white sign, as an allegory for 20th century Prague history.
the dynamic changes afoot in the country. “State television and radio provided censored, exaggerated or completely fallacious information. The national newspapers...provided more detailed information than [the Communist party newspaper], but their editions were destroyed and were distributed outside Prague only with great difficulty. And so it came to fliers and posters” (Blažek 2009, 99). In 1989, posters and prints were the single best communicator of public information, and the Mánes Gallery was the main center of production for those crucial posters. Individual artists working at the Mánes Gallery imagined and brought into print a large portion of the Velvet Revolution's iconography. These stunning posters created during those volatile months of November and December of 1989 depict many of the salient political memories at work during the Velvet Revolution.

Working closely with the Civic Forum, artists at Mánes produced the iconography of the revolution, posters that offer a gateway into understanding the vital strains of political memory that worked throughout the movement to mobilize support for the Civic Forum. Taken as a whole, the Mánes posters provide one of the clearest and most consistent collections of revolutionary poster art, and are an indispensable tool for explaining the vital spaces and memories involved in the Velvet Revolution. In examining the spatial practice at the gallery, we see how the printers themselves exemplify the qualities of the movement. They were loosely organized, individual artists, or small groups of artists who used the Mánes space to produce individual artistic contributions what when posted out on the streets of Prague, influenced the movement in 1989.
Unlike the communal production model at the *Atelier Populaire* in 1968 Paris, there was no centralized organization which guided or directed production at the gallery. Thus, the social practice of the Gallery demonstrates a very different style of production than the *Atelier Populaire*. Individual artists with individual perspectives on the movement created their own poster content. Each artist designed and printed his or her own posters with the help of volunteers and so there was no group or committee oversight over the content of the posters. The Mánes Gallery was a group effort only in the actual process of producing a print, and the dissemination of the posters around Prague. Additionally, due perhaps to this individually driven model of artistic production, there are not many large depositories of these posters. The unique social practice at the Mánes Gallery was centered around individualistic dissident viewpoints, and this practice produced a variety of posters meant to educate viewers and influence the course of events by expanding and exploiting the revolutionary situation.

One should first recognize that the posters of '89 resemble the spirit of diversity and opposition inherent in 1989. “The posters [of ’89] differ greatly in their effects on people: While some comment on current events through caricature, others look forward to the future and outline a vision for the country's direction. It is hard to find some kind of link between the posters...” (Blažek, 2009, 100). This diversity of content reflects the style of production at the Mánes gallery. Unlike the *Atelier Populaire* that almost exclusively produced single color

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34 Except the 2009, *Posters of the Velvet Revolution: The Story of the Posters of November and December 1989*. This text is the first serious appraisal of the Mánes Gallery works, and the first collection of those posters in publication. It provides interviews as well as accounts of the artists' creation of the posters, to accounts of the revolution itself. Its form mimics an overall theme of the Velvet Revolution—individual rather than collective interpretations. While some of the interest in oral histories of 1989 is due to the cultural turn in social science, it is true that the study of the Velvet Revolution lends itself well to this type of analysis. See Levitan 1993 and Long 2005.
seriographs, the '89 posters are varied in form as well as content. Since individual artists produced works with “remarkable stylistic diversity: from purely typographic solutions through photography to works of art in linoleum cuts or lithography. Some posters were created in a hurry...others...came to the fore through perfect craftsmanship even in the smallest details” (Blažek 2009, 100). The Mánes production was a composite rather than collective effort, a grouping of individuals unified in opposition to a regime rather than a collective art workshop. Secondly, the posters of '89 offer a window into the political memories deployed by the movement in November and December. “This unique collection of posters from 1989 provides information, and, especially for personal observers, it evokes memories, emotions, experiences, because spontaneous explosive creative power prevails over the conceptual” (Knobloch 2009, 104). Through these posters we can identify many of the central themes and memories in the velvet revolutionary movement. Perhaps the most central of these political memories is an inextricably linked series of remembered events, beginning with the 1968 Prague Spring.

D.2 The Spaces and Memory of Prague Spring

A remembrance of the 1968 Prague Spring provides one of the central political memories depicted in the posters of the Mánes Gallery. Prague Spring began with the election of Alexander Dubeck to the presidency in 1968. Dubeck began instituting a series of reform policies in conjunction with his counterpart, prime minister Sobvoda. Contrary to popular belief, the policies of Prague Spring did not attempt to transform the nature of the communist state—it was not a revolutionary movement. Prague Spring reforms were just that, an attempt by the state and
communist party to extend a number of social and economic reforms to a country sorely in need of them (Ello 1968; Williams 1997). The relaxing of media censorship led to a flowering of public participation. Politics and speech became the order of the day; for the first time in years, books, magazines, and newspapers were published without censorship, and people spoke openly of politics and policy.

Even as we posit a deep connection between these two important movements, it should be made explicit that Prague Spring was not purely or even largely an anti-communist movement. Dubeck and the other reformers called the policy changes they enacted 'Socialism with a Human Face'. These new policies were promulgated to improve the lives of Czech-Slovak citizens, but were not designed to replace the one-party communist state with a Western-style liberal government (Rychlik 2010). Contrary to certain attempts at mythologizing Prague Spring as a moment of liberalism, the '68 movement was executed within a largely communist political framework.35 Even so, it must be acknowledged that through these reforms there rested the potential for further policy changes that might have brought Czechoslovakia more into line with Western notions of democratic governance and capitalistic economics. The Soviet government in Moscow feared this potential trajectory of political development, and after a number of warnings from Breschnev to Dubeck's government, the armies of the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968.

In 1968, the city exploded in active resistance against the invasion of Prague by Soviet tanks, those erstwhile communist brothers. There were massive demonstrations against the invaders at Wenceslas Square, and a violent battle for control of the Prague radio station. On the

35 This is made clear in the 1968 Action Program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. See Ello 1968.
night of the invasion, the citizens of Prague worked to transform the conceived space of the city in order to confuse and bewilder the Soviet troops entering the city. The 25 August 1968 edition of the *Lidová demokracie* newspaper reported:

> Acting on an appeal from the free broadcast of 'Prague', the legal radio station in the occupied town at the end of Friday, hundreds of thousands of anonymous, unknown people tore down the signs with the names of streets and squares. Plaques with house numbers also disappeared...Prague no longer has, for example, a Vodičkova Street or a Karlovo Square. The Prague of names and numbers has become extinct. For the uninvited guests, Prague is a ghost town...Let our watchword be: The postman will find it, but the bastards won't (Koudelka 2008, 185).

The modern state (and foreign military occupation) rely on the legibility of urban space, and one form this legibility takes is street signs that make simple the navigation of a complex urban network (Scott 2002). Residents of Prague confounded the invaders by denying them ease of movement through the urban terrain since the Warsaw Pact army did not have a working local knowledge of the city and its streets. Urban resisters transformed the conceived space of the city by removing identifying markers, essentially protecting Prague's public by making the urban terrain illegible to the occupying force.

> It is difficult to express in clear terms the shock and betrayal felt by the Czechoslovak people at this act of military aggression and occupation. In an interview, Charles University faculty member Martin Hilský stated that:

> I shall never forget that there were tanks in the streets and tanks in the square...For me, these are images that will stay for life. I remember having discussions with the Russian soldiers, incredible discussions. Some of the soldiers didn't know why they came. Some of them were surprised by the fact that people were not welcoming them...In Prague, it was very strange and unforgettable because you could see people pushing prams amidst tanks. Mothers discussing politics with Russian soldiers (1993, 79-80).
Not only was the Prague Spring invasion an end to government policies, but the act of invasion was a crucial break in the social practice of Prague itself. Hilský notes the radical juxtaposition of tanks with the act of everyday life—from walking the streets, to conversations with passersby, and strolling with one's children, and the unforgettable memory it generated. In August of 1968, lived space intersected with the apparatus of military domination: seeing Russian tanks while walking through Wenceslas Square, talking with Russian soldiers on the streets, and pushing a baby cart past instruments of violence. A moment of great hope for the people of Prague was transfigured into a memory of great anxiety, fixed within the urban space of Prague.

*Figure 4.4: Spring 68/Autumn 89*

By the end of August, Moscow forced Dubeck and his reformers to resign, and a new body of Communist leadership led by Husák took control of the government. Soviet troops remained in-country as an occupying force to guarantee the new regime, though they were removed from Prague itself. Censorship reforms were rolled back, and new purges instituted. But
in the summer of 1968, the citizens of Prague demonstrated how the manipulation of urban conceived space can be a powerful form of resistance, and created a powerful memory that inspired action during the '89 movement.

Figure 4.4, a seriograph by Aleš Najbrt at the Mánes Gallery, created during the Velvet Revolution, evokes the political memory of Prague Spring. For many people, especially those who lived through both events, the 1989 revolution was seen as the restoration of a temporal possibility put on hiatus from August 1968 until November 1989. This poster plays a visual game with history, actively inverting the dates 68 and 89 in order to collapse the temporal distance between the two events: the poster can be read right-side up, or upside-down. In fact it is impossible to tell which temporality is the primary and which is the inverted form. In this sense, Figure 4.4 is very like the dialectical images deployed during the May '68 revolutionary movement in Paris, even if the content is quite different. This poster actively associates the socialist memory of '68 with 1989, unleashing a potentially threatening, socialist past that might be considered dangerous for a movement that was seeking a non-violent transition to capitalism and democracy. “[Aggression] wasn't too welcome a standpoint, and for that reason a person who came to pick up the posters...refused to distribute them because of its aggression. But he got an order directly from Mánes [Gallery], where the painters Jarda Rôna and Standa Diviš took care of him. You see, there was a revolution going on” (Najbrt 2009, 53). For many Velvet Revolutionaries, a return to the communist message and meaning of Prague Spring was undesirable, and thus a poster that recognized their connections might appear overly aggressive.
Even so, this poster makes the connection between the violently interrupted reform movement of Prague ’68, and the revolutionary movement against Communism in 1989.

D.3 The Memory of Jan Palach's Suicide

On 19 January 1969, only six months after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, a young student named Jan Palach arrived at Wenseclas Square. Going to the top of the square, between the statue of St. Wenseslas and the National Museum, he doused himself in gasoline and lit himself on fire in protest to the invasion and the end of Prague Spring. He did not die immediately—covered in severe burns, Jan Palach survived for a few days in hospital before succumbing to his wounds. Palach's act of self-immolation was a critical political memory for the later events of the velvet revolutionary movement. Most concretely, Prague saw a large mobilization of people in Wenceslas Square to protest the regime during 'Palach Week' in 1989, including Valclav Havel who was arrested for this act. Mobilization of urban resistance around the memory of his suicide indicates the position held by Jan Palach in Czechoslovak political memory. Palach's suicidal act spawned a salient memory that, twenty years after his death, influenced the velvet revolutionary mobilization. But even more so, a critical evaluation of Palach's sacrifice in the context of post-invasion Czechoslovakia opens up a realm of spatial practice hitherto unexplored.

Jan Palach went to Wenceslas Square and burned himself alive. For him, as for the soldier Michal Levick who committed public suicide two months later for the same general reasons, private space and the life of compromised ideology was simply not enough. Ironically, in
covering himself with gasoline and burning himself to the brink of death, Palach was choosing a human life over the ideological half-life of the Communist system. If private space is the space of necessity and reproduction, as philosophers from Aristotle to Arendt suggest, then perhaps no space is more private than the human lungs. These organs pump the life sustaining and reproducing air and are among the most necessary of our bodily organs. Jan Palach sacrificed his breath, this most private of spaces; in a way his own air provided the fuel for his self-destruction. His destruction of private space propelled the dying Jan Palach into the public realm—Wenceslas Square was transformed from a place to walk between isolated units of private space into a space of demonstration. Palach demonstrated that private life under the Communist system, private space without the public, this life of loneliness and forgetting (Kundera), was not worth its own reproduction.

*Figure 4.5 The Truth Will be Victorious*
Palach confirms Arendt's claim that a life without access to public space is not a fully human life. Unlike the vast majority of Prague citizens, Palach was willing to trade private life in isolation for a chance at public life. He killed himself as a public act, the final public act of his life. Yet Arendt would tell us that acts such as Palach's never end (Arendt 1958). His life may have been consumed by the fire, but this act lit fires in the imagination of others, it kindled hope and memory for future generations of dissidents. Figure 4.5 depicts a young man, a soldier, or a worker, or a student. He stares out at the viewer proclaiming the victory of truth over lies. Originally conceived in the spring of 1989 to mock the false optimism of the totalitarian era of the 1950s, morbidly “fascinating in the gray depression of the 1980s” (Jirasek 2010, 44), this poster took on new meaning in the late autumn of 1989. This young man could be Jan Palach, clutching the flag, representative of public life and Czechoslovak government. One can see the passion in his eyes, the commitment to an ideal. The artist's other major poster contribution during the Velvet Revolution is a poster that draws on the image of a young man, sleeping or perhaps dead; it is a metaphor for the moral and spiritual sleep of the Czech population. The young male body lies prone: Perhaps he has been sacrificed for a cause. Perhaps he is waiting for the moment to awaken and usher in a new utopia. Awaken Czech Soul suggests the mythic history of Czech folklore and simultaneously those lives, both literal and figurative, that had been sacrificed during the post-totalitarian era. Lives like Palach's may have been snuffed out, but the soul of their action lived on through memory, endlessly influencing and supporting the claims of a dissident spatial practice against a regime that was always ready to overwhelm it.
E. **Dissident Spatial Practice**

In order to explain the development of protest from the street to the Civic Forum, it is helpful to first explore Havel's theory of resistance to the Communist system. For Havel, life under post-totalitarianism was a life lived in lies, and thus the counter position of a dissident must be to live within the truth. But from where does the moral strength come to challenge ideology? Not from public or private space. Havel suggest that when a citizen participates in the lie, then ideology works through him or her, in public as well as in the quiet refuge of the home. For Havel, the power to resist comes from a hidden sphere of life, and it is from this hidden sphere that the challenge to the system can be made (Havel 1985). The hidden sphere is a moral space resting just beyond the social space of ideological lies. Havel believes that authentic, moral choice is possible even in the most demoralized recesses of post-totalitarian life. He writes:

> Under the orderly surface of the life of lies, therefore, there slumbers the hidden sphere of life...The singular, explosive, incalculable political power of living within the truth resides in the fact that living openly within the truth has an ally, invisible to be sure, but omnipresent: this hidden sphere. It is from this sphere that life lived openly in the truth grows; it is to this sphere that is speaks, and in it that it finds understanding. This is where the potential for communication exists (1985, 41).

The hidden sphere is a moral space but it is not an individual or psychological space. It is an interdependent realm of of authentic communication that provides solidarity with those who are living within the truth. By necessity it is a clandestine space whose very existence threatens the Communist regime. It threatened the regime because it demonstrated, like Jan Palach's sacrifice, that the regime's totality was a mythic totality, an imagined one that relied on the demoralization of the people. Beyond this symbolic strike at the regime, hidden space provides a terrain upon which the Civic Forum's opposition to the state was formulated.
Out of the moral space provided by the hidden sphere grow parallel structures, actual institutions of resistance to the regime. “At a certain stage in its development, the independent life of society and the 'dissident movements' cannot avoid a certain amount of organization and institutionalization... Along with it, a parallel political life will also necessarily evolve...these parallel structures, it may be said, represent the most articulated expressions so far of living within the truth” (Havel 1985, 79). Dissident opposition in Czechoslovakia during the 1970s and 80s was built around this theory of the parallel structure. First articulated by Vaclav Benda, working with Ivan Jirous' theory of a 'second culture', parallel structures were thought of as organizational configurations entirely separate from the public and private spaces dominated by the Communist state (Long 2005; Havel 1985). To show examples of parallel structures, Jirous (the cultural critic and manager of the band Plastic People of the Universe) pointed to spaces like self-published samizdat journals or the legal-cultural organizations that developed around the arrest and trial of his rock group (Heimann 2009, 281). Havel and Benda articulated the theory and practice of parallel structures not only as a cultural space, but also as a political space. Their theory suggests that avowedly political parallel structures can eventually create a parallel polis, a new articulation of communal public and private space—essentially a replacement of the Communist system (Havel 1985, 84-5).

The spatial practice of the hidden sphere and parallel structures are clearly utopian. Even so, for brief moments this practice truly existed, actively and actually in the underground life of Prague. Through the 70s and 80s, self-published samizdat journals spoke-out against the regime, clandestine bands played illegal rock shows, and the visible lives of active dissidents like Havel,
Benda, Jirous, suggest that heterotopias were enacted really and actually in the hidden spatial hinterlands of Prague. The spatial practice of dissidence in Prague may have been located for a night in a bar over a beer and conversation, in a quiet conversation between lovers, in a handwritten and photocopied pamphlet smuggled across the Polish frontier. It may have been written into the lines of a play and staged in one of Prague's many theaters. Regardless of its location in urban space, dissident parallel practice took very little of its form from the conceived space in which it took place: parallel dissident practice was primarily a lived-space phenomenon. Living within the truth wasn't just state of mind or an attitude, it was a lifestyle and a daily engagement between the spatial domination of the system and the moral center of the hidden sphere. Even though it was utopian in aim, living within the truth produced momentarily heterotopian spaces that were only lightly linked to the conceived spaces of urban life.

E.1 Charter 77 as Spatial Practice

Perhaps the most influential and well-remembered parallel structure was the Charter 77 organization. Named after the year of its creation, Charter 77 was originally a document signed by around one thousand Czechoslovakian citizens, mostly prominent dissidents, writers, philosophers, or other academics. At its most basic level, the Charter was a published response to the Czechoslovak government signature on the 1975 Helsinki covenant on human rights. The Charter 77 document “accordingly [welcomes] the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic's accession to those agreements. Their publication, however serves as a powerful reminder of the extent to which basic human rights in our country exist, regrettably, on paper alone” (Charter 77 1985,
217). The document points out that state opposition to freedom of public expression, religious
confession, and the lack of civil rights run contrary to the written obligations of the
Czechoslovak state as expressed in the Helsinki accord, the International Declaration of Human
Rights, and the Czechoslovak constitution. The document itself created its own parallel
organization; Chartists, those people who signed the Charter, were a visible group of
Czechoslovak citizens willing to live within the truth, taking a stand for their moral and political
beliefs. Charter 77 took on the formal qualities of a parallel structure: it sought to critique the
existing political regime without engaging in everyday politics, and it was not constrained by the
spatial architecture inherent in formal organization. The Charter organization began as a utopian
critique of the regime that over time developed into an important parallel structure.

Charter 77, while being a document and organization in opposition to the regime, chose
to challenge the regime on constitutional grounds. Consider the approach that Charter 77 made to
critique the regime: The document and association did not challenge the particular policies of the
state or propose new and better policies. Rather, Charter 77 identified the particular legal
structures to which the Czechoslovak government was a party, like the Helsinki accord and the
Czechoslovak constitution, and systematically pointed out the inconsistencies between the legal
premise and experienced reality of the state.

The basic strategy of the Czechoslovak dissidents was to exploit the distance
between the concept of socialist legality and political reality. [Charter] 77 and other
dissident organizations...[pointed] out that the whole nature of the regime, which
claimed to be socialist, legal and constitutional, was in fact bluntly discriminatory,
repressive, and broke all international standards of human rights and civil freedoms,
and therefore was illegitimate. (Přibáň 2002, 166).
The dissident organizations did not seek to engage with the state on the level of everyday politics; they sought instead to attack the legitimacy of the regime by challenging the regime's claim to political authority. As Martin Palouš, Charter 77 signatory (and later ambassador to the United States) notes, Charter 77 was a mirror to the regime, pointing out its flaws and fatal inconsistencies (2005, 96). This dissident tactic created a parallel polis outside the realm of everyday politics, one that could criticize and reflect its corruption rather than validating its authority through direct electoral or legal engagement.

Havel realized that the weakest point of the system was its reliance on perceived legitimacy; every regime relies on the belief that it came to power legally and that it obeys the rule of law. The dissident legalistic challenge poked holes in this veneer of Communist legitimacy by demonstrating those points at which the system declined to enforce the laws as they were written. In pointing out legal inconsistencies, these organizations paralleled the state structure without directly engaging its administrative functions. “The primary purpose of the outward direction of [dissident] movements is always...to have a direct impact on society, not to affect the power structure, at least not directly and immediately” (Havel 1985, 82). The outward shape of the parallel structure was influenced by the Communist regime insofar as the structure was a reflection of the regime; parallel structures like Charter 77 became powerful critiques of state policy. The shape of the parallel structure cultivated the heterotopian hidden sphere of its participants, providing a communicative moral network from which to continue dissent.

The greatest strengths of the parallel structure may also have been its greatest weakness. Consider the mathematical theorem which demonstrates that two parallel lines will never
intersect: how could a dissident movement based on parallel structures ever hope to replace the state under such situations? Havel suggests that, once fully developed, the parallel polis would simply replace the old regime as it withered away (Havel 1985, 84-5). What guarantee did the dissident movement have that the parallel polis would ever have such an effect? The strength of the parallel structure is that it provided space for alternative, moral identities to develop—it provided the space for personalities like Valclav Havel to develop the moral strength and international respect needed for a peaceful transition. But parallel structures could not bring about the transition themselves. Only an active mobilization by the population in urban public space could force the dissident movement’s intersection with the state, and provide the conditions necessary for the parallel polis to replace the post-totalitarian regime. The spontaneous revolutionary movement that arouse in November of 1989 provided the necessary spatial opening necessary for the development of a new, provisional authority out of the parallel polis.

F. Urban Space and Theatrical Organization

19 November saw an important gathering of protesters at the Realistic Theater; dissidents there called for a strike and continued protest action against the communist regime (Bradely 1992, 71-2; Saxonberg 2003, 4). Soon after the Civic Form was founded out of a body of dissidents, students, and workers, many of whom had been members of Charter 77 or similar dissident structures. The importance of the Civic Form cannot be overemphasized: located in urban theaters, this diffuse but organized political body became the space of organization for the revolutionary movement. The national Civic Forum was both a political body and a spatial
location, at the Magic Lantern Theater; it became the space that directed the mass mobilization taking place on the streets and squares of Prague.

F.1 Theaters as Spaces of Organization

Theaters became the secondary space of organization during the Velvet Revolution. Accompanying the mass mobilization of students, dissidents, and the everyday people of Prague in Wenceslas Square, was the concurrent discussion and planning taking place in the vast and culturally embedded theater network. Petr Oslzly points out that in 1989 Czechoslovakia had the densest network of theaters in Europe and that the tradition of theater-going was long established (1990, 104). After the 17 November 'massacre', it was theater students at the Academy of Performing Arts who first called for a strike, a call that resonated throughout Prague. Dramatists and students met at the Realistic Theater to plan the upcoming general strike of the theaters. “The principle of the strike was simple: the theaters would not be closed, but would remain open. Performances would be replaced by public discussions. Theaters would make rooms available for political meetings. The theater strike spread like wildfire throughout the country” (Oslzly 1990, 104). The opening of the theaters brought the revolutionary movement in from the streets, gave it a secondary home and a spatial structure around which to organize and articulate its claims against the regime. Theaters provided spaces of organization and a conceived architecture to house the leadership of the movement. In large part it also provided that leadership, in the form of actors, writers and directors who knew that space, and the dissident life well.
Theaters and their people formed the natural leadership of the movement by virtue of their position in society. Marginalized by the official state culture, theaters still provided an important and beloved part of lived urban practice. The Civic Forum, spatially located in urban theaters like the Magic Lantern, formed the leadership of the revolutionary movement. The Civic Forum was so successful because the figures who spoke out against the government and in favor of the movement were well known by the people. What's more, the Civic Forum was not just the visible national leadership meeting day in and day out at the Magic Lantern. While this group was undoubtedly important to coordinating the actions of the whole Forum, Havel's crew at the Magic Lantern were just one group of a larger Civic Forum that stretched across Prague, and into most cities and towns across Czechoslovakia. The Magic Lantern was just the national center of a network of theaters throughout the country that all together formed the Civic Forum (Oslzly 1990, 106).

The key cultural space of the theater, and the actual conceived spaces of individual theaters around the country, were transformed by the movement. Changing from a cultural to an overtly political space, the theater network easily slipped into the role of organizing and mobilizing the opposition. In Prague, as well as in smaller cities and towns across the country, the Civic Forum demonstrated a rhizomatic quality—revolutionary opposition appeared in each locality spontaneously because of the spatial unity and diffusion of the theaters themselves. There was no singular 'theater district' of Prague that was the sole location of the Civic Forum or dissident activity. The Forum and the revolutionary movement was located throughout urban space; it was integrated into the very fabric of the city. Each neighborhood or community had a
theater, and each theater became the stage for disseminating information and directing the revolutionary movement.

As the movement organized through the theater network it also gained a theatrical quality. As pointed out by Ash, Kukral, Oslzly and others, the Velvet Revolution displayed certain theatrical characteristics above and beyond its formal organization in theater space. Theater was the means by which the movement took place. As the theater space provided the conceived space for the organization of the revolutionary movement, and its lived participants provided the leadership, theatrics shaped the spatial practice of the movement itself. The revolutionary movement took on the qualities of the theater. Not only did revolutionary directors like Havel and Oslzly view the revolutionary movement as an instantiation of real life theater, but this was improvised theater—staging, direction, and response had to be adapted at each moment—as the regime responded or did not respond to movement activity. It was these dramatist dissidents who cast those actions, and build the stage upon which the movement turned. It was a subtle choreography that proved itself durable, flexible, and successful in its engagement with the Communist state.

The theater network provided the secondary spatial basis for revolutionary organization, but we must be careful to fully understand what this means for our analysis. Even if dramatists were not in the absolute majority of the revolutionaries, decisions were made and actions taken using theatrical language; rallies were planned in terms of scenes and acts. In essence, the lived space of the theater network became the lived space of the movement—revolutionary practice took on aspects of the theater.
F.2 The Civic Forum and Revolutionary Leadership

Unlike the spontaneous protest in the 1968 movement in Paris, the 1989 movement in Prague was guided by an organized body of professional dissidents (if not professional revolutionaries). While there was a certain amount of spontaneity in the first protests in Wenceslas Square, after 17 November the Civic Forum worked to actively cultivate the mass mobilization of the city and the urban challenge to the Communist domination of public space. First and foremost we should recognize the Civic Forum as a parallel structure. But the practice of the Civic Forum went one step further than Havel's theory suggested. It completed the mission of the parallel structure to articulate an alternative political reality to the existing Communist system. Havel hints at the potentiality of parallel structure to build and protect a nascent shadow government, one that could replace the old order, and this is exactly what the Civic Forum set out to do. Formed at the Drama Club on 19 November 1989, the Civic Forum brought together a variety of dissident voices including signatories to Charter 77, dramatists, students, workers, and other public intellectuals (Ash 1990, 86-7).

Havel was the public face of the national Civic Forum, its spokesperson and leader. He was the natural choice since he had been the international face of Czech dissidence since the late 1970s (Oslzly 1990). As one of the first three spokespersons for Charter 77,36 Havel embodied the past twenty years of dissident organization, from Prague Spring until the current revolutionary movement. An external vantage on these past twenty years might only see the

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36 Charter 77 was a document signed by many dissidents, out of whom three spokespersons were chosen each year to represent the group to the public. Havel was one of the first spokespersons, along with Jan Patoka and Jiri Hajek. See section 4 above.
sensational moments, like 1977 and the signing of the Charter, but miss the development of vast spatial networks beyond the surface of everyday life. Since the defeat of organic state-sponsored reform in 1968, Havel and his dissident compatriots worked tirelessly to articulate and then build the relationships that proved themselves durable and practical during the last months of 1989. Many of the strongest and oldest of these relationships were located in the theaters, because it was writers, actors, and directors who were forced into hiding or censored under Normalization policy. Prevented from producing their traditional craft, dramatists turned into dissidents under Normalization, and Havel was the paradigmatic figure of this general phenomenon; he was the embodiment of the spatial practice of theatrical dissidence and dissident theater.

Ivan Havel, Civic Forum member and brother to Vaclav Havel, noted that “The first activity [of the Civic Forum] was to prepare afternoon rallies on Wenceslas Square. Every day there was a gathering of people in Wenceslas Square, so we had to prepare the program for that. My brother happened always to like to be a director of his plays...so he directed, he made the program of who talks when, and when will be a cultural activity, some song and so on” (2005, 30). The Forum and its leader Vaclav Havel worked to challenge the Communist state systematically and coherently. Like directing in the theater, Havel planned entrances and exits of speakers to the assembled crowds, and planned the marches from Wenceslas to Old Town Square. The dramaturgy of the velvet revolutionary movement cannot be denied. By casting its actions in terms of tradition and nationalist memory, and the challenge of peace, truth, and love to the regime's lies and violence, Havel's organizational leadership was a masterstroke of theatrical-political ingenuity.
Consider Figure 4.6, designed by Pavel Hořejší from a photo taken by Martin Stollenwerk. This poster is perhaps the most powerful image produced at the Mánes Gallery. The poster shows Havel sitting, smiling, without pretense or the stolid formality of a Communist official. The caption reads as the title, *truth and love must overcome lies and hatred*; this simple and compelling message became the watchword of the revolutionary movement. Not unlike the theatrical opposition of a beloved protagonist against an obviously nefarious antagonist, this binary opposition of truth to lies evoked a long Christian tradition of speaking out against corruption, the nationalism memory of Masaryk and the first Czechoslovak republic, as well as Havel's own three decade-long dissident opposition to the lies and policy of the Communist regime. The poster portrays the revolutionary movement's goal of overcoming Communism in stark terms, and provides an allegory for the past twenty years of dissident resistance against
Communism. For the Civic Forum, the simple articulation of truth versus Communist lies was the moral core behind revolutionary mobilization.

G. Conclusion

It remains to conclude by briefly considering how revolutionary spatial practice shaped the post-revolutionary period. The Velvet Revolution was a successful revolutionary movement. In the winter of 1989 the Communist regime fell due to the efforts of the movement. This chapter traced the mobilization of the movement on Wenceslas Square and the central streets of Prague, and the organization of the movement through theatrical space and the Civic Forum. The Civic Forum transitioned to political power with the election of Havel as president early in 1990. What was once a revolutionary movement led by political dissidents became a government.

What happens when a dissident movement becomes a government? Havel's writings from the Communist period make a truly utopian argument, one beyond political parties or governing ideologies. According to Havel, the hidden space that made the movement so strong drew its strength from this non-ideological nature. It was neither liberal and nor was it communist. For him, as for many of the dissidents who became revolutionaries in 1989, the “essence of the conflict...[was] not a confrontation between two ideologies (for instance an socialist with a liberal one) but a clash between an anonymous, soulless, immobile and paralysis ('entropic') power, and life, humanity, being and its mystery” (Havel 1987, 133). This positioning of the dissident struggle as one between entropic power and human life highlights the utopia at work.
during the velvet revolutionary movement; the successful dissident strategy of the hidden sphere and its parallel structures was clearly utopian. Dissidents literally built a place, a utopia outside and beyond the totalizing influence of the Communist state. Parallel structures that made the revolution possible were “nothing more and nothing less than a culture which for various reasons will not, cannot, or may not reach out to the public...” (Havel 1987, 127). Built parallel to the Communist state, the dissident utopia formed its own life, its own space beyond normal public life or state controls. Committed to authentic human life, diversity, tolerance and expression, velvet utopia aspired to create a Czechoslovakia where the marginalization of human life would be impossible. A laudable goal, but sadly this project has yet to be completed\(^\text{37}\).

The Velvet Revolution's parallel structures, centered around the vibrant theater network of Prague, were the secondary space necessary for utopia to manifest in Czechoslovakia. As the revolutionary movement demolished the last vestiges of Communist authority, the secondary space of the theater became the location for building and reviving political authority. As this new authority developed, much of the movement's utopia was drawn into the political realm, creating a merger between the moral basis of the parallel structure and the necessary realities of governance. Czechoslovakia still had political problems. But the moral commitment to self determination and peaceful transition that was the hallmark of the velvet revolutionary movement, and that became embedded in the newly-formed authority, helped the peaceful partition of the country into separate Czech and Slovak republics in 1992. One only need consider the horrific violence at the breakup of Yugoslavia to recognize the dangerous potential

that existed in Czechoslovakia with the fall of Communism (Shepherd 2000, 146). Thus, even as we criticize that practice for its failings, or for its utopian tendencies, we should recognize the positive influence of the velvet revolutionary movement's utopian and moral practice on a newly-democratized Czechoslovakia.

While it is not the primary goal of this chapter to criticize in detail the foundation of the democratic Czechoslovak state, it is worthwhile to consider the Czechoslovak political and moral landscape through the work of its most famous novelist. Milan Kundera, while not an active velvet revolutionary, was surely an active dissident writer. Ludvik, the main character from Kundera's *The Joke*, is a man somewhat like his creator: He is incapable of stomaching the seriousness of Communist rule. Early in his life, what appears to him to be a simple joke runs him afoul of the powers-that-be and he is forever tainted by his 'dissident' association. Over the course of the novel, it is revealed that he has harbored a grudge against the Communist apparatchik who presided over his downfall. Seizing on the opportunity to get back at him decades later, Ludvik seduces his wife, Helena. The novel culminates in Ludvik realizing that his enemy no longer loves Helena, and is fine with Ludvik's new role as her lover; Ludvick then rejects Helena. The joke of *The Joke* is layered: there is the first joke which led Ludvik into dissidence, there is the joke on Ludvik that he seduced a woman eager to be seduced to get at a man who does not care, and there is the final, humiliating joke on Helena as she is rejected and left in a literal pile of her own shit. This depiction of a woman, as only a pawn in a patriarchal

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38 Kundera's *The Joke* was published just months before Prague Spring in 1968. Following the Warsaw Pact invasion to restore 'normalcy' to the country, popular participation was silenced by new censorship laws and further restrictions on public life. Like other Czech dissidents, Milan Kundera spent the last decades of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia exiled from his home country.
game and worth only her value in sex or power, is characteristic of Kundera who has been roundly criticized as a male chauvinist. Engaging with Kundera's *The Joke* urges us to consider the role of women in the Velvet Revolution.

Surely there were women participants in the movement, yet almost all the iconography and historical accounts are silent on women in the movement. The historiography of the Velvet Revolution is eerily gender neutral; when we do hear of individuals in the movement they are always men like Havel. Where are the women of the Velvet Revolution? They are silent, or have been made silent. Thus the irony is that a movement lauded for its liberal character demonstrates this crucial illiberality. If, following the logic of the Velvet Revolution, the revolution was like a play directed by those dissidents of the Civic Forum, then it was a play for and by men. Not even a classical Greek play had such a masculine cast; even if the characters were all played by men, at least in a Greek drama we see forms of strong women like Antigone and Clytemnestra. Yet this criticism runs the risk of silencing women a second time, for in a mass movement like the Velvet Revolution, there were certainly women participants, many thousands of them. We should say then, that a critical reappraisal of the important role of women in the Velvet Revolution needs to be made, and more historical accounts produced that demonstrate the unique contribution of women to the spatial practice of the Velvet Revolution.

The practices of the movement were in part determined by dissident theory, and the organizational leadership, like Havel, were committed to human rights and self-expression. Yet the greatest outcome of the Velvet Revolution for Prague has not been a renewed focus on human rights, but rather the explosion of 'liberalism' in the form of capitalist economic practices. Havel
was wary of the capitalist-industrial roots of liberalism, seeing in them the same root factors behind ideological communism. Even so, it is clear that the utopian imaginary produced during the dissident years of the 70s and 80s, and then made real during the velvet revolutionary movement, wholeheartedly embraced liberal notions like freedom of choice and diversity of opinion. This liberal sensibility has manifested as consumer capitalism within the urban space of Prague. Wenceslas Square, the heart of revolutionary space, has become the central site for capitalist spectacle in Prague. Side-by-side with the statue of St. Wenceslas and Jan Palach's plaque are Western chain stores like McDonalds and Starbucks, gambling houses, and strip joints. If the Velvet Revolution demonstrated that Wenceslas square is the heart of Prague, then that heart has thoroughly embraced a consumer culture in the years since the revolution. For a country to escape one economic extreme, only to dive so completely into capitalist practices makes one wonder if the Velvet Revolution has become more about capitalist economics than any humanistic, moral alternative to Communism.

A discussion of both capitalism in post-communist Prague and the lack of visibility for a gendered Velvet Revolution leads us to a final criticism. The most pernicious post-revolutionary problem facing the Czech Republic is the trafficking of women and girls for prostitution. Located at the intersection between women in society and capitalism, the problem of human trafficking is not unique to the Czech Republic. But as the gateway between Eastern and Western Europe, the Czech Republic is geographically positioned to be a major location for Eastern bodies and Western cash. Ann-Sofi Sidén's documentary film project has captured the economic relationship between women brought to the Czech Republic from all over Eastern Europe to work for their
boyfriend-pimps servicing primarily German clients (2002). Like Ludvik's use of Helena in *The Joke*, the Czech problem with human trafficking illuminates a dangerous trend of sexism within Czech social practice. If the struggle of the dissidents was a utopian struggle of human life against entropic power, then not enough of that utopian spirit was transmitted to the contemporary spatial practice of Czech society. What’s more, it suggests that the utopian, revolutionary struggle of 1989 continues in Sidén's and others work to combat human trafficking.
V. THE GREEN MOVEMENT OF 2009, TEHRAN

“Last year's electoral procedure was...reassuringly familiar: voters brought a form of identity, took a numbered ballot, wrote the full name of the candidate, along with the corresponding code, folded the ballot and inserted it into the box”
~Ali Ansari

A. Introduction

On June 12th 2009, the Iranian ballot box became the tangible, physical object that ignited a massive popular and urban mobilization on the streets of Tehran. Urban Iran responded to the stolen 2009 election by mobilizing what has come to be known as the Green Movement, a movement that was opposed from the start by coercive state power and violent repression. The Green Movement was an urban movement not only confined to Tehran or a few major metropolitan centers, but this chapter focuses on the streets and plazas of Tehran. Doing so hones in more precisely on the processes and memories surrounding the mobilization of the Green Movement. While it began as a mobilization against the theft of the election, through the summer 2009, the movement evoked the failed promises of the 1979 revolution and signaled the waning authority of the Islamic state.

What the revolution of 1979 promised was, in part, the unification of republican notions of government with the practice of Islam in the form of clerical state authority. For thirty years these two intertwined forces have waged a long and divisive struggle within the Iranian society and government. Yet, it was not until the stolen election of 2009 that the hardline Islamicist element came to completely dominate the state. The ballot box therefore stands as an ironic statement of the problematic contradictions of the current Iranian system—it stands for the illusion of popular Iranian government. The struggle has become one between popular
accountability and clerical state authority, between republicanism and non-elected entrenched interests.

The description of the ballot box given by Ansari provides a perfect entry point to begin unpacking the issues surrounding the urban movement that arose as a response election of 2009 in Iran. What is unusual about the description of the ballot box is not the occurrence of voting in Iran—quite to the contrary. Iran has held regular elections contested between visibly different candidates for 30 years\(^3\). What the ballot box signifies is not the abnormality of the 2009 election, but rather its initial normalcy. There was a wave of popular support for Mir Hossein Mousavi in the days leading up to the election, and Tehran had seen popular support of past candidates, particularly for Khatami in 1997. In 2009, the ballot box was poised to continued in its usual role of a functional, electoral object.

That the election was stolen by the concerted efforts of the sitting president, the Republican Guard, and Supreme Leader Khamenei is not really a contested fact. Its truth is demonstrated by the impossible speed in pronouncing Ahmadinejad's victory, and the many reports of voting irregularities (Ehsani et al. 2010). But Dabashi points out that even if by some fluke of time and space the election had not been stolen, the theft of the election has become a 'social fact'. He writes that the “assumption of the election having been rigged is now a 'social fact.' It is no longer relevant whether or not the election was rigged. Millions of Iranians believe it was, and they are putting their lives on the line to announce and assert it” (Dabashi 2011, 24). The pronouncement of Ahmadinejad's reelection spawned the mobilization of popular opposition.

\(^3\) It must be noted that these elections were and are not fully democratic in the sense that any citizen is technically eligible for office since candidates must be vetted by the Guardian Council.
on the streets of Tehran and other major cities. The Green Movement became, for a time, a massive participatory phenomenon, a demand for a radical change in government, for new democratic elections and the removal of the 'dictator' Khamenei.

The Green Movement made the collective demand that the state live up to the social expectations of a truly Islamic republic. In many ways this call for authentic Islamic government resembles the same call during the 1978 mobilization that lead to the Shah's ouster and the establishment of the Islamic Republic. “Repetitions emerge, but with a difference, anxiously conjuring up costumes and slogans of the past to act upon a new historic scene. History does not always repeat only twice, the first time as tragedy, again as farce. More often the repetition, including farce and failure, clear the way for the next movement” (Fischer 2010, 356). In writing on the 2009 Green Movement, Fischer echoes Marx from the 18th Brumaire. As emphasized in chapter 1, Marx saw the repetition of slogans and symbols as debasing the effort for socialist revolutionary politics. Instead, the evocation of the political memory of the 1979 revolution in 2009 may have an entirely different function than that suggested by Marx. Whether farce or failure, the conscious deployment of Islamic revolutionary language and iconography, as well as mobilization in remembered revolutionary space suggests an Arendtian return to past traditions in a deadly serious attempt to reground the bases of authority in the Islamic Republic, and to refresh popular sovereignty as a fundamental component legitimating the government of Iran. Thus the 2009 Green Movement in Iran is revolutionary in its aims, even if it did not seek violent upheaval.
This chapter is divided into a number of sections that guide the reader through the central events, spaces, and memories surrounding Green Movement mobilization. Section one introduces the unfamiliar reader with the electoral issues and candidates in the 2009 election, before moving to a discussion of the electoral theft and its immediate consequences. Section two is an exploration of the revolutionary foundation of the Iranian state, its base of authority in the constitutative tension between republicanism and Islam. In establishing the problematic relationship between the republican and hardline elements internal to the state, this section lays the groundwork to understand the motivations and demands of the 2009 struggle. Section three returns to 2009 and explores the primary spaces of Green mobilization, the streets and plazas of Tehran, and develops the connections between these spaces and the political memory of the 1979 Revolution; an exploration of urban space and political memory illuminates the Green Movement's connection with the utopia of 1979. The fourth section of the chapter deals with the Greening of virtual space, particularly the use of Twitter, Facebook, and other computer mediated communications. Much has been made in the popular press of the use of new media during the 2009 movement; this section debunks the erroneous claims of a 'Facebook revolution' while putting virtual space into context as part of a wider urban movement.

Sections five and six seek out potential secondary spaces of revolutionary organization. During the mobilization in 1978, mosques and bazaars provided heterotopic spaces through which the movement could organize the successful challenge to the Shah's state. While in 2009 some religious leaders came out in support of the Green Movement, and while some direct action took place in the Tehran Bazaar, section five shows that these potential secondary spaces were
largely closed to the movement. Drawing on themes and tactics from the 1979 Revolution, section six explores the Green Movement's vertical geography of protest, the use of rooftops to vocalize protest, and cemeteries to coordinate action and connect with the memory of martyrs. Potent heterotopic spaces they may be, but this vertical geography was also unable to act as a secondary space for the organization of state transformation. Overall, this chapter demonstrates that the Green Movement's demands for political inclusion are deeply tied in with the tradition and heritage of the 1979 revolution; these two movements are inextricably linked. The memory and practices of the '79 revolutionary movement are embedded within the 2009 Green Movement and its urban mobilization.

B. The Election and the Movement Response

In order to understand better the Green Movement, it is helpful to first consider the 2009 election campaign that gave rise to it. There was a growing sense before the 2009 election that reform was possible in Iran—economic reforms to reduce unemployment and political reforms to foster a more inclusive and less corrupt government. Iran was facing a host of problems, from massive unemployment and a stagnant economy, to the threat of military intervention by the United States. 2009 saw four major candidates for the office of President: Ahmadinejad (the sitting president and arch-conservative), Rezei (a center-right technocrat), Moussavi (a reform-minded former prime minister), and Karoubi (a reform-minded cleric).
B.1 The Election Field

The two main candidates in the election were Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the incumbent president, and his opposition challenger, Mir Hossein Mousavi. Supported by the hardline element in government and the Republican Guard, and effectively endorsed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, Ahmadinejad was well positioned to win reelection to a second term as president. Yet in the days before the election, a wave of support arose for Mousavi, the final Iranian Prime Minister before the constitution was amended in 1989. After engaging in televised debates, popular opinion went against Ahmadinejad, who was seen as petty, untrustworthy, and unsophisticated in comparison to the other three candidates (Abrahamian 2010, 63). Popular support swung in favor of Mousavi, and the other reform candidate, Mehdi Karroubi. The Iranian constitution mandates that the two candidates receiving the most votes would face each other in a runoff election, the popular expectation being that the two candidates would end up being Mousavi and Ahmadinejad.

While not candidates for the office of the President, there were other important 'power players' who influenced the 2009 election. Mousavi and his wife Zahra Rahnavard inspired thousands to come out into the streets and visibly demonstrate for change—change in government certainly, but also for a moderation in the policies of the Islamic Republic. These were not protests; they were election rallies that demonstrated the role of popular participation can play in Iranian society. Rahnavard is a well-respected figure in Iranian arts and academia

40 Mousavi was Prime Minister of Iran from 1981 to 1989. Two other candidates stood for election: Karoubi, a reform cleric and Rezaee, a conservative. Both trailed the main candidates in political support.

41 As mentioned above, also in the race for president was Moshen Rezaee, a conservative-leaning technocrat and former commander of the Revolutionary Guard. He ultimately garnered less popular support than did Mousavi or Karroubi.
(she is a well-known sculptor, and was president of an important women's college), as well as in reform politics, and she was a popular figure on the campaign trail with her husband. As a devout Muslim and an educated professor and artist, Rahnavard helped mobilized female support for her husband (Mir-Hosseini 2010, 144). The Green Wave rose, in part, as a result of her support and visibility.

In the spring of 2009, Khatami, the former two-term reformist president threw his considerable political support behind Mousavi. In the run-up to the election, Khatami gave Mousavi a green sash at a large campaign rally, cementing the use of green as the symbolic color of the Mousavi campaign42 (Majd 2010). Connected with the long tradition of Shi'a Islam, the color green became a powerful tool of resistance after the stolen election43. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei was another influential presence during the campaign. He publicly stated that only Ahmadinejad had the potential to govern Iran in line with the principles of the Islamic Revolution (Citation). Tantamount to an endorsement, one can read this retrospectively as an ominous warning to the other candidates, indicating the Supreme Leader's willingness to become more directly involved in electoral politics than he ever had been before. On election day, June 12th, the candidate headquarters began receiving reports of widespread voting irregularities. Only hours after the polls closed, Ahmadinejad was proclaimed the winner with a vast majority of the votes, thus forestalling a runoff election.

All four of the major candidates had been vetted by the Guardian Council. This formal political body of clerics and appointed politicians seeks to ensure the compatibility between the

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42 The color green as a campaign color was chosen initially by Zahra Rahnavard. See Dabashi 2011, 58.
43 The use of Islamic green is covered in detail in part three.
values of the revolution and the Islamic Republic with those people interested in running for political office. Ajmedenijad the sitting president, Mousavi, a devout Muslim and former Prime minister, Karroubi, a leading reform cleric, Moshen Rezaee, a former commander of the Revolutionary Guards: These candidates were not radicals, secularists, Marxists, nor were they part of a faction interested in dismantling the Islamic Republic. “Only eight months ago, [the candidates] passed through the formidable filter of the Council of Guardians in order to become presidential candidates. The regime is now calling them leaders of sedition” (Verde 2010, 233). Even though they passed the inspection of the Guardian Council, after the election these candidates were condemned as radical and anti-Islamic by Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader because they spoke out publicly against the theft of the ballot.

B.2 Social Forces

In the days after the stolen election, popular outrage at the act began to coalesce into the Green Movement. Grand Ayatollah Montazeri came out in opposition to the regime and its declaration of Ahmedinejad as victor. Once slated to become the Supreme Leader at Khomeini's death, Montazeri had been under house-arrest and marginalized from official politics for over twenty years. But isolated from politics is not isolated completely—as one of the Shi’a 'sources of emulation' Montazeri had many students, followers, and supporters. “Montazeri said that an administration that does not enjoy the vote of the people will not rule thoughtfully, its justice is flawed, and its rule is illegitimate” (Rooz Online 2010, 117). In stark contrast to the Supreme Leader who threw his support behind Ahmadinejad, and endorsed the legitimacy of the elections,
Montazeri proclaimed the theft of the vote as anti-Islamic. This vital religious support shored up the moral and religious basis for the Green Movement, legitimating protest and opposition as in-line with Islamic principles like justice, truth, and community. Though he died in the winter of '09, Montaseri's support lent vital support to the Green Movement in the early days of its mobilization.

The central political force that challenged the Green Movement was the Revolutionary Guards. The Revolutionary Guard began as a corps of soldiers, formed in the early days of the 1979 Revolution to protect the revolution and its leaders. Initially a military organization, the Revolutionary Guard has become something more over the last 30 years. President Ahmadinejad is now “supported by a powerful new class of Iranians who have become rich thanks to the regime's corruption—the Revolutionary Guard is not a working-class militia, but a mega-corporation, the most powerful center of wealth in the country” (Zizek 2010, 73). No longer only a military organization, the Revolutionary Guard has become a corporate force, with economic and social interests beyond that of a security organization. Seeking economic gain and political leeway to exercise power, the Revolutionary Guards demonstrated itself to be the governmental body willing to deploy violence against the Green Movement. In control of a vast information network and the numerous Basij Militia, the Revolutionary Guard was the security force used to repress social protest. Mousavi's possible election, and the mobilization of the reformist Green Wave in support of Mousavi's candidacy, threatened the entrenched interests of all the elements who had been economically privileged by Ahmadinejad's regime, including the Republican
Guard. In order to ensure its continued political power, the Revolutionary Guard supported and was complicit with the de-facto coup d'état of the stolen election.

The stolen election demonstrates a vast split in the ruling elite of the Islamic Republic, a split that grew out of the tensions between reformist and hardline elements in the Iranian state. Although election results may have been manipulated before (particularly in the vote count that resulted in the runoff of Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani, rather than Karoubi, in 2005), elections had functioned as a limited but legitimate venue for popular political participation (Ehsani et al. 2010). In opposing the outcome of the election, formerly legitimate politicians like Khatami, Mousavi, and Karroubi, politicians with impeccable revolutionary political credentials (former president, former prime minister, cleric, etc.) are suddenly labeled as dangerous elements by the regime. While the history of the Islamic Republic has been one of elite infighting, 2009 took this tendency to the extreme. Ahmadinejad essentially conducted a coup d'état, backed by the Supreme Leader and the Republican Guard. The hardline faction excised a substantial portion of the political elite of Iran. It has long been recognized that a split in the elite can be a precursor to the onset of a revolutionary situation (Skocpol 1979). The coup d'état of June 11th consolidated hardline control over the Iranian state, leaving relatively centrist politicians like Hashemi Rafsanjani as the only quasi-opposition figures left in a stripped down Iranian political class (Ehsani et al. 2010, 36).

In considering the Green Movement, we must ask the central question: why would the sitting government and the supposedly impartial Supreme Leader take the risk of stealing the election? What was at stake in 2009? While a dramatic event in its own right, the theft of the
2009 election should be viewed as the unfortunate culmination of decades of internal struggle in the Islamic Republic. Internal state factions arose early-on in the heady days of the Revolution of 1979. Some were hardliners who wanted to see Islam dominate over the secular, republican components of Iranian society. In large part these hardline factions won the institutional struggle against more moderate, secular, or republican elements, while losing the culture wars being won by reformers and more secular perspectives among the general population. Since the death of the first Supreme Leader Khomeini in 1989, reformist elements have been in competition with the hardline position. The most obvious of these reformist trends was seen in the election of Khatami to the presidency in 1997 (Hashemi and Postel 2010, 4). Yet the struggle between reformers and hardliners has deeper roots, rising out of the 1979 revolution. These unresolved and constitutive tensions demonstrate the conflict between republican and Islamicist elements in the Iranian Government.

Demographically, Iran is a young country, well-educated and urban, but its youthful population is frustrated. In an article for the New York Times, Salehi-Ifsahani reported that “Young people ages 15-29...make up 35 percent of the population but account for 70 percent of the unemployed” (Dabashi 2010a, 23). It is in part the demographics of the country that have led to such a large outpouring of opposition to the regime. A young population, educated and without work, has a great incentive to come out into the streets in opposition to a regime that has done little to increase the general economic well-being of the country. The Green Movement is by-and-large a movement of the young, urban, and under-employed. The youth and vigor of the

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44 This same economic situation is mirrored in the case of Egypt. Vitalis notes that in “1990s Egypt, a professional education often offers less than American student's worst nightmare—moonlighting at McDonalds—and no hope
protests are made visible in the earliest slogan of the 2009 protests: 'where is my vote'. “Ra-ye man koo?...Koo is a slang word for 'where', instead of the standard koja, so the slogan might be translated as 'where's my vote at?' This slogan reflects the demographics of the Green Movement, whose principle base is educated young people” (Kurzman 2010, 8). Stepping outside conservative and normal language, this slang slogan suggests the transgressive quality of the protests. It blends a traditional republican call for voting rights with a more nuanced, youthful enthusiasm for interpretation and innovation. This is the Green Movement—a blending of republican and Islamic traditions with artful critique.

The Green Movement is an urban movement; it is critical to point out the centrality of urban space, particularly the urban space of Tehran to the mobilization of the Green Movement. “In the past three decades, Iran has become an increasingly urban and literate society. Creeping urbanity (through growing education, electrification, a nuclear family structure, specialization, media expansion and newspaper reading) has brought the countryside into the orbit of an urban pulse” (Bayat 2010, 50-51). Iran has been a majority urban country since 1979, the year of the revolution, and it has not been immune to the centralizing and urbanizing processes of globalization. Bayat points out that the countryside—often considered a bastion of conservatism and religiosity—has increasingly been subject to or at least influenced by the explosive cultural and demographic power of the city. Thus, the Green Movement as an urban phenomenon embraces and integrates the countryside as well.

of escape from the psychological violence of living ten-to-a-room in deteriorating housing stock in neglected neighborhoods” (1997, 100).
These social forces—youthful populations, literacy, and urbanity—came together in 2009 to foster Green mobilization. Yet statistical data cannot fully explain why the Green Movement mobilized. It is unclear how deeply the young and urban population was influenced by the rhetoric and iconography of the Islamic Republic, and how meaningful the ideals of Islamic justice and community, of sacrifice and martyrdom, are to this population. Instead, we should recognize the fact that these youth grew up during the reformist period under President Khatami, and actually expect their vote to matter, and expect the election to proceed along constitutional lines. Thus the stolen election and the ironic symbol of the ballot box signals a population outraged by first the hypocrisy of the election, and then energized by the use of violence against protesters. In thought provoking ways, the struggle of 2009 quickly came to resemble the struggle of 1978-9, where cries of death to the dictator (meaning Khamenei) resemble cries of death to the Shah. In the summer of 2009, the slogan 'where is my vote' changed into the revolutionary Shi'a slogan of 'ya Hossein' not only because religion is an important cultural force in Iran, but also because it is harder for Iranian security forces to arrest someone chanting the name of a major Shi'ah martyr. Young, idealistic, invested in the system—the Green Movement became the heir of the 1979 revolution by interpreting the rhetoric of the revolution for their own time and space.

B.3 Characterizing the Green Movement

From its inception, the Green Movement has been based on a principle of inclusiveness. This is not a conscious agenda like a party platform, but rather the natural development of a

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45 The slogan ‘ya Hossein’ references Hossein, the third Shi’a Imam who was killed at the battle of Karbala.
reform movement that attempts a popular revision of contemporary Iranian society. Based in part on inclusive principles, “This is a pluralistic movement, including believers and non-believers, socialists and liberals. There are all walks of life in the Green Movement” (Wright 2010, 193). From the urban poor of South Tehran to the rich at the north end of the city, from students at Tehran University to aged clerics, and from women who disdain the mandatory hijab, to those who embrace it, the Green Movement drew on all sectors of Iranian society. Contrary to some viewpoints, the Green Movement is not solely a youth movement, though due to urban demographics as noted above, it cannot help but to be comprised mainly of youth. In essence, the Green Movement represents Iranian society in a massively popular, participatory way that Ahmadinejad’s government has been unable to achieve.

To emphasize this point, it should be perfectly clear that the Green Movement does not have a single, overriding issue.\textsuperscript{46} The Green Movement is an opposition movement; it defines itself not as a political program but rather in opposition to the sitting government and its corrupt practices. Since it draws from all sectors of Iranian society: “The Green Movement represents, at this stage, a social network, both horizontal and vertical. It is not a true political organization, because as soon as it ever became one, it would be savagely suppressed.” (Sahimi 2010, 304). As a horizontal movement the Green Movement did not draw from only one geographic or demographic group; likewise it is vertical in that it cut across income groups and inspired participation from the meanest urban dweller to the educated, political elite.\textsuperscript{48} Additionally, the

\textsuperscript{46} Such as the Iranian Women’s movement that seeks the more equitable inclusion of women in Iranian society (Bashi 2010).

\textsuperscript{47} As indeed it was.

\textsuperscript{48} There is some question to whether the Green Movement has a strong basis among the bureaucratic middle class,
Green Movement is not a formal organization, because as was seen in the case of post Prague Spring Czechoslovakia, the government has the power and will to destroy any organized opposition. But since it was a loose-knit association of like-minded protesters, organizing through informal connections rather than formal organizational meetings, the Ahmadinejad government was less able to target the movement.

The Green Movement also holds to the principles of non-violence. In an interview, the Iranian trade-unionist Homayoun Pourzad states that “The youth do not have the same romanticization of revolutionary violence, which was one of the reasons things got out of hand in 1979” (Morrison 2010, 204). Even as Basiji Militia used violent, repressive tactics to crush crowds, riding motorbikes and wielding batons, the Green movement did not employ violence as a tactic in resisting the government. Non-violence allows the Green Movement to take the moral high ground against the regime—to draw and hold international support and attention while staying true to a powerful social movements tradition. The central reason for the use of non-violent tactics is the powerful memory of violence, and its terrible consequences, during the 1979 Revolution. Violence was deployed first by the Shah's state against protesters, and once in power the Islamic Government used purges and revolutionary tribunals to silence, repress, torture, and kill the opponents of Islamic Government. Eschewing violence, therefore, is a way for the Green Movement to remember and redeem past injustices committed in the name of the revolution. In a way, the use of non-violence as a tactic demonstrates the unwillingness of the opposition movement to resemble the state it opposes.

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49 The state claimed that the movement did use violence, including the claim that protesters shot Neda Soltan. This suggests that the State recognized the power of non-violent social protest and worked to undermine that quality.

since this is one population that receives major benefits from Ahmadinejad's policies.
One might think that since the current regime in Iran is a theocracy, ruled ultimately by Supreme Leader Khamenei, that the Green Movement would be a secular movement. While there are secularists in the broad coalition, the Green Movement and its leaders are avowedly Islamic in their aims. From Mousavi and his wife, Zara Rahnavard, both devout Muslims, to the cleric-candidate Karroubi, the leadership of the Green Movement is solidly Shi'a, and in solid support of the Islamic Republic—just not its current state of corruption. “By pledging unconditional loyalty to the foundations of the Islamic Republic, the leaders of the Green Movement hope to attract or at least neutralize...'moderate conservatives' and influential figures in various religious and political circles” (Tabaar 2010, 277). Mousavi and the others were certainly the symbolic leaders of the movement, while youthful campaign supporters played the important role of facilitating mobilization. These Green leaders sought to revitalize and repair the traditions of the Islamic Republic, traditions established through the foundation of 1979, and slowly weakened over thirty years of war, international opposition, and internal strife. The Green Movement seeks a return to those republican and Islamic values at the heart of the Iranian revolutionary project, values that are sometimes in tension, potentially incompatible with each other, but entirely Iranian.

C. The Iranian Revolutionary Foundation

The foundation of the Islamic Republic is critical to our study of 2009 because, unlike the other cases of Paris and Prague that largely drew on memories opposed to state authority, the

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50 In this, it was very like the 1979 revolution, in which the apparent leadership, including Khomeini, were often running to catch up with activist actions like the Iranian Hostage Crisis in 1981.
political tradition that inspired and supported the Green Movement is the one also claimed by the regime. This section explores this dynamic tension through the process of state formation in 1979 and after. Michel Foucault's much criticized intervention during the 1978 revolutionary mobilization and 1979 transition to Islamic government provides an unparalleled tool to help unpack the dual nature of modern Iranian government. Foucault correctly identified the transformative effect of modernization on the Iranian population, the central role of martyrdom as a revolutionary theme and tactic, and the problematic nature of proposing a state with parallel electoral and clerical authorities.

C.1 Forming the Revolutionary State

After the Shah fled the country and Ayatollah Khomeini returned to jubilant crowds, there was still the matter to be settled of actually governing Iran. It was left to the revolutionary leadership, like Khomeini, Bakhtiari, and Bani Sadr to draft and implement a new constitution. This period of foundation was the beginning of a process whereby the Islamist elements of the revolutionary movement began hedging out the liberal-secularist elements, taking on the reins of political power themselves. Keddie writes that:

At first there was a true united-front government, including not only nonulema supporters of Khomeini, notably Prime Minister Mahdi Bazargan and the youngster...Bani-Sadr, and Ibrahim Yazdi, but also, for a time, more conservative, secularist members of the National Front such as Karim Sanjabi...With the taking of the U.S. Embassy and hostages, the movement towards control by radical clerics received a big impetus that the growing radical clerical leadership used for its own ends” (1985, 12).
The revolutionary leadership was comprised of moderates, liberals, Islamists, and even communists; but as the days of urban insurrection against the Shah faded into a period of founding a new republic, the Islamist elements rose to dominance. By using critical events like the hostage crisis to cement their control (even though they had not initiated and were not in control of those events), Khomeini and his followers became the unquestioned faction in control of Iran.

Khomeini and the Islamicists made a successful play in consolidating their political power, even though they initially shared power with a leftist faction that included Mousavi as Prime Minister. In gaining control over the state Khomeini and his followers were able to direct Iranian society towards a more pious future. But consider the language in this passage from a speech by Khomeini:

"Those who did not participate in this movement have no right to advance any claims. Who are they that want to change the course of our nation now, and what are the groups that call for a change in direction? Who are they that wish to divert our Islamic movement from Islam? Some of them do not understand the realities of the matter; they are ignorant. Others consciously and knowingly are opposed to Islam. Those who are ignorant must be guided to a correct understanding. We must say to them: 'You who imagine that something can be achieved in Iran by some means other than Islam, you who suppose that something other than Islam overthrew the Shah's regime, you who believe non-Islamic elements played a role—study the matter carefully. Look at the tombstones of those who gave their lives in the movement'" (Khomeini 1981, 269 my emphasis).

I have quoted at length to give the reader an appreciation for the rhetorical style and content of Khomeini's post-revolution speeches. According to Khomeini, the movement was always Islamic and non-Islamic elements played no role in the overthrow of the Shah. Whether or not Khomeini actually believed this is largely irrelevant here—what is crucial to recognize is that the Islamist
government, as early as June 5th 1979, had begun to reshape the political memory of the revolution. They began to craft an Islamic whole out of a movement where before there was a diversity of ideological and practical revolutionary actors. As Dabashi and Chellowski suggest, Khomeini was 'staging' his own retroactive revolution to appropriate the '79 revolution on his own, solely Islamic terms (1999).

In his final two articles on Iran published in 1979 after Khomeini’s return to and the Shah’s departure from Iran, “An Open Letter to Prime Minister Bazargan” and “Is it Useless To Revolt?”, Foucault identifies a central problem developing within the new Iranian political system. He writes: “The spirituality of those who were going to their deaths had no similarity whatsoever with the bloody government of a fundamentalist clergy. The Iranian clerics want to authenticate their regime through the significations that the uprising had. It is not different to discredit the fact of the uprising on the grounds that there is today a government of mullahs” (Foucault 2005, 256). In separating the uprising from the state Foucault is able to criticize both the Islamic government of Iran that seeks to legitimate itself on the back of the revolution, and those Western commentators who reject the Iranian revolt because of the Islamic government established after the fall of the Shah.

Foucault’s texts produce a line of reasoning on the Islamic state that echoes Arendt’s two-part distinction between liberation and foundation. Foucault has been taken to task for supporting the revolution that ended up being the Islamic Republic, but Moruzzi notes that Foucault, like Arendt, makes a powerful distinction between the revolution and the state that it creates (2006). For Foucault and Arendt both, revolutions cannot be conflated with state power. To do so would
be a disservice to those who sacrificed their lives to establish a new order—even if the foundation is ultimately deemed unsuccessful it does not negate the worthiness of the attempt at liberation. Žižek notes this distinction between liberation and foundation in his own analysis of Foucault's encounter with the Iranian Revolution (2008; 2008). Interpreting Foucault in a manner analogous to the Arendtian distinction between foundation and liberation, Žižek argues that Foucault is concerned primarily with liberation, because the authentic revolutionary event itself is very rare and because it is a possible moment of resistance. Of course, Foucault detests the abuses of state power; this is his oeuvre, and it in no way stops him from supporting the uprising.

Foucault does not emphasize how crucial state power is to liberation, largely framing state power as a force of opposition. If there is one lesson we can take away from Arendt’s dual notion of a revolution, is should be that both liberation and foundation are ultimately necessary in revolution. Foucault stands in solidarity with the body in resistance, yet balks at the formation of a state. It is his right as an observer and foreign public intellectual. But if we are concerned with understanding revolution, then we must be concerned with both foundation and liberation simultaneously. This does not mean that if we support a people in revolt, like Foucault did in Iran, then we must accept and support the revolutionary state created by that movement. Quite the contrary, if a person (like Foucault) supports a revolutionary movement, he or she must work hard to keep alive the spirit of liberation even as a new state is founded. Foucault notes: “Concerning the expression ‘Islamic government,’ why cast immediate suspicion on the adjective Islamic”? The word ‘government’ suffices, in itself, to awaken vigilance. No adjective—whether democratic, socialist, liberal, or people’s—frees it from its obligations”
A revolutionary state once founded must hold tight to its own liberation impulse even as a new state is founded. A movement of liberation always runs a risk in founding a new system, and newly formed institutions and nascent state structures are always fragile during moments of political foundation. Revolutionary leadership must do all it can to prevent the abuses of government that undermine the foundation of freedom, even if internal power dynamics are in flux as they were during the '79 Iranian Revolution.

C.2 Foundation and the Green Movement

The Iranian revolutionary foundation is bound up with republicanism as well as with Islam; these two strains contextualize the Green Movement of 2009 just as much as they do the revolutionary movement of 1978. The central argument of this chapter is that over the course of the Iranian revolution, two major strains of political thought motivated demands and action. The first of these, republicanism, was built on a century long tradition that sought to develop democratic institutions in Iran. Republicanism first came to the fore during the 1906 Constitutional Revolution which overthrew the Qajar Dynasty (Abrahamian 2008). Though republican elements were displaced in favor of a constitutional monarchy led by Reza Pahlavi, this force was an important but divisive component of the Iranian political system. A more nationalistic republicanism came to the fore during the short lived Iranian Republic of 1951-1953, led by prime minister Mossadeq. “He does not look like a man whose fate would continue to influence the world decades after his death. But this was Mohammad Mossadeq, the most fervent advocate of democracy ever to emerge in his ancient land” (Kinzer 2010, 26). The
memory of Mossadeq's republic is contentious, but still central to the republican spirit in Iran. But it was during the founding of the Iranian 'Islamic Republic' that we identify the enshrining of republican values in the Iranian system. Contrary to a popular belief that the revolution of 1979 was entirely Islamic in nature, secular republicanism played a large part in the processes of urban mobilization in 1978, and in large part these elements were the ones who drafted the constitution in 1979 and instituted an elected parliament and presidency (Bayat 2010, 46).

Since the 1979 revolution, republicanism and the elected leadership of Iran has been overshadowed in terms of force and authority by the parallel, non-elected religious-political leaders. Islam has been a potent component of modern Iranian culture, and has been a decisive factor in Iranian politics for over a century. In 1891, Iranian mullahs condemned the Qajar tax on tobacco, initiating a religiously inspired revolt against the law. During the Constitutional Revolution, and again during the Mossadeq era, factions of politicized clerics opposed republicanism and the founding of an Iranian republic (Arjomand 1988). By the late 1970s, republican and Islamicist elements found a common foe in the Shah, and this foe united the two political forces into an opposition movement that succeed in overthrowing the Shah and establishing a new state.

Republican and Islamicist unity lasted all too briefly. The constitutional referendum after the '79 revolution established a sense of popular legitimacy for Khomeini's principle of the 'guardianship of the jurist', the principle that argued for the inclusion of the Velayat-e-faqi [Supreme Leader] position as a formal part of Iranian government. Though republicans played a

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51 Dabashi believes that the memory of Mossadeq and “the phenomenon of 28-Mordadism as a political paradigm that peaked in modern Iranian political culture...has now finally exhausted itself” (2011, 73).
role in drafting the constitution, and forming the first governments of the Islamic Republic, Islamist forces by 1981 had already began to marginalize and persecute their republican counterparts. “There is a dualism in Iran of nation-state concepts intermingled with Islamic forms. These forms are not revivals of continuities with historical instances but quite novel creations...The duality is indicated in the very title of Islamic ‘republic’” (Zubaida 1997, 105). Since the death of Khomeini, politics in Iran has centered around the constant struggle and consolidation of state power around an ever narrower and ever more conservative, hardline faction led by Khamenei. The Green Movement mobilization showcases the inherent tensions of the regime, between contrasting principles of legitimation (religious authority and popular authority) as well as the tension between appointed and elected officials. The dualism between republican and hardline elements, always in flux, has recently swung in the favor of the hardliners; the 2009 electoral coup, led by Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, is in part a signal of the one faction's attempt to finally dominate the other, more republican one. But the Green Movement demonstrates that republican tradition in Iran has not been completely excised from the national character.

D. Green Mobilization in the Streets

The streets of Tehran were the primary space of mobilization during the 2009 Green Movement. It was on the streets of Tehran that the movement began to generate massive, popular opposition to the regime. Millions strong in June, these protesters called on the political memory of protests past to support their collective claims on the state. As suggested in previous chapters,
the primary spaces of green mobilization were universities, streets, and plazas in the urban center of Tehran\textsuperscript{52}.

D.1 Primary Spaces in Tehran

A day after the election, when it became clear that the sitting government had stolen the vote, millions of people turned out on the streets of Tehran to protest. Mobilizing via word of mouth, Facebook, and Twitter, these protesters chanted and marched in opposition to the regime and its leaders, Ahmadinejad and Khamenei. “The Tehran municipality, run by the conservative mayor Mohammad Bagher [Qalibaf], estimated the number of protesters in mid-June to be three million” (Ehsani et al. 2010, 32). The June 12\textsuperscript{th} protest became so large it dwarfed the government’s attempt at crowd control. In an interview soon after the outbreak of protest, the Iranian political scientist Hossein Bashiriyeh stated that “the aftermath of the election constituted a catalyst for a potentially revolutionary situation facing a government caught in a number of crises. More specifically, it has signified a fatal crisis of cohesion and unity” (Postel 2010, 82-3). A day after the election, with uncertainty in the air and popular grievance being voiced by millions, a revolutionary situation gripped Tehran. In the explosive uncertainty generated by the stolen election, and with the unbridled camaraderie felt and expressed on the street, a revolutionary potential for sweeping change existed on the streets of Tehran.

\textsuperscript{52} Universities are always a hotbed of activism, and in 2009 Tehran University was no exception. But unlike the 1968 movement in Paris, the explosive nature of the Green Movement made it a street movement first and foremost, while university space was an additional space for mobilization and not the space which generated protest. University space in Tehran did not hold cross-cutting cultural or social relevance like the mosque or the bazaar.
Recognizing central Tehran as the preeminent site of protest is crucial. Soon after the protests of June 12th, the Iranian dissident Akbar Ganji pointed out that the “importance of Karoubi's message is that protest took place in the heart of Tehran” (Dabashi 2010b, 274). Mehdi Karoubi, one of the presidential candidates and Green Movement leaders, had been very vocal in opposing the regime. Through a Green Movement blog, Khordaad 88, Karoubi has consistently pointed out the importance of direct action in the capitol city. Iran, like many other centralized states, relies on its capital to be the primary location for government, commerce, and culture. Thus when we see three million people explode out on the streets, shutting down traffic, blocking access to buildings, and preventing 'business as usual' in the capitol, it also means the massive disruption of Iranian state power. Tehran rests in the heart of Iran, both geographically and politically; for a few tumultuous days in June, protest rested at the heart of Tehran.

Not only do the streets of Tehran hold contemporary political significance, they are also historically significant as the site of the 1979 revolutionary movement that led to the Shah's ouster and the establishment of the Islamic Republic:

This was a time of euphoria, with young people striding along the main avenues of Tehran, some of which had symbolic significance. For example, the long, tree-lined Vali Asr Avenue stretched for more than 20km from the northern part of Tehran down to its southern end, from upper and middle-class residential neighborhoods in the north to working-class districts in the south. Another avenue, Enghelab (Revolution) extended across Tehran from the east to the west, stretching past Tehran University and ending up in the large Azadi (Freedom) Square, which is laden with revolutionary memories. These geographic locations had played a major symbolic role during the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79 and as such were endowed with euphoric and historical meanings, as the birthplace of the Islamic Revolution. The new actors occupied the same thoroughfares, providing their actions with the same significance as during the heyday of the Islamic Revolution (Khosrokhavar 2012a, 169).
Streets and plazas like the ones mentioned above hold a special, spatial significance as sites of protest. These sites work to evoke political memory, particularly the political memory of the '79 Revolution, and the massive popular support demonstrated by that revolutionary movement. Thus when Iranian protesters occupy a particular location, like Freedom Square, they are consciously evoking the past traditions of revolution. While this is true in most every case of urban mobilization, it is doubly important for Tehran in 2009. Most movements evoke political memories eschewed by the state (recall the use of the memory of the Paris Commune during the 1968 protests in Paris), while the Green Movement is actively contesting the meaning and use of a memory claimed by the 'revolutionary' Islamic Republic. For thirty years, this revolutionary tradition has been put at the service of the state. Green Mobilization worked to reclaim revolutionary principles like representative, republican government and the moral integrity of the Islamic community from the state. In 2009, as the Green Movement contested with the state for control over urban space, they were also actively contesting the meaning and the memory of the '79 Iranian Revolution.

Only a few days after the election, Hashemi Rafsanjani led the Friday prayers at Tehran University to thousands of assembled protesters. Since 1979, Friday prayers have been given at Tehran University in central Tehran, and Tehran Friday prayer leaders have a central role in expressing and shaping the policy of the Islamic Republic. Additionally, Friday prayers at the University have been a significant space of political intervention by a conservative regime, one often at odds with the student population. “The open defiance by thousands of opposition supporters around Friday prayers at Tehran University on July 17th, 2009 is but a surface
indication of the heaving anger below. The gathering heard a call by the former president and influential figure Hashemi Rafsanjani for those arrested in the protests to be released” (Halliday 2010, 53). Rafsanjani openly questioned the regime (a regime in which he is a central player) and he did it at Tehran University during Friday prayers, giving it a moral and spatial weight. Rafsanjani is one of the central figures in Iranian government. Leader of the Council of Experts, a former president of the Islamic Republic, and Hojat-al Islam, Rafsanjani is no radical dissident. Yet at this Friday prayer, at the height of mobilization, he called for the release of prisoners. This action essentially backed the claims of the movement against the regime. Even as he was threatened by Ahmedinejad's Basiji supporters, Rafsanjani called into question the legitimacy of the regime, further undermining the regime's authority and signaling the internal fragmentation of the governing elite.

Very much like the transformation of Wenceslas Square during the 1989 movement in Prague, the urban space of Tehran was transformed from the everyday site of transit and commerce over the course of the June mobilization. No longer just a street or just a public square, these spaces became sites of resistance and sites of dialogue, discussion, and debate. “Numerous observers in Tehran and other cities report that political debates in public spaces, like Vanak Square or Enqelab Square were substantive and civil if impassioned” (Ehsani et al. 2010, 31). Mobilization in Tehran demonstrates again the situation we saw before in Paris and Prague—urban movements disrupt the pattern and normalcy of everyday life. Discussion on the streets, dialogue between friends, and disagreements between those with differing viewpoints: this it the quintessential essence of mobilization. First we see the suspension of everyday
practices, and then secondly we see the filling up of that suspended site with open discussion on the goals, issues and sensations relevant to the movement. In the case of Tehran we see discussions about the legitimacy of the government, the authority (or lack thereof) of the Supreme Leader and of course, about tactics of mobilization.

*Figure 5.1: Azadi Square*

Central locations, like public thoroughfares and plazas, take on central roles as spaces of mobilization. Figure 5.1 is photograph taken in Azadi Square during one of the massive protests in 2009. In Tehran in 2009 one of these major nexuses of communication and mobilization was Azadi Square. “There were vociferous protests in many parts of the country, and Mousavi and Karoubi called for a silent rally to be held at Azadi (Freedom) Square in Tehran on Monday, June
15. Around a million people heeded the call...the scene was reminiscent of the rallies held in the same square during the 1979 Revolution” (Abrahamian 2010, 67). Mobilization in urban space has multifaceted functions. At its most basic, spaces like Azadi Square have a useful function as locations where people can get together and protest the regime. Azadi Square also acts as the site for revolutionary communication as described above. Such discussion is revolutionary not so much (or not only) in its content, but also and specifically in the form in which it takes—spontaneous and open. Yet these two aspects of urban movement sites do not capture the third and most important aspect, the connection between urban space and political memory. Azadi Square was the preeminent site for protest in 2009 not only because it is well located in the center of Tehran, but because it was a very significant site during the 1979 Revolutionary Movement. Thus when protesters occupied this space, they were claiming it for 2009 and the Green Movement, but they are also claiming the heritage of the ’79 Revolution. The major centers and locations for urban protest are inextricably linked with the utopia of 1979.

D.2 The Utopian Spirit of 1979

The utopia of the 79 revolution was captured in a vivid series of revolutionary posters created during the events, and an exploration of these posters sheds insight on the utopia of the Green Movement. Mitchell notes that: “The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran produced posters, graffiti, and banners rich in popular images of piety, anti-imperialism, and martyrdom” (Mitchell 1997, 253). Blending these themes, the revolutionary posters of 79 are a vivid iconography from which we can draw insights on the quality of the Islamic nature of the ’79 movement, including
themes of social justice and inclusion (Balaghi 2002). For the movement, revolution was not just about anti-imperialism and national sentiment; it was also about bringing the national political space into line with commonly held popular beliefs about Islamic morality and community.

The dynamic forces arranged in society that opposed the Shah and foreign powers cannot be reduced to Islam alone—the Iranian Revolution was conducted by a diverse array of social forces, including communist labor activists, traditional economic elites, religious radicals, secular nationalists, among others. So the influence on the style and content of the posters did not come from Islam alone:

As social discontent increased throughout the 1970s, some of Iran's leading contemporary artists assumed an active role in the production of political posters. Inspired by the French student movement of 1968, a group of Iranian artists opened a workshop at the University of Tehran in 1978. The workshop provided the materials and equipment for printing posters to members of various political groups. Professional artists worked alongside amateurs. Their results were displayed throughout Tehran—in schools, in factories, and on the walls of other buildings, often defacing public monuments built by the Pahlavi regime as symbols of its authority and grandeur. As government agents tore them down or covered them with paint, protesters would replace them with replenished supplies (Grey Online).

As this passage suggests, not only were posters repositories of information, but posters were printed and distributed in an act of spatial resistance to the Shah's regime. Professional poster artists as well as amateurs, working within the university and along the lines of the Parisian Atelier Populaire of '68, drafted posters that evoked a mixture of the tradition of revolutionary posters as well as the cultural situation particular to revolutionary Iran.

Two silkscreen images (Figures 5.2 and 5.3 below) produced by Morteza Momayez at the height of the Iranian Revolution, “Tulips have bloomed from the blood of our nation's youth” and “Women are the companions of the revolution,” introduce us to some of the revolution's
utopian themes. “His posters clearly display the fusion of symbolism that marked Iranian modern art in this period” (Iranian Revolutionary Posters). The first depicts three raised fists that are also tulips. This is a conscious blending of two utopian traditions; the tulip is a potent symbol from Persian literature and culture, while the raised fist is iconic of workers struggles across the world\(^3\). The use of stark colors—red and black on a white background—further signals the influence of socialist imagery on the Tehran workshop, while simultaneously signaling the greater technical skill of the later workshop since they are able to work in two colors instead of only one\(^4\). This poster demonstrates a utopian blend of global, socialist revolutionary struggles with the proudly and culturally specific Iranian context.

Figure 5.2: Tulips
Figure 5.3: Women

\(^3\) The image of the first further corroborates the Atelier Populaire’s influence on the Iranian poster-makers since the second poster created at the Atelier was a singular fist done in red ink. This poster has been reproduced countless times, including for the cover of the most recent edition of Arendt’s *On Revolution*.

\(^4\) Recall that the Atelier Populaire lacked the technical skill with silkscreening to produce polychromatic posters. See Chapter 2.
The second image, also in red and black on a white field, pictures female protesters dressed in hijab. This recognition of women's participation in the movement is charged with utopian meaning. Firstly, it signals the importance of women to the overall movement effort by incorporating women into a representational space of revolution normally reserved for men. Secondly and patriarchally, it places those women firmly within an utopian, Islamic context as pious observers of modest dress.

What these posters indicate is a dynamic, sometimes contradictory blending of utopian themes and symbols, a blending that is indicative of the overall revolutionary movement. While socialist themes were much less salient during the 2009 protests, the Green Movement drew on many of these themes in the process of mobilization. The most important of these memories was perhaps the memory of women's participation in 1979, and their visibility during the 2009 election protests. Hundreds of images of women protesting in their black hijab circulated through cyberspace in the summer of 2009, and female protesters were often on the front line of protest, and out the street.

E. The Greening of Virtual Space

This section explores how digital technology facilitated the mobilization of the movement, but could not provide a secondary space of organization in 2009. Themes of martyrdom connected the Green Movement with the memory of 1979, and the color green facilitated a connection between the movement and the deeper, more contentious memories of how Shi'a symbolism was used during the 1979 revolutionary period. The movement's
deployment of Islamic imagery in 2009 initiated a battle over the revolutionary potential of Shi'a Islam and control of the memory of 1979.

E.1 The Image of Neda Agha-Soltan

Perhaps the best remembered event of the 2009 mobilization was the slaying of Neda Agha-Soltan. “Neda Agha Soltan, 26, became the rallying point of the protesters' struggle when she was fatally shot by a sniper during the government's crackdown in Tehran on June 20...Her death was captured on video and broadcast worldwide” (Khosrokhavar 2012a, 212). Shot by a sniper, Neda quickly succumbed to her wounds, dying on the Tehran street while her death was filmed by a friend with a mobile phone. Neda's death was similar to the deaths of other Iranian youth at the hands of state repression in 2009; the Basiji militia was deployed to harass and beat protesters, while military snipers targeted people in crowds. In this sense, Neda is emblematic of all those young Tehranians who felt the the coercive power of the state in June of 2009. But Neda died on camera, looking into the lens; as you watch the video you can see the life go out of her eyes, and blood gush from her mouth. The viewer remembers Neda (while those other deaths and injuries become just statistics) because the video of her death conveys the fragile nature of life and evokes the flower of youth, stamped out before its time. Neda's death is iconic because the viewer sees her face as she dies, and is able to literally stare into the face of death and bear witness to murder at the hand of the state.

Neda's death, her 'martyrdom' in the language of the Green Movement and Shi’a tradition, became a media sensation. Dying in the way that she did, not at the hand of a visible attacker, but
at long range by a hidden gunman, her youthful beauty and innocence catapulted Neda to a posthumous fame on the Internet, where videos of her death have been watched over a million times on Youtube (Youtube). Neda's death “circulated worldwide via videos captured by Iranian amateur photographers and discredited the Iranian regime beyond repair, making her an icon of the Green Movement” (Khosrokhavar 2012b, 154). The proliferation of the video of Neda's death suggests the potential for a secondary space hitherto unexplored or exploited by urban movements—cyberspace. Of course, the Internet must exist for a movement to take advantage of its significance as a tool for mobilization, and so the 2009 Green Movement is among the first, large-scale examples of what some have erroneously referred to as a 'Facebook' or 'Twitter Revolutions'. To be clear, Facebook and Twitter were not the cause of the Green Movement. Rather we should recognize the significance of cyberspace as a tool for mobilization. Knowledge of an event like Neda's death is spread so rapidly that it can inspire continued and future protest; thus opposition galvanizes through this new technological medium.

The centrality of computer mediated communications to the Green Movement becomes clear when we recall the demographics of the movement. Young, connected, and urban, the Green Movements use of technology is explained in part by generational causes. “This time around, again, the scene is overwhelmed by the massive participation of the youth, the students, and above all women—on both sides of the political divide. This new generation is Internet savvy, versatile with Facebook, Youtube clips, and Twitter. It is globally wired” (Dabashi 2011, 55.

Yet Neda's boyfriend and the doctor who attempted to help her were forced to flee the country after they were identified and harassed by the state, signaling the potential personal costs of internet publicity.

For example, Ethan Zuckerman's January 2011 article “The First Twitter Revolution?” in Foreign Policy magazine suggests that while Tunisia's 2011 revolution may not have been determined by technology, that for “users of social media, the protests [of 2009] in Iran were an inescapable, global story”.
From an early age, these Iranian youth have developed a facility with digital media—Twitter and Facebook may well be new technologies, but these are new people. They are youth for whom the use of technology is integral to social and cultural participation in modern Iran.

E.2 Modernity in Iran

Contrary to an orientalist position which might affirm the 'backwardness' or anti-modernism of protest in Iran, modern Islamic movements have had a close and productive relationship with technology. “The organizational and mobilizational forms of political Islam—high-speed international communications using faxes, cassette tapes, and posters—rely on modern technology” (Beinin and Stork 1997, 4). From cassette tape recordings of Ayatolalh Khomeini's sermons disseminated secretly in 1977 and revolutionary posters plastered on the walls of Tehran in 1978, Iranian urban movements have demonstrated a savvy use of modern technology as a tool to educate, inform and radicalize citizens into protesters. The 2009 Green Movement is no exception to this trend.

Michel Foucault explored the connections between modernity and political Islam in his editorials on the Iranian Revolution, written during his visits to Iran in 1978. In the document *The Shah is a Hundred Years Behind the Times*, Foucault wrote that:

I then felt that I had understood that recent events did not signify a shrinking back in the face of modernization by extremely retrograde elements, but the rejection, by a whole culture and a whole people, of a modernization that is itself an archaism. The Shah’s misfortune is to have espoused this archaism. His crime is to have maintained, through a corrupt and despotic system, that fragment of the past in a present that no longer wants it (2005, 194 emphasis in original).
Here modernization policy is not the salvation of Iran. Instead Foucault points out that the absolutist monarchy was implementing a 'modernizing' policy at the behest and benefit of outsiders and connected elites, rather than providing access to modern education and democratic institutions for the population. We see economic exploitation by Western powers and the Shah for the benefit of court elites and foreign corporations. This is a form of developmental 'modernization' implemented as state policy, rejected by the people, and culminating in the rejection of an absolutist monarch supported hypocritically by Western democratic powers. This is the conflict as Foucault sees it. The revolution taking place in Iran was a rejection of the Shah’s state and the 'modernity' that came along with it.

Michel Foucault has been criticized for his “one sided critique of modernity” (Afary and Anderson 2005, 26). Some suggest that when Foucault turns to 'pre-modern' forms of society and government, he is privileging those forms over 'modern' forms, that he is being uncritical of the brutishness and savageness of those pre-modern techniques of power. But arguments like this one read the future clerical state retroactively onto the revolutionary impulse, while not actually addressing Foucault’s critique of the Shah's Iran. Foucault is explicitly rejecting the popular Western belief that the utopia of the Islamic movement in Iran is a reactionary one. In rejecting an absolutist state supporting an imposed policy of Western-oriented development, Iran is in a way “more modern than the moderns” (Anderson 2008). That is, Iran embraced modern political notions of popular protest for a popularly elected government, rather than being beholden to the Shah's authoritarian dictatorship (one ironically imposed by the democratic West).
Foucault has been critiqued as one-sided, but isn’t it rather the modernity of the Shah’s state which was one sided, having many of the elite benefits of a liberal state without the political and social freedoms that should come along with such a liberalization? In their critique, Afary and Anderson write “Finally a question arises concerning his characterization of the Islamist movement as ‘the form of revolt that is the most modern.’ Was he attempting to redefine and reappropriate the concept of modernity by suggesting that there could be alternative forms of modernity—not the western (or communist) ones that had become “archaic,” but new Eastern ones that were rejoining spirituality and politics?” (2005, 99). This is a fine question, but a better phrasing would be, is Foucault reappropriating modernity for the sake of Iran, or is Iran itself reformulating what it means to be modern, and Foucault just interpreting this reformulation? In demanding political modernization, along with economic modernization, the Iranian people were only claiming the second half of a modernity that was promised to them.

How relevant is Foucault's discussion of modernity in Iran to our contemporary study of the Green Movement? At the heart of his discussion is the potential misconception that takes place when we interpret revolutionary events. When new media arise as the sensational component of a movement, we can latch on to this as a determining factor for the movement itself. In 1979, the misconception was that the revolutionary movement was anti-modern, and Foucault points out that the reverse is in fact true. In 2009, the misconception is that the movement is hyper-modern, when again the reality is that the movement seeks the very modern, very Arendtian reconnection with the foundational principles of the '79 Revolution. Technology
becomes, therefore, a potential distraction from understanding the contemporary urban movement.

E.3 Technology and the Green Movement

The significance of technology in mobilization is not technology itself, but rather the purpose to which technology is put as a tool of mobilization. “The 2009 movement was facilitated by cell phones and the Internet just as the revolution of 1977-79 was facilitated by cassette tapes produced by Khomeini in Paris and disseminated in Iran” (Fischer 2010, 367). Clandestine recording provided interested Iranians with an outlet for exploring alternative ideas of government and legitimate authority. Tapes provided an Iran ready for change with a source of inspiration—the voice of Khomeini. Fischer suggests that Twitter and Facebook in 2009 operate in a similar manner to tapes in 1979, but the relationship between these types of communication technology is anything but one-to-one.

Consider how audio-tape technology worked in the 1970s: Khomeini, while in Iraqi or Parisian exile, recorded a sermon on a particular topic, say the corruption of Iranian government and the benefits of an alternative Islamic system. This recording is either smuggled into Iran and reproduced, or it is played over the phone into another tape recorder, and that copy is then reproduced and disseminated to interested Iranians. “By the mid-1970s, a survey reported some thirteen centers for recording and distribution of tapes. The contributions of this organizational network to the success of the Islamic revolution was of crucial importance. Their organizers distributed Khomeini’s taped messages and carried out the tasks of planning the massive
demonstrations during the winter of 1978” (Arjomand 1988, 93). At each stage, people share the tapes, talk to one another, exchange ideas, and a powerful communicative network is built. Yet there is a fundamental truth about a tape: it is a one-way communication of information. A community of discussion builds around the tape over its journey, but the message of the tape is fixed in time. It does not change in its dissemination. Khomeini's words remain Khomeini's words no matter who hears them, or where those tapes end up.

Now consider the method of digital communication used in 2009, Twitter for example. Each individual protester with a web-enabled phone and an account could send messages to followers, who can then re-send the message to their followers, or respond to that message with their own. Where tapes conveyed the message of one man, digital communication makes it possible for literally hundreds of thousands of people to engage one another in a mutually referential space. This form of technology is so fundamentally different from that of tapes, that they are almost unrecognizable. They may fill the same categories, as Fischer suggests they do, as modes to communicate revolutionary ideas and information on mobilization to a wide audience. But different communication techniques operate quite differently. This said, we should not privilege one form of communication over another. Tapes are not 'bad', or even outmoded communication while Twitter is 'good' and modern communication. Instead, we can learn a lot about a movement from the types of media it uses and the way it conveys a message.

Tapes are a more personal form of communication: one person sits down to make a tape, and personal relationships develop as the tape is clandestinely listened to and disseminated. Tapes are tied to a single voice that can make them more focused and have a powerful effect on
the listener. Twitter, alternatively, is impersonal, where almost-anonymous users can send and receive images or text without ever developing a personal relationship. This isn't to say that friends or associates don't follow one another on Twitter, or that personal relationships don't develop through Twitter over time. It is rather that the space of digital communication is so much larger and more impersonal than that of tapes. Tapes only convey a unidirectional message, while the other is multi-directional and lends itself to a diversity of more impersonal voices. Pluralistic, but easily diluted, Twittered communications allowed the Green Movement to remain more organic, but simultaneously diffused.

Thus it is entirely overblown to suggest that the 2009 Green Movement was a Twitter or a Facebook revolution. First of all, there was no revolution, therefore said revolution could not have been a result of digital communication\(^{57}\). But digital communication did offer a new space in and through which the movement could mobilize. The question comes when we look to the events and situation of the Green Movement to discover a potential secondary space through which the movement could have organized a challenge to the Ahmadinejad regime (if not the state entirely). In 2009, in Tehran, did cyberspace fulfill the function of a secondary space for organization? No, because cyberspace is produced, but evanescent. There is nowhere tangibly or physically to locate the space itself; cyberspace can produce a discussion around occupying a particular square, but cyberspace itself cannot be occupied. Moreover due to state power over telecommunications, cyberspace is surveillable and ultimately can be 'unplugged' by the state. This happened in late June, when Ahmadinejad and the security apparatus shut-off wireless

\(^{57}\) For more on media and mobilization see Khosrokhavar (2012) Chapter 8, and Linjakumapu (2008) Chapter 3, on the use and abuse of technology in movements.
communications in Iran (Hashemi and Postel 2010, 5). In 2009, in Iran, cyberspace had yet to achieve viability as a secondary space of organization.

E.4 Spaces of Organization/Spaces of Perception

Can cyberspace ever operate as a secondary space, providing the organizational resources and leadership for a movement to successfully challenge a state? The answer must be no. If the use of new media and computer mediated communication during the Green Movement is any indication, then cyberspace may provide an additional space of mobilization, a new primary space through which the utopian aspirations of a movement can find voice. But as it currently stands, cyberspace is too open, too indeterminate, and not structured enough to provide organization to the movement. In the case of theaters in Prague we saw how the movement was able to 'come in off the streets', and into theaters. It is hard to envision a movement using cyberspace in a similar way; nor is the social practice of cyberspace one that is conducive to organizational leadership. Yet cyberspace provides the best location for protest mobilization since the invention of the street; what's more, it is a space that actively enhances and supports other forms of urban mobilization.

Communication technology has become more than just a tool, even if it falls short of being the secondary space of movement organization. Technology has transformed “the public sphere in Iran—the low-tech green armbands and scarves (the green wave, or maj-e sabz) and the high-tech Internet and cell-phone cameras, inscribing and filling the spaces of perception” (Fischer 2010, 357). New spaces of perception were created through the exchange of images and
words that took place on the Internet in the summer of 2009. Computer mediated communication create a space for the production of perception. Just as with other forms of computer mediated communication, we see a process of perpetual revision taking place on the Internet\textsuperscript{58}. But a slightly different process was at work in the social communication during and at the service of the urban movement in Tehran. In 2009 in Tehran, one person is not revising or updating an individual status. Instead we see a collective expansion of the space of perception as a people revise and debate what it means to act politically and to act in concert.

As events happened in one place, plaza, or street in Tehran, activists made the entire movement aware of that situation through cyberspace linkages. This rhizomatic updating certainly informed movement responses and developed solidarity across the city. But we should not glorify this mode of communication, for all those reasons listed above (impersonality, anonymity, etc). Rather, we should recognize how the Green Movement appropriated cyberspace for the concrete goal of communication for mobilization. The space of technology and cyberspace communication is inherently open (in fact nothing prevented the regime from following the movement's actions on Twitter too). The security forces of the regime knew as well as the movement what actions were being planned, and could take steps to counter those actions. They too were part and parcel of the space of perception. Even so, the decision by the regime to turn off the internet suggests that digital communication gave the Green Movement the upper hand over the state.

\textsuperscript{58} Elsewhere I have described this phenomenon as problematic in terms of identity formation and the seductions of fantasy (Deaton 2008). Normally, when an individual user continually revises or updates a profile or an avatar, he or she is playing out a fantasy of total control and costless personal revision (Balbus 2005).
E.5  The Color Green in Mobilization

Communication technology comes in more forms than just digital communication, even in the 21st century. “Green is a tool for neural media; it is a transformation of the tactics of the ‘little or minor media’ of the 1977-79 revolution. Graffiti suddenly appear on walls. Posters with photos call for the release of jailed activists” (Fischer 2010, 365). Fischer describes how the use of the color green as a symbol of the movement itself is a potent technology. Image 5.4 shows the ubiquitous deployment of the color green during a Tehran protest in mid-June, 2009.

Figure 5.4: Green Technology

The manipulation and strategic use of a culturally integrated symbol such as the color green might well be considered a technology. The color green is the color of the Prophet
Mohammed, and therefore holds a significance for all Islamic cultures, not just Iran. “On June 8, four days before the election, a human chain of tens of thousands held up a huge ribbon of green cloth for some fifteen miles, from north to south Tehran along Valisar Avenue. It was clear that something momentous was in the air...” (Fischer 2010, 365). In activating green technology, the movement consciously evoked the long tradition of Shi’a Islam and the memory of past Islamic sacrifices in the face of injustice or tyranny. The significance of the Shi’a martyrs, especially Hossein, is that they dedicate themselves to fighting for justice in the here-and-now in the face of an overwhelmingly powerful state. Even though these martyrs lose their lives, they provide a continual metaphor of righteous struggles for justice against power. In embracing Green as the movements appellation and symbol, the goals and issues of the contemporary era are merged with those of eras past—particularly the Shi’a martyrs. Doing so fused the movement with one of the most powerful forces in Iranian society.

One might think then that the Green Movement would be instantly, or quickly successful in its goals of reforming the state. In yoking Green technology to the movement they should have gained enough popular support to be victorious. But this fails to recall that the color green, and Islam itself is also tied directly and historically to the state. “Many of today's opposition invoke the same symbols and memories as the hardliners” (de Bellaigue 2010, 220). Since 1979, the Islamic Republic and the central figure of the Supreme Leader, has held the reigns of Shi’a Islam imagery and memory. In evoking Green technology, the movement is contesting with the state for control over the national religious and cultural tradition. “Islam, like all cultural systems is a contested field of meaning” (Beinin and Stork 1997, 21). Thus the Green Movement can enter
onto the field and make use of those symbols like the color green, but there is no guarantee that these symbols will remain uncontested. This is precisely what happened in 2009—The Islamic state was supported by the power of Green technology. During the election, the government led by Khamenei felt the structural underpinnings of the Islamic half of the Islamic Republic threatened by the use of this Green symbolism by the reform candidates. The use of the cultural meaning behind the color green became an existential threat to the hardline Islamicists in government. If reformers were able to control the symbols of Islam, then there would be nowhere for the government to turn to support their own (tenuous) position: nowhere but to the deployment of coercive state power and urban violence.

F. The Bazaar and the Mosque

This section searches out possible locations for secondary space in 2009, specifically the spaces of the Mosque and the Bazaar. Returning to explore the role these spaces played in the 1979 Iranian Revolution sheds light on their contemporary spatial role in movement organization. Protest against the Shah developed in intensity during the late 1970s. Resentment to the Shah’s policies, worsening economic conditions, and Khomeini's implacable and vocal opposition worked in concert to increase protest sentiment in Tehran and other major Iranian cities.
F.1 Urban Mobilization in 1978

September 4th, 1978 “was the beginning of both mass and massive demonstrations, which included women and children and cut across age and class differences” (Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 1994, 146). By late in the year 1978, protest action took on a revolutionary quality. Massive popular demonstrations became commonplace, striking workers—particularly those at the Abadan oilfields—brought the economy to a halt. Key events, like the Black Friday Massacre at Jaleh Square on 8 September 1978 worked to further undermine the authority of the Shah, as army troops were ordered to fire on the protesters. Black Friday is centrally important because it triggered the onset of numerous strikes in key sectors of the economy (Abrahamian 2008, 159-161).

The central spaces of urban mobilization in 1978 were the streets and plazas of Tehran, squares like Jaleh and Azadi that became the locations for mass protest, and the universities. University space was one of the earliest locations targeted by the Shah’s secret police, SAVAK. The Shah’s government perceived Tehran University as location of radical thought and a space from which to organize direct action, and therefore it was heavily watched. Even so, protest through university space was widespread throughout 1978, since the University provided open space to organize massive demonstrations and was largely controlled by students and faculty who had occupied the buildings. By late 1978, Tehran University was ineffectually 'closed' by the military government as a protest site though mobilization still occurred there through January of 1979 (Parsa 1989, 155).

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Over the spring and summer of 1978, urban mobilization turned to revolutionary organization within two closely allied spaces: the mosque and the bazaar. “[The] mosque (in the sense of the urban religious establishment) and the bazaar actually acted to give each other shape and sustenance” (Mottahedeh 2000, 346). When we discuss the mosques as a space of organization, as the central secondary space in the 1979 revolution, it should be perfectly clear that the mosque is more than just a religious building set within a city. The mosque was a network of communication and community, a network that connected everyday Tehranians with the larger urban community. As Mottahadeh suggests, the relationship between the mosque network and the traditional economic space of the Bazaar is a reciprocal one. Bazaaris supported mosques and mullahs financially through religious tithes, and the religious sanction given by the mosque justified the economic interactions of the bazaar.

As economic modernization ramped up in the Shah's Iran, increasing pressure was placed on the traditional economic elite, the Bazaari. Small shopkeepers, traders, and merchants, the Bazaari were negatively affected by cheap imported commodities and squeezed financially through taxation. Strikes and closures of the Bazaar were some of the earliest protests against the Shah and his policies. After a number of violent encounters with security places, the movement began to realize that a “safer place was needed, and [after November of 1978] Bazaaris increasingly turned to mosques for mobilization. They had to borrow this preexisting organization to be able to broaden and sustain their mobilization and launch larger attacks against the government” (Parsa, 1989, 110). Parsa relates how the relationship between the Bazaar and the Mosque developed, but he does not recognize how organizing through the
Mosques worked to strengthen the symbolic and communicative power of the religious class over the movement itself. Organization within the space of the secondary space of the mosque created a relatively safe, heterotopic space for movement organization since the mosque was protected by the long religious tradition and the authority of the Shi’a clergy⁵⁹.

In a remembered echo of 1978, protesters in 2009 staged demonstrations at the Tehranian Bazaar. Closure of the Bazaar space was seen as an act that, if successful, would be a potent strike at Ahmadinejad’s regime. In 2009, the Green Movement organized some protests that targeted the bazaar, such as “the one in downtown Tehran where a group massed in front of the bazaar [and] was able to close down the gold sellers section. The significance of a protest in front of the bazaar should not be missed. Once a movement affects and includes business owners (such as the mobilization of trade unions), political demands gain the weight and strength of economic concerns as well” (Taheri 2011, 166). In 2009, the Green Movement moved to connect the overt political issue of election fraud and state repression with the vital economic concerns of the Bazaar. Only marginally successful at doing so, the Green Movement could not rely completely upon the support of the traditional economic elite, and they were unable to connect with the trade-union movement which has been even more severely repressed by Ahmadinejad’s government. Nor could they count on the secondary space so central to the revolution in 1979, the Mosque.

⁵⁹ This is the mid-century period when many Western governments backed Islamists against leftists, on the assumption that the big global ‘threat’ to capitalism and freedom was from Communism. From this perspective, fundamentalists were just religious stooges to be manipulated in the cold war between the West and the Communist bloc.
F.2  Islamic Spatial Politics

The Islamic clergy in Iran has been the decisive faction in domestic politics for over 100 years. “In Iran, the pulpit has played a considerable political role at key historical moments, particularly during the constitutional movement and again in the recent [1979] mobilization” (Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 1994, 5). At critical revolutionary points in time, like the 1905 Constitutional Revolution, during the Mossadeq years, and the ‘79 revolution, portions of the clergy have thrown their considerable cultural weight behind the factions that at the time, ended up in control of the state. After the Constitutional Revolution, some ulema backed Reza Khan and opposed the creation of a full republic; in the early 1950s portions of the clergy again opposed republican government, backing a return to monarchy. From the Constitutional Revolution to the contemporary era, the ulema has been a divided social force, sometimes supporting and sometimes opposing systemic change. As suggested above, Ayatollah Khomeini’s religious supporters worked to radicalize the more traditionally a-political clergy in the years running up to 1979. Thus even in the tumultuous years of 1978-9 the ulema were not united in support of social change.

The ulema themselves are not a terribly large population, yet their influence over the Iranian people in 1979 was vast. Many scholars have noted the importance of the relationship between the ulema and the bazaari, the traditional economic class; this close relationship certainly provides the ulema with financial support. A spatial analysis of the ulema points to the crucial influence of mosque space as an organizational force in Iran. In the 1979 revolution,

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60 Though this is less true today, because of the institutionalizing influence of the state. The ulema are no longer the key cultural and social authorities they once were since the state curtailed the independence of the clergy.
mosques provided the secondary space necessary to transform revolutionary mobilization on the streets of Tehran into an organized challenge to the Shah's state. Michel Foucault, in one of his Iranian editorials, gives a compelling description of the revolutionary action in and around the secondary space of the mosque: “In the mosques during the day, the mullahs spoke furiously against the Shah, the Americans, and the west and its materialism. They called for people to fight against the entire regime in the name of the Quran and of Islam. When mosques became too small for the crowd, loudspeakers were put in the streets” (Foucault 1999, 200-201). Foucault recognized the potential power of the Mosque as a space of revolutionary organization. It was an alternative source of authority to the state; its privileged position was integral to Iranian culture and history protected it from infiltration and repression by the state. In 1978, the mosque was perfectly positioned to act as the space of organization for the revolutionary movement.

Unlike factories and universities that were being surveilled by SAVAK, mosque space in the late 1970s was relatively safe from state intervention. The ulema were able to speak openly and publicly against the regime, with very little reprisal because of the privileged social and cultural position of the clergy within the larger Iranian society. As discontent increased under the Shah's 'White Revolution' modernization policies, the mosque became the central site where an angry population could come together in opposition to the regime. Mosques were a space where people hungry for news, communication, and action could meet publicly. Mosques became the place for revolutionary communication; the spatial practice of the mosque provided safe haven to urban populations seeking information and community in the effort to mobilize against the state.
In one of his editorials written from Iran in 1978, Foucault encapsulates the influence of mosques during this period of revolutionary mobilization. He writes that religion is:

[Much] more than a simple vocabulary through which aspirations, unable to find other words, must pass. It is today, what it was several times in the past, the form that the political struggle takes as soon as it mobilizes the common people. It transforms thousands of forms of discontent, hatred, misery, and despairs into a force. It transforms them into a force because it is a form of expression, a mode of social relations, a supple and widely accepted elemental organization, a way of being together, a way of speaking and listening, something that allows one to be listened to by other, and yearn for something with them at the same time as they yearn for it” (Foucault 1999, 202 emphasis in original).

Foucault expands the concept of religious rhetoric into a notion of language and communication as a social force. In 1978, the mosque became the space through which mobilization passed, and as revolutionary second space does, this space shaped the form and content of revolutionary organization. For a majority of the population, revolutionary speech at mosques and Islamic leadership were the central mobilization and organizing forces during the 1979 Revolution. Religion and the mosque provided the common spatial practice through which revolution was made possible.

When we turn to consider the mosque space during the 2009 movement, there is no perfect symmetry. The Green Movement drew on many of the salient political memories of 1979—martyrdom and piety, and Islamic iconography. But we did not see the massive popular support of the ulema for mobilization, nor do we see the opening of urban mosques as spaces of movement organization. For 30 years the Supreme Leader has had influence over both the political structure of Iran, influence in the selection of Friday prayer speakers, and ideological

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61 There are other examples of clergy influencing politics; Verges notes that in Egypt, Islamic activists used “religious rhetoric to translate social discontent into political terms” (Verges 1997, 293).
influence within the religious community. Unlike in 1979, the space of the mosques was not available or able to become the secondary space needed to transform revolutionary mobilization into an organized challenge to the state. It isn’t just simply a question of religious influence, but rather that clergy are now participating in both non-elected and elected positions in the Iranian state. There is no unified ulema class; clergy with different governmental and cultural roles are often in conflict with one another. In 2009, the ulema participated on both sides of the Green Movement struggle, some in support of the movement and others in support of the state.

In 2009, the ulema were a divided social force. The institutional space of the mosque was controlled by the state and the Supreme Leader, and thus unavailable as a site for organization. This did not prevent the Green Movement from seizing upon Islamic symbols and iconography to support its cause. But it did mean that unlike in 1978-9, religious leadership was paralyzed by division and indecision, and thus unable to play a deciding role in the Green Movement.

G. A Vertical Geography of Protest

The ’79 Revolution was the central political memory motivating the 2009 Green Movement. Themes of social justice, political participation, martyrdom and nationalism that drove the ’79 revolution were active in 2009 as well. Islamic green, for which the movement in 2009 was named, is the central visual cue to trigger remembrance but the river of ’79’s political memory runs deeper and wider than just the color green. Our past cases of revolutionary mobilization have generally considered what we call horizontal spaces of protest: the street and
This section shifts the spatial perspective to consider vertical spaces of mobilization, and the potential for vertical spaces of revolutionary organization.

G.1 Rooftop Protests

In '79, a major rallying cry was *Allahu Akbar* or 'God is Great'. In 1979 this cry heard from the rooftops of many buildings in Tehran was a radical political assault in religious form on the secular monarchist regime of the Shah. Since protesters could take the staircase of their buildings to the roof, away from the prying eyes and batons of SAVAK, their chants were anonymous. In 2009, this vertical protest tactic once again played a central role in urban mobilization:

“[From] somewhere behind, probably an apartment block on the next alley, they hear the sound of several male voices. 'Allahu Akbar!' A second later, a group of predominantly female voices responds from a different roof. 'Allahu Akbar!' And so it starts, from different roofs, all around. Two or three people here, more over there. Some people have thrown open their windows and shout from the sill. Many more are on the roofs of their apartment blocks...The neighborhood is bounded by main roads but as the chorus grows in volume and intensity, the growl of traffic becomes irrelevant.” (Moqadam 2010, 51-2).

Each individual voice merges with those of other protesters on other rooftops, each shouting *Allahu Akbar*. The protesters of 2009 appropriated this powerful vertical geography of roof-top protest.

Just as in 1979, Tehran citizens went to their rooftops and protested the current regime by invoking their piety. The crucial difference is that a pious protest in '79 challenged an autocratic, secular regime, while in 2009 it charged the Islamic theocracy with bad faith. “Into this old revolutionary slogan, so chilling to the monarch, they pour their sadness and anger. Everyone
realizes that Allahu Akbar in 2009 means something different from Allahu Akbar in 1979. No longer is it a call for religion. It has become a call for truth. And it is a mischievous call, for it dares the authorities to declare Allahu Akbar a counterrevolutionary slogan!” (Moqadam 2010, 52). And in fact, as a response to this vertical geographic protest, the Islamic Republic declared this type of protest illegal. The irony of an avowedly Islamic regime declaring the phrase 'God is great' illegal points to the central religious tension of 2009. Who can claim the political memory of the '79 revolution, and its well-remembered Islamic content? The vertical geography of rooftop protest suggests that the Green Movement claimed this contested memory, revealing the absence (or at least massive degradation) of Iranian political authority. If the Islamic Republic bases its authority on the foundation of 1979 and the Islamic tradition, then the use of those political memories by protesters in 2009 demonstrates that the regime was not in control of its own basis of authority.

The vertical geography of protest doesn’t just, or only mean rooftop protest. Cemeteries and the remembrance surrounding the dead and martyred also contain an element of verticality. In Iran, both are removed from the horizontal plane: Buildings provide protection from the eyes and guns of hostile observers, creating an anonymous space for expression. Likewise, Islamic cultural practices provide protection for funeral mourners, even those who use the cycle of mourning to celebrate the martyrdom of loved ones and as a space to criticize the regime. While Neda Agha-Soltan is the best remembered martyr of 2009, she was certainly not the only one. In framing death at the hands of the state as martyrdom, the Green Movement imbedded itself within the long tradition of Shi’a Islam, stretching back to the first Shi’a martyr Ali (the Prophet's
cousin and son-in-law, and the first Shi’a Imam) and the martyrdom of Hossein (the Prophet’s grandson) at the Battle of Karbala. This potent political memory is perhaps the single most salient one in the Shi’a tradition (Keddie 2006).

G.2 Cemeteries Protests and Martyrdom

In 1978, martyrdom took on a form that was tied directly to a central urban space; the cemetery. In 1978, cemeteries became locations for social protest. Foucault gives a compelling description of the practice of protest at urban cemeteries. “Last Sunday, I went to the Tehran cemetery, the only place where meetings are tolerated under martial law. People stood behind banners and laurel wreaths, cursing the Shah. Then they sat down. One by one, three men, including a religious leader stood up and started talking with great intensity, almost with violence” (Foucault 1999, 219). He goes on to describe how security forces arrived to arrest the speakers and disperse the protest. Memorials were held for the deceased, drawing crowds and more protest; these protestors were target by police, shots were fired and more martyrs made, inspiring future memorials and more protests. This cycle of revolutionary martyrdom became a central mechanism for the mobilization of protest in 1978.

In “Teheran: Faith against the Shah,” Foucault writes:

I did not even have to ask him whether his religion, which alternately summons the faithful to battle and commemorates the fallen, is not profoundly fascinated with death—more focused, perhaps, on martyrdom than on victory. I knew that he would have responded: “what preoccupies you, you Westerners, is death. You ask her to detach you from life, and she teaches you how to give up. As for us, we care about the dead, because they attach us to life. We hold out our hands to them in order for them to link us to the permanent obligation for justice. They speak to us of right and
of the struggle that is necessary for right to triumph (Foucault 2005, 201 emphasis in original).

What is the difference between death and the dead? In his imaginings of how an Iranian writer would respond to the criticism that Shi’a Islam is a religion obsessed with death, Foucault pulls out precisely the modern Western fear of death and contrasts it with what he might call “care for the dead.” Through the guise of an Iranian voice, Foucault accuses the West of detaching life from death, a process that leads (psychodynamically) to a rejection of life itself, what Foucault calls “giving up.” In contrast, Foucault sees Shi’a Islam and its care for the dead as a way of ratifying life itself, through a remembrance of those who resisted injustice.

Afary and Anderson claim that, “To Foucault, it seemed that Shi’ism had a different approach to death. It was not seen as the end but simply one more stage in the drama of life” (2005, 50). This claim bears little relation to the passage above; Foucault never discusses stages of life, but rather is concerned with the fundamentally different ways that Western modernism and Shi’a Islam approach death and dying, and thus how these two broadly defined cultures approach life, living, and resistance. To be fair to Afary and Anderson, they do recognize Foucault’s overall juxtaposition of Western regimes of truth with Islamic or Iranian regimes of truth, but for them this is not a very important point. More essential for them is connecting Foucault’s writing on Christianity to his obsession with death and dying in Iran. This is a prejudgmental oversight. Afary and Anderson lose the richness of Foucault’s discussion because they are overly concerned with connecting the dots in a preconceived line of argument.

The difference here is one between death as terminal limit, and death as resistance. Foucault tries to demonstrate that a death given and then socially remembered in resistance to
tyranny is not just a death as might be found in the West; it is a continuation and expansion of a demand for rights and justice. Rights and justice are useless to those who are dead, but they are treasures for the living. So for Foucault, martyrdom does not mean a selfish escape from life, a Western “giving up,” but rather a sacrifice for the living in order that they might come one step closer to justice, and the living recognize it as such. While resistance may involve violence or death (Foucault 2005, 210), and it may consume the life of one man or one woman, the end of resistance is not death itself. It is rather the pursuit of justice and other qualities of life. It seems that for Afary and Anderson, Foucault’s obsession with death is only one more reason why Foucault’s larger project on power and human life is wrong, while for Foucault, death for a cause, remembered as such, can be a powerful form of resistance.

Foucault identifies martyrdom as a powerful form of resistance: spiritual resistance to tyrannical power. Yet martyrs and martyrdom are not only themes for resistance; they have since 1979 been used as a bulwark for the state. “These fallen occupy a special place in the Islamic Republic of Iran's political and moral iconography: almost every official speech on a national theme refers to the sacred blood of 'martyrs' who...are forever exalted. But this is not an innocent act, for this eulogizing involves a posthumous conscription of their loyalty to the revolution of 1979, to Islam, to the Islamic Republic's leaders” (Alavi 2010, 323). Alavi recognizes that the Islamic Republic has used martyrdom—iconography; martyrs became the symbol of the revolutionary struggle appropriated by the state. In 2009, when the Iranian state began to kill its own people, creating new martyrs like Neda Agha-Soltan, we can point to the changing iconography of martyrdom. Like piety and the color green, in 2009 martyrdom became a
contested theme, a contested memory claimed by both the Green Movement and the Islamic Republic.

Neda's martyrdom is significant not only because her death was claimed so visibly as martyrdom by the movement. Neda's martyrdom is significant because she is a female martyr. The active participation of massive numbers of women in the Green Movement—old and young, veiled and unveiled—is another indication of the broad popular support the Green Movement had in the summer of 2009. That the central martyr for this movement is a young woman indicates the willingness of the movement to draw on Islamic and traditional sources of authority to ground its claims against the state, but also to invigorate those claims with a fresh, new, representative figure of martyrdom. The Green Movement's evocation of the political memory of 1979, specifically the iconography of martyrdom, suggests the unwillingness of the movement to eschew the deep values of the Iranian revolutionary spirit. Rather the Green Movement's choice of Neda as a martyr can be read as a reinvention of those traditions for a new generation. The Green Movement is therefore a large-scale attempt to restore the foundational bases of authority to an Islamic Republic, without seeking a return to the historical instantiation of those past traditions.62

Arendt offers a possible explanation for this failure of state authority and the tactical reappropriation of political memory by the Green Movement. While state violence erodes

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62 Hannah Arendt recognizes that this is not a simple task, filled with the complicated and perhaps contradictory tasks of remembrance, mythology, and the constitutive gap between republican and Islam. But a revolutionary state must attempt this task of connecting its foundation to liberation; otherwise it runs the risk of destroying the freedom it sought to establish. If we hold with Charles Kurzman’s theory on the deeply complex nature of revolution, and realize that “the veil of confusion that accompanies such [revolutionary] phenomena washes out all attempts to link preconditions with outcomes” (2004, viii) then it is not so unrealistic to distinguish between revolutionary Iran and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact doing so aids us in understanding a revolutionary movement.
political authority (and 2009 saw much state violence from the stolen ballot box to riot police and the thuggery of the Basiji), there is another place we must look: to foundation itself. Arendt suggest that one of the central problems of revolutionary foundation is that as a new regime is founded on the ashes of the old order, it often eschews the revolutionary spirit that made the foundation possible in the first place. The revolutionary challenge to the old regime is, in essence, a threat to all regimes since revolution is always opposed to 'normal' politics. Thus for Arendt, the great problem for the American system is that we, as a people, have forgotten our revolutionary spirit, the spirit of liberation that inspired the revolutionary challenge of 1776. Action in Iran in 2009 suggests that the regime had embraced particular aspects of the 1979 revolution and its revolutionary symbolism, but avoided (and even feared) its liberatory potential. This potential still rested in the collective political memory of the Iranian people and was thus already there, ready to be reactivated by the Green Movement.

G.3 The Future of the Green Movement

The Green Movement's revolutionary action on the streets of Tehran was a massive popular demonstration in favor of a pluralistic understanding of the Iranian revolutionary tradition, and the assertion of the republican elements enshrined in the constitution of the Islamic Republic. The movement does not reject Islam; it is not a movement to secularize the state. It is a movement that demands the honest combination of representative, electoral representation side-by-side with piety as the dual principles of the Islamic Republic. The electoral coup d'état was the culmination of thirty years of internal struggle within society and the state between
republicanism and hardline political Islam, and the cost to the Islamic Republic was ultimately its legitimacy and authority to rule. In stealing the election, Ahmadinejad and Khamenei demonstrated that the Islamic Republic has become a republic in name only, and the Green Movement was the revolutionary response. The Green Movement was not revolutionary in the sense that it sought to replace the state, but it was revolutionary in its aims to rejuvenate the Islamic Republic by re-establishing both halves of the Iranian revolutionary tradition as part of the state, republicanism alongside political Islam.

Some concerns remain: What has become of the Islamic Republic after the state repression of the Green Movement, and its failure to establish a secondary space from which to force republicanism back into the state? What is the prospect for future revolutionary action in Iran? It is clear from its own actions that Iran is no longer governed constitutionally, that the power politics of the hardline political faction has trumped the rule of constitutional law in Iran. Who will be allowed to run for presidential office in 2013? According to the constitution, Ahmadinejad cannot run for a third consecutive term, but also according to the constitution, the winner of the vote is elected president, not the favorite of the Supreme Leader. After the bloody summer and fall of 2009, the Green Movement largely retired from the streets. But activism has continued through personal communications and in cyberspace. It is likely that the 2013 election will generate urban mobilization, though how large and how effective remains to be seen. If there is a movement, it will draw on the political memory of 2009 as well as 1979, and perhaps this combination of remembered action will sustain the movement as it attempts to reassert the value of republicanism in the face of hardline resistance.
VI: THE CITY CANNOT BE OCCUPIED

A. Introduction

On 17 December 2010, a shopkeeper named Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself in the central marketplace in the Tunisian city of Sidi Bouazizi, igniting the series of urban movements that came to be known as the Arab Spring. Only weeks later, thousands gathered in Cairo's Tahrir Square to protest the regime of Hosni Mubarak. In the fall of 2011, vocal protesters calling themselves Occupy Wall Street camped in Zucotti Park in New York City, the most visible example of a wave of urban occupations in the West. For months during the spring of 2012, thousands of students gathered in Parc Emile Gamalin and marched each night through the streets of Montreal to protest the Liberal government's austerity measures. As we move into the twenty-first century, anti-systemic protest continues to influence the political in every geographic region of the world. What unites all these vastly different examples of contemporary mobilization? It is not nation, or ideology; neither is protest confined to one region of the globe. What unites all these disparate examples of contemporary protest is their occurrence in urban space. The city has been and continues to be the preeminent site for social and revolutionary mobilization, and an analysis of urban space during periods of mobilization provides crucial insights into the nature of contemporary protest. Urban space provides a common frame for understanding almost every modern social movement or moment of revolutionary mobilization. Thus, embracing urban space as a location for inquiry provides an unparalleled perspective from which to build stronger descriptions and explanations of contemporary movements.
Urban space provides the terrain for the mobilization of protest against a state, but locating a movement within urban space means much more than saying 'the city plays host to a protest movement'. The last three chapters have dealt with revolutionary urban space across very different cases, the student-led protests of 1968 in Paris, the relatively peaceful 'Velvet Revolution' movement of 1989 in Prague, and the post-election protests and state repression of 2009 in Tehran. In observing urban space, I have attended to the primary structural and human factors that make mobilization processes possible in each of these cases. Each chapter demonstrates that urban movements do not only mobilize protest on the streets of a city; it is through urban space that movements have the potential to connect with secondary networks, though of course not all movements achieve this goal. It is through secondary spaces that movements have the potential to organize sustained challenges to the state. In order to generate mass protest and activate secondary spatial networks, mobilization activates salient political memories embedded throughout the urban milieu. Urban space holds the remembrance of past urban movements, abuses of state power, broken promises, and stories of martyrdom and sacrifice that put contemporary struggles into context for everyday citizens; activating political memory builds relationships between street-level protest and already-existing organized institutional networks that have the potential to effect change at the level of the state and society. Urban space provides the sinew between our operative categories of street-level protest, political memory, and secondary spatial networks.

This concluding chapter draws together the major insights derived from the previous chapters, illuminating the intellectual contribution of my dissertation: The city cannot be
occupied. This insight has a dual meaning. Under everyday circumstances, the local state assumes a monopoly over urban space. Revolutionary situations and urban movements challenge this perceived monopoly and instantiate other potential alternative uses for the city. However, urban movements cannot be successful in transforming the state if they only rely upon urban occupation. In a short span of time, a movement can successfully occupy streets and plazas at the heart of a city and make demands on the state, but in order to sustain the movement over time and protect against state repression movements must cultivate a relationship with secondary spatial networks. Neither the state nor an movement can completely occupy urban space. Urban space always holds the potential for radical action, but other memories and practices also exist within urban space, including practices of state control. Many groups have a right to the city, and at different points and at different times both the local state and urban movements claim that right. Urban movements are a way of working out new (or reasserting old) rights to the city.

Section one of this chapter develops the urban context of mobilization by focusing on the primary role of streets and plazas in my three cases. This section also explains how changes in government policy, elections, and dramatic political events can provide openings in which popular protest can arise. Section two explores how in each case, initial urban mobilization evoked political memory in an attempt to scale-up protest by gaining mass appeal through collective political memories. The final section lays out the tactic of spatial organization through secondary institutions, and discusses this in contrast to tactics of urban occupation for all three cases. Mobilizations in Paris, Prague, and Tehran demonstrate that movements are more effective
at expressing their demands to society and securing change at the level of the state when they are able to activate secondary spaces.

Previous chapters have described in detail the spatial practice of three urban movements: the 1968 student-led movement in Paris, the 1989 'Velvet Revolution' movement in Prague, and the 2009 'Green Movement' in Tehran. The next three sections of this chapter use data gleaned from my three empirical chapters to synthesize and explain the claim that the city cannot be occupied. By fleshing out my theoretical framework with the insights of my chapters, I will illuminate how successful movements seek to organize within secondary spaces rather than only to occupy urban space.

B. **Policy, Plazas, and Police**

Changes to state policy provide openings through which movements begin to coalesce. The policy changes that came to Czechoslovakia and the rest of the Eastern Bloc under the names Perestroika and Glasnost opened up public space for increased dissident action (Sarotte 2009). Gone was the threat of a Red Army invasion of Prague, as had happened in August of 1968 (Rychlik 2010). With this international political opening, students and dissident activists began mobilizing the local social forces that would come to the fore in Prague's 1989 Velvet Revolution (Levitan 1993; Long 2005). The 'Fouchet Reforms' to education policy brought changes to the French university system, packing increasing numbers of students in the already overcrowded University of Nanterre (Schnapp and Vidal-Naquet 1969; Seale and McConville 1968). Cut off from the cultural center of Paris, and relegated to a “desolate and strange
landscape” (Lefebvre 1969), students began to demonstrate in opposition to these conditions by the spring of 1968. The dramatic event of the stolen 2009 presidential election in Iran provided the opening to transform an electoral 'Green Wave' into the Green Movement on the streets of Tehran. We can identify a shift in policy by Supreme Leader Khameini from supporting moderately fair elections, to deciding one in favor of his chosen candidate (Esaneh et al., 2010). Additionally, the Green Movement is closely tied to the experience of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, a revolutionary movement that was generated in large part by resistance to the Shah's sweeping economic and social policy dubbed the 'White Revolution' (Armojand 1988). Though different types of policy in all three cases, changes to state policy provided openings in social space around and through which urban mobilization commenced.

Demographics and urban density also play a crucial role in mobilization. Overcrowding at the University of Nanterre, brought student activism to a boil, and only after the closure of the university and the arrest of student leaders did protest move from the urban periphery at Nanterre to the Sorbonne at the heart of Paris (Feenberg and Freedman 2001). Iran also has an incredibly young population: in 2009, “Young people ages 15-29...make up 35 percent of the population but account for 70 percent of the unemployed” (Dabashi 2010, 23). In the case of contemporary Tehran and many other cities, the existence of a youthful, well educated population and the lack of employment provide incentive to demand political accountability and economic reforms from the state.

Initially, political and economic demands are made out in the street. The boulevards of central Paris became the primary location of protest after students were forced out of the
Sorbonne by police on May 3rd, 1968. From Boulevard St. Germain by the Université de Beau Arts, to Boulevard St. Michel that runs south through the Latin Quarter, to the narrower streets on the hill above the university, the streets of Paris were the central site for Parisian student protest (Glicher-Hotley 2008). Likewise, Prague student protesters planned marches along the riverfront in 1989. When some students chose to transgress the mandate of their march, they decided to move onto Narodni Trida, the 'National Way', a wide boulevard at the heart of the city (Bradley 1992). Only hours after the theft of the 2009 election, massive numbers of protesters gathered along the major boulevards in central Tehran, including Vali Asr Avenue to Enghelab Avenue; the days after the election were a “time of euphoria, with young people striding along the main avenues of Tehran” (Khosrokhavar 2012a, 169). In almost all modern cities, streets are easy to access by large populations. They are built to facilitate transport and communication. During times of mobilization, streets lose their function as transit sites and become a primary location where dissent is aired.

Likewise, plazas and squares take on different functions, becoming sites of concentrated protest. Wenceslas Square, located in central Prague, is a major transit hub and commercial area, and presents perhaps the most iconic example of central squares playing a role in urban mobilization for all three cases. During the Prague Spring of 1968 and again during the Velvet Revolution of 1989, Wenceslas Square, along with nearby Old Town Square, provided a space where mass demonstrations could take place against the Communist state. “Since the Revolution of 1848, Wenceslas Square has been the epicenter of human action during Prague revolutions, a stage, where power, politics, and human spirit all come together” (Kukral 1997, 167). Like
Wenceslas Square in Prague, Azadi Square in Tehran provided a central location for mass protest during the 2009 Green Movement. Plazas like Azadi or Wenceslas oftentimes provide a destination for marching protesters, or a location from which many can hear public speeches and join in chanting protest slogans. Protest in 1968 Paris has no perfect correspondence with Prague and Tehran; while the boulevard streets of Paris are certainly large, there was no central plaza used by protesters. While the small central courtyard at the Sorbonne played an important role in initiating the street protests of May 3rd, we should consider the role the Latin Quarter of Paris played as the primary site of mobilization. Rather than a central square, in 1968 Paris it was a whole district wherein we can primarily locate urban street protest.

Furthermore, Goldstone suggests that movements become revolutionary when they are presented with violent resistance on the part of the state (1998). All three of my cases demonstrate the effects of police crack-downs on urban protest. After the incursion of police into university space at the Sorbonne, student protesters erected barricades in the Latin Quarter, and spent days struggling violently with the CRS riot police. Intermittently through May and June of 1968, state-sanctioned police violence and violent resistance on the part of the students were the order of the day (Bourg 2007). From the start of protest in June of 2009, police and the Basiji paramilitary forces deployed high levels of violence against the mass of protesters on the streets of Tehran. A wing of the Republican Guard, the Basiji militia perpetrated many of the worst atrocities of the summer including the murder of Neda Soltan on June 20th, a recorded event which spawned further protest and garnered much local and international support for the movement (Khosrokhavar 2012b). Though it was largely peaceful, even the Velvet Revolution
experienced some police violence: as protesters marched down Narodni Trida on 17 November, they were met by riot police who violently prevented their entrance into Wenceslas square. This afternoon of violence initiated a wave of popular support for the nascent movement, and is an example of a violent response to mobilization from an otherwise hesitant Communist regime (Wheaton and Kavan 1992). State-sanctioned violence deployed against protesters is a sign of a developing revolutionary situation, and can often signal the transformation of a movement from one focused on reform to one aimed at the transformation of the state.

C. The Mobilization of Political Memory

Movement mobilization within urban space evokes political memory. Street protests and mass rallies on central plazas become tangled up in the memory of past urban events. Since their creation by Baron Haussmann in the middle of the 19th century, Parisian boulevards have been the site of revolutionary and political action, from the Commune of 1871 to Nazi occupation during World War II. Student protest in the Latin Quarter and on the nearby boulevards consciously activated those memories in the urban population (Ross 1988; 2011). Vali Asr Avenue and Enghelab Avenue in Tehran were the location of vociferous protest during the 1979 Iranian Revolution and again in 2009, and Enghelab (Revolution) itself was named after those events; likewise Azadi (Freedom) Square was a site of mass demonstrations in 1979 and actively chosen again in 2009 (Abrahamian 2010). Wenceslas and Old Town Squares in central Prague saw protest action during the Warsaw Pact invasion in 1968; Wenceslas Square has historically been the site of mass demonstration in Prague since its creation during the 19th century, while
Old Town Square, with its iconic statue of the Catholic religious reformer Jan Huss, has long been connected with traditions of Christian resistance (Bartos 1986; Kukral 1997). These sites were the natural choice for urban protests in 1989 because of their remembered pasts as sites of resistance. Protesters plan actions on certain streets and in specific plazas not only because of their central location and ability to hold large numbers of participants, but also because these spaces have always been chosen as locations for urban protest, and thus allow the movement to connect with past memories even as they are connecting with a contemporary urban population.

Mobilization processes actively target urban locations with embedded political memory in order to present contemporary demands for liberation in terms of easily identifiable past struggles. Yet such active courting of memory cannot completely account for the deeper remembered connections between contemporary movements and past ones. The political demands of the 2009 Green Movement for representative government and fair, constitutional elections was directly linked with the failures of the Islamic Republic to live up to the values and spirit of the 1979 'Islamic' Revolution. While not explicitly a revolutionary movement in its aims, the Green Movement sought to reactive the liberal revolutionary heritage that was a large part of the 1979 Revolution, and reintegrate it back into the current Islamic Republic (Bayat 2010). Barricades constructed on the streets of Paris during the student protests of 1968 harken back to the most famous barricades in French history, those of the Paris Commune of 1871. The Paris Commune was an attempt at radical self-government on the part of Parisian citizens, and the barricades at the heart of Paris in 1968 evoked this tradition of urban democracy (Ross 1988; Harvey 1999). For some, the Prague's Velvet Revolution had the potential of returning to the
interrupted socialist reforms known commonly as Prague Spring of 1968 (Shepard 2000). For others, like the dissident leader and future Czech president Valclav Havel, the Velvet Revolution's non-socialist character demonstrated the demise of a reform-socialist tradition whose destruction was begun by the Communists themselves during the Warsaw Pact invasion in August of 1968. Even if the 1989 movement did not claim the memory of Prague Spring, the Velvet Revolution was directly shaped by its memory (Přibáň 2002; Blažek 2009). Contemporary movements cannot help but be shaped by the memories of the past; some protesters actively use memory strategically, while others movements find themselves defined in terms of past struggles, and some like the 2009 movement in Tehran are direct continuations of those past struggles.

In all three urban movements, Paris 1968, Prague 1989, and Tehran 2009, memories and acts of martyrdom directly influenced the course of mobilization. The protest march on November 17th that led to mass demonstrations on the streets of Prague was held in memory of Jan Opletal, a student activist killed when protesting the Nazi occupation of the city during World War II. A student named Martin Smid was said to have been killed during the clash with police in 1989; the symbolic value of a student being killed on International Students Day, during a march in memory of another student martyr dramatically increased levels of mobilization in Prague63 (Kukral 1997; Heimann 2009). From the time of the Imam Ali in the 7th century, martyrdom has been a potent theme for Shi'a Islam, the dominant religious sect in modern Iran (Mottahedeh 2000). Neda Soltan was almost immediately declared a martyr for the 2009 Green

63 It was later discovered that Smid was in-fact alive and well, but this did not limit the symbolic potential of his 'martyrdom' to the mobilization of protest.
Movement after her murder of on 20 June, an incredibly significant act (Khosrokhavar 2012b). Not only was Neda a martyr for a movement opposed to the Islamic Republic's current government, but she was a female martyr, a fact that captures the important role of women, and women's mass participation in the mobilization of the Green Movement. While not the martyrdom of an individual person, student protesters in 1968 referenced the 'massacre' of nine communist and union protesters at the Charonne train station during the 1954-62 Algerian War. Political tracts, and posters created by the Atelier Populaire print collective, demonstrate that for Parisian protesters during 1968, Charrone was a vividly remembered and violent example of President De Gaulle's abuse of power (Atelier Populaire 1968; Wlassikoff 2008; Kugleburg and Vermes 2011). In Benjamin's terms, evoking the memory of martyrdom is a way for movements to redeem the debt of past generations. For urban movements, martyrdom and self-sacrifice can and often do provide a powerful political memory around which movements coalesce and gain mass appeal.

Movements actively connect with political memories, but police repression and state violence often have their own way of associating a nascent movement with past memories in the minds of an urban population. The use of tear-gas in the streets in 1968 was a vivid reminder for those Parisians who had lived through demonstrations against the Algerian War, and it is through the smell of tear-gas that the May '68 movement became bonded with the Algeria anti-colonial struggle in Parisian experience (Schnapp and Naquet 1969; Gallant 1986). Active use of the slogan 'Death to the Dictator' arose only after the brutal crackdown on the streets of Tehran in June of 2009. In 1978, this slogan was used by the movement to refer to Mohammed Reza, the
last Shah of Iran; in 2009 it referred to Ayatollah Khameini, the current Supreme Leader of Iran (Dabashi 2011). Violent abuses of state power associated one past dictator with a current one in the minds of large numbers of urban protesters; state violence deployed by one regime is much like state violence deployed by another. As these cases demonstrate, the urban population which is a witness to, or target of, such violence begins to frame its own struggle within the context of past ones, unlocking potent and salient political memories.

The use of political memory in each of these cases suggests some larger conclusions about the positioning of these movements within wider ideological frameworks. At first blush the movements of Paris in 1968, Prague in 1989, and Tehran in 2009 conform to revolutionary Marxist, liberal, and Islamic ideologies respectively. Yet upon closer inspection these movements rupture such easy categorization: The student movement of 1968 was certainly influenced by a tradition of Marxism, but influential situationist writings, the memory of the Commune, and the middle class status of the student protesters demonstrate some of the complex influences on the movement. Students spoke with the language of workers struggles, but were also concerned with the exercise of individual freedom. And as Fraser (2009) notes, this movement strain was so strong that we can make direct connections between the iconography and spirit of '68 and the dynamic force of a resurgent capitalism (particularly in terms of marketing and corporate structure) during the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Prague's Velvet Revolution has been framed as a liberal movement against the bankrupt forces of Communism, yet this movement was more complex than a binary framing permits. Havel's own writings suggest that at least part of the movement leadership was wary of
unfettered capitalism; the future president of independent Czechoslovakia framed the dissident struggle as one of life versus entropy, not liberalism versus Communism. Even if we move past this critique and choose to understand the Velvet Revolution as a liberal movement, the most visible force in post-communist Prague is not liberalism per se, but rather capitalism in the form of urban spectacle, centered in the new commercial district around Wenceslas Square.

The 2009 Green Movement in Tehran could easily be labeled as an Islamic movement, since it occurred within a largely Islamic nation. But this simplistic framing of the movement does not grasp that the struggle in 2009 was not between republicanism and Islam. Nor was it a struggle between the state and Islam, as it was in 1979. Rather 2009 was a struggle between republicanism and state authoritarianism. Both hardline authoritarian and republican factions in the 2009 struggle used Islamic imagery and memory to make collective claims. Islam was not the driving force behind the movement, but along with the state itself, the meaning of Shi’a Islam became a major contested object of the overall struggle. In all three cases, the importance use of political memory transcends the contemporary urban struggle and simplistic ideological formulations. In mobilizing against the state, complex ideological factors merge to reconfigure urban space and create remembered precedents for future urban protest.

D. Tactics of Occupation and Organization

Movements can respond very differently when presented with the spatial challenge of a state resistant to urban mobilization. When students began to mobilize in 1968 at the University of Nanterre, university officials closed the campus in an attempt to prevent radical protest.
Protest at the periphery of Paris moved to the center when Nanterre students relocated to the still open Sorbonne; this concentrated space of student protest was ruptured by the police entering the Sorbonne courtyard on May 3rd, igniting a massive night-long struggle out on the streets of the Latin Quarter (Bourg 2007). Rather than retreating into an institutional space, students initially chose to struggle with the police out on the boulevards. Only after May 3rd were university buildings at the Sorbonne, École des Beaux-Arts, and the Odéon Theater occupied by protesters (Brown 1974). While the police were seen on the streets after 17 November 1989, the Velvet Revolution in Prague saw only one real moment of police violence. Government indecision and lack of support for repressive techniques from Moscow made the use of violence untenable (Sarotte 2009). With free reign over the city, Prague saw mass marches between Old Town and Wenceslas Squares every afternoon in late November and early December while dissidents in the allied space of Prague's theaters organized a transitional government (Ash 2010). In Tehran, the state response to the mobilization of the 2009 Green Movement was brutal and swift. Police and militia used tactics of extreme violence against peaceful, if massive, demonstrations and in short order the movement was forced in off the streets, and lacking allied institutional spaces, it was forced into the private space of homes and on to the internet (Hashemi and Postel 2010).

In all three cases described above, after mobilizing on the streets and in plazas, the movements then 'came in off the streets', though they did so in very different ways. The student movement in Paris occupied the Sorbonne and a number of other nearby buildings in the Latin Quarter. Using these buildings as a base of operation, the movement waged street battles with the police while reaching out to factories and factory workers in the urban periphery. Though in May
of 1968 the factories did strike in sympathy with the urban protesters, they never opened themselves up to integrate the student movement into a larger worker’s struggle. The occupied university and the occupied factory remained allied, but separates spaces (Gretton 1969; Johnson 1972). As soon as the movement broke out onto the streets of Prague in the winter of 1989, actors, playwrights, and technicians opened up the theaters of the city to be used as spaces of movement organization (Saxonberg 2003). Meetings were held in theaters all across Prague, not only in the Magic Lantern Theater made famous in the book by the same name (Garton Ash 1990). Professional dissidents like the playwright and author Vaclav Havel joined the movement and provided leadership and an organizational space beyond the level of street mobilization. Theaters were perfectly positioned to act as the space to generate a transitional government: well respected by the general population despite being out of favor with the Communist regime, professional dissidents had decades of experience thinking, writing, and organizing alternatives to the existing Communist system (Bren 2010).

In 2009, the Green Movement in Tehran was unable to activate an urban secondary space beyond the street to help facilitate revolutionary organization. In 1979, mosques had played a crucial role in organizing a transition from the Shah’s regime to the Islamic Republic. As discontent increased under the Shah’s government, the mosque became the central site where an angry population could come together in opposition to the regime. Mosques were a space where people hungry for news, communication, and action could meet publicly (Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 1994). In the mosque, Islamic activists used “religious rhetoric to translate social discontent into political terms” (Verges 1997, 293). Mosques became the place for
revolutionary communication; the spatial practice of the mosque provided space haven to urban populations seeking information and community in the effort to mobilize against the state (Foucault 2005). But by 2009, most of the religious leadership in Tehran was incorporated into the governing structures of the Islamic Republic, or sympathetic to the regime; mosques were not available to act as a secondary space, nor was the traditional market bazaar due to its close alliance with mosque space. Without a spatial refuge from state violence, the 2009 Green Movement persisted as long as it could out on the streets of Tehran.

The 2009 Green Movement was forced off the streets by the concerted, violent efforts of the Iranian state. Without an allied secondary space in which to organize, the Green Movement left the streets and took to the internet. Calling any urban movement a 'facebook' or 'twitter' revolution debases that movement's long struggle within urban space, but these virtual communities did help facilitate the movement as it was mobilizing, and allowed protesters to continue discussing action and criticizing the state after it was forced off the streets (Fischer 2010). Perhaps more important than limited processes of organization that can take place via the web, the Green Movement was also able to organize what I call a 'vertical geography' of protest. Since horizontal urban spaces, like streets and plazas, were unavailable to the movement because of state violence, protesters took to the rooftops of their homes and apartment buildings to protest the regime's abuses of power. A major rallying cry during the 1979 Iranian Revolution, was *Allahu Akbar* or 'God is Great'. This cry heard from the rooftops of many buildings in Tehran was a religious assault on the secular monarchist regime of the Shah. In 2009, this vertical protest tactic once again played a central role in urban mobilization. Each individual voice
merged with those of other protesters on other rooftops, each shouting *Allahu Akbar*. Urban protesters can take the staircase of their buildings to the roof; away from the prying eyes and batons of the police, their chants become anonymous (Moqadam 2010). The Green Movement protesters of 2009 used this powerful vertical geography of roof-top protest when they could no longer mobilize on the streets.

The vertical geography of protest doesn’t only mean rooftop protest. Cemeteries and the remembrance surrounding the dead and martyred also contain an element of verticality. In Tehran, both are removed from the horizontal plane: rooftops provide protection from the eyes and guns of hostile observers, creating an anonymous space for expression. Likewise, Islamic cultural practices provide protection for funeral mourners, even those who use the cycle of mourning to celebrate the martyrdom of loved ones and as a space to criticize the regime (Foucault 2005; Alavi 2010). Shifting the geography of protest can be a useful tactic for a movement forced off the streets, since it permits the continued existence of the movement past its primary mobilization within urban space. But these tactics are just holding-actions against demobilization; a movement needs secondary, urban spaces, organized networks of people and spaces like factories, universities, churches, shops, theaters, movie houses, or civic or arts organizations, in order to insure the movement over time, and facilitate a revolutionary transition if that is the goal of the movement.

The cases of Paris in 1968 and Prague in 1989 demonstrate alternative urban tactics: occupation and organization. During clashes with police in 1968, student protesters occupied their university campuses and nearby buildings. Much was made of declaring these spaces free
and open spaces for democracy and speech (De Certeau 1997; Ross 2002; Bourg 2007). Yet the record indicates that these occupied spaces were controlled by a patriarchal population that marginalized the participation of women and homosexuals, while totally excluding or shouting down those ideologically at odds with the movement (Duchen 1994; Martel 1999; Sibalis 2009). For an urban population ambivalent about the movement, occupation can be a hostile rather than collaborative act. It is an appropriation of public or institutional space for the needs of a movement. Occupation disregards the everyday usage of urban space, a potentially hostile act if the urban population is not allied to the movement. A movement may see occupation as a solid strategy, one in line with the goals and principles of the movement. Members of a movement may work collaboratively and even harmoniously, yet be at odd with the larger urban population. This form of collaboration does not make the act of occupation any less threatening to an urban population normally used to using that space, nor does it ensure that the occupied space will be used effectively to produce a movement organization. Occupation may make a powerful statement to the state and to the urban community; it may draw in more adherents to the movement, but as in 1968 Paris, occupation also runs the risk of alienating an urban population as well (Kenward 2006).

The 1989 Velvet Revolution movement in Prague demonstrates a different tactic, one of organization within allied secondary space. Theaters became the secondary space of organization during the Velvet revolutionary movement. Accompanying the mass mobilization of Prague in Wenceslas Square, was the concurrent planning taking place in the vast and culturally embedded theater network, one of the densest and long established network of theaters in Europe
(Osłzy 1990). The opening of the theaters brought the revolutionary movement in from the streets, gave it a home and a spatial structure around which to organize and articulate its claims against the regime. Theaters provided spaces of organization and a conceived architecture to house the Civic Forum, the dissident leadership of the 1989 movement (Ash 1990). Just as the theater space provided the conceived space for the organization of the revolutionary movement, its participants also provided the leadership, and its theatrics shaped the spatial practice of the movement itself. In organizing within the theater, the revolutionary movement took on many theatrical qualities (Havel 2005; Osłzy 1990). As many scholars have noted about the relationship between mosques and the Islamic Revolution (Parsa 1989; Keddie 2006), the space of revolutionary organization directly influences the shape of the future regime, since the people who work within the secondary space (whether it be a mosque in 1979 Tehran or a theater in 1989 Prague) tend to go on to leadership positions within the new regime and bring with them their ideological values and political beliefs.

E. Conclusion

My dissertation has focused on the processes at work in urban space during periods of revolutionary mobilization. As they develop, processes of mobilization and organization intersect with processes of political memory to build a revolutionary movement.

The primary space of mobilization is always the streets and plazas of the city: With the breakdown of political authority and the rise of a revolutionary situation, streets and plazas become the communal and public space through which social and political grievances can be
aired. Streets and plazas provide a territory through which mobilization becomes a visible challenge to the state. The fundamental truth of this insight should not be overlooked. Private space cannot provide the necessary spatial resources to make a challenge to the state. Only the openness of urban streets and plazas has this potential. Yet the very potential of the primary space is also its greatest limitation. While protesters may occupy a square, or marchers traverse the many streets of a city, the duration of this occupation of public space is inherently limited. As open and undetermined, streets and plazas make the perfect choice as a site of mobilization, but a movement cannot dominate or determine primary space forever. Movements rise and fall with their ability to occupy primary spaces.

*Secondary space are those that have the potential to organize a formal challenge to the state:* Since movements cannot guarantee the successful occupy primary space for long, secondary spaces are needed through which a movement can establish itself and make collective claims on the state. In order to be successful, a movement must use secondary spaces to 'come in off the street', so to speak. Unlike the primary spaces of streets and plazas, secondary spaces need not be the same across cases, yet all secondary spaces are important economic, cultural, or political networks that are grounded in urban space and integrated into the urban community. Depending on the movement, secondary spaces could be factories, universities, churches, shops, theaters, movie houses, or civic or arts organizations, or any other integrated network unique to that urban milieu. Secondary spaces translate the oftentimes inchoate language of protest into

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64 This spatial problem was one that Occupy Wallstreet and the protesters in Tahrir Square tried to overcome with urban encampments. Mixed results for these movements (limited success in Cairo and forced evacuation in New York) presents an avenue for future research on the success and failure of urban encampments as a form of occupation.
formal challenges to state power. They provide the organizational resources, often in the form of leadership that makes a revolutionary transformation possible. In the language of Hannah Arendt, developing a secondary space gives a revolutionary movement the potential to 'liberate' the state, and found a new one in its place. Of course, many urban movements are not able to organize successfully within a secondary space, and even if a movement is successful in organizing a transition to a new regime, there is no guarantee that the new regime will be more amenable to the establishment of freedom.

Salient political memories provide the temporal binding to urban mobilization: As movements mobilize within urban space, they activate powerful political memories that work to inspire popular participation in the movement. The memory of past injustices, the memory of lost political values, and the commonly understood history of a population provide the language through which rights and demands are articulated. Mobilization begins on the streets, but it speaks through the collective memories of the urban population; streets and plazas are always already saturated with memory, and it is through mobilization that a movement gives voice to its own urban history. Not only does political memory inspire mobilization, but it also develops the necessary connections between primary and secondary spaces. Often strong political memories are associated with strong urban networks; political memories are integrated into urban space, both the primary space of the street and the plaza, and also within secondary spatial networks. Political memory is the temporal substance that unites processes of mobilization, and that gives substance and context for the claims a movement makes on the state.
Post-Script: The City as Hermeneutic Circle

Urban movements transform urban space; they are memory-making and space-making processes. This analysis of the city demonstrated that movements are in many ways a continuation of past movements—they draw on past spaces of protest and past memories of struggle to make a new claim on the right to the city. Likewise, urban struggles create the memories and significant urban spaces that future movements may call upon to (once again) challenge the urban order.

Considered in its entirety, the city provides a vast temporal and spatial spectrum to explore. A wise interpreter will realize that categories like remembered moments, contemporary struggles, and future movements are all located by the position of the interpreter within this vast territorial field. Where the interpreter enters must be a conscious choice because the perspective given by a unique point sheds light on the past, present, and future in ways that illuminate the prejudgment of the analysis. In studying a given movement, the interpreter must seek out its spatial and temporal bases; this unfortunately and unavoidably results in the occlusion of other aspects of the city. The nexus of insight is and must be the privilege of the interpreter since the whole cannot be represented. Yet once an interpreter chooses a position all historical time collapses into the memories that shaped and continue to shape the city, a movement, and the future. Once a question has been engaged the interpreter can move from urban memory to spatial location and back, all the while gaining insight on the city, and all the while creating explanation by identifying the particular parts that make the movement's practice unique or comparable. And
at the project's conclusion, the interpreter can turn to the city once more, with excitement and new wisdom, to begin again the project of understanding.
CITED LITERATURE


Grey Online. “Iranian Revolutionary Posters”


Skocpol, Theda. (1979) *States and Social Revolutions*. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.


APPENDIX

Richard Embray
Four Corners Books

I am writing to request permission to use the following material from your publication, Beauty is in the Streets, in my thesis:

1) Reforme/Chloroforme (p. 172)
2) Cohen Bendit, Nous sommes tous des juifs et des allemandes (p.148)
3) Usines Universite Union (p.32)
4) de Gaulle, Chienlit c'est toi (p.16)
5) de Gaulle, l'etat c'est moi (p.61)
6) l'etat c'est chacun de nous (p.47)
7) CRS officer with matraque held high, later printing with the CRS/SS added (similar to the one on p. 73)

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End date: Aug 1, 2020
 Territory: United States
 Industry: Publishing - Textbooks
 Exclusivity: No Exclusivity
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